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This eighth issue of Energy and Geostrategy (E&G) follows the 
pattern established in the three preceding ones. It opens with 
the publication of an interview with a well-known public fig-
ure from the world of geopolitics or energy; in this particular 
publication, José Borrell, EU’s High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs & Security Policy, explains his view on a wide range 
of current affairs in the energy geostrategy field. Five articles 
are then presented: by David Robinson, The Impact of COVID-
19 on the Energy Transition, a Global Approach; Miguel Ángel 
Lasheras, Geopolitics of the Green Deal: a Challenge for the 
European Union; Thijs van de Graaf Clean Hydrogen: the Cor-
nerstone of a New Geopolitical Scenario; Ricardo Prego, Rare 
Earths, a Key Piece in the Energy Puzzle, and Ignacio Fuente 
Cobo, Energy Geopolitics in the Maghreb, the cases of Algeria 
and Libya. Although the matters treated in each article are very 
different, the fact that energy transition is the central theme 
in each one, makes it possible to include common spaces for 
a reflection on the authors’ work, as well as on the content of 
the interview with J. Borrell, thus providing a diversity of per-




As is the case every year, when trying to pinpoint the changes 
that have affected the energy geopolitical scenario since the pre-
vious issue, there is no doubt that the COVID-19 pandemic and 
its impact on energy transition (a matter closely examined in the 
work by D. Robinson) plays a prominent role. The pandemic, just 
like the «Great Recession» brought about by the financial crisis 
that began in 2008, as mentioned with regard to the latter in E&G 
2016, forms part of the statistically «rare» historical events (one 
would have to go back to 1918 to find a global precedent like the 
so-called «Spanish Flu», or back to 1929 to find another «Great 
Depression»). The main characteristic of statistically «rare» 
events (not frequent) is their relative unpredictability1, and so, if 
they are particularly severe and catastrophic, Governments and 
International Institutions alike are poorly prepared to cope with 
them, which accounts for the mistakes that may have been made 
in responding to both the economic and the health crisis. How-
ever, in much the same way as the «Great Recession» brought 
about notable changes in the economic policy (for example, the 
widespread use of quantitative easing by the Central Banks as a 
monetary policy instrument), the recession, when faced with the 
supply shock caused by COVID-19, led to a radical redirecting 
of the taxation policy, a speeding up of innovations in health-
care technologies (rapid development of vaccines) and, at least 
in regional areas such as the European Union, a much closer 
cooperation between the Member Countries, leading to approval 
being given to a huge stimulation package amounting to €1.8 bil-
lion (adding up the EU’s long term budget and the €750 thousand 
million for the Next Generation EU program, which aims to repair 
the immediate economic and social damage caused by the pan-
demic). Yet in his interview, J. Borrell considers that except for 
the European case, the health crisis has brought about a reduc-
tion in world cooperation (e.g. in supplying vaccines and masks).
It is clear that COVID-19 has had a disruptive effect on historic 
continuity and that it has caused major changes in the popula-
tion’s behaviour (modifying mobility patterns, increasing working 
from home, isolation, a trend towards staying away from urban 
centres, etc.), and that all of these have affected energy consump-
1 C.A. Sims (2012), «Statistical Modeling of Monetary Policy and Its Effects», Amer-
ican Economic Review, indicates the limitations of the DSGE models when it comes to 
predicting events such as the Great Recession, not only for statistical reasons inherent 




tion. This begs the question of whether these modifications to the 
collective psychology will be structural, or if once the health crisis 
has been overcome, it will be back to «business as usual» i.e., 
just as it was before the pandemic. J. Borrell states that he does 
not believe there will be a return to the «old normal» and thinks 
that «we are at a global turning point, in the broadest sense of 
the term global». D. Robinson, in his article in this publication, 
points out that «COVID-19 has improved the prospects for energy 
transition and given greater insight into understanding how to 
bring it about». If we take into account only the energy sector, 
it seems logical to consider as reversible, the downward trend in 
energy consumption and CO2 emissions associated directly with 
the decline in economic activity. What are not so clear, are the 
effects on the energy consumption structure and on the display 
of energy technologies to attend the aforementioned population 
behavioural changes. Firstly, because in many cases, the modifi-
cations to the population’s behaviour have had opposing effects. 
For example, the impact on oil consumption from the fall in the 
air transport demand has had the opposite effect to the impact 
from rejecting public transport. Secondly, because, although it 
would appear reasonable to expect some behavioural traits to 
remain where these affect mobility and the energy consumption 
structure, (for example, working from home), any future conduct 
changes affecting light transport for passengers will probably be 
determined more by the restrictions and taxation associated with 
energy policy, and by the effects of a trend towards greater rural-
ity, and these changes are difficult to predict.
Whatever the case may be, accepting that a traumatic global 
event like COVID-19 will inevitably leave its mark, and this also 
applies to the energy sector, the global energy transition process, 
conditioned by such factors as the rivalry and cooperation net-
work existing between States, the technological innovation, the 
national and international regulation of the energy markets, etc., 
will follow its own dynamics. The uncertainties surrounding the 
way the energy sector will evolve worldwide and the assessment 
of the «geopolitical risk» and of the growingly important «climate 
risk», are basically linked to the same set of variables to which 
attention was being paid before the pandemic. Nevertheless, this 
does not mean to say that the way these variables interrelate 
will not vary. Quite the opposite, the international energy envi-
ronment is constantly changing, but it is subjected to forces that 
for the most part have nothing to do with the effects of the pan-
demic. That is why the orientation of any reflections about energy 
Claudio Aranzadi
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geostrategy in this publication could be deemed to keep continu-
ity with what has been explained in the preceding issues.
If energy strategies are approached in the same way they have 
been in previous publications, i.e., as an optimisation programme 
(with a view to minimising the cost of supply, with restrictions 
owing to sustainability and security), it seems unnecessary to 
substantially alter this conceptual framework. In fact, the restric-
tion associated with the imperative global decarbonisation from 
application of the climate policy (as it is defined in the 2015 Paris 
Agreement) will still be what basically determines the medium- 
and long-term energy policies and will still be an essential ingre-
dient in the cooperation processes between States. However, 
the nature of these restrictions may be modified, not only by 
the changes in geopolitical balances, but also, and above all, by 
technological innovations. The rapid progress being made with 
the learning curve for wind and photovoltaic power generation 
technologies over the last decades is a clear example. Despite 
their incorporation into the power generation mix amounted to 
an extra cost, in a considerable number of countries and par-
ticularly in Europe (See the article by M.A. Lasheras), restric-
tions were imposed in the form of a minimum requirement for 
using renewable energies, justified on imperative sustainability 
and security requirements. These restrictions were «limitative» 
(the associated «shadow price», i.e., the marginal cost of tight-
ening the restriction was positive). Once those technologies have 
become competitive in terms of cost, as is now the case, the 
restrictions no longer constitute a «limitation» to minimising the 
supply cost (the «shadow prices» would be zero) and, so, ini-
tially, government intervention would not be necessary for them 
to enter the mix (although, as we shall see below, the question 
is more complex).
Along the same lines, the energy geostrategy landscape could be 
significantly modified by changes in strategic direction, not only 
in the energy area but also in global foreign policy, made by polit-
ical stakeholders who are essential to the international balance of 
power, such as the United States. Previous issues of this publica-
tion followed D. Trump’s drift in foreign policy matters, from his 
penchant for protectionism and his mistrust of multilateralism to 
specific initiatives more directly associated with the energy sector, 
like his systematic break with B. Obama’s initiatives in the inter-
national field (withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, withdrawal 
from the nuclear agreement with Iran) and on the domestic front 
Introduction
15
(imposing a clearly lax attitude to environmental policies). As 
J. Borrell points out, not only the statements made by the new 
President J. Biden, but also his appointments (J. Kerry as special 
envoy for climate policy) and his first initiatives (cancelling the 
construction permit for the oil pipeline connecting the US to Can-
ada, Keystone XL, etc.) all amount to a radical U-turn from D. 
Trump’s political stand in the area of climate policy. The impacts 
of the Biden Administration’s new direction in climate policy are 
twofold. Firstly, it enables the world’s second biggest emitter (the 
first one is China) to return to a roadmap that is consistent with 
the Paris Agreement, thereby making a considerable contribu-
tion towards achieving the global emissions reduction target. 
Secondly, with proactive diplomacy where climate is concerned, 
it will strengthen what had been an isolated moral leadership 
of the European Union (with only 10% of the global emissions, 
the United Kingdom included) and will encourage co-responsibil-
ity from China (which has already committed itself to an emis-
sions ceiling by 2030 and climate neutrality by 2060). In fact, as 
D. Robinson indicates in his article, with the USA re-joining the 
Paris Agreement and China’s commitment, plus the declaration of 
more than one hundred countries that they are willing to take on 
the challenge of achieving climate neutrality by 2050, the process 
of decarbonisation by midway through the century seems to be 
on the right track, as this commitment has now been made by 
countries representing over 65% of the global emissions.
Even so, by clearly opting for a decarbonisation strategy for the US 
(i.e., progressively ceasing to use fossil fuels and replacing them 
with clean energies), Biden is facing a difficult dilemma, between 
climate policy and national security policy. «Energy dominance» 
as a major component of the US’s national security strategy is 
largely based on the privileged position the country has attained 
in developing unconventional natural gas and oil, enabling the 
country to become the world leader in oil and gas production2. 
It could be argued that this definition of national security and 
«energy dominance» fits rather with President Trump’s outlook, 
but it must be admitted that, in the uncertain but probably not 
in a too short period during which oil will continue to account 
for a significant proportion of the global energy mix, the US’s 
energy independence and its strategic position on the energy 
markets are strengthened by the fact that it leads the supply of 
oil and natural gas. This will undoubtedly affect the rate at which 
2 «National Security Strategy of the United States of America». (December 2017).
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domestic climate policy unfolds but, above all, it should lead to an 
energy policy and national security policy aimed at guaranteeing 
an «energy dominance» in decarbonised technologies (nuclear 
and renewables) where China, its main strategic rival, is pro-
gressing very fast. Furthermore, mention must be made of the 
strategic value of tight oil in the USA as a regulating mechanism 
for the global oil market that, unlike Saudi Arabia (with a central-
ised and politically dependent offer), can guarantee a response 
to the price fluctuations through a decentralised offer, without 
government impositions, and with such a rapid reaction to the 
market signals as is required by its shorter investment cycles and 
the decline rates, sharper than in the offer of conventional oil 
(E&G 2018, 2019, 2020).
The American diplomatic about-turn could also affect other world 
scenarios where geopolitical and energy factors are closely linked, 
such as Russia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Iran, Libya and Vene-
zuela. Borrell mentions this in his interview. The potential resump-
tion of the nuclear agreement with Iran, where Borrell himself 
also has a major role to play as a coordinator, is, undoubtedly the 
most ambitious challenge, given its repercussions not only on the 
oil market and nuclear proliferation, but also on the geopolitical 
balances in the Middle East. Borrell is aware of the difficulties 
involved in reconducting the agreement, but despite this he is 
moderately optimistic. As he states in the interview: «The Iranian 
Minister has assured me that they are prepared to comply with 
their obligations again on the nuclear question if the others com-
ply with their part of the bargain regarding the economic ques-
tions. It should be possible for the USA to return to an agreement 
that has prevented Iran from becoming a nuclear power. But I 
foresee there may be difficulties in doing so». It is still too early 
to predict exactly what the about-turn in American diplomacy will 
be in the other scenarios mentioned, but it would appear to be 
clear that a new space is being created for developing the Euro-
pean «strategic autonomy» through more assertive geopolitical 
action from the EU (to which Borrell also makes reference in the 
interview); preserving, however, the spirit of cooperation within 
the transatlantic relationship. It is possible, for example, that 
new opportunities for collaboration between Europe and the US 
develop, conducive to a political transition in Venezuela that will 
make it possible to re-establish political and economic stability 
in the country, including a return to normal for its oil sector. Yet 
it will be more difficult for the EU to define an energy diplomacy 
with Russia that is perfectly in line with the US’s (the case of the 
Introduction
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North Stream 2 gas pipeline, mentioned by Borrell, is one exam-
ple), although a greater diversification of the natural gas sup-
ply to Europe, in order to correct the excessive dependence on 
Russian gas, ought to be a strategic priority for the EU. This will 
mean increasing LNG imports and probably, as I. Fuente Cobo 
points out, attaching greater importance to the Southern Corri-
dor of gas pipelines coming from Algeria; Spain could play a more 
prominent role in this strategy, not only because of the country’s 
gas pipelines connecting it with North Africa, but also due to its 
gasification and storage infrastructure that, with a suitable inter-
connection network linking it to the rest of Europe, would help to 
enhance European supply diversification. Whatever the case may 
be, the biggest stumbling block to applying «strategic autonomy» 
in Europe, an aspect that is also dealt with by M.A. Lasheras in 
his article in this publication, will be the difficulties faced when 
it comes to getting all the EU Member States to adopt a unani-
mous position; a clear example of this, explained in detail by I. 
Fuente Cobo in his contribution to this publication, and which is 
also mentioned by Borrell, is the difference in criteria between 
European countries regarding the Libyan conflict.
As has already been pointed out, the United States’ strategic shift 
on climate policy since Biden came into office will make it easier to 
forge a joint leadership policy between the US, China and Europe 
to establish a roadmap for the global decarbonisation policy that 
is consistent with the Paris Agreement goals and the conclusions 
of the IPCC (2018)3. The correction to the «national commit-
ments» (which in their current form would lead to temperature 
rises close to 3oC by the end of the century) which was left over 
for the COP 26, is going to require complicated geopolitical arbi-
tration and, so, a coordinated diplomatic leadership despite the 
will expressed by a considerable number of countries to achieve 
climate neutrality by 2050; the question of Article 6 of the Rule-
book will also have to tackled in COP 26, given that no agreement 
was reached on this point at the COP25 in Madrid and that it is of 
paramount importance to coordinating the mechanisms for mit-
igating climate change that have been put into practice by the 
different countries and regional areas (E&G 2020). Splitting the 
effort into different geographical areas is further complicated by 
the fact that the damage caused by climate change is not evenly 
distributed and it also depends on the efficiency of the mitigation 




policies. Although given the global negative externality character 
of climate warming, a global «social cost» caused by that warm-
ing can be defined (the updated global damage of a marginal 
increase in emissions), it is clear that this «social cost» varies 
from one geographical area to another, and the same also applies 
to the «marginal cost» of the mitigation policies developed in 
each area.
But even though diplomatic deployment and the progressive 
development of liaising and global governance mechanisms are 
vital for the success of a global cooperation project like the Paris 
Agreement, there is a core axis that conditions the entire energy 
transition process, namely technology. Technological evolution 
not only determines the cost of each scenario proposed under 
the decarbonisation policy, but it also becomes its feasibility 
condition. As a result, any uncertainty regarding the way the 
learning curves develop for each technology, is thus a central 
factor in explaining the uncertainty surrounding the different 
roadmaps devised for the climate policy. Of course, the extent 
to which investment is made in science and technology, scale 
economies and learning-by-doing can all sharpen the learning 
curve gradient (that is what has happened, for example, with 
the sharp drop in the cost of generating electricity thanks to 
wind energy and, above all, photovoltaic energy in the past 
few decades). Even so, technological evolution also has its own 
internal dynamics, which is not always easy to predict: one only 
has to think, for example, of the constant postponing of the date 
for the successful outcome foreseen for nuclear fusion power, 
or what some have defined as a change of sign for the slope 
on the learning curve with the Third Generation nuclear fission 
reactors (although, as we shall see below, in this case the char-
acterisation is more complex). With the global energy transition 
currently in progress, the rate at which new technologies are 
incorporated is so great that in the long term, it is going to turn 
an energy system where the core factor revolved around the 
availability of primary resources, into one where control over 
the technologies will be the main determinant where achieve-
ment in matters involving cost, supply security and sustaina-
bility is concerned. This logically means that, in the long term, 
in the energy area, the geopolitical relations of power between 
the main stakeholders in the sector, where control over primary 
resources will be the main asset, will move towards new inter-




The annual assessment carried out by the IEA (2020)4 regarding 
the evolution of the technologies whose incorporation into the 
energy system is deemed necessary to achieve the transition to 
climate neutrality by about halfway through the century, consid-
ers that most of these technologies are not yet mature, whether 
this is in terms of cost or availability (IEA 2020)5. This creates a 
scenario of uncertainty that affects the cost of energy transition 
and even the feasibility of some of the roadmaps devised, what 
consequentially has a bearing on the «climate risk» associated 
with the energy activities. As is natural, technological uncer-
tainty will be accentuated at the final phases of energy transition 
towards climate neutrality, since at the initial phases technologies 
that are mature or approaching maturity can be already counted 
on.
In this sense, the direction taken by the EU’s energy policy (that 
M.A. Lasheras examines in detail in his article in this publication) 
is enlightening. In the framework established for the Union by 
2030 – before the Green Deal – (which laid the foundations for 
preparing the comprehensive energy and climate plans, including 
the Spanish National Energy & Climate Plan (NECP)) and that 
considered the goal of reducing emissions by 40% (compared 
to the 1990 figure), there were no extraordinary technological 
requirements. The main courses of action for attaining that goal 
involve making progress with the decarbonisation of the power 
sector (boosted by a reduction in the cost of renewable electricity 
generation technologies), electrifying light passenger transpor-
tation (the prices of electric vehicles are expected to fall during 
this decade until they are on a par with the prices of internal 
combustion vehicles, while governments are expected to devise 
ways of encouraging the creation of a battery-recharging net-
work of sufficient capacity), and in renovating buildings that at 
that phase did not require sophisticated technologies. Therefore, 
the goals for 2030 seemed to be attainable without too many 
difficulties. In fact, the European Commission6, in 2018, forecast 
that with the policies approved, it would be possible to attain a 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction of 45% by 2030 (and 60% 
by 2050). However, at the same time, the Commission submitted 
a series of very demanding scenarios for achieving a 90% emis-
4 International Energy Agency (2020 a). «Tracking Clean Energy Progress».
5 International Energy Agency (2020 b). «Tracking Clean Energy Innovation».
6 COM (2018). «A clean planet for all. A European strategic long-term vision for a 
prosperous, modern, competitive and climate neutral economy».
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sions reduction by 2050 plus the negative emissions needed to 
reach climate neutrality by that date, all of which would require 
the use of technologies which in most cases are not yet mature.
According to the European Commission7, the addition of a new 
and more demanding goal for reducing emissions by 2030 (55%) 
under the Green Deal approved in 2020, and the application 
of supplementary measures during this decade, would make it 
possible to alleviate the transition in the period 2030 - 2050 to 
achieve climate neutrality. The investments required in the indus-
try, services, transport and energy sectors would be considera-
ble, but it would be possible to be able to count on at least 30% 
of the potential pluriannual budget together with Next Generation 
EU. In some aspects, such as in the power sector decarbonisation 
policy, the goals do not seem to be very demanding, because the 
prediction made by the Commission regarding the inroads made 
by renewable energies into power generation by 2030 is 65% 
(whereas the Spanish NECP predicted 74% in the framework 
previous to the Green Deal). Nevertheless, it is true to say that 
progress is expected to be made during this decade in the area 
of decarbonising heavy road transport, sea and air transport, 
and also in decarbonising industries. that had originally been left 
for the last two decades in the process of transition towards cli-
mate neutrality and that will require a large-scale incorporation 
of technologies that are not yet mature.
The weight of technological innovation on the global transition 
towards achieving climate neutrality by 2050, is clearly demon-
strated in the analysis made in the IEA´s WEO for 20208, which 
for the very first time, examines systematically a scenario that is 
compatible with the target of net zero emissions by 2050. Until 
this latest issue of the WEO, the Agency had always included as 
its most stringent scenario from an environmental perspective, 
the so-called Sustainable Development scenario, which was in 
line with the Paris Agreement (limiting the growth of the world’s 
temperature to well below 2oC), not achieving though climate 
neutrality in 2050, but in 2070 instead, leading to a global tem-
perature increase of 1.65oC (with a 50% probability); according 
to the Agency, with a sufficiently intensive deployment of tech-
nologies that will facilitate negative emissions as from 2070, it 
7 COM (2020). 562 final. «Intensify European climate ambition for 2030. Invest in a 
neutral climate future for the benefit of our citizens».
8 International Energy Agency (2020). «World Economic Outlook 2020».
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would be possible by 2100, to reach the temperature increase 
limit of 1.5ºC (with a 50% probability).
Even in this scenario, less ambitious than the one that would 
achieve climate neutrality by 2050, the required energy transfor-
mation is considerable. In the WEO 2020 issued by the IEA, it is 
pointed out that in that scenario, by 2040 the demand for oil would 
fall to 66.2 M/bd (in 2019, before the pandemic was declared, the 
oil demand reached 97.9 M/bd) and all the coal plants would be 
either closed, reconverted or utilised as flexibility instruments for 
the electrical sector, operating for only a limited number of hours 
(WEO 2019). The required adjustment would logically be greater 
if the target were to have climate neutrality by 2050. Yet the 
WEO 2020 does not offer a quantified framework for the global 
energy variables in 2050, for the climate neutrality scenario on 
that date (it does so for their value in 2030 for this roadmap). 
The WEO 2020 however does provide insight into the technolog-
ical challenges for that goal, and this view is very similar to what 
is shown in the European Commission’s documents, or to what 
is shown in the documents prepared by the Member States that 
have drawn up long-term programmes (by 2050) as is the case 
with Spain in its «Long-Term Decarbonisation Strategy 2050» 
(which sets a 90% emissions reduction target, in line with the 
European target, a 97% share in the energy system for renewa-
bles, an electrification of the economy amounting to around 50% 
and 100% renewable energies used in power generation). In the 
first place, the technological challenges affect to the electrical 
sector, a key factor in the decarbonisation process, which still has 
to make progress in digitalisation and storage technologies if it is 
to be able to efficiently incorporate a massive variable renewable 
generation (with the uncertainty that affects the future of nuclear 
energy in the power generation mix), and to the electric vehicles 
with batteries that must complete the evolution of their learning 
curve. Secondly, and it is here where the biggest challenges have 
to be overcome, it is necessary to tackle the processes involved 
in decarbonising such activities as heavy road transport, sea and 
air transport and industrial sectors presenting considerable bar-
riers to electrification. Two technologies will be playing a basic 
role in facing up to these challenges: the utilisation of hydrogen 
and the capture, use and storage of carbon. Green or low-car-
bon hydrogen will make a decisive contribution to the process of 
decarbonising, as a fuel, as component of other low-carbon fuels, 
as an industrial raw material, a storage vector and as alterna-
tive to electric vehicles with batteries (vehicles with «fuel cells»). 
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CO2 capture, apart from being a necessary supplement for some 
technologies producing low-carbon hydrogen or hydrogen deriv-
atives, also has great decarbonisation potential in power genera-
tion and in industrial processes, and, as can be seen in the IEA’s 
climate neutrality scenario for 2070, it would be essential when 
applying technologies for extracting CO2 from the atmosphere 
(negative emissions) necessary for reaching the limit of 1.5oC by 
the end of the century.
Yet the evolution of the learning curve for these two key tech-
nologies at the most advanced phases of the decarbonisation 
policy is uncertain. Although there is tendency to extrapolate the 
success obtained with the learning curves for wind and photo-
voltaic generation technologies to these technologies, the tech-
nological risks are high, at least as regards the time schedule 
for incorporating them into the energy system as competitive 
alternatives. In fact, according to the data shown by Th. van de 
Graaf (who provides an extensive overview of hydrogen tech-
nology in his article in this publication), the estimates concern-
ing the commercial potential for hydrogen by 2050 vary greatly 
from one institution to another (ranging from 1% to 18% of the 
final energy consumption). At present, hydrogen (or its deriv-
atives, ammonia or methanol) are used in the oil sector, the 
fertiliser industry and other chemical industries, but generally 
in the form of «grey» hydrogen (obtained from reformed meth-
ane or, in the case of China, from gasified carbon and without 
CO2 capture). «Blue» hydrogen (reformed methane with CO2 
capture) is logically more expensive to obtain than the variety 
where CO2 is not captured, and this increase becomes consider-
ably greater in the process for obtaining the «green» hydrogen 
variety (obtained by electrolysis of the water with decarbonised 
electrical generation): according to NEA/IEA (2020)9, the «lev-
elised cost»10 of producing «blue» hydrogen ranges from $1.2-
2.0/kg.H2 compared to $0.7-1.6/Kg.H2 for the variety without 
CO2 capture; how expensive it is to produce «green» hydrogen 
obviously depends on the cost of the electricity used; NEA/IEA 
offers a wide range of costs for green hydrogen, ranging from 
approximately $3 to 8 / Kg.H2, and it indicates that in locations 
9 Nuclear Energy Agency/International Energy Agency 2020. «Projected costs of gen-
erating electricity» (2020 edition).
10 The «levelised cost» of production with a particular asset as defined by NEA/IEA is 
the constant average price in real terms of the goods produced that makes the total 
updated cost equal to the updated income throughout the useful life of the asset. 
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where renewable electrical generation could take place, this cost 
could be below $2 /KgH2.
In the future, hydrogen production will logically concentrate on 
the «blue» and «green» variety. Countries like Algeria or Saudi 
Arabia will tend to favour blue hydrogen; countries like Morocco or 
Chile, which are well-provided with renewable resources and do 
not have fossil fuels, will tend to produce green hydrogen; coun-
tries without any cost advantages in either area, such as German 
or Japan are already emerging as hydrogen importers. As Th. van 
de Graaf states in his article, the competitive edges in develop-
ing green hydrogen lie in the availability of renewable resources, 
fresh water and infrastructures, which under the hypothesis of 
hydrogen expansion would lead to a new global energy network 
of production, consumption and commercialisation. As Th. van de 
Graaf indicates, although some have described this scenario as a 
copy of the current oil scenario, it has more in common with the 
natural gas scenario (in fact, the hydrogen flows, when mixed 
with methane, could use the existing gas pipeline networks and, 
in the future, with reconversion investments, a purer hydrogen 
would be able to flow through them too).
Carbon capture, utilisation and storage is another of the key 
technologies in the decarbonisation process, but one where con-
siderable progress in its learning curve still has to be made. The 
IEA11 accepts this delay in its development (there were originally 
about thirty projects planned on a commercial scale in the world), 
it provides, however, an account of the future potential of this 
technology in a variety of fields: as has already been mentioned, 
CO2 capture is a prerequisite to obtaining «blue» hydrogen (from 
reformed methane), whose low-carbon content makes it a poten-
tial technological alternative to «green» hydrogen (obtained by 
electrolysis of the water with clean electricity); it could also be 
a technological option when it comes to reducing emissions in 
industrial sectors where decarbonisation is difficult to achieve, 
such as the steel industry or cement production; it is also a tech-
nological ingredient that is necessary in the production of car-
bon-neutral synthetic fuels from bioenergy or from the extraction 
of CO2 (thus opening its possible use to replace fuels in trans-
port segments that are difficult to electrify, such as aviation); it 
would play a basic role, with the extraction of the CO2 emitted, 
11 International Energy Agency 2020. «Energy Technology Perspectives 2020, Special 
Report on Carbon Capture Utilisation and Storage».
Claudio Aranzadi
24
in enhancing a negative emissions programme, something that 
as we have seen, (for example in the Sustainable Development 
scenario of the IEA’s WEO 2020 ) could be crucial in the second 
half of the century. This technology, applied to power generation, 
would make it possible to produce low-carbon content electricity 
from natural gas or coal. However, as indicated by NEA/IEA9, 
the extra cost imposed upon power generation is considerable: 
it means that only the power generation with CO2 capture would 
be competitive, in relation to the technological variant without 
emissions correction with CO2 emission prices at $50/Tn of CO2 
if electricity were to be generated with natural gas and $100/Tn 
if generating with coal. Yet as NEA/IEA indicates, if these CO2 
prices were to be reached (through taxation or as a result of 
the «cap-and-trade» mechanism), this would only serve to make 
power generation with renewables and even nuclear generation 
more competitive.
As has already been pointed out, decarbonisation of the elec-
tricity sector will be until 2050 the main driving force behind the 
climate policy. In Europe, the target for this date is to obtain an 
almost totally decarbonised generation mix, with the presence of 
nuclear energy in some countries, but invariably with a predom-
inance of renewable energies, (Spain’s goal with its «Long-Term 
Decarbonisation Strategy 2050», is to reach 100% renewables in 
the power generation mix). Even though the sharp reduction in 
the cost of wind and photovoltaic electrical generation has greatly 
helped to achieve complete decarbonisation in the sector, there 
are still technological uncertainties and challenges, as well as 
regulatory uncertainties caused no doubt by the extreme tech-
nological changes that have already been and will continue to be 
recorded. The electricity supply is usually broken down into four 
types of service: energy, soundness (output availability), flexi-
bility and grids; all of these will undergo major transformations 
throughout the energy transformation process.
Uncertainties even appear regarding the decarbonised power 
generation mix that will be imposed on the mid-century horizon. 
Power generation with natural gas or coal seems to have been 
ruled out in the long-term owing to the excessive cost involved in 
including CO2 capture, as has already been stated. Even so, thirty 
years from now it is difficult to imagine how the learning curve 
will evolve for this technology, given that it is at the early stages 
of commercial operation. Even greater uncertainty surrounds the 
weight that nuclear energy will have in the electricity generation, 
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given the existence in this case of cost, safety/security, public 
opinion and geopolitical determinants. The potential future for 
nuclear energy in the decarbonised electricity generation mix is 
analysed both in IEA12 and in MIT13 publications.
NEA/IEA (2020)9 considers that the option of extending the work-
ing life of Second Generation nuclear power plants so that they 
continue to operate 10 or 20 years beyond their design life is cur-
rently the option with the lowest cost for generating electricity. 
NEA/IEA’s estimate for the levelised cost10 of this option (which 
can be regarded as a metric of the total average cost), under 
the hypothesis of a 7% discount rate and a load factor of 85%, 
ranges from $31.2/Mwh to $41.1$/ Mwh, which places it below 
the NEA/IEA’s estimates for the levelised cost even of renewa-
ble wind or photovoltaic generation. Furthermore, the location 
of both wind and photovoltaic electricity generation facilities is a 
crucial factor when it comes to cost, so the latter tends to vary a 
great deal. For example, in Spain, the average costs judging by 
the bids made in the most recent renewable generation auction, 
were clearly lower than the levelised cost figures for electricity 
generated at the nuclear power plants with an increased working 
life offered by NEA/IEA.
The situation is completely different for the new Third Genera-
tion plants. The first plants were affected by considerable delays 
in their construction periods, as well as major deviations from 
the original budgets, all of which have a negative effect on the 
cost of generation; for example, the generation cost accepted 
(i.e. the «strike price» in its Contract by Differentials) for Hin-
kley Point C, in the United Kingdom is 92.5 £/MWh for 35 years 
(which could be reduced to 89.5 £/MWh if certain conditions are 
fulfilled). As the NEA/IEA indicates, it is true to say that these 
«first-of-a-kind» reactors featuring a new technology always have 
extra costs and that the experience gained from learning dur-
ing their construction projects leads to a significant reduction in 
the cost of the subsequent reactors. The «levelised cost» figures 
for generation, once this first phase has been overcome, which 
is quoted by NEA/IEA (under the hypothesis of a 7% discount 
and a load factor of 85%) would be considerably lower (around 
$71/MWh in France and the USA, $66/MWh in China and India, 
12 IEA (2019). «Nuclear power in a clean energy system».
13 MIT Energy Initiative (2018). «The future of nuclear energy in a carbon-constrained 
world» (An interdisciplinary MIT study).
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and $52/MWh in Korea). Notwithstanding, NEA/IEA9 has a more 
optimistic vision of the potential of «small modular reactors» of 
the light-water type, because of the radical changes made to the 
way the construction is arranged (a greater emphasis on manu-
facturing the components at the factories and their subsequent 
assembly in situ), the possibility of modulating the investment, 
the access to locations where high-powered reactors cannot be 
accommodated, and the technological optimism, also applied to 
other Fourth Generation reactors.
With the costs shown in the latest report issued by the NEA/IEA 
and, given its potential for providing the electrical system with 
soundness and flexibility, nuclear electrical generation could have 
a certain share in the decarbonised generation mix. However, the 
main drawback is that it is rejected by a significant proportion 
of the general public (a percentage that varies from one country 
to another) that does not trust the safety of the nuclear facili-
ties, especially after the Fukushima accident in Japan. Although 
the risk of a nuclear accident (quantified as the product of the 
damage expected in terms of its likelihood, plus a risk premium) 
constitutes only a small part of the total cost of nuclear genera-
tion14, a certain proportion of public opinion considers this risk to 
be much greater than is generally estimated and thinks that the 
continued use of this technology is unacceptable (in fact, this per-
centage of opinion implicitly expects any potential damage to be 
almost infinite to the extent that even the fact that the likelihood 
of accidents with the new nuclear technologies is very low, this 
does not reduce their perception of the risk). This state of affairs 
has affected the political positioning of European governments 
in different ways. Some countries, such as Germany and Spain 
have chosen to abandon nuclear technology, whereas others like 
France and the United Kingdom are expected to carry on relying 
on nuclear power generation in the long term. Certain geopoliti-
cal factors condition this choice. It seems unlikely that countries 
which still consider nuclear arms to be a central element in their 
defence strategies will opt for abandoning the civil uses to which 
this energy can be put. This would partly account for the French 
and British stances on nuclear power. Where France is concerned, 
industrial policy also plays a role: nuclear technology is an indus-
trial niche where France is in an outstanding position. Be that 
as it may, arguments of a geopolitical nature may be utilised to 




justify the continuity of nuclear technology both in the US and in 
Europe. M. Bowen15 describes the risk of US disinvolvement in 
exporting nuclear technology, which would mean a reduced abil-
ity to exert influence on international agreements dealing with 
technical and security regulations and this could also even have a 
bearing on nuclear non-proliferation policy. According to Bowen, 
the data concerning the number of nuclear plants constructed or 
in the process of being constructed since 1997 in China, indicate 
that they are more than four times those in the US, while the 
number of plants in Russia nearly triple the US’s (besides, most 
of the ones in Russia being exported). Moreover, apart from the 
advantage that this gives China or Russia in the evolution of the 
learning curve, it also enables those two countries to obtain con-
siderable strategic advantages through exporting nuclear tech-
nology to sensitive areas such as the Middle East.
The variable nature of renewable power generation also imposes 
technological requirements if it is to be able to efficiently inte-
grate these technologies on a large scale (in countries like Spain, 
renewable energy is expected to account for 100% power gener-
ation by 2050). This situation will require the development of a 
major offer of sound and flexible services, charged to the avail-
able generation capacity, the smart management of demand, 
interconnections and storage (above all, pumping and batteries), 
which means enhancing the digitalisation of the electricity system 
and a breakthrough in storage technologies not yet fully mature. 
Developing distributed resources (generation and storage, plus 
the sharp growth in domestic consumption) also poses consider-
able technological challenges with respect to efficient integration 
with the most centralised resources; the grids, above all, that are 
going to find themselves faced with the generalisation of two-di-
rectional flows coming from multiple network nodes, are going to 
require the large-scale incorporation of information & communi-
cation technologies (smarter networks)16.
In the next few years, these major changes affecting the tech-
nological structure of the electricity sector will take place at the 
same time as its institutional and corporate architecture under-
goes a far-reaching transformation that will also greatly affect 
15 M. Bowen (2020), «Why the United States should remain engaged on nuclear 
power. Geopolitical and National Security Considerations». (Columbia/SIPA. Center on 
global Energy policy).
16 C. Aranzadi (2019), «Distributed electricity storage workshop. Introduction». 
(Think Hub. Fundación Caminos).
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the composition of the agents that operate in that sector, the 
business models, the contracting mechanisms and, ultimately, its 
regulatory framework. The paradigm for the liberalised electricity 
models that first became widespread in the 1980s had a whole-
sale energy market whose prices were the important signs not 
only for an operation but also for an investment efficient in gen-
erating electricity. Although the «energy only market» model did 
not function in its purest form hardly anywhere (the added factor 
of the «capacity markets» or other mechanisms aimed at mak-
ing up for the «missing money» on the energy markets became 
quickly widespread), the basic logic of the new liberalised models 
was able to remain in the system where conventional genera-
tion (nuclear, coal, natural gas) was predominant. The predomi-
nance of generation technologies whose variable costs are close 
to zero and variable in operation (as is the case with wind and 
photovoltaic energy generation) disrupts the essential nature of 
the current model. The average prices on the wholesale mar-
ket will continue their downward trend in the medium and long 
term (as a result of the growing share in electrical generation 
of near-zero marginal cost generation technologies in the short 
term), which means that in the payment of the electricity supply, 
the weight of the revenues on the wholesale energy market will 
tend to decrease and, therefore, the dependence of the electricity 
business on payment for the soundness services (capacity mar-
kets), flexibility services (supplementary service markets man-
aged by the system operator) and grid services (whose payment 
as natural monopolies is fixed by the regulator), will increase 
accordingly16.
D. Robinson (in his article in this publication) argues in favour of 
a «double-market» model17 to cope with the prices trendy evo-
lution on the wholesale energy market, with the need to con-
siderably increase the flexibility offer and to accommodate the 
complexity of the expected increase in the resources distributed, 
so that the progress made in the digitalisation of the electricity 
sector can guarantee their implementation. Whatever the case 
may be, the regulatory evolution would appear to lean towards 
a model with strong «single purchaser» characteristics, as is the 
case with Spain. Even if the «capacity markets» (where the vol-
ume of available capacity required or the demand curve con-
17 D. Robinson and M. Keay (2020), «Glimpses of the future electricity system? De-




structed were already established by a centralised administrative 
body) or the flexibility markets (where the system operator 
obtains the reserves and other adjustment services in a central-
ised way) were to use competitive mechanisms to allocate the 
offer among the end suppliers in their respective markets, the 
definition of and guarantee for a certain soundness and flexi-
bility standard has been corresponding to a central body (i.e., 
they were «one-sided» markets). These services were implicitly 
considered to be a public asset. Most probably, soundness and 
flexibility will continue to be managed in centralised form in the 
future, although it could be suggested that the development of 
digitalisation will enable the end suppliers and the end demand-
ers of those services to cross over in those markets (making it 
possible to distinguish between the demanders on the basis of 
their preferences for both services, and supressing their charac-
terisation as a public asset). However, it is perhaps the wholesale 
energy market that is drifting further towards a direction that is 
consistent with the single purchaser logic. As the renewable elec-
tricity generation offer allocation increases (or in the case of the 
United Kingdom, nuclear electricity generation) through the auc-
tion procedure where the «strike price» is established in contracts 
by differentials that may differ from both the «spot» wholesale 
market price profiles and the fix-term prices in bilateral contract-
ing (for example in the form of Power Purchase Agreements), it is 
established that a growing proportion of the energy offer is allo-
cated in a «one-sided» market (the auctioned volumes are fixed 
by an administrative body) and where the «strike prices» yielded 
from the auction mechanism actually represent «standard costs» 
albeit determined by a competitive mechanism. The model’s logic 
has a lot in common with the logic that characterised the Spanish 
wholesale market under the LOSEN Act (1994).
This technological centrality affecting the energy transition pro-
cess manifests itself in many ways. Firstly, the uncertainty sur-
rounding the availability and evolution of the learning curves 
for the different technologies involved in the process (most of 
which, as the IEA points out, are not yet fully mature) means 
that the technological risk becomes a significant contingent cost. 
This uncertainty is accentuated still further by the competition 
between some new technologies whose deployment is announced 
for the next thirty years. A clear case is the one described by 
Th. van de Graaf, in his article in this publication, in which the 
competition is illustrated between the use of hydrogen and a 
more direct energy cycle (with different efficiencies in the set of 
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energy conversion processes required) for electricity end uses 
not only for mobility but also for the refurbishment of residential 
buildings. Furthermore, most of the new technologies that will 
be involved in the energy transition are capital intensive, which 
will mean, in addition to a considerable investment outlay (with 
high discount rates applied owing to the high technological risk), 
a greater proportion of «sunk costs». In this context, it is highly 
likely that there will be «stranded investments». Some examples 
have already arisen in conventional power generation: a signifi-
cant reduction in the number of hours that combined cycle natu-
ral gas plants are used as renewable generation sources increase 
their share of the market, decommissioning or reconversion of the 
coal plants (a process that, as is indicated in WEO 2019 issued 
by the IEA, is going to have a major impact on Asian countries 
investing heavily in these plants that have only been operating 
for short periods of time). In the oil sector, the risk of «stranded 
investments» will depend on the extent to which the planning 
for the new investments is adjusted to the overall impact of the 
evolution in oil demand and the depletion of wells, although it 
seems inevitable that in the long term, a considerable proportion 
of the underground resources in countries with huge reserves will 
become «stranded assets» if the climate neutrality targets are to 
be achieved by 2050.
Secondly, the future technological scenario associated with 
energy transition will also have major geopolitical effects. The 
advantageous geostrategic positioning that some countries enjoy 
because their abundant fossil fuels (especially if, as is the case 
with oil, these resources are concentrated in certain geographical 
zones) will gradually decline as the overabundance of resources in 
the long term becomes evident; the contribution of certain geo-
graphical areas, such as the Middle East or some «choke points» 
on the oil traffic routes, to determining the geopolitical risk on 
the energy markets will also become less important. The control 
over decarbonised technologies and the availability of mineral 
resources containing elements associated with these technolo-
gies, such as «rare earths», (to which Ricardo Prego devotes his 
article in this publication), and other critical materials, will pro-
gressively displace fossil fuels as an «energy dominance» factor 
in the international relations. It is true that technologies spread, 
but the «first moving» normally has a significant strategic advan-
tage. That is why the geostrategic importance of China’s grow-
ing advantage in decarbonised technologies must be stressed 
(not only regarding nuclear energy but also regarding renewable 
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energies), a question addressed by I. Tapia in the preceding issue 
of E&G. Moreover, China has achieved a predominant position by 
having the mineral resources needed to develop decarbonised 
technologies, namely «rare earths», whereas the US and Europe 
have been late in reacting (See the article by R. Prego). China will 
obviously continue to benefit from this scale effect by using such 
resources for its technological development in all energy areas 
as its learning curves evolve. Although technological distances 
can be shortened with a suitable policy for investing in research 
and infrastructures, correct planning and allocation of resources 
in the medium and long term are necessary to minimise the cost, 
in an environment of great technological uncertainty like the one 
created by energy transition. Furthermore, although it is true to 
say that the predominant primary energy resources of the future 
in the long term (sun and wind) exist in all geographical areas 
(albeit with different intensities), location is a crucial factor when 
it comes to the cost of production using these renewable ener-
gies, which will lead (in view of the major differences in cost) to 
a new international specialisation and a new network of global 
energy flows (Th. van de Graaf examines this question where 






The COVID-19 pandemic has caused a major breach 
in historical continuity. Firstly, owing to its impact on 
economic activity and energy consumption (and its 
effect on CO2 emissions). Secondly, due to the way it has 
modified the population’s behaviour and their collective 
psychology (changes in movement patterns, working from 
home becoming widespread, isolation, etc.). And thirdly, 
because of the way it has spurred on the development 
of innovations in the area of health care technologies 
and has helped to achieve a more cooperative political 
conduct between nations (for example, the EU Next 
Generation Programme). Do you think the changes 
brought about by the pandemic will be transitory and 
that once we get back to normal health-wise, it will be 
«business as usual» again, shall we witness a structural 
transformation?
No, I don’t think we’ll be back to the old normal. Pandemics have 
been major vectors for change throughout human history. My 
experience of the crisis from the post of HR/VP has made me 
understand that we’re at a global turning point, and I mean global 
in the broadest sense of the term. Not even the World Wars were 
Josep Borrell Fontelles
34
really «world» wars, and previous pandemics did not affect as 
many countries at the same time.
I think the consequences will be somewhat more than steepening 
the gradient of a linear evolution. They’ll affect globalisation, the 
role of the State, world governance and multilateralism, which 
was already in crisis. They’ll also affect competition between the 
political systems in a liberal democracy and the systems with dif-
ferent degrees of authoritarianism.
In everyday life, the pandemic has speeded up the use of online 
commerce or videoconferences and has generated new dynam-
ics, such as a move from cities to rural zones. How each one of 
these changes takes root and what their net effect will be on the 
global energy demand remain to be seen.
Do you think the aftermath of the pandemic could have 
any effects on the way the long-term geopolitical scenario 
evolves?
Many! The world will be more digital, more unequal and also more 
Asian, given that Asia, and especially China, is emerging stronger 
from the pandemic. COVID has accentuated the rivalry between 
China and the US. What you’re saying about more cooperative 
behaviour between countries is true among the Europeans with 
Next Generation EU, but I can’t see that this crisis has increased 
world cooperation in general. I’d say the opposite has happened. 
There hasn’t been enough cooperation, but there has been con-
frontation between powers to show which one has been the most 
efficient and which one has done most to help the others, first 
with masks and now with vaccines.
The European Union and the Western Countries have been having 
difficulties when it comes to providing developing countries with 
vaccines in the way that we are expected to and we should have 
done. It is undeniable that China and Russia have managed to act 
more quickly and that’ll have geopolitical consequences.
In the US, President Biden’s Presidency has announced 
that the country will be re-joining the Paris Agreement and 
will possibly re-join the Nuclear Agreement with Iran, and 
that generally, the US will be returning to multilateralism. 
From a European viewpoint… How do you think this will 
affect the energy and climate geostrategy?
It will clearly have an enormous effect! Just for the two reasons 
that you’ve mentioned, climate and Iran, the world will be much 
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better and a safer place. President Biden has already kept his 
promise and signed the Decree that paves the way for the US’s 
return to the Paris Agreement that it left on 4 November last year. 
We have already had the first videoconference with his Special 
Envoy for Climate, John Kerry, who shared with is a «much more 
humble yet ambitious» plan. But they’ll have to work hard to 
make up for the years of damage caused by Trump. The United 
States has promoted climate change negation and encouraged 
this attitude in major countries like Brazil and Saudi Arabia. The 
United States is the second biggest emitter on the planet, but 
it has only paid one out of the three thousand million dollars it 
promised to the Green Fund for Climate. However, the rectifi-
cation is now crystal clear: Biden has revoked the construction 
licence for the Keystone XL Oil Pipeline and has ordered a mora-
torium on the use of oil concessions in the Arctic, etc.
But the world has changed and is no longer the world of Paris 
2015. Other stakeholders such as the EU and China are executing 
outstanding activities. The United States will have to set more 
demanding climate targets for 2030 before the COP26 Confer-
ence. Biden will have to put climate neutrality by 2050 to the vote 
in order to equal the commitment made by China, and there is 
no doubt that he will have to face a powerful lobby in opposition 
when he tries to apply his green relaunching plan.
We are waiting for the United States at the G20 and at the world 
climate summit that Biden has undertaken to call in the first 100 
days. And of course at the COP26, too. There are great expecta-
tions and what will be important are the specific commitments.
And regarding the nuclear agreement with Iran, the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)? Are you optimistic 
about the possibilities of revitalising the nuclear agreement 
with Iran or replacing it with an agreement with broader 
scope?
In my capacity as coordinator of the JCPOA, I’ve tried to keep the 
agreement alive after the US withdrawal. We are now waiting to 
see what the new Biden Administration decides to do.
Until Trump withdrew from the agreement, Iran had fulfilled its 
part. Now, both the US and Iran have expressed their willingness 




The Iranian Minister has assured me that they are prepared to 
comply with their obligations again on the nuclear question if 
the others comply with their part of the bargain regarding the 
economic questions. It should be possible for the US to return to 
an agreement that has prevented Iran from becoming a nuclear 
power. Though I foresee difficulties in doing so.
To what extent might the US’s return to a more conventional 
diplomacy affect the inflection in the EU’s foreign action 
towards being more geopolitically assertive and having 
greater strategic autonomy, something that the experts 
attribute to your mandate as High Representative?
With Biden as President, there is a significant increase in opportu-
nities for collaboration with the EU. Europe’s strategic autonomy, 
which is a position that I definitely defend and that has nothing to 
do with protectionism or isolationism, is not directed against the 
United States. It is simply that Europe is to be capable of acting 
on its own account whenever necessary. A stronger and more 
united Europe would be a better ally. And this should also be of 
interest to the United States.
Although the expected return of the US to the Paris 
Agreement increases the possibilities of success at 
the Glasgow´s COP26, the difficulties in achieving an 
agreement regarding the questions that are still pending 
approval from the COP held in Madrid (mainly concerning 
the devising of a mechanism for coordinating the 
instruments for the state or regional mitigation policies 
and the urgent correction of the national commitments to 
reduce emissions) are still considerable. Do you think that 
Europe can play an active role in the effort to achieve a 
convergence of positions from those who are party to the 
Agreement?
As is said before, the United States has returned to Paris Agree-
ment, but it has to meet its duties. And so do us. We have set 
the standards very high, and it is not going to be easy to achieve 
them. However, as Europe (excluding the UK) only generates 
7% of the world’s emissions, even if we were to miraculously 
stop emitting even one sole gram of CO2 tomorrow, the prob-
lem would still be the same, because there would still be the 
other 93% to consider. So, what we have to do is to get the big-
gest emitters, including the US and China, to move in the same 
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direction and, above all, we have to ensure that the increase in 
energy consumption that must take place to meet the developing 
countries’ needs is produced in a sustainable way. Our climate 
ambition is one of the signs of identity of this Commission, but 
we have to understand the problem globally and work hard and 
actively on the diplomatic front to ensure we don’t stand alone in 
the attempt. At the COP26, the United States, China and the EU 
all have to pull together, and row in the same direction.
And how can this great increase in energy consumption be 
combined with a reduction in emissions?
The world has two energy problems. The first problem is that 
those who have access to energy produce greenhouse gas emis-
sions that are too high. That is what receives most attention in 
our developed world. But there is another global energy prob-
lem that is just as big: energy poverty. That makes hundreds of 
millions of people to lack access to sufficient energy, with terri-
ble consequences for them and for the environment. When you 
travel through Africa you realise this. The green and digital future 
cannot be constructed on such uneven energy consumptions per 
capita. The richest 1% in the EU emits an average of 43 tonnes 
of CO2 per year, nine times as much as the world average of 4.8 
tonnes. The average US citizen emits more CO2 in four days than 
the inhabitants of Ethiopia, Uganda or Malawi in a whole year. 
What is more, the inhabitants of the latter countries use very 
primitive fuels and technologies. Firewood provides more than 
half the total energy consumed in East, Central and West Africa.
That is a description of the problem, or of the problems, if 
you like, but you haven’t said anything about the solutions.
True, and I haven´t finished describing the problems either. 
Energy poverty has an enormous cost in terms of human health. 
Now that we are suffering a major pandemic that affects the 
respiratory tract, it is good to know that the WHO considers that 
air pollution indoors is, or was before COVID arrived, the biggest 
environmental health risk in the world for the poorest people and 
causes 1.6 million deaths every year. Furthermore, it contributes 
to the deforestation of the planet.
The solution can only come from cheap, safe and low-carbon 
technological alternatives to fossil fuels, at large-scale. Without 
them, we will not enable poor countries to meet their needs or 
rich countries to change their current unsustainable model.
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I know I am stating the obvious, but that is what must be done, 
and we still haven’t done it. The energy transition requires large-
scale technological innovation.
We are doing it, developing renewables is a good 
example. What more must be done and what geopolitical 
consequences will this technological transformation have?
Well, we’re doing it more quickly now, but not in all sectors. In 
electricity production we have developed alternatives to fossil 
fuels. But if my information is correct, the proportion of renewa-
ble energies plus nuclear energy still stands at about 35%, and 
in percentage terms it has not improved for thirty years. In other 
sectors we are not yet finding a solution.
But, when we do find a solution, the requirements of the 
climate policy brought together in the Paris Agreement 
will, in the long term, lead to a global fossil fuel demand 
profile that could make a large proportion of the resources 
currently existing to become «stranded assets», 
reducing the strategic importance of pivotal countries 
in the oil market, such as Saudi Arabia or Russia. Once 
again … What are the geopolitical implications of that 
transition in a world with an overabundance of fossil fuel 
resources?
Much greater than what we think. In my postgraduate days at the 
French Oil Institute in Paris in 1982, I was told there was oil for 
50 years. Now, we are talking about an overabundance of assets 
that will lose their value owing to climate restrictions. A reduction 
in fossil fuel demand will certainly lead to changes in the degree 
of geopolitical influence exerted by countries that currently use 
those fuels to finance their own welfare. That is why some of 
them frown upon our climate ambitions, and that includes coun-
tries in our immediate vicinity. Without suitable planning, there 
could be new areas of instability instigated by the regional stake-
holders affected. The climate factor is going to change the dis-
tribution of wealth in the world. Very rich countries will be less 
wealthy and others that are currently poor will find that the value 
of their natural resources increases. Think of all the lithium there 
is in the Andes, and it is needed for batteries. It is not a neutral 




Electricity and hydrogen are going to be two essential 
energy vectors in the decarbonisation policy. Renewable 
electrical generation (photovoltaic and wind) is now 
fully competitive in relation to alternative technologies. 
However, the cost of producing hydrogen is not yet 
competitive with the technologies available. Are the 
measures taken in Europe sufficient to help progress to 
be made in the learning curve for hydrogen production 
technologies?
I’m convinced that hydrogen has a role to play in the future 
of the energy/climate binomial. Especially the so-called green 
hydrogen, which is produced from photovoltaic electricity. Last 
July, the EU announced its European Hydrogen Strategy with 
the ambitious target of generating 40 GW using this source 
by 2030. In countries like Spain, generation companies are 
showing great interest in hydrogen. Portugal and the Nether-
lands are already working together on production and trans-
port projects and Germany and France are also collaborating on 
large-scale projects. The experience obtained while developing 
photovoltaic and wind energies must serve to devise an incen-
tives structure that facilitates the development of this technol-
ogy. North Africa could be a very suitable place for production, 
given that we already have a gas pipeline network linking it 
with Europe.
With respect to alternative supplies by gas pipeline or in 
the form of LNG, Russia could be considered a potentially 
competitive supplier (in production and transport cost) of 
natural gas to Europe, in the long term. Yet the proportion 
of Russian gas imports in the European demand seems 
excessive. Shouldn’t Europe seek greater natural gas 
supply diversification, for energy security reasons, as 
regards geographical origins, modes of transportation and 
contractual characteristics?
For a long time, European countries have lacked alternatives to 
Russian gas supplies. At present, Russia accounts for 40% of 
the gas imports to the entire EU, and between 80% and 100% 
of the supply to such Member States as Slovakia and the Baltic 
countries. Yet it isn’t the supply percentage but the availability of 
alternatives that gives a realistic image of the EU’s energy secu-
rity situation. And from that perspective the EU’s situation has 
improved in the last 15 years, thanks to internal legislation and 
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infrastructure, including the diversification of its import sources 
via the South Corridor and new LNG terminals that have con-
nected us to the global market.
Furthermore, as the Green Deal develops, purchases from Rus-
sia will progressively decrease. Therefore, although Russian gas 
purchases are still considerable, the EU Member States that are 
purchasers now have a bargaining power they lacked before.
To what extent is energy diplomacy with Russia being 
considered in the EU’s Energy Diplomacy Action Plan?
To tell you the truth, I must admit that there is no reference to 
any particular country in the recent Conclusions issued on 25 
January by the EU Foreign Affairs Council on climate & energy 
diplomacy. The aim is to promote an ambitious green energy 
transition on a world scale, including the gradual removal of 
investments in fossil fuels; it also stipulates that «the EU’s 
energy diplomacy will discourage any further investments in 
fossil fuel-based energy infrastructure projects» and it will guar-
antee energy security.
And what can you tell me about the controversial Nord 
Stream 2 in these moments of tension with Russia? To 
confront Russia, must it be halted?
You’re certainly putting me on the spot… This matter was not con-
sidered in the recent EU Foreign Affairs Council of EU Ministers, 
but there are countries that would like to use this lever in their 
relations with Russia although, as the French Minister Jean-Yves 
Le Drian stressed publically, it is Berlin’s responsibility to do this. 
An overwhelming majority at the European Parliament has asked 
for the gas pipeline to be closed immediately, and it is also a bone 
of contention between Berlin and Washington, which is imposing 
extraterritorial sanctions on the European companies involved. 
But let’s be realistic. The Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline is a €10,000 
million project that is 90% complete and it’ll double the capacity 
for sending Russian gas to Germany. It certainly does not help 
to diversify energy supplies to the EU and the Commission has 
stated that it does not consider it a priority, it is understanda-
ble however that Chancellor Merkel is not prepared to throw the 
investment down the drain.
The discovery of natural gas deposits in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the Black Sea has added a new source 
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of tension to a region of considerable strategic importance 
to Europe, as it affects the European south-east energy 
supply route. What position will the EU adopt in this 
regional area and, more specifically, with respect to an 
essential stakeholder like Turkey?
Exploiting these deposits ought to provide a source of revenue 
with which to give a boost to prosperity in the region. The Euro-
pean Union is working on a solution that stands up for the Mem-
ber States’ interests and that is accepted by Turkey. The Turkish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs told me recently that a solution to the 
sharing out of revenue from these gas deposits would help to 
solve 50% of the relation problems between the EU and Turkey, 
especially regarding the situation in Cyprus.
I think the solution must be found within the framework of the 
negotiations that the United Nations has undertaken to begin 
soon pursuant to the partition of Cyprus. However, it’d be a good 
idea to consider that at a time when attempts are being made 
to boost ecological transition, launching operations of doubtful 
future profitability in a zone that is ideal for developing renewable 
energies doesn’t make much sense.
Talking of China, the election of Biden would at least 
amount to a new diplomatic style when tackling relations 
with China, even while keeping up the strategic rivalry 
between the two countries. What space is left for Europe 
in the balance of geopolitical power between the two 
powers?
Whatever space we want, depending on our political will to use 
our economic and commercial dimension and our investment and 
technological capacity to defend our interests.
The United States and Europe enjoy a political system based on 
alternating power through elections, share a market economy 
system, and we have a long-standing alliance, we are not equi-
distant therefore in the conflict between the United States and 
China, that is going to shape this century. For both, China is at 
the same time an adversary, a competitor and a partner, depend-
ing on the subject concerned.
Nevertheless, Europe has its own interests. Developing and 
defending those interests is in no way detrimental to the United 
States. One such example is the recently signed Investment 
Agreement with China. But we must do things our way by pursu-
Josep Borrell Fontelles
42
ing what some have referred to as the Sinatra Doctrine. Europe 
cannot be fenced in by this conflict and must be able to defend 
its own interests, which don’t always coincide with those of the 
United States, even if we do basically see eye to eye.
While we’re on the subject of China, in a process of global 
decarbonisation of the energy sector, as required by the 
climate policy, the competitive and strategic advantages 
in the sector no longer lie in the reserves of primary fossil 
fuel resources, they now revolve around leadership in the 
development of decarbonising technologies and around 
controlling the rare earth materials needed to operate 
those technologies. In both areas, China is making major 
breakthroughs. Is Europe preparing to play a major role in 
this area?
In September 2020, the EU drew up a plan of action entitled «Crit-
ical Raw Materials» in response to this challenge. The EU is work-
ing with partners such as the USA, Canada and Australia and in 
regions of Latin America to develop a strategy for guaranteeing 
the sources of the raw materials needed for the European demand.
You have referred to the importance of Europe’s transatlantic 
relationship with Latin America. In the energy field, the 
future of a country with oil reserves like Venezuela is of 
great importance. What contribution can the EU make to 
breaking the deadlock affecting the Venezuelan situation, 
at a time when Biden’s access to the Presidency would 
appear to give greater room for geopolitical manoeuvre?
Our contribution would be to carry on doing the same as we’ve been 
doing so far: support the Opposition while at the same time call 
them for unity and pressing Maduro’s Government so that a solution 
involving presidential and legislative elections that can be recog-
nised by the international community may be negotiated. A new US 
Administration can contribute to creating the incentives for ensuring 
that these negotiations, which so far have failed, can prosper.
Libya, a major actor in the oil sector, has initiated a process 
of dialogue to guarantee peace in the country, under the 
auspices of the UN and the EU. How do you expect this 
process to evolve?
The Libyan conflict is still one of the most complex ones in the 
vicinity of the European Union. In Libya we are paying the price 
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of our division. Some Member States have favoured one of the 
contenders, while others have supported the other. Meanwhile, 
Turkey and Russia have played major roles as they’ve done in 
Syria. Now, Turkey can bring influence to bear on the Central 
Mediterranean route for immigrants heading for Europe. The EU 
has deployed Operation Irini to enforce the arms embargo and 
the situation is relatively stable. The EU is about to create the 
figure of Special Envoy to establish the necessary dialogue with 
the important stakeholders and to make progress in finding a 









There is no compelling reason to be optimistic about meeting the 
goals of the Paris Climate Agreement. However, despite its dev-
astating effects on world health and prosperity, COVID-19 has 
perhaps created the opportunity for governments and compa-
nies to accelerate an energy transition that was already under-
way and gathering steam. The consequences of the pandemic 
and the responses to it may provide some glimpses of the future 
decarbonised energy system and guidance on how companies 
and policy makers should prepare for it. COVID-19 has certainly 
provided the justification and the opportunity for governments to 
loosen their purse strings to support a green economic recovery 
in a number of major countries – a recovery that not only helps 
to provide short-term relief, but also to build for a more sustaina-
1 This chapter draws on some of the ideas and articles from «COVID 19 and the 
Energy Transition», Oxford Energy Forum 123, July 2020. The views are however the 
author’s.
2 The author would like to thank Rocío Rodríguez-Villanueva for her comments, as well 
as research and editorial assistance. He would also like to thank Michael Tennican for 
his advice and comments. Any remaining errors are the author’s responsibility.
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ble future. Finally, the pandemic has laid bare other global prob-
lems – notably limited governmental resources, lack of resiliency, 
income inequality, trade tensions, debt and poverty – that will 
inhibit the energy transition. It has also demonstrated the impor-
tance of the international cooperation that will be required for a 
successful global transition, which in turn will help address the 
other problems. In short, COVID-19 has improved the prospects 
for the energy transition and provided a better understanding of 
how to realise it. It remains to be seen, however, whether we will 
take advantage of this unique opportunity.
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Introduction
It is too early to know what the long-term impact of COVID-193 
will be on the energy transition because we do not know how 
governments, companies and consumers will behave in a post-
COVID world; nor do we know how long the pandemic will last. 
What we do know is that the impact of COVID-19 must be seen 
in the wider context of other global trends, including increased 
stress on the environment and encroachment on the natural 
world, social inequality, rising levels of debt and extreme poverty 
in emerging and developing countries, a retreat from globalisa-
tion and the deterioration of international cooperation.
What does COVID-19 mean for the hoped-for and expected 
energy transition, in particular decarbonisation of energy and 
end-use markets and greater energy efficiency? The pandemic 
has been devastating in many respects. Nonetheless, I will argue 
that COVID-19 has not diminished the pressures that were driv-
ing the energy transition before the pandemic and that some 
of these pressures – especially the financial ones – have grown 
stronger. (See section ‘The energy transition was well underway 
before COVID-19’).
Furthermore, in certain ways the pandemic has improved the 
prospects for the energy transition. First, COVID-19 offers les-
sons about what changes are needed to avoid future pandemics 
and other global crises, especially climate change. These lessons 
– in particular, the risks of disrespecting nature’s boundaries 
and taking a short-term view – support the case for accelerat-
ing the energy transition. Other lessons relate to managing the 
energy transition, including the importance of addressing social 
concerns, promoting science and innovation and of government 
competence. (See section ‘Lessons from COVID-19 that support 
the energy transition’).
Second, the pandemic may also provide some glimpses into the 
likely future decarbonised energy system and some guidance 
on how energy companies and policy makers should prepare 
for it. (See section ‘COVID-19: a glimpse of the future energy 
system?’).
3 COVID-19 is the disease caused by a new coronavirus called SARS-CoV-2. WHO first 
learned of this new virus on 31 December 2019, following a report of a cluster of cases 
of ‘viral pneumonia’ in Wuhan, People’s Republic of China. 
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Third, the resulting economic crisis has provided the justifica-
tion and the opportunity for governments to loosen their purse 
strings to stimulate a ‘green’ economic recovery that aims not 
only to help provide short-term economic relief but also to build 
for a sustainable future. Although governmental investments will 
be important, most of the investment will come from the pri-
vate sector, which underlines the importance of policies that will 
encourage private investment. (See section ‘Green recovery and 
the energy transition’).
Fourth, the pandemic has accentuated other global problems 
– like trade barriers, international debt and extreme poverty – 
whose resolution requires international cooperation, which has 
been much diminished in recent years. Fortunately, the condi-
tions and momentum now exist for a renewal of cooperation on 
the energy transition that is required to address climate change 
and related global problems. (See section ‘International barriers 
to a global energy transition’).
By way of conclusion, COVID-19 has in a number of respects 
improved the prospects for a global energy transition and pro-
vided a better understanding of how to proceed. However, it 
remains to be seen whether we will seize the opportunity. (See 
section ‘Summary conclusions’).
The energy transition was well underway before COVID-19
The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) defines the 
energy transition as «a pathway toward transformation of the 
global energy sector from fossil-based to zero-carbon by the sec-
ond half of this century. At its heart is the need to reduce ener-
gy-related CO2 emissions to limit climate change4.» Another view 
is that the aim is for zero net carbon emissions, with any posi-
tive emissions being offset by negative emissions, e.g. by CO2 
air capture and sequestration. Either way, the central objective 
of the energy transition is decarbonisation of the energy sec-
tor. This will involve a very significant penetration of renewable 
power, supplemented by decarbonised gases (e.g. ‘green’ hydro-
gen produced by electrolysis employing electricity generated by 
renewable sources). It will also require the electrification of many 
end-user markets that consume fossil fuels today, notably build-
ings, transport and industries, as well as improved energy effi-
4 International Renewable Energy Agency, «Energy Transition». Consulted 24.12.2020
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ciency throughout the economy. Indeed, the energy transition 
implies a change in the current overall social, political and eco-
nomic paradigm, since energy is an input to almost everything, 
and the way it is produced and consumed affects the role of con-
sumers, corporate strategy, competitiveness of an economy and 
much more. It is fair to say that global economic development 
and energy geopolitics have been ‘path dependent’5 on fossil 
fuels for over 100 years. The energy transition would put an end 
to this historic path.
Although fighting climate change is the primary policy driver 
behind the energy transition, it does not follow that the energy 
transition will be sufficiently fast or deep to ‘solve’ the climate 
crisis, if by that we mean meeting the ambition of the Paris 
Agreement to limit global warming (compared to the pre-indus-
trial period) to well below 2ºC and if possible to 1.5ºC. Indeed, 
there is no compelling reason to be optimistic about meeting 
these targets. We are already seeing considerable global warm-
ing and its effects. Furthermore, there is a huge gap between the 
required emission reductions to reach the Paris targets and those 
that have occurred or are planned. The United Nations Environ-
ment Programme (UNEP) Emissions Gap Report 20196 estimated 
that a 7.6% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions every year 
between 2020 and 2030 could limit global warming to 1.5ºC. But 
the longer we wait, the more we will need to do later to avoid a 
climate disaster7.
Climate change is not the only driver of the energy transition. 
Indeed, climate policy is an integral element of economic and 
trade policy. Other important drivers include gaining geopoliti-
cal advantage, industrial strategy, creation of employment, and 
growing support for reducing local environmental pollution.
The point is that, even during the pandemic and certainly after it, 
the energy transition is likely to continue and gather momentum 
for a variety of reasons explained below, even if it does not meet 
the Paris Agreement targets.
5 Path dependence is when decisions are dependent on previous decisions or experi-
ences in the past. Path Dependence exists when a feature of the economy is not based 
on current conditions, but rather has been formed by a sequence of past actions each 
leading to a distinct outcome. It is a reflection of institutional rigidity.
6 United Nations Environment Programme 2020. Emissions Gap Report 2019. Con-
sulted 22.12.2020. 






The Paris Agreement was a pivotal moment in the history of 
global climate change negotiations. Before the agreement, there 
was considerable doubt about the potential for any serious global 
commitment to fighting climate change. My own experience was 
that fossil fuel company executives were inclined to be resistant 
to acknowledging the need to cut carbon emissions, presumably 
because of the near-term threat to their own businesses from the 
energy transition. After the agreement, that changed. It was dif-
ficult for energy companies, investors and citizens to ignore the 
global political consensus in favour of the energy transition. Sub-
sequently, President Trump slowed down the political momentum 
of the fight against the climate crisis, especially in the US and in 
countries, such as Brazil, that saw US withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement as an opportunity to weaken their own ambition or 
indeed ignore the issue altogether. In spite of this setback, the 
political momentum behind the energy transition continued to 
grow before COVID-19 and indeed during the COVID-19 crisis, as 
witnessed especially with the growing number of countries com-
mitting to carbon neutrality8.
National Commitments and Regional Agreements
In June 2019, the United Kingdom (UK) became the first major 
economy in the world to pass laws to end its contribution to 
global warming by 2050. The target will require the UK to bring 
all greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to net zero by 2050, com-
pared with the previous target of at least an 80% reduction from 
1990 levels9.
In December 2019, the European Commission presented its 
communication on the European Green Deal. It was described 
as a new growth strategy for the EU, aiming to transform it into 
a climate-neutral, fair and prosperous society, with a modern, 
resource-efficient and competitive economy. EU leaders reaf-
firmed their commitment to playing a leading role in the global 
8 Carbon neutrality is zero net emissions of CO2.. Climate neutrality refers to zero net 
emissions of all greenhouse gases, including CO2, methane and other gases.
9 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. Gov.UK, «UK becomes 
first major economy to pass net zero emissions law», Gov.UK, 27 June 2019. Consulted 
22.12.2020.
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fight against climate change during the December 2019 meeting 
of the European Council, when they endorsed the objective of 
climate neutrality by 205010.
The number of countries adopting the objective of carbon neu-
trality grew during the COVID-19 crisis. By the end of 2020, more 
than 110 countries had pledged to reach carbon neutrality by 
2050, and China had pledged to get there by 2060. By early 
2021, countries representing more than 65 percent of global car-
bon dioxide emissions and more than 70 percent of the world 
economy had made commitments to carbon neutrality11.
Sub-national Agreements
Political support around the world is also evident at the sub-na-
tional level. For instance, in the US, where President Trump did 
his best to promote fossil fuels and to discredit the Paris Agree-
ment, there is a powerful movement to meet US commitments 
under that agreement, expressed through the «We are still in» 
Declaration. Since it was initially released in June 2017, over 
3800 leaders at federal, state and local levels of government, 
corporations and colleges have signed the declaration. Together, 
they represent more than 155 million Americans and over $9 tril-
lion of the US economy12.
Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI13) is another exam-
ple of sub-national commitment, in this case on a global scale. It 
is a network of more than 1750 local and regional governments 
– active in more than 100 countries – committed to sustainable 
urban development, and in particular to low emission, nature-
based, equitable and circular development. Cities have become 
particularly important and active in the pursuit of decarbonisa-
tion, which reflects that a rising share of the global population 
lives in cities, and that emissions in cities are major contributors 
to climate change and to local pollution. It is noteworthy that a 
growing number of countries, states and cities around the world 
10 European Council, Council of the European Union, European Council Conclusions, 
12-13 December 2019. Consulted 22.12.2020.
11 The race to zero emissions, and why the world depends on it, United Nations, 2 
December 2020. Consulted February 15, 2021.
12 «We Are Still In» Declaration. Consulted 22.12.2020.




are phasing out or restricting the use of internal combustion 
engine (ICE) vehicles14.
Technology and economics
The political momentum and support for the energy transition has 
grown along with the decline in the anticipated costs of that tran-
sition, in particular the falling costs of solar photovoltaics (PV), 
wind power, electric vehicles (EV) and batteries. In fact, the two 
are related. For instance, the political (and public financial) sup-
port for renewable energy, especially in Germany, led to growing 
demand for solar PV and wind turbines. In response, China was 
able to significantly reduce the cost of these technologies, largely 
due to their ability to take advantage of scale and learning econ-
omies. Today, these technologies are available throughout the 
world at prices that have fallen steadily and steeply since 2010, 
as illustrated by Figure 1.
14 WAPPELHORST, Sandra & CUI, Hongyang, «The countries and states leading the 
phase out of fossil fuel cars», The Driven, 12 November 2020. Consulted 22.01.2021.
BENDIX, Aria, «15 major cities around the world that are starting to ban cars», Busi-
ness Insider, 12 January 2019. Consulted 22.01.2021.
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L ATEST COST TRENDS
New capacity added over this period covers an 
estimated 76% of cumulative installed capacity 
out to 2021. In both cas s, this is materially higher 
than the estimated LCOE learning rate calculated 
by IRENA in 2018, which was 21%, and represents 
the more rapid fall in the cost of electricity than 
was implied by the data available two years 
ago, although part of the reduction to 2021 
comes from a more detailed treatment of the 
non-indexed price contracts in the Auct ons and
PPA Database. 
Utility-scale sola  PV has he highest estimated 
learning rate for the cost of electricity over the 
period 2010 to 2019, of 36%. The learning rate 
rises to 40% when the Auction and PPA data 
ar  used to extend the time series out to 2021, 
a period over which 95% of cumulative installed 
capacity for this technology will have been added. 
The learning rate for CSP for the period 2010 to 
2019 is 23%.
It rises to 38% for the period 2010 to 2021 using 
the PPA and Auction prices in this report for 2020 
and 2021, when an estimated 83% of cumulative 
installed capacity for this technology will have 
been deployed. 
These learning rates represent quite remarkable 
rates of deflation for wind and, in particular, solar 
power technologies. Just quite how remarkable 
can be seen by comparing solar and wind power 
cost declines to Consumer Price Index (CPI) data 
for individual unit costs. For instance, of the price 
quotes for 531 individual items that are used to 
compile the United Kingdom’s CPI index, only five 
items13 (all of relatively little weight in a household’s 
annual consumption) saw price declines of 23% to 
32% (nominal) between January 2010 and Augu t
2019. At the same time, however, the global 
nominal LCOE decline of solar PV was over 70%, 
that of CSP over 40%, that of onshore wind 35%, 
and that of offshore wind 24%. 
13  These were: strawberries, fruit smoothies, internet computer games, household cleaner and underground/metro fares outside London. 
Concentrating solar power Oshore wind Onshore wind Solar photovoltaic
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Figure 1.11  The global weighted-average LCOE and Auction/PPA price learning curve trends for solar PV, CSP, 
onshore and offshore wind, 2010 – 2021/23
Source: IRENA.
Note: The LCOE and auction price data are for utility-scale projects.
Figure 1. Global weighted-average LCOE and Auction/PPA Price learning 
curve for solar PV, CSP, onshore and offshore wind, 2010-2021/23
Sou ce: IRENA Renewabl  P wer Generation Costs Report 2019, 
International Renewable Energy Agency, 2020.
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Apart from the declining cost and price of renewables, digital 
software has enabled the growth of distributed energy resources 
(DER), which increase competition in energy markets and provide 
flexibility to integrate renewables and reduce the cost of decar-
bonisation. This does not mean that decarbonisation is costless. 
Replacing fossil fuels with decarbonised energies involves major 
new investments. Furthermore, existing assets producing or con-
suming fossil fuels lose value (assets are ‘stranded’) as a result 
of decarbonisation, with important costs for the ‘losers’ – the 
affected companies, employees and communities. Nevertheless, 
as the incremental costs of new technologies fall, the resistance 
to the energy transition diminishes, especially when measures 
are taken to compensate and support the ‘losers’.
Financial regulatory and market pressure
Well before COVID-19, financial regulators and private finan-
cial markets had already demonstrated their concerns about 
climate-related financial risks and their growing support for 
decarbonised energy sources. There was also a recognition that 
global investment requirements for the energy transition were 
on the order of $2-3 trillion per annum, over 2% of global Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), significantly more than historic invest-
ment in the energy sector. This would also require a major reallo-
cation of private capital flows towards ‘green’ activities.
In 2015, when he was the Governor of the Bank of England, Mark 
Carney made a speech on climate change at Lloyds of London15. 
He warned that climate change would lead to financial crises and 
falling living standards unless the world’s leading countries did 
more to ensure that their companies come clean about their cur-
rent and future carbon emissions. He referred to climate change 
as the Tragedy of the Horizon. «We don’t need an army of actuar-
ies to tell us that the catastrophic impacts of climate change will 
be felt beyond the traditional horizons of most actors - imposing 
a cost on future generations that the current generation has no 
direct incentive to fix.» He was referring to changes beyond the 
traditional time horizons of the business cycle, the political cycle, 
and technocratic authorities, like central banks, who are bound 
15 Speech by Mr Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of 




by their mandates. He said the outer boundaries of the horizon 
were about a decade.
He pointed to three kinds of risk:
 – First, physical risks: the impacts today on insurance liabilities 
and the value of physical assets that arise from climate- and 
weather-related events.
 – Second, liability risks: the impacts that could arise tomorrow 
if parties who have suffered loss or damage from the effects 
of climate change seek compensation from those they hold 
responsible.
 – Finally, transition risks: the financial risks which could result 
from the process of adjustment towards a lower-carbon econ-
omy. Changes in policy, technology and physical risks could 
prompt a reassessment of the value of a large range of assets 
as costs and opportunities become apparent.
Perhaps the most important document on global ‘green’ finan-
cial policy following the Carney speech was prepared by the Task 
Force on Climate-Related Financial Risk Disclosures (TCFD). The 
final conclusions were published in 2017. In the letter introduc-
ing the report16 to the Financial Stability Board of the Bank for 
International Settlements, on behalf of the Task Force, Michael 
Bloomberg writes:
The Task Force’s report establishes recommendations for disclos-
ing clear, comparable and consistent information about the risks 
and opportunities presented by climate change. Their widespread 
adoption will ensure that the effects of climate change become 
routinely considered in business and investment decisions. Adop-
tion of these recommendations will also help companies better 
demonstrate responsibility and foresight in their consideration of 
climate issues. That will lead to smarter, more efficient allocation 
of capital, and help smooth the transition to a more sustainable, 
low-carbon economy.
No doubt partly in response to the TCFD proposals, the EU, among 
other governments, has been actively promoting greater disclo-
sure of climate-related financial risks and more generally sustain-
able finance. In 2018, the EU published its Action Plan: Financing 
16 TCFD, «Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclo-
sures», Final Report, June 2017. Consulted 12.01.2021.
The impact of COVID-19 on the energy transition: a global perspective
59
Sustainable Growth17, which outlined a number of measures that 
influence both the EU’s own financing decisions and decisions by 
the private sector. These measures aimed to:
 – reorient capital flows towards sustainable investment in order 
to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth;
 – manage financial risks stemming from climate change, re-
source depletion, environmental degradation and social is-
sues; and
 – foster transparency and long-termism in financial and eco-
nomic activity.
The EU has built on this action plan and adopted a taxonomy to 
guide and encourage investment in sustainable businesses18.
The pressure from financial regulators has continued to grow 
during the pandemic, with the US Fed announcing in December 
2020 that it had formally joined the Network of Central Banks 
and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), 
as a Member. At that time, the NGFS had 83 Members and 13 
Observers19.
In parallel, private banks have been committing to support 
decarbonisation. For instance, the UNEP FI project (Finance Ini-
tiative of the United Nations Environment Programme) includes 
38 banks from across all six continents who have committed to 
align their loan portfolios (i.e., to finance businesses committed 
to the environment) with the global climate goal to limit warming 
to well-below two degrees, striving for 1.5ºC20.
Investment
The financial regulatory pressure, along with political and eco-
nomic evidence that decarbonisation was becoming economically 
more attractive, had an impact on private investment decisions in 
the energy sector well before COVID-19. For instance, according to 
17 European Commission, «Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth», Document 
52018DC0097, Brussels, 8 March 2018. Consulted 06.01.2021.
18 Helena Viñes Fiestas, «Post-COVID-19 green recovery through the lens of an inves-
tor», Oxford Energy Forum 123, July 2020. Consulted 14.01.2021.
19 Membership of the NGFS- Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening 
the Financial System as of 14 December 2020. Consulted 08.01.2021.
20 GASCUEÑA, Dory, «38 banks against climate change: what are they achieving?», 
BBVA, 10 December 2020. Consulted 08.01.2021.
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Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF)21, nearly 78% of new gen-
eration capacity added globally in 2019 was in wind, solar, biomass 
and waste, geothermal and small hydro. Investment in renewa-
bles, excluding large hydro, was more than three times that of new 
fossil fuel plants. This brought the share of renewables in global 
generation to 13.4 percent, up from 12.4% in 2018 and 5.9% in 
2009. In the transport sector, sales of electric vehicles rose to 2.1 
million globally in 2018, a 40% year-on-year increase, albeit on a 
small base relative to total vehicle sales. It is certainly true that 
the increased investment in renewables and EVs reflected policy 
support. Nevertheless, it also reflected investor confidence in the 
future of decarbonised energy and ‘green’ industries and diminish-
ing confidence in the prospects for fossil-fuel based companies and 
the industries that relied on fossil fuels.
In spite of the economic crisis, the investment trend towards green 
energy appears to have continued during the pandemic, both on 
the stock market and in direct investment in certain assets, espe-
cially renewable power. For example, Tesla’s share value rose by 
700% over 2020, making Elon Musk the wealthiest man in the 
world, with Tesla worth more than the nine largest automobile 
manufacturers22. The rising value of Tesla also reflects the view 
that the company is actually investing in a decarbonised energy 
system, including EV’s, rooftop solar panels and the Powerwall 
battery. Other stock market examples are the rising share val-
ues of electricity companies that have strongly committed them-
selves to renewables (Enel, Iberdrola, Orsted)23 and the falling 
value of oil stocks24.
One reflection of the energy transition is the declining global 
investment in fossil fuels since 2014 compared to the steady 
investment levels in electricity. It is worth stressing that costs of 
renewable power have fallen substantially, so generation capacity 
additions can rise when investment amounts are steady or even 
potentially when they fall.
21 Bloomberg New Energy Finance, «Falling Clean Energy Costs Can Provide Oppor-
tunity to Boost Climate Action in COVID-19 Recovery Packages», 10 June 2020. Con-
sulted 05.01.2021.
22 KOLODNY, Lora & WAYLAND, Michael, «Tesla’s market cap tops the 9 largest au-
tomakers combined- Experts disagree about if it can last», CNBC 14 December 2020. 
Consulted: 08.01.2021.
23 ADEEB, Maryam, «Top 20 European utilities gain €74.1B market value in Q3», S&P 
Global, 14 October 2020. Consulted 08.01.2021.
24 HUME, Neil & RAVAL, Anjli, «European oil stocks dealt €360bn blow white renew-
ables surge», Financial Times, 29 October 2020. Consulted 08.01.2021.
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Because Figure 2 includes fossil fuel investments in power, it hides 
the continuing strength of investment in renewable power during 
the COVID-19 pandemic. In November 2020, the IEA’s main case 
scenario was that renewable electricity capacity additions would 
be almost 4% higher in 2020 than in 2019. They expected renew-
ables to account for almost 90% of additional capacity. This was 
in spite of a very slow start to the year.
Supply chain disruptions and construction delays slowed the 
progress of renewable energy projects in the first six months of 
2020. However, construction activity did not halt in many coun-
tries even during full/partial lockdowns, manufacturing activ-
ity has ramped up quickly, and logistical challenges have been 
mostly resolved with the easing of cross-border restrictions since 
mid-May. Monthly capacity additions through September have 
exceeded previous expectations, pointing to a faster recovery in 
Europe, the United States and China. As a result, the forecast for 
2020 has been revised upwards by over 18% from our previous 
update in May25.
Figure 3 illustrates the IEA’s forecast of investment growth in 
renewables in 2020 and 2021, well ahead of forecasts they made 
for both years in May 2020 (the yellow dots).
While the investment signals increasingly favour the transition 
away from hydrocarbons, the penetration of decarbonised energy 
25 International Energy Agency, Renewables 2020 Analysis and forecast to 2025, No-
vember 2020. Consulted 23.01.2021.
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Over the last ten years, power sector spending has been relatively stable compared with the 
rollercoaster ride for oil and gas 
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Figure 2. Global investment in energy supply.




is still very low. Fast growth rates reflect the low bases. Over 80% 
of energy continues to be from fossil fuels. Even the power sector 
which was decarbonising most rapidly continues to rely heavily 
on fossil fuels, in particular coal, as illustrated by this BNEF graph 
below (Figure 4). However, this graph also illustrates the expecta-
tion, which was widely shared before COVID-19, for much deeper 
decarbonisation of the power sector from 2020-2050.
Before COVID-19, the oil companies were already predicting a 
significant decline in the role of oil, gas and especially coal, along 
Renewables 2020 Renewable electricity 
Analysis and forecast to 2025 















Renewable power markets are more resilient than 
previously thought 
The IEA main case scenario forecasts that the increase in net renewable electricity
capacity additions will be almost 4% higher in 2020 than in 2019. This means the world 
is expected to install over 198 GW of renewable capacity this year, breaking another 
record, accounting for almost 90% of the increase in total power capacity. Higher
additions of wind (+8%) and hydropower (+43 %) are expected in 2020, while solar PV
growth remains stable. More utility-scale PV plants will be installed, while growth in 
distributed PV systems decreases almost 8% as individuals and companies reprioritise 
investments in light of the economic crisis. 
IEA. All rights reserved. 
Supply chain disruptions and construction delays slowed the progress of renewable 
energy projects in the first six months of 2020. However, construction activity did not 
halt in many countries even during full/partial lockdowns, manufacturing activity has 
ramped up quickly, and logistical challenges have been mostly resolved with the easing 
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Figure 3. Renewable electricity net capacity additions by technology, main 
and accelerated cases, 2013-22.
Source: Renewables 2020: Analysis and Forecast to 2025, International 
Energy Agency, November 2020.
Figure 4. Global electricity generation mix
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Outlook 2020, p8, Bloomberg NEF.
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with rising renewables and electrification, but they expected a 
smooth transition that would give them time to adapt. In 2017, 
the CEO of Shell said that his next car would be electric, and he 
predicted that electricity’s share of energy demand would rise 
from 20% in 2019 to about 50% in 2050. In 2020, BP published 
its own Energy Outlook26, which included three scenarios that 
all reflected the declining share of hydrocarbons and the rise of 
renewables over the period to 2050. In one of the scenarios (Net 
Zero), its projection was that renewables would account for 60% 
of primary energy and hydrocarbons for 20% in 2050.
Civil society
Partly because of clear evidence of a changing climate, we have 
seen growing citizen awareness and perception of climate change 
as a reality, as well as evidence of the energy transition gaining 
momentum.
Special mention of Greta Thunberg is important, not just because 
she has galvanised support for action to fight climate change, 
especially among the young, but because she is perceived by the 
fossil fuel community as a ‘tsunami’. The term used by some in 
that community reflects both the power of the wave and perhaps 
their hope that the wave will recede.
It is interesting to note a move to involve citizens directly in policy 
making (or thinking) through Citizen Assemblies. Between 2016 
and 2018, Ireland held a number of these assemblies to address 
difficult policy issues, including same-sex marriage, abortion and 
climate change. The assemblies there were designed to feed ideas 
directly into the existing political process rather than to replace 
it. A number of countries, including the UK and France, have 
adopted similar assemblies to engage citizens in decisions about 
the energy transition and climate change, and others, including 
Spain, are planning to do so27.
Resistance weakening
Prior to COVID-19, there remained strong resistance to decar-
bonisation from part of the fossil fuel community, especially the 
26 BP Energy Outlook 2020.Consulted 28.12.2020.
27 FARAND, Chloé, «Citizen’s assemblies on climate change seek to shape the post-
Covid recovery», Climate Home News, 17 April 2020. Consulted 08.01.2021.
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US-based oil, gas and coal companies and from countries that are 
either major exporters of fossil fuels or see fossil fuels as their 
best bet for economic development.
However, the resistance to the energy transition was weakening 
well before COVID-19 and has weakened further during the pan-
demic. For fossil fuel companies, this was mainly because the eco-
nomic, political, financial, legal and social conditions were forcing 
the fossil-fuel companies to disclose their climate-related finan-
cial risks and because these companies were increasingly aware 
that they needed to decarbonize. In 2019, a number of oil and 
gas companies, mainly European (Shell, Total, BP), had already 
announced plans to reduce their emissions and shift investment 
to electricity, and at least one (Repsol) had announced plans to be 
a net-zero emissions company by 205028. During the pandemic, 
Exxon announced a new five-year plan to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, including from methane flaring and upstream opera-
tions, which it said were in line with the Paris Agreement reduc-
tion targets29.
In developing countries, financial and political support from China 
to build carbon-intensive infrastructure through the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) resulted in coal-fired plants being built in many 
developing countries. However, even before COVID-19, the Chi-
nese BRI was running into trouble30. For example, lending by the 
China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China is 
reported to have collapsed from a peak of $75bn in 2016 to just 
$4bn in 2019. The main reasons for this appear to be that recip-
ients of the loans were unable to pay their debts and that there 
was international criticism of the BRI for lack of transparency or 
social and environmental impact studies.
Resistance to decarbonisation also comes from countries whose 
economies and security depend on fossil fuels. These include 
major exporters of fossil fuels (e.g. Middle East, Russia) as well 
as countries which rely on domestic fossil fuels and are concerned 
that decarbonisation means rising energy costs and weakened 
security (e.g. China, Poland, India). But all of these countries are 
28 Repsol será compañía cero emisiones netas en 2050, Repsol Strategic Plan 2021-
25. Consulted 29.12.2020.
29 ROSENBAUM, Eric, «Oil giant Exxon Mobil pushes new climate change plan as activ-
ist investors circle», CNBC, 14 December 2020. Consulted 08.01.2021.
30 WHEATLEY, Jonathan & KYNGE, James, «China curtails overseas lending in face 
of geopolitical backlash», Financial Times, 8 December 2020. Consulted 10.12.2020.
The impact of COVID-19 on the energy transition: a global perspective
65
aware that decarbonisation is now inevitable, even if they would 
like to slow it down.
Key Messages
The first message is that energy transition was already under-
way and gaining momentum before COVID-19, in response to 
growing pressures. The second is that, from this overview, these 
pressures continued to exert influence during the pandemic, and 
that some of them intensified further, especially from the finan-
cial sector. Indeed, growing investment in renewables during the 
pandemic is evidence of the particular strength of this part of 
the energy transition. However, fossil fuels continued to supply 
over 80% of world energy supplies and most forecasts assumed 
that fossil fuel demand would only begin to peak after 2030. The 
remainder of this chapter argues that the pandemic has created 
the conditions for an acceleration of the energy transition.
Lessons from COVID-19 that support the energy transition
COVID-19 has revealed a number of policies and human behav-
iours that have contributed to the pandemic and that need to 
change in order to avoid future pandemics and other global cri-
ses, in particular accelerated climate change, ocean degradation 
and loss of biodiversity. These lessons reinforce the case for the 
energy transition and offer some guidance on the respective roles 
of government and civil society.
The change we need
Respect for the natural world
The pandemic should be a wake-up call about the consequences 
of human disrespect for the natural world. A World Wildlife Fund 
report31 explains how this disrespect (or encroachment) has 
caused wildlife populations to plunge over five decades and sig-
nals a broken relationship with nature that helped trigger the 
global coronavirus pandemic. In their view, the coronavirus pan-
demic was caused by the sort of «spillover» of a zoonotic virus 
that is becoming more common as humans expand their foot-
31 «Living Planet Report 2020- Bending the curve of biodiversity loss», 2020, World 
Wildlife Fund. Consulted 11.01.2021.
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print: it should be viewed as «an SOS signal for the human enter-
prise»32. In response to that signal, the energy transition is an 
important move in the right direction, towards greater respect for 
the natural world.
A long-term view and the precautionary principle
A second and related problem is that key decisions, especially 
policy and investment decisions, are taken with a relatively short-
term time horizon. As mentioned in the last section, Mark Car-
ney has argued that this leads to the tragedy of the horizon: 
the impacts of our decisions are evident well beyond the period 
that most actors consider. These decisions impose costs on future 
generations that the current generation has no direct incentive 
to fix until it is too late. The response to this tragedy should 
be to demand of ourselves, policy makers and investors a much 
longer-term view of the consequences of our decisions, and to 
apply the precautionary principle when there is a material prob-
ability of contributing to environmental or human catastrophe. A 
successful energy transition is consistent with taking a longer-
term view and policies should be designed precisely with this 
guidance in mind.
Early action to stop a crisis from becoming uncontrollable 
Although a long-term view is required to avoid a crisis, COVID-
19 illustrates the consequences of acting too late when a crisis 
arrives. Those countries that moved swiftly to stop the pan-
demic were able to control it and to return to relative normality 
quickly. Those that did not move swiftly found themselves with 
problems of increasing intensity, leading to increasingly severe 
policy responses which some cultures (especially in the US) 
resist. This seems exactly analogous to the harsh cutbacks in 
emissions that will now be required to meet emission reduction 
goals because the world did not act earlier. The slower we move 
on the energy transition, the greater will be the intensity of the 
climate change problem, the severity of measures to manage 
it and the potential for serious political, economic and social 
consequences.
32 BRULLIARD, Karin, «Humans are decimating wildlife, and the pandemic is a sign, 
report says», The Washington Post, 10 September 2020. Consulted 08.01.2021.
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Global cooperation to deliver global public goods
Global pandemics are like climate change and nuclear prolifer-
ation. They have the potential to impact the lives of everyone 
because their effects cross borders. Dealing with pandemics and 
other global crises requires international cooperation. By con-
trast, the responses to COVID-19 have mainly been national or 
regional, as if the pandemic and its effects could be stopped from 
crossing borders. Furthermore, COVID-19 has accentuated health 
disparities within and between countries, regions and continents, 
with the global scramble for vaccines being a sad example. The 
lesson is that global cooperation is required to avoid crises and 
to deal with them when they occur. The energy transition has the 
potential to contribute to the global public good of a safe environ-
ment. For it to do so will require global collective action, includ-
ing policies to address the negative consequences of the energy 
transition, with ‘fair transition’ plans that apply both domestically 
and internationally.
Support for science and innovation
2020 has confirmed the importance of science and innovation. On 
the one hand, the chaotic initial response to the virus revealed 
the failure of the funding of scientific research prior to the pan-
demic, and more generally the failure of preparation, especially 
in western nations. This was in spite of warnings from scientists 
and others about the growing likelihood of global pandemics. On 
the other hand, the rapid analysis of the underlying genome of 
the virus and the successful development of effective vaccines in 
record time are undeniable evidence of the role that science can 
play in making the world a safer place for all. Indeed, science has 
been an example of outstanding international cooperation during 
the pandemic. In the words of the European Parliament:
Despite rising geopolitical tensions, the pandemic has thus 
opened a window of opportunity for reinforced scientific 
cooperation and a global approach to health. Not only has 
the pandemic spurred a sense of urgency for such a global 
scientific approach but also do today’s technologies today 
allow for it – which for instance was not the case during 
the HIV epidemic in the 1980s and 1990s. This need has 
been acknowledged by leaders across the globe; for instance 
at a UNESCO meeting with representatives of ministries in 
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charge of sciences in 122 countries as well as the EU, the 
African Union, and the WHO33.
This has implications for the energy transition:
 – First, it is a reminder of the importance of listening to the 
scientific evidence when making political decisions. Given the 
overwhelming scientific consensus that decarbonisation is 
key to fighting climate change and that the remaining carbon 
budget is very limited, the case for a rapid energy transition 
is increasingly clear.
 – Second, the failure to fund research prior to COVID-19 is a 
cautionary tale. RD&D is essential to develop the necessary 
technologies and services to mitigate climate change and to 
adapt to it. This is not simply a matter of political decisions, 
although public funding for basic research is economically jus-
tified due the potential welfare benefits that would not be real-
ised if all research were to be privately funded. It is also about 
creating the right political context, financial markets and oth-
er institutions to fund RD&D and to bring new zero-carbon 
technologies to market.
 – Third, COVID-19 is an illustration of the enormous cost of not 
being prepared for something that is inevitable. There was 
sufficient evidence from the scientific community that a pan-
demic was inevitable to warrant dedicating the necessary re-
sources to being prepared for it34. The failure to plan was, 
as they say, a plan to fail. The costs of being unprepared for 
the inevitable are counted in human lives and suffering as 
well as in the enormous economic disruption caused. The con-
sequences of not being prepared for climate change are far 
greater.
 – Fourth, the pandemic, and the incredible science-based re-
sponse to it, have (I hope) augmented people’s trust in sci-
ence, even if they don’t know anything about gene sequencing, 
bioengineering or other contributors to understanding and 
now responding to the threat of the novel coronavirus. Any 
such increase in people’s confidence in biological science may 
33 European Parliament, Policy Department for External Relations, «The Geopo-
litical Implications of the COVID-19 pandemic», p35, September 2020. Consulted 
28.12.2020.
34 MARANTZ HENIG, Robin, «Experts warned of a pandemic decades ago. Why weren’t 
we ready?», National Geographic, 8 April 2020. Consulted 29.12.2020.
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carry over into other areas of science, notably climate sci-
ence, another area where the general population has no real 
understanding and where interested parties (coal, oil, gas and 
other profit-seeking entities) have stoked considerable scepti-
cism about climate change (causes and consequences) in that 
general population.
Increasing citizen awareness of the case for change
COVID-19 generally confirms that we are able and willing to 
change the way we live and behave, when ‘necessary’. However, 
for most of us, the experience is very unwelcome, in particular 
being confined to our homes, wearing masks, social distancing, 
and not visiting friends and family. We would not want this to be a 
permanent and forced change in lifestyle. This experience should 
serve to make citizens more aware of the risks to our lives asso-
ciated with irreversible deterioration of the environment.
On the other hand, COVID-19 has rewarded citizens with the 
return of blue skies, birdsong and relative quiet, especially in 
urban areas35. David Attenborough was especially pleased not 
to hear the sound of airplanes landing every 30 seconds over his 
house in London. No one expects the world to remain this way 
once the worst of COVID-19 is in our rear-view mirror. But it is 
surely reasonable to expect people to be more sensitive to the 
value of the environment and to do more to protect the basic 
pleasures it offers.
The COVID-19 experience has contributed positively to our social 
lives in other ways: understanding the potential for technology to 
connect us, allowing some to work from home36, recovering and 
visiting rural areas as we travel within our confined national or 
regional spaces, and creating a sense of community37 and soli-
darity with those who are hardest hit by the pandemic, and with 
those who have been so critical to surviving the pandemic.
35 European Parliament, Policy Department for External Relations, «The Geopo-
litical Implications of the COVID-19 pandemic», p40, September 2020. Consulted 
28.12.2020.
36 BAILEY, Joel & NEUFELD, Peter, EY, «How is COVID-19 continuing to change hu-
man behaviour and affect our ways of living and working?», 18 June 2020. Consulted 
27.12.2020.
37 BRADSHAW, Alan, World Economic Forum, «How is COVID-19 affecting our day-to-
day behaviour?», 14 October 2020. Consulted 19.12.2020.
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In short, increased citizen awareness should contribute to an 
understanding of the potential benefits of the energy transition 
and the costs of being forced to change lifestyles in response to 
environmental and other crises that will be beyond our control if 
we do not act to contain them in time.
The role of government and civil society in shaping the energy 
transition
These lessons from COVID-19 offer some high-level guidance on 
how to shape the energy transition, in particular on the roles of 
government and civil society.
Government competence is key
Some governments were well prepared, acted swiftly and effec-
tively to stop the virus from spreading, and managed well the 
economic and social consequences. Others were totally unpre-
pared, very slow to react and ineffective in their management. 
A successful energy transition requires competent governments, 
whatever their political stripe.
Governments need to address social concerns
COVID-19 is both revealing and increasing inequality and pov-
erty within countries and among them; climate change would 
do the same, and the energy transition entails the same risk. 
In pursuing the energy transition, governments need to manage 
the social impacts carefully and think through their policies with 
them in mind, including the introduction of ‘fair transition’ mech-
anisms to support those most in need. COVID-19 experience also 
suggests that people are prepared to accept even quite harsh 
measures, at least temporarily, provided that they are confident 
that the measures are necessary and fair, that there is a coherent 
strategy, and that there is light at the end of the tunnel. In a sit-
uation with radical uncertainties, but a need to take strong policy 
measures, the best way to maintain public trust is to operate 
transparently and keep the messaging clear and straightforward.
Governments must work with business and civil society
Governments in the world’s largest economies are responding to 
COVID-19 with stimulus packages to aid the economic recovery, 
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drawing on fiscal and monetary resources. There is widespread 
support for governments playing this role. If the funds are chan-
nelled effectively, this is undoubtedly good news. Nevertheless, 
government control over the key investment decisions raises the 
risk of major and expensive policy mistakes that are paid for 
by today’s taxpayers and consumers and ultimately future gen-
erations. Planning has to be as robust as possible to minimize 
the risk of mistakes, especially in the use of public funds. It is 
important to ensure that those funds are channelled effectively 
and that they do not restrict innovation or impose unnecessary 
barriers to international trade and investment. This will require 
governments at all levels and in most countries to cooperate and 
to work closely with investors and citizens.
Key Messages
Lessons from COVID-19 support the energy transition and offer 
guidance on how to make the transition effective. In support 
of the energy transition, the pandemic is a cautionary tale that 
should remind us of the importance of respecting nature’s limits, 
thinking long-term, taking early action and adopting the precau-
tionary principle. In terms of making the energy transition effec-
tive, we should be more aware now of the importance of global 
cooperation, science and innovation and the critical role of com-
petent governments, especially in addressing social concerns and 
in working with civil society and private investors.
COVID-19: a glimpse of the future energy system?38
The question mark in the title to this section is intentional. It 
is not possible to say for certain what the impact of COVID-19 
will be for the energy transition. Many of the changes during 
COVID-19, especially in energy demand, may be reversed when 
the pandemic is over. However, the first part of this section iden-
tifies a number of features of the energy scene during COVID-19 
which seem consistent with forecasts for the longer term in many 
climate scenarios. The second part looks in more detail at some 
early glimpses of a future decarbonized electricity sector and 
their possible implications for policy and strategy. The third part 
38 This section draws on KEAY, Malcolm & ROBINSON, David, «COVID-19: Glimps-




indicates what sorts of change could be in the cards in relation to 
oil and gas and what they might imply for industry strategies and 
business models.
Early glimpses of the future energy sector?
During the COVID-19 epidemic, the world has witnessed changes 
which are consistent with developments that have been widely 
forecast for 2030 and beyond. Some of the changes are reflected 
in Figure 5, which is the IEA’s forecasts for 2020, as of November 
of that year.
Global energy demand will fall by almost 6%, roughly equivalent 
to the increase of the last five years. Of that, coal demand will fall 
by about 7%, and oil demand by almost 9%, equivalent to almost 
a decade of growth39.
Renewables are the only energy source with rising demand. The 
IEA forecast a rise of 1% in demand for renewables. This demand 
figure is the net result of an increase of more than 6% in the 
39 SMITH, Grant, «Oil Nations’ Summer of Strife Offers Glimpse of Pain to Come», 
Bloomberg, 12 August 2020. Consulted: 05.01.2021.
Figure 5: Key estimated energy demand, CO2 emissions and investment 
indicators, 2020 relative to 2019
Source: World Energy Outlook 2020, International Energy Agency. Release 
date: October 2020.
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demand for renewable electricity and a decline in the demand for 
other renewables (e.g. biofuels for transport).
Although global investment in energy is expected to fall by 
almost 20% in 2020, this is not a glimpse of the future. Invest-
ment in energy will rise very substantially in future. However, 
COVID-19 did illustrate how investment would shift, namely 
towards renewables and electricity and away from fossil fuels. 
As illustrated earlier in Figure 3, investment in additional renew-
ables generation capacity increased in 2020 by over 4% com-
pared to 2019.
Global emissions fell by almost 7%, mainly due to declining 
demand and also due to a rising share of renewable energy. 
Declining global energy demand is not consistent with most pre-
dictions, but the rising share of renewables certainly is.
Electricity
Beyond the changes in overall energy demand and investment, 
there were a few glimpses of special relevance for the power 
sector.
 – A shift towards electricity, especially residential use. Electric-
ity demand has fallen by much less than demand for other 
energies, due to increasing residential electricity consump-
tion, matching a shift seen in many decarbonisation scenarios 
(although most previous scenarios expect this shift due to the 
expected electrification of transport and heating, not to peo-
ple being confined at home).
 – Absorbing renewables has presented major challenges. Rising 
renewable output and lower demand have caused problems 
for many systems.
 – Falling and negative wholesale electricity prices coincide with 
rising final tariffs. Lower demand and rising renewable output 
is driving wholesale prices down, while negative prices have 
become more common as generators have to be paid to re-
duce output in the face of low and inflexible demand. In a small 
number of cases, consumers have been able to benefit from 
these negative wholesale prices. More commonly, final tariffs 
(per unit consumed) are rising or will rise to recover fixed 
costs from lower throughput, renewable subsidies that rose 
with higher renewable output and higher balancing charges. 
Rising tariffs per unit of output could be consistent with falling 
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bills if total consumption is falling. But during the pandemic, 
residential consumption has been rising due to confinement 
and home working.
 – Digitalisation and the role of electricity. Confinement at home 
has significantly increased consumer use of the internet for 
home working, shopping online and communications. The 
accelerated digitalisation of society is consistent with an in-
crease in the potential for more active consumer participation 
in the power sector.
By way of illustration, here is a short summary of some of the 
changes witnessed in the UK electricity sector during 2020.
 – Increased generation from intermittent renewables, especially 
wind and solar PV. At times intermittent renewables as a whole 
have reached 60% or more of generation: during the week-
end of 23/24 May renewable generation in the UK amounted 
to 73% of the total. On December 26, Great Britain reached 
a new, green milestone when wind turbines generated more 
than half of its total electricity.
 – Growing decentralization. Generation from decentralised 
sources has grown – for instance, output of solar power (main-
ly decentralised) at its peak on 20 April 2020 met around 30% 
of UK demand, a record.
 – Falling carbon intensity. This reached the lowest level record-
ed, at 46g/kWh - well below the target for 2030 and a reduc-
tion of over 90% compared with the 1990 baseline. Changes 
on the supply side are capable of meeting even very ambitious 
carbon targets.
 – Increased volatility in generation. For instance, during the 
week commencing 4 May, wind averaged 9.2% of the gener-
ation mix for the first six days of the week before jumping to 
41% on 10 May. This creates a need for flexibility.
 – Rising element of fixed costs and falling flexibility. With the 
still significant nuclear component and rising renewable out-
put, the dominant element in the cost structure of generation 
was capital, rather than marginal cost, and the flexibility of 
generation has diminished substantially.
 – Increasing cost of balancing. The penetration of intermittent 
renewables requires flexible resources to balance supply and 
demand. As the share of renewables rose during COVID-19, 
so did the cost of balancing the system. Whereas balancing 
costs were about 10% of generation costs in 2019, they rose 
to over 20% in the first half of 2020 (Figure 6).
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In short – in line with expectations for the future – the UK system 
has become much less carbon intensive, but it has also had to 
adapt much more rapidly and flexibly than in the past and with-
out the tools it used to rely on.
Experience during COVID-19 has thus witnessed new patterns of 
energy demand and supply in line with those that have been widely 
predicted for a more distant future. It may prove helpful that the 
future has arrived more quickly than expected (even if only on a 
temporary basis). In the process, we may be able to learn some 
practical lessons which, while consistent with the general trends 
above, were not necessarily obvious in advance. For instance, here 
are some possible lessons for the future from the UK.
 – Role of nuclear. Many industry observers have seen decarbon-
isation as paving the way for a nuclear renaissance, arguing 
that no other source can provide large quantities of secure, 
carbon-free ‘baseload’ power. But experience in 2020 sug-
gests that nuclear may not be such a good ‘fit’ in a decarbon-
ised system – the concept of ‘baseload’ is getting less relevant 
and large quantities of inflexible generation are proving more 
Drax Electric Insights Quarterly – Q2 2020
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5. The cost of staying in control
The cost of keeping Britain’s power system stable has 
soared, and now adds 20% onto the cost of generating 
electricity. The actions that National Grid takes to manage 
the power system have typically amounted to 5% of 
generation costs over the last decade, but this share has 
quadrupled over the last two years. In the first half of 2020, 
the cost of these actions averaged £100 million per month.
Supplying electricity to our homes and workplaces needs 
more than just power stations generating electricity. Supply 
and demand must be kept perfectly in balance, and flows of 
electricity around the country must be actively managed to 
keep all the interconnected components stable and prevent 
blackouts. National Grid’s costs for taking these actions  
have been on the rise, as we reported over the previous  
two summers; but recently they have skyrocketed. 
At the start of the decade, balancing added about £1/MWh to 
the cost of electricity, but last quarter it surpassed £5/MWh 
for the first time (see below). Balancing prices have risen 
in step with the share of variable renewables. The dashed 
line below shows that every extra percent of electricity 
supplied by wind and solar adds 10 pence per MWh to the 
balancing price. Last quarter really bucks this trend though, 
and balancing prices have risen 35% above the level expected 
from this trend. The UK Energy Research Centre predicted 
that wind and solar would add up to £5/MWh to the cost of 
electricity due to their intermittency, and Britain has now 
reached this point, albeit a few years earlier than expected.
This is partly because keeping the power system stable is 
requiring more interventions than ever before. With low 
demand and high renewable generation, National Grid is 
having to order more wind farms to reduce their output, at a 
cost of around £20 million per month. They even had to take 
out a £50+ million contract to reduce the output from the 
Sizewell B nuclear reactor at times of system stress.
The quarterly-average cost of balancing the 
power system, expressed as a percentage of the 
cost of generation
Balancing price shown against share of variable 
renewables, with dots showing the average over 















Share of generation from wind and solar
(£ / MWh)
Figure 6: Great Britain electricity system balancing cost as share of 
generation cost
Source – Drax Electric Insights: Q2_Report, p9.
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of a problem than a solution in a renewables dominated sys-
tem. An agreement reached this spring between the UK Elec-
tricity System Operator (UKESO) and EDF Energy to reduce 
output from the 1.2GW Sizewell B nuclear power station was 
one illustration of the problem. If nuclear is to have a role in 
the low carbon future it may have to be by providing flexibility, 
rather than baseload power. Indeed, in France, this seems to 
be happening already – the head of the French system oper-
ator described the company as being ‘permanent acrobats’ in 
a new sport40. The design and operation of any new nuclear 
plants may need to be based on their acrobatic abilities.
 – Role of the demand side. Although overall energy demand has 
seen the big shifts described above, electricity demand has 
in fact changed relatively little (at least in terms of the scale 
of the changes needed to make a significant contribution to 
decarbonisation) and its role may need to be rethought. Tra-
ditionally, the demand side has been seen as passive and the 
main policy focus has been on energy efficiency. Even in rela-
tion to ‘demand response’ most attention has been on shifting 
consumption away from times of peak demand. But recent 
experience has created a new focus on peak supply and the 
need to find efficient ways of increasing demand to match it 
(e.g. by filling storage). However, the instruments for doing 
so remain rudimentary – negative wholesale prices rarely get 
through to consumers. They have been supplemented by ad 
hoc instruments like the UKESO’s Optional Downward Flexibil-
ity Management (ODFM) service to encourage large users and 
generators to increase demand or reduce generation respec-
tively during low demand periods, but these remain marginal 
elements. In the longer term, as an article by Keay and Rob-
inson argues, more fundamental market reforms will be need-
ed to encourage active consumer participation and they have 
proposed a new ’two market’ approach41 for this purpose.
 – Platforms. The old model of electricity supply was straight-
forward – electricity flowed from a central generating unit, 
through transmission and distribution systems, to the con-
sumer. Now the picture is much more complicated. Not only 
are consumers increasingly active participants via flexible de-
40 https://www.web24.news/u/2020/04/containment-drops-electricity-consump-
tion-by-20-in-france.html. Consulted 09-04.2020.
41 KEAY, Malcolm & ROBINSON, David, «The Decarbonised Electricity System of the 
Future: The ‘Two Market’ Approach», The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, June 
2017, University of Oxford. Consulted 07.01.2021.
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mand, they may also be producers themselves (e.g. via rooftop 
solar panels) and their demand patterns may be more complex 
(e.g. for Electric Vehicles – EVs) while more real time infor-
mation about their consumption is available via smart meters. 
Meanwhile, a host of other sources (for instance, decentral-
ised generation, storage and community energy systems) also 
need to be coordinated. Future business models may depend 
on the effectiveness of a company’s platforms for integrating 
all the sources in real time, just as Uber, which is essentially a 
platform, has revolutionised the car hire business42.
These glimpses from the UK demonstrate that while new technol-
ogies such as wind and solar are needed to reduce carbon emis-
sions, they are not the end of the story. Their effect is to change 
the whole underlying operation and dynamics of the system. 
The electricity sector is moving from a position where flexible 
generation responds to uncertain demand, to one where flexible 
demand is needed to respond to uncertain generation output. 
This is especially true in areas where local demand flexibility can 
match local renewable output. Furthermore, we are not speaking 
about shifting demand from predictable peaks to predictable off-
peak periods for an entire system. Rather, we need demand to 
respond to very uncertain solar and wind output that can be very 
local (imagine cloud cover reducing solar output at short notice).
There are many proposals being discussed to introduce flexi-
ble demand, ranging from different time of use (ToU) tariffs to 
encourage demand response, to allowing the sale of demand 
flexibility in energy and ancillary service markets, to more funda-
mental reforms along the lines of the Keay and Robinson article 
referred to earlier. These two authors argue that reforms need 
to reflect the changes underway in the electricity industry that 
have been driven by two main forces: the increasing penetration 
of intermittent renewable sources; and developments in informa-
tion technology, potentially transforming the capacity of electric 
power companies and consumers to control, monitor and coor-
dinate different sources and activities. Together these develop-
ments have fundamentally changed the nature and operations 
of the sector, turning it ‘upside down’. Figure 7 summarises the 
ways in which the industry of the future is likely to differ from the 
one we have been familiar with in the past.
42 See for instance: Strategic partnership with Octopus Energy to transform Origin’s 
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Figure 7. Projected changes to the electricity industry.
Source: KEAY, Malcolm & ROBINSON, David, «Glimpses of the future energy 
system? Demand flexibility and a proposal for a special auction», Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies, October 2020, Consulted 10 January 2021.
Oil, gas and coal corporate strategy
The key message from the electricity sector experience and 
glimpses of its future – that a change in energy sources changes 
the whole underlying operation and dynamics of the energy sys-
tem – applies equally to oil, gas and coal companies facing a 
decarbonised future. The energy transition will require new ways 
of thinking, and new business models.
It is difficult to imagine a new business model for coal companies 
unless they are able to develop carbon capture, utilisation and 
storage (CCUS) technologies that meet increasingly tight carbon 
emission standards.
In transport and heating, as in electricity, the energy transition 
will not be simply a matter of replacing fossil sources by renew-
ables; companies will need to consider the dynamics of the new 
system in prospect and their role in it. Technology change will 
of course be required as a first step, probably to a mixture of 
electricity and hydrogen. But either approach leads to a com-
pletely new set of system requirements. For instance, EVs would 
be an active part of the complex new electricity system described 
above – a main source of short-term storage and flexibility. Gov-
ernment policy and corporate strategy for energy and transport 
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companies will have to change to reflect the nature of the new 
business. Likewise, if (green or blue) hydrogen43 is used for res-
idential and industrial heating, this will almost certainly require 
government policy and corporate strategy that combines electric-
ity with hydrogen gas infrastructure.
The new platforms described above, which may be a key source 
of competitive advantage, will also help to link transport, heating 
and electricity sectors. In this new world, companies will need to 
think about the energy system as a whole, not just about particu-
lar sectors like transport or heat.
But, while electrification will be one key vector for decarbonis-
ing transport, buildings and some industrial sectors, it will also 
need to be integrated with a range of non-electric technologies, 
including decarbonised gases, thermal water storage, wastewa-
ter heating and cooling systems and more. Downstream, energy 
system platforms will assist in the optimization of all energy ser-
vices, not just electricity.
Upstream, energy system thinking is also important – perhaps 
particularly for hydrogen, because the economics almost certainly 
require combining multiple end-product markets for hydrogen in 
multiple countries, which in turn requires coordination of infra-
structures both between and within countries. For instance, in 
June 2020 Repsol announced a project combining green hydrogen 
from electrolysis with CO2 to produce lower-emissions transpor-
tation fuels44. Projects like Repsol’s, linking electricity, hydrogen 
and transport, may be the norm rather than the exception in 
future; companies will need the skills and expertise to prosper in 
this complex new world.
Key messages
COVID-19 is offering us some early glimpses of what most longer-
term forecasts anticipate for the energy sector. They offer some 
guidance (what to do and what not to do or avoid) for policy mak-
ers and energy companies. Electricity companies have already 
had ten years to adapt to an industry turned upside down by 
43 Green hydrogen is produced via electrolysis using renewable electricity. Blue hy-
drogen refers to hydrogen produced from fossil fuels, where the carbon emissions are 
captured and stored. 
44 For this fuel to be zero-emissions would require the CO2 to come from air capture. 
If the CO2 came from the combustion of fossil fuels, there would be some CO2 emitted.
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decarbonisation and have had to develop new business models. 
Very few of them anticipated the enormous scale of the changes 
and it remains to be seen how many will succeed in the new busi-
ness environment. Oil and gas companies have not yet had to 
face the full force of this kind of systemic change; most of them 
used to argue that they would have time to adapt, using reve-
nues from existing businesses to make the needed adjustments. 
However, COVID-19 may be a useful wake-up call, not only for 
the energy sector, but also with respect to the need for advance 
planning which most western countries failed to do in the public 
health/scientific sector.
If there is one message for the energy sector it is that the energy 
business has changed: it is no longer about selling oil, gas, elec-
tricity and gradually changing to a lower carbon mix. We are 
entering into a new paradigm where bottom-up (technology and 
economics) and top-down (political) pressures are moving in the 
same direction, towards the need for integrated, fully decarbon-
ised energy systems, where consumer decisions are especially 
important. Corporate strategy for all energy companies needs to 
reflect this emerging new paradigm and the possibility that it will 
arrive faster than expected.
Green recovery and the energy transition
Recovery from COVID-19 is an opportunity to invest in the energy 
transition. As explained below, many governments have included 
‘green’ recovery measures in their crisis recovery packages – for 
example grants, public-private investment projects, loans and 
tax reliefs to support green transport, renewable energy, cir-
cular economy, and clean energy research, development and 
deployment. However, OECD country analysis of green recovery 
measures indicates that a number of governments have been 
using the post-COVID pandemic as an excuse to roll back exist-
ing environmental regulations and taxes, and increase fossil-fuel 
intensive infrastructure and electricity45. This section examines 
the economic case for a ‘green recovery´ from COVID-19 and 
illustrates how governments are furthering the energy transition 
through public funds and new policies.
 – First, COVID-19 has caused a serious economic crisis world-
wide that governments are trying to manage. Global gross 
45 OECD, «Focus on Green Recovery», 2021. Consulted 23.01.2021.
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domestic product (GDP) is projected to fall by more than 5% 
in 2020 and governments around the world are dedicating 
enormous resources to support economic activity, alleviate 
suffering and begin to put people back to work. Government 
spending on decarbonisation can advance goals in the areas 
of both economic recovery from the ravages of the pandemic 
and environmental protection. Government spending will con-
tinue, taking advantage of historically low interest rates. But 
with unemployment, economic hardship and a full economic 
recovery likely to take years, the challenge is to move beyond 
short-term spending and to focus on the opportunity to put 
countries on a more sustainable path.
 – Second, if governments are going to meet their decarbonisa-
tion commitments, they will have to adopt policies that allo-
cate investment to green energy, related infrastructure and 
industries that will consume green energy, for instance elec-
tric vehicles. One estimate is that with current and planned 
policies for the global energy sector, investments will be about 
$95 trillion over the period until 2050, and that an additional 
$15 trillion will be required fully to decarbonise the energy 
system. In total, this represents more than 2% of global GDP 
per year46. Most of these funds could come from private in-
vestors, but the latter may depend on government funding of 
pathbreaking projects and the development of related policies 
to support a coherent long-term strategy for attracting private 
investment for the transition.
 – Third, history suggests that recovery packages can play a role 
in the energy transition47, even when decarbonisation was not 
the primary motivation. In particular, the stimulus measures 
introduced in 2007-2009 included support for renewables that 
generated new domestic construction, installation and manu-
facturing jobs. In the US, loans, grants and tax credits helped 
to trigger growing investment in solar capacity and solar-relat-
ed projects. In Europe, stimulus investment in offshore wind 
and subsidies for wind power helped to make Europe the glob-
al leader in wind energy. In Northeast Asia, stimulus spending 
focused on ‘green industrial policy’ that helped China, South 
Korea and Japan to gain international competitiveness in so-
46 International Renewable Energy Agency, «Global energy transformation: A road-
map to 2050», 2019, p. 11. Consulted 12.01.2021.
47 JAEGER, Joel, World Resources Institute, «Lessons from the Great Recession for 
COVID-19 Green Recovery», November 24, 2020. Consulted: 03.01.2021
David Robinson
82
lar PV and battery technologies; as scale rose and costs fell, 
these Asian countries exported their products, enabling glob-
al penetration of renewable energy and advancing the date 
when EVs would be cost competitive with conventional vehi-
cles. These investments have not fundamentally altered the 
trajectory of GHG emissions to date, but they are contributing 
to the ongoing energy transition and have created competitive 
advantage for certain nations and companies.
 – Fourth, analytical support for green stimulus packages to 
recover from COVID-19 has come from influential reports 
prepared by respected thought leaders and institutions48. 
In particular, the Oxford Smith School of Enterprise and the 
Environment published a report49 in May that asked whether 
the recovery from COVID-19 would accelerate or retard pro-
gress in fighting climate change. The answer (summarizing 
the views of hundreds of experts and policy makers) was that 
some green investments to recover from the pandemic would 
not only stimulate the economy and create jobs in the short 
term, but also provide high positive impact on the environ-
ment and have a high long-run multiplier effect. In short, the 
authors argued that it makes no economic sense to invest in 
carbon-intensive industries and processes because they are 
not sustainable50.
For these reasons, most of the major economies have introduced 
or are planning to introduce some form of green recovery pack-
age. Governments in these countries are aware of the need for 
a long-term strategy to support investment in the energy tran-
sition and to create or strengthen the competitive advantage of 
industries based in the country. The main exceptions are devel-
oping countries that do not have the financial strength to pursue 
a green recovery without external support.
48 Other influential reports were prepared by the Energy Transitions Commission 
(ETC) which is Chaired by Lord Adair Turner. See DELASALLE, Faustine & TURNER, Lord 
Adair. «7 Priorities to help the global economy recover while building a healthier, more 
resilient, net-zero emissions economy», Oxford Energy Forum Issue 123, Covid-19 and 
the Energy Transition, July 2020. Consulted 29.12.2020.
49 HEPBURN, Cameron et al., «Will COVID-19 fiscal recovery packages accelerate or 
retard progress on climate change?», Oxford Smith School of Enterprise and the Envi-
ronment, Working Paper No. 20-02 ISSN 2732-4214, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 
36 (S1), 4 May 2020. Consulted 20.12.2020.
50 I have co-authored a subsequent report with the authors from the Oxford Smith 
School and IDMA, «Breve guía para contribuir a la reconstrucción ‘verde’ tras la crisis 
de la COVID-19 en España», 24 June 2020. Consulted 09.01.2021.
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European Union
The EU has passed legislation that commits over €1.8 trillion 
to stimulate the economy and to cover its many programmes 
over the period 2021 to 202751. Of that total, NextGenera-
tionEU (NextGenEU) includes €750 billion that is specifically 
designed to help recover from COVID-19, while the remaining 
€1.1 trillion is the EU’s seven-year budget (Multiannual Finan-
cial Framework, or MFF, for 2021-2027) to stimulate the econ-
omy and cover its many other programmes. These sums do 
not include the substantial investments being made by Member 
State governments.
NextGenEU and the 2021/2027 budget essentially provide the 
financial commitment to implement the EU Green Deal52 that 
was adopted before COVID-19 and to accelerate digitalisation. 
At least 30% of this total budget will be dedicated to fight-
ing climate change, and in particular to supporting the energy 
transition.
Within the Green Deal, the key elements affecting the energy 
transition fall into four of the eight ‘leaves’ in Figure 8.
51 European Commission, «Recovery Plan for Europe» 2020. Consulted 20.12.2020.
52 European Commission, The European Green Deal, COM/2019/640 final. https://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1588580774040&uri=CELEX-
:52019DC0640. Consulted 08.04.2021.
Figure 8. The European Green Deal




More ambitious emission reduction targets for 2030 and 2050
When the Green Deal was approved in December 2019, the EU 
had committed to achieve a 60% reduction in GHG emissions by 
2050 compared to 1990 levels. During the COVID-19 pandemic, 
the EU adopted a policy of net zero emissions (climate neutrality) 
by 2050 and a 2030 target to reduce GHG emissions by 55% 
compared to 1990 levels. To achieve these targets, the EU will 
use a range of measures that will accelerate the decarbonisa-
tion of the energy sector itself and other energy end-use sectors, 
especially transport and heating. In particular, the EU plans to 
expand the coverage of the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) and 
introduce new environmental fiscal policy to ensure effective car-
bon pricing throughout the European economy.
The Green Deal is also supposed to protect EU industries from the 
risk of carbon leakage, i.e. competition from companies in coun-
tries that do not face similar carbon taxation or other restrictions 
on emissions. The Commission has proposed a carbon border 
adjustment mechanism (CBAM) for selected sectors to reduce 
the risk of carbon leakage. The aim is to ensure that the price 
of imports reflects more accurately their carbon content. This 
proposal is controversial and could raise serious problems for 
international trade that need to be addressed in its formulation, 
especially to make it compatible with World Trade Organization 
rules. However, the environmental objective is valid and the 
approach is gaining support, notably from the US.
Supplying clean, affordable and secure energy
Energy accounts for 75% of the EU’s GHG emissions and so it is 
not surprising that this is a focus of the European Green Deal. 
The first priority is to improve energy efficiency. Beyond that, 
the broad objective is for the power sector to be based largely 
on renewable sources, complemented by the rapid phasing out 
of coal and the decarbonisation of gas. The transition to climate 
neutrality also requires smart infrastructure. The regulatory 
framework, including the TEN-E Regulation, aims to foster the 
deployment of innovative technologies and infrastructure, such 
as smart grids, hydrogen networks, carbon capture, utilisation/
storage (CCUS) and other energy storage; and to enable sector 
integration (for example electricity with green hydrogen). Since 
the Green Deal was agreed, it is notable that the Commission has 
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indicated its support especially for hydrogen projects involving 
multiple EU Member States.
Building and renovating in an energy and resource efficient way
Buildings account for about 40% of energy consumed in the EU. 
The rate of innovation in buildings has been very low and a large 
share of the European population has economic difficulty heating 
their homes. To address these challenges, the Green Deal calls 
for a ‘renovation wave’ of public and private buildings. This also 
aims to boost the construction sector and be an opportunity to 
support SMEs and local jobs.
Accelerating the shift to sustainable and smart mobility
Transport accounts for 25% of the EU’s greenhouse gas emis-
sions in the EU, and that percentage is still growing. All modes 
of transport will be decarbonised, and this will inevitably accel-
erate the energy transition. On the supply side, the EU plans to 
ramp-up the production and deployment of sustainable alterna-
tive transport fuels. For instance, by 2025, about 1 million public 
recharging and refuelling stations will be needed for the 13 mil-
lion zero- and low-emission vehicles expected on European roads. 
This is a reminder that the European Green Deal is not just about 
fighting climate change. Transport must also become less pollut-
ing (e.g. reduce emissions of NOx and particulates) for reasons 
of public health, especially in cities. The Commission will propose 
more stringent pollution standards for internal combustion engine 
(ICE) vehicles and consider applying the ETS to road transport. It 
will also take action in relation to other forms of transport.
It is important to stress some important developments of the 
financial package that was eventually agreed by the EU Member 
States since they raise the level of climate ambition and offer 
greater confidence that the ambition can be met. First, the Euro-
pean Commission has for the first time raised money directly to 
fund credits (not loans) to Member States. Never before has the 
urgency to act or the political commitment been so great as to 
justify this. Second, this departure reflects a change in the politi-
cal balance of power in the EU, away from an alliance of the ‘fru-
gal’ northern countries (now the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden 
and Austria) and towards the others (in particular now France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain). This shift is significant because Ger-
many did not vote with the frugal countries and because the UK, 
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which would typically vote with the frugal group, was no longer 
a Member of the EU. The combination of a more powerful Euro-
pean Commission, the departure of the UK and support from Ger-
many enabled the passage of an economic recovery package that 
was historic in its scale and in its focus on the European Green 
Deal. Furthermore, COVID-19 and the departure of the UK have 
strengthened the sense of European unity and the case for using 
the recovery to enhance the competitive position of European 
industries in global markets and to play a more ambitious role in 
global affairs. Of course, there are no guarantees that the EU will 
deliver on its goals and ambition, but there is greater resolve and 
confidence than there has been for at least a decade.
China
The 2015 agreement between the US and China to reduce their 
emissions was the key to obtaining global support for the Paris Cli-
mate Agreement. China was keen to present itself as a responsi-
ble player on the international climate stage. However, soon after 
the Paris Agreement was signed, the Chinese economy began to 
slow, and the government introduced an economic stimulus that 
had the effect of increasing Chinese coal consumption. The elec-
tion of President Trump and his support for fossil fuels lessened 
the international pressure on China to limit emissions, and the 
subsequent trade war probably lessened the pressure further: 
However, domestic considerations – in particular security of sup-
ply and economic growth – were the main drivers of Chinese 
energy policy. COVID-19 injected a new element of uncertainty 
about China’s policy on climate change, which might cut both 
ways. In the words of Sam Geall:
On the one hand, it has increased international tensions, 
which could spur further retrenchment and a focus on ener-
gy security, boosting coal-fired power. On the other hand, it 
[COVID-19] may lead to renewed calls from inside China for 
a deeper environmental commitment, with Beijing taking the 
opportunity to lead in the technologies of the future53.
The debate over these options in China is taking place in the 
context of the economic recovery and the preparation of the 14th 
53 GEALL, Sam, «China’s climate commitments and energy ambitions beyond 
COVID-19», Oxford Energy Forum Issue 123, Covid-19 and the Energy Transition, July 
2020. Consulted 29.12.2020.
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Five Year Plan (FYP). The evidence until recently did not favour 
decarbonisation54. Instead, China has significantly increased its 
investment and production in heavy industries that rely on coal. 
In February 2020, the National Energy Administration lowered 
the risk ratings for coal-power overcapacity in many parts of the 
country for the third year running, opening the door for more 
regions to build coal power in 2021–202355. Furthermore, in the 
preparation of the 14th FYP, there have been proposals for a yet 
looser cap on coal-fired capacity.
However, this does not mean that China is not investing in the 
energy transition. There is a lively debate among policy makers 
between those who favour coal and others who think it is nec-
essary to limit it. Throughout the debate, renewable energy has 
been growing very rapidly. China has the largest capacities of 
wind and solar in the world (respectively 240 GW and 230 GW 
for solar) and capacity is growing steadily. For instance, between 
January and November 2020, China added 30 GW of wind and 26 
GW of solar power in spite of a significant drop in the first three 
months of the year.
China appears also to have a ‘green industrial plan’, much as 
they did in 2007-2009. They have announced ambitious plans for 
‘new-infrastructure’, a term that includes 5G, ultra-high-voltage 
grid transmission, intercity transportation and rail, electric vehi-
cle charging stations, big data centres, artificial intelligence, and 
more. This industrial plan is a signal that China is investing in 
innovation, rather than merely bailing out incumbent industries. 
China could argue that their infrastructure plan is to electrify the 
economy, initially using coal, and then to decarbonise the elec-
tricity system. They are also driving down the costs of ‘green’ 
industries, thereby improving their competitive position in global 
markets for EVs, batteries and other products aligned with the 
energy transition.
All of the above was known before President Xi’s announcement 
at the UN General Assembly in September 2020; the unilateral 
commitment to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 was a game-
changer. It was a surprise to almost everyone and suggests that 
China may take a greener route than expected. Of course, this 
did involve some geopolitical gamesmanship with China showing 
54 CHANG, Charles et al., «Economic Research: China’s Energy Transition Stalls Post-




global leadership while the US was absent. And one could argue 
that these were empty words since 2060 is a long way away and 
the other commitment (peaking emissions before 2030) was not 
very different from what China was already able and committed 
to doing. However, China has never made a unilateral commit-
ment of this kind and tends to be conservative about its multilat-
eral commitments in the sense that it only commits to what it is 
confident about being able to deliver.
These commitments are now considered not only as a cornerstone 
of China’s climate-related policy making, but also an encourag-
ing signal to other countries which are committed to combating 
climate change. Indeed, a number of countries have announced 
their carbon neutral targets following Xi’s announcement, includ-
ing Japan and Korea. Additional 2030 targets were announced by 
Xi in the Climate Ambition Summit in December 2020, although 
they appear to be in line with previous plans. These commitments 
include the reduction of CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by over 
65% from the 2005 level, an increase in the share of non-fossil 
fuels in primary energy consumption to around 25 percent, and 
an increase in wind and solar installed capacity above 1,200 GW. 
The 1,200 GW target would imply an average annual installed 
new capacity of 70 GW between 2020 and 2030.
We will have to wait at least until we see the 14th FYP for the 
energy sector to know how China will reflect its international com-
mitments in national energy policy56. My sources say that this plan 
will set the scene for the period to 2035. Furthermore, apparently 
it is being developed in a way that gives regional governments 
less influence over the initial drafting, thereby weakening some of 
the resistance to decarbonisation that is normally associated with 
provinces that rely on coal and that favour its continued expan-
sion. If this is an accurate report, it suggests that the energy plan 
will be more ambitious than many expect and send signals for 
how China plans to decarbonise over the longer period.
United States
The Biden presidential campaign proposed a $2 trillion Green 
New Deal, setting goals of climate neutrality by 2050, and full 
decarbonisation of the electricity system by 2035. These goals 
56 There are various plans. The most important, strategic, plan was published in March 
2021. The sectoral plans (including for energy) will appear later in the year.
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are in line with the targets of the EU and China, although Chi-
na’s is for carbon neutrality by 2060. However, there are serious 
doubts about the new Administration’s ability to pass the sort of 
energy legislation required to meet those targets. First, the Dem-
ocrats have a razor thin control over the Senate and the House of 
Representatives, making it more difficult to pass legislation with-
out bipartisan support. Second, the Administration has already 
passed a $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan, which designed to 
address the immediate dangers of the pandemic and provide 
direct assistance to those in need; this will probably limit the 
scale of support for green programmes. Third, the Administration 
knows it will be challenged in the courts on virtually any measure 
that does not have bipartisan support57. Fourth, the Administra-
tion has less than two years before the midterm elections and 
this places a premium on solving the COVID-19 crisis and quickly 
putting people back to work. Nevertheless, there is every reason 
to expect the US Federal Government to do whatever it can to 
support the energy transition at home and be part of a renewed 
global partnership to fight climate change, starting with the US 
re-joining the Paris Climate Agreement.
With respect to a federal green recovery plan58, it is too early 
to confirm what the Biden Administration will achieve. However, 
we now have a clear idea of the objective. At the end of March, 
Biden presented «The American Jobs Plan»59, a programme for 
the reconstruction and modernization of US infrastructure, with 
investments worth over $2 trillion over an eight-year period. The 
programme aims to «reimagine and rebuild a new economy», 
remedying serious deficiencies in the provision of essential ser-
vices, including bridges, highways, airports and electricity net-
works, while creating millions of «well paid jobs». However, it is 
more than that. The overarching political objective is clear: to 
maintain US supremacy and to out-compete China.
Within that programme, there are many important initiatives to 
support the energy transition. First, it includes $174 billion to 
57 BROWER, Derek, Financial Times, «US energy: ‘the more ambitious Biden tries to 
be, the more likely he is to fail’», 21 December 2020. Consulted 28.12.2020.
58 These measures are separate from using Executive Orders to reverse the previous 
administration’s policies that weakened climate and environmental policies. See «Biden 
rejoins Paris climate accord, works to overturn Trump’s climate policies», Washington 





promote the electrification of vehicles, including among other ini-
tiatives a national network of 500,000 EV chargers by 2030 and 
the electrification of at least 20% of the fleet of yellow school 
buses. Second, the plan includes $100 billion to «re-energize 
America´s power infrastructure», including building a more resil-
ient electricity grid, which is recognised by both parties as being 
necessary for improved reliance related to intermittent renewable 
penetration. Third, the plan proposes a ten-year extension and 
phase down of an expanded direct-pay investment tax credit and 
production tax credit for clean energy generation (in particular 
renewables) and storage. The plan also refers to moving towards 
100 percent carbon-pollution free power by 2035. It is too early 
to know what plan will eventually become law, especially because 
the intention is to fund the plan through a significant increase in 
corporate taxation. However, the focus on preparing the US to 
out-compete China strengthens the prospect that some legisla-
tion will be passed that supports the energy transition.
On the international front, the US has re-joined the Paris Agree-
ment and held a Climate Leadership Summit in Washington in late 
April. They will come to COP26 in Glasgow with a new and pre-
sumably ambitious Nationally Determined Commitment (NDC). 
The administration will use the US International Development 
Finance Corporation (DFC) to support decarbonisation in selected 
developing countries, probably in competition with other world 
powers. It will also use its influence in the World Bank, the IMF, 
political groupings (like the OECD, G-7 and G-10) and private 
financial organisations to limit funding to fossil fuels and carbon 
intensive activities.
For national policy and international negotiations, the credibil-
ity of the US federal government ultimately depends on pass-
ing legislation that will be difficult for future administrations to 
eliminate.
The rest of the world
There are many other countries that have announced plans to 
finance a green recovery. These plans include decarbonisation 
of energy sources as well as the decarbonisation of industries 
and the development of industries that will produce goods that 
consume decarbonised energy (mainly electricity). The UK, most 
notably, has announced an ambitious ten-point plan that includes 
financial support for offshore wind, low-carbon hydrogen, new 
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advanced nuclear, a shift to zero emission vehicles, green public 
transport, low carbon aviation and maritime transport, greener 
buildings and carbon capture utilisation/storage (CCUS).
Boston Consulting Group (BCG) has prepared an interesting report 
on how COVID-19 may affect the energy transition in different 
countries, based upon the economic impact of the pandemic and 
the ability of governments to respond60. They highlight (Figure 9) 
in particular the increasing interest and ability of Northeast Asian 
countries to develop ‘green industrial strategies’ aimed at supplying 
global markets for EV’s, and to increase generation from renewables.
That framework also highlights the difficulty of delivering a green 
recovery in the poorest and most populous countries in Latin 
America, Africa and Asia. Post-COVID-19 stimulus packages that 
ignore the poorest countries will not only widen global inequal-
ity61, but could also encourage those countries to maintain or 
60 ALKADIRI, Raad et al., «How COVID-19 is changing the pace of energy transi-
tions», BCG, 22 September 2020. Consulted 04.01.2021.
61 United Nations General Assembly, GA/EF/3531, «Prospects of Quick Global Eco-
nomic Recovery from COVID-19 Are Unrealistic, Says Nobel Laureate, as Second Com-
mittee Begins General Debate», 5 October 2020. Consulted: 04.01.2021.
Boston Consulting Group  |  How COVID-19 Is Changing the Pace of Energy Transitions 5
Another important consideration is the im-
provement in the cost competitiveness of 
renewables in the region in recent years. In 
China, solar and wind power now costs less 
than coal on a levelized basis, which mea-
sures the average net present cost of elec-
tricity generation for a generating plant 
over its lifetime; and in South Korea and 
Japan it is rapidly approaching parity with 
coal. (See Exhibit 4.) The declining cost of 
renewables, together with the energy int n-
sity and import dependence of many Asian 
economies, provides a meaningful incen-
tive for those countries to consider facilitat-
ing a faster transition to renewables in the 
power sector.
The Asian EV Stra egy
Although Asian governments have logical 
reasons to pursue faster energy transitions, 
the paths that they are taking are not nec-
essarily similar to those used in other re-
gions or in the past recession. In particular, 
the strategy emerging this time appears to 
focus on EVs. 
So far, of the more than $600 billion of 
“green” government stimulus measures 
that have been announced globally, China 
has committed to $200 billion and South 
Korea to $60 billion. Within these stimulus 
measures, the promotion of EV technology 
innovation and adoption is a key priority. 
(See Exhibit 5.) 
For example, a signal feature of China’s 
stimulus package involves funding to in-
crease its EV charging infrastructure by 
50% and to improve its power grid capacity 
and stability in support of faster growth of 
the EV market. In South Korea, the so-
alled Green New Deal allocates money for 

































































Exhibit 2 | Asian and European Countries Have the Greatest Potential to Accelerate Energy Transitions




increase their reliance on fossil fuels, thereby slowing or even 
reversing the fight against climate change.
Key messages
COVID-19 has provided an opportunity to pursue green policy 
objectives through the use of fiscal stimulus, taking advantage 
of very low interest rates. However, government green recovery 
spending is a small fraction of the investment required to com-
plete a successful energy transition, and its purpose should be to 
leverage ‘green’ investment by the private sector. The ambition 
and the specific investment targets reflect national or regional 
financial resources and the pursuit of strategic opportunities in 
specific industries. The EU has been the most ambitious to date, 
but the US, China and many other countries are committing sig-
nificant public resources to green energy and ‘green industrial 
strategies’. Indeed, we are witnessing the three great global 
economic giants taking advantage of the recovery from COVID-
19 to prepare themselves to compete in the 21st Century. How-
ever, the prospects are poor for a self-financed green recovery in 
developing countries that were already heavily in debt before the 
pandemic.
International barriers to a global energy transition
In spite of the many challenges it faces, the global economic sys-
tem continues to rely on open markets for trade and investment, 
and more generally international cooperation to address climate 
change and meet other global challenges, especially the United 
Nations’ 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)62. However, 
COVID-19 has exacerbated a number of barriers to the global 
energy transition. One is the retreat from globalisation that was 
already underway and that was slowing growth of international 
trade and investment. The other is the deterioration of interna-
tional cooperation, especially with respect to the poorest devel-
oping countries. Conversely, in the fight against climate change, 
the energy transition could provide the basis for agreements that 
help to lower both barriers, improving prospects for trade, invest-
ment and international cooperation.
62 «The 17 Goals», United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Con-
sulted 13.01.2021.
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Using the energy transition to enhance global trade and 
investment
International trade expanded significantly from the early 1990s 
and had reached almost a quarter of global GDP before the 2008 
financial crisis led to a sharp decline63. Although trade rebounded 
briefly, it has not returned to previous growth rates. Part of this 
may be explained by the economic downturn that shifted the 
focus to income inequality in the wealthy countries and its causes, 
including the integration of China’s labour force into the global 
economy. China’s trade and investment practices, as well its pro-
gress in developing advanced technologies and its importance in 
global supply chains led eventually to the US-China ‘trade war’ 
in 2018, with other major economies also increasingly concerned 
about globalisation and China. Supply chains were already short-
ening before COVID-19, with a move away from globalisation and 
a focus instead on self-reliance.
COVID-19 has reinforced the trend towards self-reliance. It has 
revealed new risks related to ‘just in time’ global supply chains 
for most industries that rely on the timely delivery of intermedi-
ary goods. Part of this is related to China, which has become the 
main source for certain inputs, especially in information and com-
munication technology. But the shift to self-reliance goes beyond 
China, with the US in particular raising tariffs and imposing trade 
barriers on many countries (including the UE and Canada with 
which the US has a history of more open trade), ostensibly to 
protect domestic industries.
The retreat from globalisation and the rise of protectionism could 
be much more serious if it slowed global economic recovery fol-
lowing the pandemic. This is quite possible because recovery 
plans involve investment of public as well as private funds to 
develop new technologies and businesses that will compete in 
global markets.
The EU, for instance, is about to invest heavily in green hydrogen, 
electric vehicles, batteries and other advanced technologies that 
are consistent with the energy transition and the EU commitment 
to net zero carbon emissions. The UK, China and many other coun-
tries are doing the same thing; seeking to establish a competitive 
advantage in various industries. Governments and companies in 
63 «The post-COVID Economy», Barclays, 14 August 2020. Consulted 13.01.2021.
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the EU and other countries have always been concerned about 
competition from countries with weaker environmental standards. 
Prior to COVID-19, the EU had already announced its plans to 
introduce a CBAM to protect its industries against carbon leak-
age. However, the concern about carbon leakage is significantly 
greater now as a result of the enormous sums of public finance 
being invested in new technologies. It would be a political disaster 
for any government if the investment funded by the taxpayer did 
not pay off in terms of jobs and international competitive advan-
tage. On the other hand, to protect these investments, the EU or 
other countries may introduce barriers to investment and trade 
that raise costs, reduce competition and effectively weaken the 
incentives to innovate. If the same focus on self-reliance applied 
in all major countries, this would definitely slow economic growth 
and weaken the incentives to innovate in favour of a rapid energy 
transition. To take one example, were it not for the international 
trading regime that enabled China to export solar panels to the 
world, the cost of renewables might have remained much higher, 
and penetration would be far less than has been the case.
What, then, can be done to support freer international trade and 
investment to support the energy transition, while dealing with 
the legitimate concerns about carbon leakage, theft of intellec-
tual property and other unfair practices? I think the conditions 
are now better than they have been for a long time to improve 
relations among the US, China and the EU, with climate change 
being one of the few global crises which offers the potential for 
progress, especially by accelerating the energy transition needed 
to fight climate change.
 – First, each of these political blocs has made or (in the US 
case) is likely soon to make a commitment to carbon or cli-
mate neutrality, in line with an agreed international treaty. 
This should make it easier than before – although certainly 
not easy – to reach trade and investment agreements that 
respect and support the Paris Climate Agreement.
 – Second, the recovery from COVID-19 has the potential to 
stimulate coordinated global economic growth of benefit to all 
countries. The commercial opportunities from global growth 
would be severely limited if the major trading blocs introduced 
further restrictions on trade and investment. Restrictions re-
lated to environmental standards should become less neces-
sary as more countries and companies commit to net zero 
emissions.
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 – Third, financial regulators and markets around the world clear-
ly favour green investment opportunities and companies that 
can demonstrate they are not at risk from climate change; 
few if any corporations can ignore that pressure. Companies 
that have committed to carbon neutrality are looking for ways 
to meet their commitments, while investors are looking for 
ways to use their funds at a time when interest rates are low.
 – Fourth, the US and China made headway under President 
Trump’s presidency in addressing some of the most press-
ing trade and investment concerns, in particular protection of 
intellectual property in China and reciprocal rights to invest. 
The EU and China have just recently reached a trade and in-
vestment agreement that would appear to deliver similar pro-
gress on that front to that enjoyed by the US. According to 
some sources, the EU-China agreement includes sustainability 
provisions, including commitments to implement multilateral 
environmental agreements – notably the Paris Agreement – 
and to not lower the standards of labour and environmental 
protection to protect investment64. These agreements are cer-
tainly not enough to justify confidence, and the EU-China deal 
may finally not be approved65, but they are a step in the right 
direction.
 – Finally, COP26 will take place in Glasgow at the end of 2021 
and all of the major countries appear ready to make it a suc-
cessful one. The UK will do everything they possibly can to 
make that event a success and to highlight Britain’s leadership 
credentials post-Brexit. The EU has demonstrated its intention 
to continue to lead on global climate change negotiations. Chi-
na will aim to demonstrate its commitment to carbon neutral-
ity, perhaps by announcing an earlier date for reaching a peak 
in its carbon emissions. The US will try to regain credibility, 
ideally supported by new federal legislation, probably with an 
ambitious NDC and financial support for mitigation and adap-
tation in the developing world.
With some approximation of these relatively positive conditions 
in place, in addition to the other pressures discussed earlier in 
this paper, confidence should be higher than it has been for many 
64 BALIÑO, Sofía, «EU-China Trade Ties in the Spotlight Following News of Investment 
Pact», IISD, SDG Knowledge Hub, 20 January 2021. Consulted 23.01.2021.
65 The EU-China agreement requires European Parliamentary approval, which is in 
doubt following China’s decision to retaliate against international (including EU) sanc-




years with respect to improving international cooperation on the 
energy transition. Yet, there is a need for action to ensure that 
the opportunity is seized, especially given the global tensions that 
were heightened over recent years. I would propose three steps to 
take advantage of these conditions to further the energy transition.
Climate clubs
The first is to build on the Paris Climate Agreement, through joint 
collaboration agreements, or climate clubs, among the countries 
best able and willing to lead in the implementation of the agree-
ment, notably the EU, China and the US, but potentially a larger 
group that have committed to net zero emission targets, includ-
ing the UK, Japan, South Korea and Canada. The members of 
the club would jointly make commitments to support innovation, 
investment and trade that would support realization of the Paris 
Agreement objectives. They could make other commitments, 
such as agreeing to link their carbon pricing mechanisms, even 
if that might only include regional pricing mechanisms in the US. 
They would agree on a common set of standards related to trade 
and investment, possibly also guided by principles for a CBAM. 
We obviously must not underestimate the difficulty of achieving 
this sort of agreement, particularly since there will be legisla-
tion available to protect domestic industries and many companies 
ready to use it66. However, we should certainly make every effort 
to reach an agreement. The key to the climate club approach is 
to emphasize the role of benefits as incentives for participation 
and compliance. In order for the benefits to be effective in induc-
ing participation and compliance, they must be shareable among 
complying participants and excludable to non-participants and 
non-complying participants67. The greater the economic impor-
tance of the club, the greater the incentive to be a member.
Industry-specific agreements
The second, related idea is to establish agreements for trade 
and investment in specific industries and products, drawing on 
instruments like a well-designed CBAM that is compatible with 
66 KREIER, Jesse, «Countervailing the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme, Part 2», In-
ternational Economic Law and Policy Blog, 17 December 2020. Consulted 13.01.2021.
67 World Bank Group, Climate Strategies, «Carbon Market Clubs and the New Paris 
Regime», p3, July 2016. Consulted 10.01.2021.
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World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules and that has support from 
members of the agreement. Although the agreement would be 
industry- or product-specific, it would require government sup-
port from all member countries. This measure could be based on 
the principles used in the Montreal Protocol on substances that 
deplete the Ozone Layer68. That Protocol essentially allows the 
countries that adopt specified technologies to trade with each 
other without facing import tariffs from the other members (the 
carrot), but excludes imports from countries that do not use 
these technologies (the stick). In the spirit of that Protocol, the 
wealthy countries would provide assistance to the others. This 
sort of agreement is suited to specific industries and products 
and becomes viable only when it attracts enough members to 
make non-membership very expensive. In the case of the Mon-
treal Protocol, it helped that the population in wealthy countries 
(especially white-skinned people) were more adversely affected 
by the hole in the ozone layer than the population in poorer coun-
tries. For climate change, the key to mitigating global emissions 
is in the poorest developing countries, especially in Africa and 
Asia, where expected emissions growth dwarfs the expected 
reductions in the global north. The prospect of runaway climate 
change should provide powerful incentives to direct public and 
private ‘green’ investment in the specific sectors to the countries 
with the greatest potential and lowest cost of emissions mitiga-
tions; obviously, it is essential that the investments appear to be 
profitable and have the necessary guarantees.
Using the energy transition to meet multiple SDGs
Most of Africa, Latin America and some of Asia have been severely 
affected by COVID-19, leaving them more heavily indebted and 
with millions more below the extreme poverty line69 70. Unlike the 
wealthiest countries, they have very limited ability to care for the 
health of their people and even less to finance an economic recov-
ery, green or otherwise. The experience to date from COVID-19 
suggests that they will be the last to receive the most trust-
68 «The Montreal Protocol», United Nations Environmental Programme, UN Environ-
ment Portal. Consulted 14.01.2021.
69 CASTANEDA AGUILAR, R. Andrés et al., «Updated estimates of the impact 
of COVID-19 on global poverty», World Bank Blogs, October 7, 2020. Consulted 
23.01.2021.
70 BP Energy Outlook 2020, p29, Consulted 28.12.2020.
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worthy vaccines, and will not have sufficient financial resources 
to stimulate their economies. This can only help to expose and 
increase the global divide between wealthy and poor nations and 
to increase the number of people without access to clean energy 
or health care71. In short, there will be a delay in meeting the 17 
SDGs (Figure 10).
This is not simply a matter of injustice, although it is and will be 
perceived as such, weakening the willingness of these countries 
to respond to siren calls for them to slow their economic growth 
to reduce global emissions. It is also a grave concern because 
beating the pandemic and defeating climate change are global 
public goods. Failure to cooperate in addressing these problems 
on a global basis means that no one anywhere can be truly safe. 
For a health crisis, the implications are grave, but for climate 
change they are potentially catastrophic, because these are the 
countries where energy demand will grow substantially, and 
where a very large share of incremental carbon emissions will 
71 United Nations General Assembly, GA 12293, «With More Than 1.5 Million Lives 
Lost to COVID-19, World Leaders in General Assembly Demand Urgent Action to Guar-
antee Equitable Distribution of Life-Saving Vaccines», 3 December 2020. Consulted 
04.01.2021.
Figure 10. The 17 Sustainable Development Goals.
Source: «The 17 Goals», United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs.
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occur over the next thirty years if there is no available decarbon-
ized energy alternative. The potential to avoid a climate catastro-
phe depends on ensuring that economic development in these 
countries is green and not brown.
The difficulty of global cooperation reflects the familiar problem 
of the tragedy of the commons. Climate change has always had 
to deal with the free-rider problem, whereby the national costs 
for each country to reduce emissions were often greater than 
the benefits, so the preferred strategy has been, where possible, 
to let other countries do the heavy lifting. However, today, the 
economic benefits of a global energy transition, and the costs of 
inaction, are greater than ever72.
For many of the same reasons mentioned above, the time is ripe 
for initiating new international agreements to supplement the 
Paris Climate Agreement. Furthermore, by supporting an energy 
transition in these countries, we not only help to reduce the threat 
of climate change, but also further the realization of other SDG. 
Here are three proposals.
Donor-recipient or global agreements
The first proposal is for donor countries (together or separately) 
to adopt measures that will support decarbonisation in the poor-
est regions in the developing world, especially where emissions 
are expected to grow quickly73. The donor countries would 
adopt measures such as: debt cancellation, ending public sup-
port for fossil fuel projects, scaling up support for green energy 
and energy access for the poorest, and supporting the bail-out 
of companies that have stranded fossil fuel assets, conditional 
on these companies having plans to transition to net zero. As 
a condition for receiving support, the recipient countries would 
adopt their own measures, including removing fossil fuel sub-
sidies, incorporating nature-based solutions into their national 
climate plans under the Paris Agreement, and investing in the 
restoration of ecosystems. These agreements could include all 
of the major donors on one side and all the recipients on the 
other, or involve smaller groups. The donors may be open to col-
72 World Health Organisation, «COVID-19 intensifies the urgency to expand sustain-
able energy solutions worldwide», 28 May 2020. Consulted 02.01.2021.
73 ACT Alliance, «Whose Green Recovery? Why poorer countries must not be left 




laboration, for instance with the EU and China working together 
on specific green investment projects in Africa. On other hand, 
competition to invest in green investment projects should be 
welcome, and public funding should aim to leverage private 
investment.
Not all of the agreements need come with conditionality. For 
instance, the COVAX Facility involves governments and com-
panies from higher income countries. Its aim is to ensure that 
COVID-19 vaccines and drugs reach those in need, whoever they 
are and wherever they live. One of President Biden’s first deci-
sions was for the US to join this global effort, which has struggled 
to achieve its mission74. Similar agreements could provide the 
basis for assistance to the most needy countries in the interest of 
promoting the energy transition.
Clearly, none of this will be easy. For example, debt cancellation 
is extremely complicated and will depend on the country and the 
type of investor. Furthermore, COVAX could fail due to vaccine 
nationalism. Nevertheless, it is critical to take advantage of the 
improved conditions for international collaboration, resulting in 
part from the election of President Biden, to promote the initi-
atives that can accelerate the energy transition in the world’s 
poorest countries.
Offset markets
Second, private and public financial institutions should consider 
the potential to develop new offset markets. Mark Carney recently 
made the case for creating new capital markets to support green 
investments in developing countries, in particular through off-
sets75. He pointed to the enormous demand ($100 trillion) for 
sustainable investments and the capital that companies were 
ready to commit to invest in order to reach carbon neutrality. 
Since much of the world’s incremental energy-related investment 
will happen in the emerging and developing countries, this is 
where a significant share of the offsets should take place. But for 
that to happen, Carney argues, some public funding for projects 
will be required to attract the enormous resources available from 
the private sector. There are serious concerns about offset mar-
74 MANCINI, Donato P., «US joins global vaccine efforts on Biden’s first day», Financial 
Times, 21 January 2021. Consulted 24.01.2021.
75 KIRKA, Danica, «UN envoy lays out strategy for financing climate battle», AP News, 
9 November 2020. Consulted 20.12.2020.
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kets, not least the incentive to weaken decarbonisation in wealthy 
countries, and the difficulty of ensuring that the offsets actually 
deliver real emission reductions and are not simply green wash-
ing76. Nevertheless, I consider this to be an initiative that has 
the potential to attract significant incremental financial resources 
for decarbonisation in developing countries and requires policy 
and financial market support as well as clear rules to avoid green 
washing.
Support to the losers
Finally, the energy transition will inevitably involve winners 
and losers, among countries and within them. Domestically, 
many wealthy countries are adopting ‘fair transition’ strate-
gies. Internationally, either individually or as part of a regional 
group (EU), or a multilateral agreement, the ‘winners’ should 
consider strategies that will assist the losers to make the 
transition.
Key messages
A successful global energy transition will require international 
agreements to support green innovation, trade and investment, 
and to support the energy transition in the poorest developing 
countries. It will also require mechanisms to compensate the 
losers. It is very easy to argue that these proposals are virtu-
ally impossible to achieve, especially now because of the grow-
ing tension between China and the two other global economic 
powers, the US and the EU. I do not accept that conclusion for 
four reasons. First, each of these great powers is accelerating 
the energy transition for domestic reasons: eventually to reduce 
costs and immediately to improve the health and quality of life of 
its citizens. Second, there is now a competitive race among them 
to achieve carbon neutrality and to export their green technol-
ogies and products; some people compare this with the «space 
76 Indeed, Carney himself has been accused by some green finance experts of gre-
enwashing, by claiming that Brookfield, a company of which he is Vice Chair, had 
«net zero» emissions across its portfolio because the «avoided» emissions from its 
renewable business compensated for the positive emissions from other businesses, 
including coal. https://financialpost.com/financial-times/mark-carneys-big-stumble-
at-brookfield-intensifies-focus-on-net-zero-emissions-claims. For more on what con-




race» of the past77. Third, for the many reasons explained in 
this chapter, a growing number of the world’s major private and 
public financial institutions and corporations have made commit-
ments to carbon neutrality; their markets are global, and their 
futures depend on the credibility of their commitments. Finally, 
COVID-19 has created unique set of political and economic condi-
tions that justify public investment that would have been impos-
sible previously. The urgency to make every effort could not be 
greater.
Summary conclusions
1. The energy transition underway does not guarantee that the 
world will meet the Paris Climate Agreement target. There is 
no compelling reason to be optimistic about that. Neverthe-
less, the faster and more effective the attempt is, the better 
the prospects of limiting climate change.
2. The pandemic is a cautionary tale that should remind us of 
the importance of respecting nature’s limits, thinking long-
term, taking early action and adopting the precautionary 
principle. In terms of making the energy transition effective, 
we should be more aware now of the importance of global 
cooperation, science and innovation and the critical role of 
competent governments, especially in addressing social con-
cerns and in working with civil society and private investors.
3. The energy transition changes everything. It is not just about 
replacing fossil fuels with renewables. It is about changing 
the entire energy system, which will become increasingly 
electric. It is about improving efficiency and developing the 
industries and products that will consume electricity or oth-
er renewable energies. It is about decentralisation of deci-
sion-making, as consumers become more active participants 
in the energy system. Just as oil created path dependence 
that drove global innovation, economic and political develop-
ment for more than a century, so will the energy transition 
create a new path.
4. The COVID-19 pandemic is a pivotal moment in the ener-
gy transition. In some ways, it reinforces the pressures fa-
vouring the transition and offers guidance on what needs to 
77 Stephanie Butcher, «Europe’s chance to lead the Green technology race» Financial Times, 
1 April 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/195bb547-8b01-4c99-a789-f77e8b779620
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change. The need to recover from the pandemic also pro-
vides a justification and an opportunity to dedicate signifi-
cant public and private resources to the energy transition. 
The recovery is an opportunity for companies and countries 
to create competitive advantage and to set the standards for 
the new path.
5. Energy corporations have some new information that should 
lead them to reflect on their strategies. COVID-19 may have 
offered glimpses of the future and suggests that we are 
moving towards integrated, fully decarbonised energy sys-
tems, where consumer decisions are increasingly important. 
The power sector has already had many years to begin to 
adapt to that reality. Oil, gas and coal companies can learn 
from that experience and should be planning for an earlier 
peak to global demand than they had anticipated before the 
pandemic.
6. The energy transition creates opportunities and threats for 
industries. Global markets will certainly grow for electric ve-
hicles, batteries, heat pumps and other electrical devices 
and green technologies, as well as for services to support 
electrification and consumer participation. Likewise, markets 
will increasingly support companies in process industries like 
steel and cement that rely on decarbonised energy sources 
and other inputs, and penalize those that do not. Obviously, 
corporate strategy should reflect the changing global market 
preferences for green products.
7. COVID-19 has increased the public recognition of the impor-
tance of government policy and competence. Governments 
have a particularly critical role in dealing with social chal-
lenges during the energy transition and in providing support 
for the science and innovation that is required for that tran-
sition. They are also critical to an economic recovery that 
provides short-term stimulus and supports the development 
of sustainable economic activities. However, while most of 
the investment funds could come from private investors, 
private investment may depend importantly on government 
funding of pathbreaking projects and the development of 
policies that encourage private investment in support of the 
transition.
8. COVID-19 has exposed and in some respects exacerbated 
other serious global challenges, including rising protection-
ism on a global basis, and increasing debt and poverty in de-
veloping and emerging countries. These could well slow the 
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energy transition, especially in the countries where it is most 
needed to avoid a major increase in global GHG, and where 
the transition could actually help to advance other SDGs, 
such as the end to poverty. To meet these challenges, this 
chapter has made the case for greater cooperation among 
nations as well as the development of efficient financial mar-
kets to allocate capital in ways that reflect climate-related 
financial risk.
9. Finally, although there are powerful reasons to doubt the 
willingness of the world’s great economic powers to collab-
orate, this chapter argues that each of them has national 
motives to accelerate the energy transition and to attempt 
to win the global race towards carbon neutrality.
End comment
I would like to end by highlighting some recent news that under-
lines the enormous challenge we face and provides reasons for 
being somewhat more positive concerning the potential to fight 
climate change and to accelerate the energy transition globally.
The first news item comes from the International Energy Agency, 
which has warned of the recent increase in carbon emissions 
associated especially with coal-based generation in the emerging 
nations, in particular China. After a reduction of 5.8% in 2020 due 
to the pandemic and measures to control it, the Agency expects 
carbon emissions to rise by 4.8% in 2021. This is not a surprise, 
but it does confirm the necessity to accelerate the energy transi-
tion, especially in the power sectors of the emerging and devel-
oping countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.
The more positive news relates to the improved prospects for 
international collaboration in the fight against climate change. 
First, in spite of the tension between the US and China on many 
fronts, the two countries have now committed to collaborate with 
other countries to address the climate crisis. Second, in the Cli-
mate Leadership Summit (on International Earth Day), President 
Biden announced a new US objective to reduce greenhouse gases 
by 50-52% in 2030, compared to 2005 levels, doubling the pre-
vious US commitments. He also presented an «International Cli-
mate Finance Plan» that is dedicated to mobilizing resources to 
assist developing countries in reducing or avoiding GHG emissions 
and in building resilience against climate change. Other coun-
tries also made more ambitious commitments, including Brazil 
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and Canada, while the EU emphasized its commitment to climate 
neutrality, its green recovery plan and its contribution to global 
green finance. However, the importance of the Summit was the 
attempt by Biden to convert the US into a global leader on cli-
mate change. As explained in this chapter, the US will have to 
pass federal climate legislation before it can be a credible leader. 
Nevertheless, the agreement between China and the US and the 
more ambitious commitments from the US and other countries 
are very welcome news.
This most recent international political news adds to the momen-
tum for an accelerated global energy transition that has been 
building due to financial, corporate and social pressure for decar-
bonization, the adoption of green recovery plans, and in particu-
lar the technology innovation that is making the transition more 
affordable. COVID-19 is certainly not the main reason for the 
acceleration and some will say it played little or no part. Never-
theless, I hope at least to have demonstrated that the transition 
has not stopped during the pandemic and that COVID-19 has 
improved the prospects for the energy transition and facilitated a 




Geopolitics under the green deal: 
a challenge for the EU
Miguel Ángel Lasheras Merino
Abstract
At the same time that the EU Commission announced in Decem-
ber 2020 the Green Deal (GD) aimed at transforming Europe 
into an emission-free society by 2050, the COVID-19 virus began 
to settle in the world. The Green Deal defines a set of objec-
tives and tools whose scope and use, as initially formulated and 
developed throughout 2021, place the EU before the greatest 
challenge assumed since its foundation. This article describes 
this set, and locates them in an energy and environmental policy 
that has become the backbone of the unity and cooperation of 
Europeans and the core of the leadership sought in the foreign 
action of the Union. The appearance of the pandemic, far from 
altering the formulation of the GD, has reinforced its relevance 
as a substantial part of the recovery process initiated by com-
munity institutions. Supporting investments in new technologies 
(such as electrification, renewables, hydrogen and smart grids) 
and funds aimed at a Just Transition, that offset the costs caused 
by this transformation process, will require a mobilization of pub-
lic and private resources greater than that of any other process 
initiated from the Union. And the Union appears ready to meet 
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this challenge along with its costs. The ecological transition in the 
midst of a crisis of the international order forced mainly by the 
new weight of China in the world will force to seek new cooper-
ation frameworks and operate in fields of competence unknown 
until now. The very existence of the EU seems to be linked to the 
success of this process.
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Introduction
In 1916, and despite growing economic inequality, populist 
nationalisms, political violence and terrorism, the European 
Union’s (EU) strategy in foreign action and security considered 
that: «these are also times of extraordinary opportunity. Global 
growth, mobility and technological progress – alongside our 
deepening partnerships – enable us to thrive, and allow ever 
more people to escape poverty and live longer and freer lives» 1.
In recent years, climate change2 together with the huge increase 
in human migratory movements, the new technological revolu-
tion, and since March 2020, COVID-19, have made Europe face 
an unprecedented challenge. Since the beginning of the 21st 
Century the world has become more complicated, and instead of 
moving towards closer international cooperation, uncertainty and 
rivalry seem to be pushing the planet in the opposite direction.
In December 2019, the EU Commission formulated the European 
Green Deal (EGD), which in its final paragraph states the follow-
ing: «The European Green Deal launches a new growth strategy 
for the EU. It supports transition of the EU to a fair and prosperous 
society that responds to the challenges posed by climate change 
and the environmental degradation, improving the quality of life 
of current and future generations». Growth and progress, the 
fight against poverty, increasing life expectancy and even consol-
idating liberties, now have a common goal in the EU: obtaining a 
sustainable and clean development. Yet, to achieve such a world, 
will compete with other futures that are not so promising3.
As we enter the third decade of the 21st Century, climate change 
is causing risks that constitute a global and collective problem 
that calls for international cooperation. It also requires strong 
and sufficient individual support, firstly because this is undeniably 
1 European Union Global Strategy: «Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Eu-
rope» June 2016. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_review_web_0_0.pdf 
(Consultation Date January 2021).
2 Climate change means the global variations affecting the Earth’s climate. These 
variations are due to natural causes and to human activity and affect all climate pa-
rameters: temperature, precipitations, cloudiness, etc, at very different time scales. 
https://www.miteco.gob.es/es/cambio-climatico/temas/cumbre-cambio-climati-
co-cop21/el-cambio-climatico/ (Consultation Date January 2021). 
3 For example, NYE, Joseph: «Los futuros posibles tras la pandemia». In El País on 11 
October 2020, he describes several potential scenarios for 2030 and only one of them 
is consistent with the consolidation of an international green agenda.
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the basis for giving legitimacy to political decisions in democratic 
societies and, secondly, because the responses to climate change 
make it essential for us not only to find new ways of consuming 
and producing, but also to change our work habits and the ways 
in which we relate to each other. Shortly, this means modifying 
our current lifestyles.
The economic doctrine considers environmental protection to 
be a public good because of its non-exclusive and non-individ-
ualizable consumption4,and climate change induced by human 
behaviour to be an externality or cost that is not borne by those 
who cause it but by everybody in general5. Mitigating climate 
change requires collective actions that must involve all countries 
and nations as a whole,6 whether they are developed or devel-
oping countries, whether they are from the North or the South 
and however democratic they may or may not be. An interna-
tional response is needed «based on a shared understanding of 
the long-term objectives and an agreement on the institutional 
frameworks for action»7. Yet just like any other global collective 
action, acting against climate change also brings about incentives 
to act as opportunists or free riders, i.e., obtaining the benefits of 
the actions taken by others, without bearing their cost.
Collective action in defence of the environment is also jeopard-
ised if it cannot find sufficient social support for the political deci-
sions it implies and fails to encourage changes in the individual 
behaviour. Paradoxically, these support and modifications of indi-
vidual habits rather than due to their real impacts on the climate, 
are usually adopted according to how each person values the 
esteem that her actions induce in the closest social environment. 
The actual effect on global warming or on the CO2 emissions of a 
4 These are the basic features of a public asset according to SAMUELSON, PAUL: «The 
Pure Theory of Public Expenditure», Review of Economics and Statistics 36 (4), Pages 
387-89. (1954)
5 Although the source of externalities as an economic concept is attributed to PIGOU, 
A.C.: «Wealth and Welfare» (1912), a specific application of this term to climate change 
appears in the STERN N. Report, Review on the Economics of Climate Change. 2006. 
Available at www.sternreview.org.uk. (Consultation Date January 2021)
6 These collective actions can also be regarded as included in the «Prisoner’s Di-
lemma» model, where the optimum strategies of each individual or country lead to 
socially suboptimal equilibrium. CONTHE, MANUEL: «Geopolítica de la Energía y Teoría 
de Juegos». In Energía Geoestrategia 2019. Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos. 
Comité Español del Consejo de la Energía. Club Español de la Energía. Ministerio de 
Defensa. 2019.
7 STERN, N. Ibid (2006)
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particular attitude or a specific individual action, is very marginal 
and hardly appreciable. That is why obtaining sufficient social 
support to combat the anthropogenic effects on the climate, is 
regarded as one of those problems of the kind that is described 
in economics as «tragedy of the commons»8. The «tragedy» 
consists that if individuals rationally make their decisions (they 
decide in favour of what is most beneficial to them), they cause 
a collective result that is self-destructive. They are decisions that 
are taken not because of the state of the world, but because of 
what we are like or what we want to be like.
If the actions to combat climate change are to be successful in 
the next few decades, inducement to behave as opportunists or 
free riders must be discouraged, and the same applies to any 
opposing decisions and attitudes adopted by individuals who, 
for a variety of reasons, question the feasibility of such actions 
and their implementation speed, or those who even question 
the very existence of climate change. For this purpose, it is 
essential to mitigate the asymmetries that, in terms of geo-
political power and social welfare, this transition will cause. If 
combating climate change is to make headway, international 
cooperation and social support have to overcome the interests, 
asymmetries and inequalities that induce negative and uncoop-
erative behaviours.
Although the European Union strategy and its foreign policy have 
not been particularly influential over the last three decades, 
it seems to be awakening since the approval of the European 
Green Deal and the political reaction to COVID-199. After the 
EGD was formulated in December 2019 and the Reconversion 
Plan to refloat the Union’s economy was drawn up in April 2020 
8 This is what Steven Pinker in «Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Humanism 
and Progress». Viking, New York, 2018, states to remind us that it is a behavioural 
model that generates negative externalities and that this model is referred to as «trag-
edy of the commons», originally described by Hardin in 1968 in the journal Science. 
Pinker, following in the wake of Kahan et al. identifies the beliefs surrounding the 
effects of climate change as a problem that is in keeping with this collective action 
model. KAHAN, DAN M. WITTLING; MAGGIE et al, in The Tragedy of the Risk-Percep-
tion Commons: Culture Conflict, Rationality Conflict, and Climate Change. Temple Uni-
versity Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2011-26, Cultural Cognition Project Working 
Paper No. 89, Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 435, Yale Law School, Public 
Law Working Paper No. 230, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1871503 
or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn. 
9 BERGMANN, Max: «Europe’s Geopolitical Awakening. The pandemic rouses a sleep-
ing giant.» Foreign Affairs, 20 August 2020.
Miguel Ángel Lasheras Merino
116
and finally accepted in December, the EU has made an attempt 
to take over world leadership in the process of transition towards 
a decarbonised world. If it is to achieve this leadership, the EU 
has to be prepared to take on the risks involved and to face up 
to the internal and external tensions that it could entail, including 
those that internally affect its own political project, such as, for 
example, that the transition is unsuccessful and gets diluted in 
the geopolitical tensions of a fragmented world10.
This article is structured as follows: after this introduction, there 
is a section devoted to explaining, as international precedents 
to the EGD, the crisis situation of the international order at the 
beginning of the 21st Century and the origins of a new suprana-
tional framework of action in support of the fight against climate 
change. The third section traces and describes the path taken by 
EU energy policy until the EGD became the core strategy of the 
Union’s domestic and foreign policies at the end of 2019. The 
fourth section concerns the EGD, its objectives, its policies and 
the requirements that have defined it throughout 2020. The fifth 
section gives an account of the main geopolitical consequences 
that the EGD may bring about and, by way of conclusion, the 
sixth section consists of a general reflection on the repercussions 
of the EGD defined by the EU, as it is implemented.
Climate change and green transition in an international 
order in crisis
The international order crisis
After the Second World War, the international order led by the 
United States of America (US) was based upon the doctrine 
of containment through deterrence. It was able to contain the 
danger of uncontrolled nuclear expansion; turned Germany into 
a democracy; provided financial support to the reconstruction 
of Europe through the Marshall Plan; forged new alliances in 
Asia and Europe; established and consolidated several multilat-
eral institutions, such as the United Nations, the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organi-
10 At the moment the EGD was defined, in December 2019, Giuseppe Conte, then 
Prime Minister of Italy, warned his European counterparts that Europe was facing «an 
appointment with History» that ran the risk of «ending up in failure». Quoted in CO-
LOMINA, CARME. «Una Union Europea en Transición». CIDOB. Barcelona Centre for 
International Affairs. anuariocidob.org. July 2020.
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zation, amongst others. All these advances would have been 
described as pure utopia right at the end of the Second World 
War11.
After the fall of Communism in the Soviet Union and once the 
Cold War ended, the US acquired a largely unexpected economic 
and military superiority and could have led a new phase of inter-
national cooperation. Yet the Governments in the 1990s, both 
Bush Senior’s and Clinton’s, proved unable to work out a strategy 
that would have taken US foreign policy beyond the defence of its 
own immediate interests and the simplest values of capitalism. 
It was thought that: «No two countries that both have a McDon-
ald´s have ever fought a war against each other»12. After all, the 
use of force, i.e. the military power, was always an option, should 
the expansion via McDonald´s not be sufficient13.
Once the 1990s had passed, the US and the Western World found 
themselves up against two unexpected phenomena: the boom 
in Moslem terrorism and China’s spectacular economic growth. 
The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 finally closed that 
window of opportunity and drove the US to a foreign policy that, 
in an attempt to prevent further terrorist actions, led to the uni-
lateral waging of wars, such as the ones in Afghanistan, Iran and 
Iraq. Even with the benefit of hindsight, these wars were difficult 
to explain, and after having cost the lives of thousands of US 
soldiers and hundreds of thousands of civilians, they gave rise 
to a geopolitical notion that did not consider the main problems 
to be transnational and thus failed to realise that the solutions 
also needed to be transnational, «… diplomatic, multilateral and 
inherent to a foreign policy that would enable other countries 
to manage their domestic problems instead of expanding them 
beyond their frontiers»14.
Once Trump came into Office in 2017, US military and economic 
supremacy went into crisis and was questioned owing to China’s 
rise as an economic force. In these recent years, the USA has 
given up the multilateralism of previous periods (its new target 
11 HAASS, Richard: «Present at the Disruption: How Trump Unmade U.S. Foreign Pol-
icy» Foreign Affairs. October 2020. 
12 FRIEDMAN, Thomas: «Foreign Affairs Big Mac». New York Times 8 December 1996.
13 ZARIFIAN, Julien: «U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s and 2000s, and the case of 
South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia)». European Association for Ameri-
can Studies. European Journal of American Studies. Summer 2015.
14 FUCHS, Michael F.: A Foreign Policy for the Post-Pandemic World: How to prepare 
for the next crisis. Foreign Affairs. 23 July 2020. 
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becoming «America First»15) distancing itself from the Joint Com-
prehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) for controlling Iran’s nuclear 
expansion, from the Paris Agreement and the World Health 
Organisation, and plunging the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
into crisis. The 2020 Elections paved the way for a new Adminis-
tration under the Presidency of Joe Biden from whom it is hoped 
that there will be a change in direction that will enable the USA 
to reappear as the «hegemonic and benevolent stakeholder» it 
was in earlier times. The return to the Paris Agreement and the 
announcement that a New Green Deal will be considered in the 
US will set a new balance in the world’s environmental policies, 
although nothing will be quite the same again.
Shortly before Trump took over the presidency, Martin Wolf 
stated in the Financial Times that the moment the world was 
going through could be regarded as «…the end not only of an 
economic period – globalisation led by the West – but also the 
end of a geopolitical era, the unipolar moment after the Cold War, 
that of a global order led by the US». This period has come to an 
end and we are at the outset of a new era with new objectives, 
new methods and new institutions.
Dani Rodrick’s trilemma,16 is well known. It is used to argue that 
hyper globalisation is incompatible with liberal democracy and 
with maintaining Nation-States as the basic and sovereign unit 
for political decision17. The principles of the international order 
that have prevailed in previous decades and that we can identify 
with those of an «international liberal order» – difficult to define 
with precision but abundantly quoted – have been in crisis for 
several years and have been questioned from the East and from 
the West18.
15 «America First» is not an empty slogan devoid of content, but a philosophy that is 
fairly consistent with a long tradition and has many followers in the US academic world. 
See KAGAN, ROBERT: «The twilight of the liberal world order». Brookings Big Ideas for 
America. Policy Brief. 24 January 2017.
16 «Rodrick’s trilemma» indicates that it is impossible to achieve economic globalisa-
tion, political democracy and national sovereignty, all at the same time. The three op-
tions at the same time, are incompatible, because once two of them hold; this prevents 
the third from occurring, so we will be forced to choose only two at the same time.
17 RODRICK, Dani (2011), «The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of 
the World Economy»Norton, New York.
18 As is accepted by RABINOVICH, MARYNA and ZUZANA REPTOVA: «The future of 
values in the EU global strategy 2020» Strategic and international studies. Real Institu-
to Elcano. 19 November 2019: for the US and the EU, there is no doubt that the annex-
ation of Crimea (2014) and the actions taken by Peking regarding its claims based on 
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China and Russia, countries that can hardly be said to epito-
mise the definition of liberal democracies, happen to be the main 
challenges to the international order in recent years, owing to 
their relatively great economic, military and political power and 
their clear readiness to use it. China’s positioning with regard to 
international trade is not only a positioning in defence of its own 
economic interests. The country also seeks to occupy an ideo-
logical role in the world that currently appears to be vacant. 19 
The «international order» of recent decades has seen progress 
in human rights, democracy and the autonomy of the individual, 
but on the other hand, from a political and economic perspec-
tive, it has sought to expand through colonial violence and by 
subordinating the material and personal resources of the periph-
eral countries to the «mothercountry»20. Critics of this order with 
regard to China have in their favour the fact that in the past 40 
years, China has managed to lift 800 million people out of pov-
erty. Whereas at the beginning of the 1990s, the Soviet Regime 
collapsed in Russia and Eastern Europe, the peculiar Chinese 
Regime has managed to take the country into second place in 
the world rankings in terms of nominal GDP. China has sacri-
ficed domestic democracy in an effort to consolidate itself as the 
world’s top exporting nation.
All in all, according to Charles Powell, Director of the Real Insti-
tuto Elcano, although the declining international liberal order, 
which was the driving force behind globalisation and multilateral-
ism, is fraught with uncertainties and concerns, it is looked upon 
in some parts of the world «…even with hope, because it could 
pave the way for a new multipolar order that is more egalitarian, 
inclusive and stable than the current order.»21 This ought to be 
the «Nine-Dash Line» in the South China Sea amount to a threat to international order 
that claims to be based on shared rules (yet it is paradoxical that Washington accuses 
Peking of violating the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea, when the US 
Congress has refused to ratify this Convention because it considers it to be incompati-
ble with the free exercising of its sovereignty). 
19 We must not forget that, for example, Chinese behaviour has been paradigmatic in 
the same heart of the EU. When no other European country responded to the Italian Gov-
ernment’s urgent call for medical equipment and personal protective equipment, China 
reacted by sending 1,000 items of ventilation equipment, 2 million masks, 100,000 res-
pirators, 20,000 protective suits and test kits, as is pointed out by CASTIÑEIRA, Angel: 
«COVID-19 and geopolitics: first impacts» Global Agenda. ESADE 29 May 2020. 
20 NOONAN, Jeff. «Trump and the Liberal International Order», International Critical 
Thought, 10:2, 182-199, DOI: 10.1080/21598282.2020.1779601. June 2020.
21 POWELL, Charles: «Tiene futuro el orden liberal internacional?» Estudios Interna-
cionales. Real Instituto Elcano. 29th June 2017.
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an order that is able to take on the international fight against 
climate change and provide cover for the cooperation required to 
progress towards a decarbonised world that is environmentally 
sustainable.
Climate Change
When the EU talks about Climate Change it is referring to the 
fact that the atmosphere is warming and the climate is changing 
from one year to the next. One million out of the eight million 
species on the planet are in danger of extinction. We are polluting 
and destroying the forests and oceans22. The Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, an organisation belonging to the United 
Nations and that periodically issues scientific, technical and soci-
oeconomic reports for the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change23 , considers that the scientific evidence of the warming 
of the climate system is unequivocal24. The Fifth Report from the 
Intergovernmental Panel was vital for ensuring that the Climate 
Conference held in Paris in December 2015 put the Convention 
Parties to one accord in signing a commitment to act jointly, try-
ing to prevent this global warming. The Paris Agreement is based 
on the Convention and, for the first time, it has given the coun-
tries a common cause to undertake ambitious efforts to com-
bat climate change and to adapt to its effects, with increased to 
help developing countries to do likewise25. The main aim included 
in the Agreement is to limit the temperature increase to 2ºC, 
when compared to preindustrial levels and, if possible, to limit 
this increase to 1.5ºC. It is the first time that within the national 
order, still based above all on respect to national sovereignty, it 
has been possible to obtain a world agreement with quantified 
targets taken on by the Parties with regard to adopting policies 
that affect the exercising of their sovereign rights. Although the 
Agreement was not signed by all the Parties to the Convention 
22 COM (2019) 640 final.
23 The Convention is an international treaty signed in New York on 9 May 1992 that 
seeks to increase public awareness all over the world regarding climate change prob-
lems. In 1997, the legally binding Kyoto Protocol was added to it. This Protocol was 
only binding to the developed nations and established new practical measures (such as 
the three flexibility mechanisms that it defined: Emissions Trading, the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism and the Joint Implementation Mechanism).
24 https://climate.nasa.gov/evidence/ 
25 ht tps://unfccc. int/es/process-and-meet ings/the-par is-agreement/
que-es-el-acuerdo-de-paris
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(by the end of 2020, 187 out of the 197 Parties had ratified it), it 
managed to achieve an unprecedented mobilisation in favour of 
policies to combat climate change26.
Not long before the Paris Conference, in September 2015, the 
United Nations Assembly approved Agenda 2030 concerning Sus-
tainable Development that sets 17 targets to be reached that 
range from poverty eradication to combating climate change, 
education, equality of women, defence of the environment or the 
design of our cities27. In the Report submitted to the Assembly 
shortly before approval of the Agenda, the UN Secretary General 
made reference to the 17 goals and 169 associated targets, stat-
ing in the final paragraph: «The threats to international peace 
and security are becoming increasingly complex and intercon-
nected, which is why we are required to examine and update our 
approach to conflict prevention, keeping peace and consolidating 
peace. These are just some of the challenges that must be over-
come, and that require an unprecedented spirit of cooperation 
between the Member States. Let us all work together to achieve 
these common goals.»28 These targets are enumerated in the 
Agenda, but there is no legal requirement to comply with them, 
and neither are there any common methods defined for quanti-
fying them29.
In a world whose international order is based on respect for the 
sovereignty of every Nation-State, the Paris Agreement consti-
tutes a break away from this base and provides an experience 
on which to build a series of new rules of the game. The require-
ment to act, taken on by the signatory States, does respect the 
autonomy of each Party or State to define which tools to use, but 
it imposes clear obligations on them regardless of the tools they 
use30.
26 Even a company that is as fully oil oriented as British Petroleum admitted in its En-
ergy Outlook for 2020: Delaying these policies measures and societal shifts may lead 
to significant economic costs and disruption.
27 https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/es/ 
28 «The Secretary General’s Report on the Organisation’s activities». General Assembly. 
Official Documents. Seventieth period of sessions. The United Nations. New York, 2015.
29 LORENZO, Claudia: «Medición de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible en la Unión 
Europea a través de indicadores compuestos». Work Document. Special Issue. Fun-
dación Carolina, April 2020, an attempt is made to use this quantification for the UE 
Member States in 2016 and 2017 utilising synthetic indicators.
30 This is the principle of «sovereign obligation» which Haass defines as an alternative 
to national sovereignty and which should lead to a new world order 2.0. See HAASS, 
RICHARD, Ibid.
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The US, which ratified the Paris Agreement in September 2019, 
formally informed in November that it was withdrawing from the 
Agreement as from November 2020. President Trump had already 
formally announced this withdrawal in July 2017, seven months 
after taking possession. The USA thus became the first major 
world power to withdraw from an Agreement in which the rest of 
the major powers remained, including India, China, Russia, the 
European Union, Japan and Brazil31.
The EU, which is energy dependent and until relatively recently 
(until the beginning of the Millennium) did not have an energy 
policy as such, i.e., one of its own and different from that which 
was implemented by each Member-State, approached the green 
transition after the Paris Agreements, from a position of great 
institutional weakness (Brexit, slow decision-making processes 
that require unanimity for key matters such as taxation and budg-
ets, poorly-managed increase to 27 members, crisis affecting 
migration policies, etc.) that, together with taking into account 
the effects of COVID-19, put it in a relatively marginal position in 
the current world concert of nations. However, since the spring 
2020, the Union seems to have been overcoming this situation 
and finding a new way to tackle its current challenges: with new 
decision-making formulas, new tools and a new sense of unity. 
In his 2017 speech on the State of the Union, President Juncker 
made a clear reference to the fact that important decisions for 
market unity, the Council’s decisions and those involving the 
European Parliament, should be taken by qualified majority. In 
the words of the Commission: there comes a moment when the 
unanimity rule slows down progress and in some cases prevents 
the EU from adjusting to changing realities and offering Europe-
ans the best means for defending their interests32. The qualified 
majorities rule is now applied to protect the environment & con-
sumers, employment & social standards, data protection and free 
& fair trade. Let us hope it will soon be applied to the rest of the 
important EU´s decisions.
31 In a year, 2020, when forest fires and hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico have in-
creased greatly, the future President Biden promised during his campaign to return to 
the Agreement and apply a new plan to combat climate change, with investments of 
up to US$ 2 million million, setting the target of achieving completely clean electric-
ity generation by 2035. See DAVENPORT, CORAL: «Biden Pledges Ambitious Climate 
Action. Here’s What He Could Actually Do». The New York Times. 3 December 2020. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/25/climate/biden-climate-change.html (Consulta-
tion Date, January 2021)
32 COM (2019) 177 final
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Energy policy in the European Union
The Treaties of Rome and the Liberalisation Directives
Energy has been present in the EU since it was created. In 1957, 
in Rome, the Treaty was signed that established the European 
Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Com-
mission (EURATOM) and it also included the Treaty signed years 
before to set up the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). 
The aim of the Treaty was to achieve economic and political coop-
eration between European countries (basically France and Ger-
many at that time) enabling the signatory countries to access the 
benefits of free trade among each other. In accordance with the 
ECSC Treaty, coal, which was mentioned from the beginning of 
Europe as an autochthonous source of energy, should be allowed 
to move freely between the Community countries.
The Treaties constituting the European Communities only men-
tion three common policies: the Common Agricultural Policy, the 
Common Transport Policy and the Common Trade Policy. Although 
the Treaties did not explain exactly what was meant by common 
policies, these were essentially defined by two characteristics. 
Firstly, the Communities had a sufficiently generous attribution of 
competences to enable them to intervene globally in these mat-
ters. Secondly, vocational intervention was high enough to bring 
about the virtual disappearance of the competition that the State 
originally exercised33. As a result, and in accordance with these 
constituent treaties, the way for European institutions to inter-
vene in the Energy Sector was through its link to the Common 
Trade Policy or domestic market.
This orientation to the domestic market plus a concern over guar-
anteeing the security of supply were extended to energy as a 
whole, in the Merger Treaty of 1965 (the «European Community 
Treaty», ECT); a Treaty that embeds the initial Treaties, consti-
tutes the Customs Union and consolidates the Common Market.
Two major events took place in 197334:
 – The Continental Can Ruling in which the Court of Justice of 
the European Union rules that, in the interpretation of the 
33 URREA, Mariola: «La política energética de la Union Europea a la luz del Tratado de 
Lisboa» Cuadernos de estrategia, ISSN 1697-6924, Nº. 150, pp.. 115-143. Instituto 
Español de Estudios Estratégicos. Ministerio de Defensa, 2011.
34 https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/1970-1979/1973_es (Con-
sultation Date January 2021) 
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provisions contained in the ECT, any company that occupies 
a dominant position and attempts to concentrate a degree of 
power such that it is in fact tantamount to the abolition of free 
competition, is incurring in an abuse of power.
 – The holding of the Copenhagen European Summit, where 
prompted by the Oil Crisis, the Member States decided to im-
plement a common energy policy and published a declaration 
on European identity, a result from several political coopera-
tion agreements, that was approved by the Ministers of For-
eign Affairs. It was above all an indication of European concern 
to guarantee the security of supply, by using autochthonous 
resources such as coal.
The Community’s Energy Policy began to take shape over the 
next two decades, but it remained closely linked to the policy 
of promotion and defence of competition. The energy policy, for 
example, aimed at promoting certain electrical generation tech-
nologies, was going to be subsidiary to the national policies of 
each Member State. Hence, the defence, from the European 
institutions, of the privatisation processes and the introduction 
of competitiveness in sectors such as energy, which traditionally 
operated by means of monopolies.
This allocation of powers led, by virtue of Article 95 of the ECT 
regarding the approximation of legislations, to the approvement 
of the first electricity and gas Directives as a market liberalisa-
tion package. This package took the form of Directive 96/92/
EC concerning common standards for the domestic electricity 
market and Directive 98/30/EC concerning common standards 
for the domestic natural gas market. Basically, these first gas 
and electricity Directives established free access to the trans-
port and distribution networks, and the separation or unbundling 
between activities in competition and activities in monopoly. Fur-
thermore, the National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) were set 
up, as institutions that were independent both of governments 
and companies.
The way that Article 154 in the Maastricht´s Treaty of the Euro-
pean Union in 1992 (the «European Union Treaty», EUT) was 
expressed, indicated that «the Community will contribute to 
establishing and developing trans-European networks in the 
transport, telecommunications and energy infrastructure sec-
tors». Thus, the development of trans-European networks is 
added to the supply security and competitiveness areas, in order 
to carry on filling the European Community´s Energy Policy with 
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content. In 1995, the Commission published the White Paper «An 
Energy Policy for the European Union» in which it highlighted 
three key objectives: improving competition, security of supply 
and environmental protection.
The second package of gas and electricity Directives was passed 
and published in 2003. Its main effect was to increase the group 
of «eligible» consumers, for those consumers entitled to select a 
supplier through a competitive system, extending this right to all 
industrial consumers. In April 2009, approval was given to a third 
energy package whose intention was to liberalise the domestic 
electricity and gas markets to a greater extent. It made modifi-
cations to the second package and is regarded as the cornerstone 
of the creation of the internal energy market.
All in all, this whole set of Directives was lacking a common legal 
doctrine and they did not give rise therefore to creating a Euro-
pean Energy Policy in the real sense of the term, because there 
was a lack of clear distribution of decision-making and compe-
tence procedures in such important areas as fixing the energy 
mix for each Member State and the subsidy policy for certain 
energy sources.
The Kyoto Protocol and the Green Papers on Energy Policy
At the same time that this «rather undefined» energy policy 
appeared, in December 1997, the Kyoto Agreement was signed in 
the context of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
with the commitment to reduce Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions 
in 37 countries and in the European Union. The commitment con-
sisted of a reduction of the emission by at least 5% compared 
to 1990, and to do so between 2008 and 2012, a period that 
was later extended to 2020; the EU accepting a target to reduce 
levels by 20%. Moreover, the Protocol set in motion the flexibil-
ity mechanisms or instruments for achieving the reduction goals 
accepted (joint implementation, clean development mechanisms 
and emissions trading rights).
The Commission’s 1997 White Paper «Energy for the Future: 
Renewable Energy Sources» anticipates the Kyoto agreements 
and, in a certain way, it is considered to be the document that 
spawned the energy policy for promoting renewable energies in 
the European Union, given that it was to be followed immedi-
ately by the first Directives making reference to the promotion 
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of renewables and setting indicative targets: These are Direc-
tive 2001/77/EC to promote renewable electricity in the domestic 
electricity market and Directive 2003/30/EC to promote biofuels 
in the transport sector. As a consequence, during the years 2000-
2010, Europe has witnessed a change in the power generation 
mix that, although it has managed to reduce CO2 emissions in 
the Union as a whole, has yielded very different results in each 
one of the Member States35.
The need to adapt the constituent treaties after more than 
twenty years had passed since its foundation, together with the 
enlargement of the European Community to 27 members, led 
to the Treaty of Nice, signed in 2001, which left the legal frame-
work for European activities in energy matters almost intact, 
but marked the beginning of a series of actions, documents and 
communications from the European institutions, with proposals 
for coordinating the energy and environmental activities of the 
Member States. One of the first documents was the Green Paper 
«A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure 
Energy», 200636, which was followed in 2007 by nine communi-
cations issued by the Commission to the Council and Parliament 
concerning the generation mix (nuclear, hydrocarbons, biofuels 
and renewables), the domestic gas and electricity market and 
the strategic technologies plan. All these documents paved the 
way for the European energy plans included comprehensively in 
the European Energy Policy, referred to as such in the Commis-
sion’s Communication of January 200737. The First Renewables 
Directive in 200938 already set mandatory targets and made pro-
moting the use of renewable energies a central issue within the 
Union´s energy policy and a key driving force for complying with 
the 2020 targets. However, at this first attempt, no legal instru-
ments were provided that could require the «mandatory» targets 
to be fulfilled or that could make them effective.
The Treaty of Lisbon
The Treaty of Lisbon (Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, TFEU) came into effect on 1 December 2009 and now 
35 SOLORIO, Israel: «La política europea de renovables y su influencia en España y el 
Reino Unido». Estudios de Progreso. Fundación Alternativas. Nº 80, 2014.
36 COM (2006) 105 final
37 Directive 2009/28/EC
38 Directiva 2009/28/EC
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contained a chapter exclusively devoted to Energy (Title XXI), 
according to which the Union had its own competence and capac-
ity to act without having to resort to each one of the Member 
States. The Treaty refers to environmental protection, energy 
and trans-European networks as being among the shared com-
petences, the aims of the Union’s energy policy are constituted 
with a principle of a political nature, i.e. the principle of soli-
darity, becoming a legal obligation. The four objectives estab-
lished for the Union’s Energy Policy and whose measures are to 
be approved by a qualified majority, are: a) to guarantee that the 
domestic energy market functions; b) to guarantee the security 
of supply; c) to encourage energy efficiency and energy saving, 
as well as the development of new and renewable energies, and 
d) to encourage network interconnection.
The Treaty thus foresees a new decision-making process that 
incorporates the Union’s ability to act into the energy policy and 
determines the residual power that corresponds to the Member 
States39. To be specific, Article 194(2) TFEU states that EU leg-
islation will not affect each Member State’s right to choose from 
among the different energy sources available and to decide what 
the general structure of its energy offer or mix will be.
This distribution of competences is of particular importance for 
the EGD. While the First Renewables Directive issued in April 
2009 established a series of targets that were considered manda-
tory for every Member State, yet it lacked the means for enforc-
ing these targets and penalising those who failed to comply, the 
Second Directive40, passed after the TFEU had already come into 
force, was drawn up under completely different premises and 
complied with the Treaty’s distribution of competences.
Clean Energy for All Europeans
The TFEU paved the way for the EU to adopt several legislative 
measures in 2018, aimed at implementing its medium-term strat-
egy for reducing emissions; these came to be known as the 2030 
Climate & Energy Framework. A year later, this Framework was 
incorporated into what was referred to as the Clean Energy Pack-
39 URREA, Mariola: ibid.
40 DIRECTIVE (EU) 2018/2001 ISSUED BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUN-
CIL on 11 December 2018 concerning encouragement to use energy from renewable 
sources
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age for All Europeans. The essential new pieces of legislation were 
the aforementioned Second Directive on renewables and the Reg-
ulation on Governance of the Energy Union & Climate Action41. A 
further six legislative instruments were added to the «package», 
concerning: energy efficiency, competences of the Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), the domestic electricity 
market (Directive and Regulation), building construction stand-
ards and treatment of risks in the electrical sector.
The goal set by the Framework and taken on by the Clean Energy 
Package was to reduce emissions by 40% when compared to 
1990, and to reach 32% generated by renewable means and a 
32.5% improvement in energy efficiency in the EU as a whole 
by 203042. One of the biggest innovations of the energy pol-
icy formed by these strategic targets and these regulatory pack-
ages was the search for a balance, under the TFEU, between 
respect for the sovereignty of each Member State and the need 
to make the European energy policy targets and strategies imple-
mentable, even at national policy level. Thus, the goal set by 
the Framework for the renewable energy share out of the total 
energy generated is defined as a target for the Union as a whole, 
but it does not require each one of the Member States to com-
ply with this limit individually. The executive obligations of each 
Member State are imposed not in the generation percentage, but 
in the area of governance. The Member States are required to 
commit themselves publicly before the rest of the Union, through 
National Energy & Climate Plans (NECPs) coordinated to make 
sure they are compatible with the global target. Furthermore, 
these must be periodically updated following the methodologies 
and guidelines established for that purpose. The Commission will 
assess each Member State’s Plan, to check that it is consistent 
with the overall goal for the entire EU in 2030. The EU intervenes 
in boosting, coordinating, reviewing and approving these plans, 
which are mandatory. However, to «honour» what is contained 
in them and to materially comply with the goals established in 
them, falls within the sovereign «competences» of each Member 
41 Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 on Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action.
42 The upward review of these goals was anticipated by the Commission in the EGD 
[COM (2019) 640 final] and they were included in its proposal for a Climate Act [COM 
(2020) 80]. In its Resolution dated January 2020 [Text Approved P9 TA (2020) 005] 
the Parliament gave its support to the Green Deal and also backed the upward review 
of the goals. Finally, the objectives were reviewed by the European Council in Decem-
ber 2020 and the emissions reduction was raised to 55%. By no later than June 2021, 
the Commission will submit the legislative proposals to comply with these targets. 
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State. If they are not fulfilled, the State concerned will pay a 
political price, yet the State is «sovereign» from a legal perspec-
tive when it comes to establishing its own energy mix. The EU 
is thus trying to overcome the traditional difficulties that existed 
prior to the TFEU, which it came up against when it lacked the 
legal instruments that would make it possible to set goals and 
monitor compliance, all of which were discussed so much at the 
time of 2009 Renewables Directive.
Notwithstanding, this reformulation of competences in the TFEU 
and their application to the Union’s energy policy, have caused 
a degree of division within the Union: on the one hand, there 
is a block of environmentally progressive countries led by Ger-
many and Denmark, who are trying to encourage the adoption of 
ambitious targets while on the other hand, there is the group of 
Member States from Eastern and Central Europe, led by Poland, 
which opposes the adoption of ambitious targets for renewable 
energies, on claim that these will cause potential risks to their 
energy security, and in defence of their sovereign right to estab-
lish the composition of their energy mix.
All in all, if despite all its complexity and all the internal frictions 
involved, the EU´s energy policy after the TFEU were successful, 
this unusual combination of national competences (to quantify 
objectives) and European competences (to make requirements 
mandatory) would not have been alien to it and it would be highly 
likely that it could be exported to other supranational and multi-
lateral entities43.
The Green Deal as an axis of the European strategy
The new Commission appointed after the 2019 Elections, rede-
fined the energy policy with an ambitious extension to its tar-
43 Another example of this combination of targets that are binding on the Union as 
a whole while also respecting each Member State’s «autonomous» competences, is 
the mechanism for financing new investments in renewable generation devised by the 
Commission and approved in September 2020. This mechanism makes it possible to al-
locate to the goals of a Member State (contributor) projects that it finance but which lie 
within another Member State (host), by means of a process of statistical allocation de-
fined by the Commission in accordance with the fulfilment of the EGD’s and the NRCP’s 
targets. The mechanism integrates the financial contributions of all the Member States 
into a pool and then allocates them through a process of competitive auction that, for 
the purpose of fulfilling the joint renewable energy targets, enables all the participating 
States to benefit. See COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2020/1294 on 
15th September, regarding the Union’s renewable energies financing mechanism.
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gets, announcing a Deal consisting of «… a new growth strategy 
that aims to transform the EU into a fair and prosperous soci-
ety, with a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy, 
where there are no net emissions of greenhouse gases in 2050 
and where economic growth is decoupled from resource use»44. 
This formulation is a leap forward when compared to the energy 
policy in the 2030 Framework and the Clean Energy Package. 
Implementing the policies included in the EGD and the strategies 
defined in previous years for the EU’s energy policy are unfea-
sible if these are not carried out in the context of an interna-
tional collaboration that accepts them and commits itself to their 
development. However, the Deal goes still further, and not only 
accepts that the EU must play an international leadership role 
in this process and obtain the support of the rest of the inter-
national blocks45, but also broadens the European energy policy 
by defining as a broader objective, achieving a sustainable and 
circular economy by 2050.
Although it is not easy to find precise definitions of what a circular 
economy is, one of the main think tanks that is devoted to pro-
moting and studying it, the Ellen MacArthur Foundation is of the 
opinion that promoting a circular economy involves disassociating 
the economic activity of consuming finite resources and removing 
waste from the system from the outset. Backed by a transition to 
renewable energy sources, the circular model creates economic, 
natural and social capital and is based upon three principles: 
removing waste and pollution from design; maintaining products 
and materials in use; and regenerating natural systems46.
Therefore, the circular economy is a new economic and social 
model that, more than just through its intrinsic features, is defined 
as an alternative to the «traditional and linear economic model», 
which is the model that is operating in the Western world as we 
know it. To be more precise, this is defined in economiacircular.
org as: … an economic concept that interacts with sustainability, 
44 This mention of a growth disassociated with the use of resources is responsible for 
the fact that the term «energy transition» has been transformed into the broader term 
«ecological transition», which appears in the Green Deal. COM (2019) 640 Final.
45 On 10th September 2019 Úrsula Von der Leyen tweeted: «The European Green Deal 
has to become Europe’s hallmark. I want Europe to be the front-runner. I want Europe 
to be the exporter of knowledge, technologies and best practice. At the heart of it is our 
commitment to becoming the world’s first climate-neutral continent». https://twitter.
com/vonderleyen/status/1171376907964813312 (Consultation Date January 2021).
46 See https://www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/es/economia-circular/concepto 
(Consultation Date January 2021)
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and whose objective is that the value of products, materials and 
resources (water, energy,…) is maintained in the economy for as 
long as possible, and that waste generation is reduced to a min-
imum. It is implementing a new economy, circular -not linear-, 
based on the principle of «closing the life cycle» of products, ser-
vices, waste, materials, water and energy47.
Furthermore, the EGD is called upon to be the new European ref-
erence axis, displacing the integration of Europe as the centre of 
actions and strengthening Europe’s global position in a vis-à-vis 
with China, Russia and the US, as well as multilaterally with respect 
to the world in general. However, formulated with such ambition, 
it has also aroused fears that it could end up by turning into the 
new «refugee crisis» and thus divide Europe, stirring up populism 
and nationalism within the Union48. At the end of 2019, the Aus-
tralian Strategic Policy Institute considered that the EGD was so 
important in the EU’s set of policies that the way it functioned in 
the coming years would either strengthen or break Europe and the 
Union. Because, in order to exercise the international leadership 
of this ambitious process it is essential to obtain internal support 
from among the Member States, and this support has to be strong 
and extensive enough to prevent the interests of some of States 
dominate, given that such prevalence could slow down the pace 
required to comply with the EGD in the Union as a whole.
Adding to the complexities arising from the very broad objectives 
and the new tools for implementation, a further complication has 
erupted since March 2020; this is the COVID-19 pandemic, the 
biggest disruption to affect the world since the outbreak of the 
Second World War.
The Green Deal: Objectives, Policies, Requirements and 
Consequences
Green Transition and COVID-19: The objectives
The COVID-19 upheaval caused an immediate nationalist back-
lash in the EU, placing each State as the citizens’ first level of 
protection49. Strict controls preventing the free movement of 
47 https://economiacircular.org/wp/?page_id=62 (Consultation Date January 2021)
48 LEONARD, Mark: «The Green Deal will make or break Europe» The Strategist – 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute. December 2020. https://www.aspistrategist.org.
au (Consultation Date January 2021)
49 COLOMINA, Carme: Ibid.
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persons were imposed at internal frontiers, certain communi-
ties and regions were stigmatised and authoritarian measures 
were enforced, all of which seem to have revived internal crises 
that had already manifested themselves before in the form of 
North-South confrontations due to economic policies, or East-
West confrontations arising from refugee and frontier defence 
policies. These initial reactions were a spontaneous response to 
the degrees of uncertainty created by the pandemic. Moreover, 
as a consequence of the uncertainty created, firms and consum-
ers alike became more cautious and retained investments and 
expenditure on long-lasting consumer goods, depressing still 
further the aggregate demand levels that were already greatly 
affected by the health measures that were being taken50.
Amongst the effects of COVID-19, it was expected that one 
would be to cause difficulties in the energy transition, mainly for 
three reasons: first, because it was a classic problem of collec-
tive action showing how difficult it was to control the free-riding 
behaviour that was abounding, not only at company and indi-
vidual consumer´s level, but also at State and regional level; 
secondly, because it was going to demonstrate the importance 
of being able to count on strong support from citizens and on 
their education in order to deal with this type of problems; and; 
in the third place because this crisis would reveal how close a 
link there is between economic growth and CO2 emissions, and 
thus the costs involved in removing those emissions51. Further-
more, it would absorb financial resources in a situation where, 
in general, the world becomes more impoverished and the 
financing of the transition was competing with new and great 
needs for investment, not only in the area of public health, but 
also in the defence and sustaining of the traditional economic 
sectors.
Nevertheless, from the outset, public leaders, company directors 
and influential persons from research centres and think-tanks, 
50 VoxEU/ECPR: «Economic uncertainty in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic», 
quoting BLOOM, N «Fluctuations in Uncertainty», Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
Spring, 2014 to review the economic literature that backs up this statement. https://
voxeu.org/article/economic-uncertainty-wake-covid-19-pandemic#:~:text=Mea-
sures%20of%20economic%20uncertainty%20derived,thus%20necessitating%20for-
ward%2Dlooking%20measures. (Consultation Date January 2021)
51 BORDOFF, Jason: Sorry, but the Virus Shows Why There Won’t Be Global Action on 
Climate Change Foreign Policy. 27 March 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/27/
coronavirus-pandemic-shows-why-no-global-progress-on-climate-change/ (Consulta-
tion Date January 2021)
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called for public and private mobilisation the world over, in order 
to obtain a resilient recovery, through a circular and sustainable 
economy, in response to the economic impact of the coronavirus. 
The approximately US$ 10 trillion (US$ ten million million) that 
governments decided to mobilise all over the world, according 
to the Club de Roma, constitute an unprecedented opportunity 
to «depart from a path of unqualified growth at any cost and 
from the old fossil fuel economy, to enter a long-lasting balance 
between people, prosperity and planetary limits»52.
This strategy of post-COVID-19 economic recovery justified the 
fact that in September 2020 the President of the Commission, 
Ursula Von der Leyen, formally announced as a goal, a reduction 
in Greenhouse Gases (GHG) of more than 40%53 when compared 
to the emission levels in 1990. The Member States must be able 
to use the 750 thousand million Euros from the recovery fund and 
the over one million million Euros (€1,073,000 million) from the 
52 ELLEN MACARTHUR FOUNDATION: «The circular economy: a transformative 
Covid-19 recovery strategy. How policymakers can pave the way to a low carbon, 
prosperous future». 2020.
53 GHG emissions are gases released into the atmosphere that absorb and emit ra-
diation within the infrared range. It is these gases that are mainly responsible for the 
greenhouse effect and the resulting global warming. The direct greenhouse gases are: 
carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), 
perfluorocarbons (PFC) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).
Figure 1: European Green Deal. Source: EU Commission.
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Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) mostly to finance invest-
ments in ecological transition and in enhancing the production of 
renewable energies. Approximately 37% of all these funds will 
be earmarked for investments associated with the EGD. The first 
assessments made by the EU regarding the National Energy & Cli-
mate Plans (NECPs) indicate that, in general, the Member States 
are speeding up the process of transition and that the initial tar-
get of 32% renewable generation by 2030 might be exceeded 
and even approach 34% when this review ends.
Thus, one year after they were originally formulated, and despite 
the tensions and doubts initially created by the economic and 
social crisis, the responses given by the European institutions 
have been emphatic, making the EGD the backbone of their 
recovery strategy and providing it with a considerable volume of 
funds from the issuing of social bonds with joint European backing 
and a new MFF with its own new resources54. All these responses 
situate the EU at the dawn of a green transition that could enable 
it to realise its most ambitious project since its creation and con-
solidate it as epitomising an example of successful supranational 
institution, constructed on broader and more complex principles 
than any other institution belonging to the international order of 
the second half of the 20th Century.
The Green Deal Policies
A greater climate ambition
In March 2020, the Commission announced its proposal for a Euro-
pean Climate Law55, with a view to raising the EGD’s targets at a 
legislative level, and with the specific aim of making Europe the 
first climate-neutral continent by 2050. The Climate Law would 
thus mean a firm and legal commitment to the EGD objectives, to 
give a sense of security to investors, companies, citizens and the 
international community pursuant to the Green Deal.
54 The framework for issuing European bonds backed by the Union as a whole, to 
finance the SURE Programme was approved by the Commission in October 2020 and 
the allocation of a new set of own resources for the Multiannual Financial Framework 
2021-2027 was adopted by the European Council in December 2020.
55 The Commission’s proposal for a Climate Law [COM (2020) 80 final] was adopted 
by the Parliament in October 2020, to be debated with the European Council, which 
between October and December established its position to carry on with the EU’s ordi-
nary legislative process. 
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With a view to being consistent with recent European experience, 
the Climate Law seeks to attain its goals through governance 
standards, i.e., through detailed regulation of processes, and by 
their monitoring and control. The Law Project, in line with the 
TFEU and with what had already been established in the Second 
Renewables Directive and the Governance Regulation, proposes 
an effective governance system as a means for ensuring that 
every Member State complies with climate neutrality. The govern-
ance system would issue monitoring reports, proposals for cor-
rective measures and a periodical review of targets, so they can 
be adapted every 5 and 10 years to the prevailing reality in each 
time period. The European Climate Law Project, thus finds itself 
in the area of legal standards approved by different European 
countries to establish multiannual and extensive frameworks of 
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F I G U R E  1 :  Geographic overview of the state of national framework climate 
laws in the EU
Source: Ecologic Institute research based on a range of sources (including 
legislative databases, direct legal texts, news reports and personal contacts)
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Figure 2. The Climate Law in different European countries.
Source: Ecologic Institute nd European Climate Foundation.
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action that offer security and guarantees in the medium- and 
long-term, for complying with the Paris Agreement targets56.
Supplying clean, affordable and secure energy
In view of the fact that energy production and use is responsible 
for at least 75% of the GHG emissions in the EU, the EGD seeks 
to reduce these emissions by promoting efficient energy, replac-
ing fossil fuel generation with renewable sources, decarbonis-
ing gas and deploying new infrastructures such as smart grids, 
hydrogen networks, the capture, storage and use of carbon and 
the storage of energy.
Internally, the extent to which the different Member States com-
ply with these targets will be controlled by monitoring the NECPs. 
The Commission will carefully examine the ambitions of the 
objectives proposed by each one of them, suggesting modifica-
tions and advocating new objectives if these prove insufficient.
The EGD also calls for greater transfrontier and regional coopera-
tion, especially between the Member States, to obtain innovative 
infrastructures such as smart grids, hydrogen networks, the cap-
ture, storage and use of carbon, as well as energy storage, while 
at the same time making sectoral integration easier57.
A great effort must be made by the Member States to cooperate, 
given the outdated and obsolete status of the European infra-
structures. In recent years, European investment in grids and 
networks has remained stable, reaching almost US$ 50 thousand 
million per year. However, complying with the objectives of the 
EGD will require much greater volumes in the next few years58.
Mobilising industry in favour of a clean and circular economy
The EGD realises that transforming an industrial sector and its 
entire value chain could take 25 years, a whole generation; so it 
is calling for immediate action to be taken over the next 5 years 
and for the percentage of recycled materials be raised consid-
erably. The percentage currently stands at 12%. An industrial 
56 EUROPEAN CLIMATE FOUNDATION. «Climate Laws in Europe good practices in 
net-zero management». Ecologic Institute. NET ZERO 2050. February 2020. https://
europeanclimate.org/net-zero-2050/ (Consultation Date January 2021).
57 COM (2019) 640 Final.
58 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY: «World Energy Investment 2020». July 2020.
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strategy and the New Circular Economy Action Plan59 seek to 
decarbonise the value chains and use recycled materials, enhanc-
ing the circular and sustainable nature of the economy. One of 
the prerequisites is to guarantee the supply of sustainable com-
modities, especially those that are critical for clean technologies 
and digital, special and defence applications.
Efficient use of energy and resources in construction and renovation 
of buildings
Buildings account for 40% of all energy consumed and they are 
renovated at an annual rate that will at least double in the coming 
years in order to achieve the EGD targets. The materials utilised 
in construction will have to meet circular economy requirements 
and be conducive to «digitalisation and the ability of the real 
estate stock to adapt to climate change». Applying this energy 
efficiency policy to old and new buildings only seems to be fea-
sible by applying two conditions: relative prices that include 
the cost of emissions in each material; and detailed regulations 
about the trading conditions for construction products and mate-
rials60. Both requirements involve production costs that could 
create imbalances not only between the suppliers of construction 
materials but also between regions. The IEA has detected and 
warned about these imbalances for the US $66 thousand million 
announced until October 2020 by the governments of the world, 
to be spent on measures associated with energy efficiency and 
as part of the supportive measures adopted in response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Europe is responsible for 86% of these pub-
lic funds and the remaining 14% is divided between Asia-Pacific 
and North America61.
Speeding up the transition to a sustainable and intelligent mobility
The target indicated by the EGD is a 90% reduction in emissions 
released by all types of transport between now and 2050. It is 
an extremely ambitious goal that requires measures to be taken 
that will affect all kinds of transport: land, air and sea.
59 COM (2020) 98 final.
60 The EGD announces the adaptation of EU Regulation n.° 305/2011, whereby stan-
dardised conditions are established for commercialising construction products and Di-
rective 89/106/ECE issued by the Council is repealed.
61 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY: «Energy Efficiency 2020». December 2020.
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With a view to this, according to the EGD: «the Commission will 
propose increasing European emissions trading rights by apply-
ing them to the maritime sector and reducing the rights assigned 
gratuitously to the airlines in the EU´s Emission Trading Rights 
System. This will be coordinated with actions at world level, 
especially by the International Civil Aviation Organisation and by 
the International Maritime Organisation»62. In the short term, 
the Commission also sets as a goal for 2025 that nearly 1 mil-
lion public charging and refuelling stations be provided for the 
13 million zero-emission vehicles, basically electric cars, that are 
expected to be using European roads by then.
Energy consumption in the transport sector estimated for 2020 
was 10% less than in 2019, and there was an 11% drop in crude 
oil consumption (around 6 million barrels per day). This fall is 
increasing energy use per passenger, but doubts surround the 
post-COVID effects, given that if travellers move from air to rail 
transport this will reduce energy intensity per traveller, whereas 
the opposite would happen if those passengers were to move to 
road transport. The IEA announced that convincing public policies 
will be needed, aimed at speeding up the electrification of trans-
port so that there is no return to pre-pandemic behaviour63.
From the farm to the table: a fair, healthy, and environmentally 
friendly food system
The EGD proposes linking the climate goals to the traditional 
EU´s agriculture & fisheries policy. The Deal is in favour of giv-
ing incentives to organic farming, agroecology, agroforestry and 
applying more stringent standards where animal welfare is con-
cerned. Measures will also be taken regarding transport matters, 
storage, packaging, and food waste, while imported foodstuffs 
that do not comply with the EU’s environmental standards will 
not be authorised.
In applying what is established in the EGD, in May 2020 the Com-
mission announced its agricultural strategy, indicating the follow-
ing targets:
 – Reducing by 50%, the use and the risk of the most hazardous 
chemical pesticides.
 – Reducing nutrient losses by at least 50%.
62 COM (2019) 640 final.
63 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY: «Energy Efficiency 2020». December 2020.
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 – Reducing the use of fertilisers by at least 20%.
 – Reducing the sale of antimicrobials for farm animals.
 – 25% of agricultural land under organic production.
To reach these targets, the Commission proposes that the cur-
rent regulatory standards are reviewed, that other new ones are 
implemented and that the tools for intra-community coordination 
are improved64. This coordination is essential if one accepts that 
achieving these goals requires «flexibility and adaptation to the 
actual situation in each Member State». Moreover, if this strategy 
is to be successful, it has to be compatible with keeping an agri-
culture and livestock sector competitive, so that it can compete 
against the rest of the countries. The only way to do this without 
raising barriers and limiting world trade is to find one «single reg-
ulatory framework without inequalities and with a set of rules of 
the game as similar as possible for all concerned»65.
Conserving and restoring the ecosystems and biodiversity
After an initial call to the EU’s «world partners» to put a stop to 
the loss of ecosystem biodiversity, which is to blame for natural 
catastrophes, plagues and diseases, the EGD announced a biodi-
versity strategy for 2030. In compliance with the announcement, 
in May 2020 the Commission made public the EU Biodiversity 
Strategy for 2030: bringing nature back to our lives. The follow-
ing is stated as part of this strategy: «The EU is ready to show 
ambition to reverse biodiversity loss, lead the world by example 
and by action, and help agree and adopt a transformative post-
2020 global framework at the 15th Conference of the Parties to 
the Convention on Biological Diversity». 66
It initially accepts that something more than mere legislation is 
required to protect and recover nature. It proposes the following: 
that natural protected zones are created in at least 30% of the 
EU’s land and sea surface areas; that land and sea ecosystems 
are recovered by limiting urban expansion; that invasive species 
are controlled; and that aggressive farming and fishing practices 
with a negative impact on the environment are stopped. It also 
64 COM (2020) 381 final.
65 Declarations to the journal Agricultura by the leaders of agricultural associations 
on, 16 June 2020. Accessible at http://www.revistaagricultura.com/de-la-granja-a-la-
mesa/economia/estrategia-de-la-granja-a-la-mesa-en-busca-de-una-solucion-armo-
nizada_12078_39_15135_0_1_in.html (Consultation Date January 2021).
66 COM (2020) 380 final.
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announces a proposal for binding targets in the area of nature 
recovery and a new monitoring and reviewing mechanism that 
will include a set of clear and consensually agreed indicators for 
assessing this monitoring process.
Aiming for zero pollution in an environment free from toxic 
substances
Under this heading, the EGD presents a set of actions that mainly 
affect local and regional authorities. The actions involve improv-
ing the quality of the air, groundwater and surface water, the 
soil and products for consumption. It announces a plan of action 
for attaining «zero pollution» that the Commission has to adopt 
in 2021. In June 2020, the Commission prepared a report for 
the Parliament and the Council concerning the progress made in 
implementing Directive (EU) 2016/2284 regarding the reduction 
of national emissions of certain pollutants into the atmosphere. 
The report is critical of what has been achieved in applying the 
Directive, the criticisms being levelled at form, content and sub-
stance. Only eight Member States submitted their National Air 
Pollution Control Programmes (NAPCP) on time, sixteen submit-
ted them late, but before May 2020, two only submitted a draft 
by that date and two others (Greece and Rumania) had not sub-
mitted either a Programme or a Draft by the report´s publication 
date.
The Commission stated the following, about the Policies and 
Measures (PyM) included in the NAPCPs: «In general, the NAPCPs 
do not provide sufficient information about the PyM to definitely 
confirm their credibility; there is a particular lack of information 
about the planned adoption of PyM, the schedule for applying 
them and the level of emission reductions planned, Furthermore, 
with regard to about one third of the Member States analysed, 
there are some significant inconsistencies between the projec-
tions notified in accordance with Article 10, Section 2 of the 
Directive and those included in the NAPCP, which causes certain 
doubts regarding whether the measures proposed in the NAPCPs 
are suitable». In spite of all the above, the report was optimis-
tic that the application of the EGD and the support given by the 
Union’s financing programmes and funds would make it possible 
to achieve the Directive’s targets, in view of the fact that the dif-
ferent initiatives proposed by the EGD (greater climate ambition, 
energy efficiency, developing renewables, etc.) will reduce the 
emission of pollutants and GHGs.
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The Requirements
The EGD not only establishes the strategic targets and describes 
the set of policies and tools that can be used to achieve them, 
which have just been mentioned, the Deal also emphasises as 
needs or requirements that must be included horizontally in all 
these policies: 1) to bear in mind and make up for the social cost 
that might be involved; and 2) to be able to count on the financ-
ing required.
The EGD also mentions two pillars that lend it support and guar-
antee its success, namely: the consolidation of the EU as the 
world leader in promoting and applying environmental, climate 
and energy policies; and secondly enabling citizens to participate 
in drawing up and applying these policies through a European 
Climate Pact, in such a way that «the green transition occupies 
an outstanding place in the debate on Europe’s future»67, thereby 
clearly and explicitly linking the EGD’s success to the future of 
the Union.
A Just Transition
Since the outset, the declaration announced by the EGD shows 
it is aware of the fact that if suitable supplementary social and 
economic policies are not adopted, the transition to climate neu-
trality could make the inequalities within the EU even greater, or 
even cause new inequalities and fail in a vital element, namely 
the support of the citizens of Europe and the unity of the Member 
States around this.
According to the Bruegel Report for the European Parliament68, 
the idea of a just transition is historically deeply rooted in Euro-
pean institutions (Professional Recycling and Worker Relocation 
Fund in the framework of the ECSC and the European Social Fund 
within the Treaty of Rome). However, a more explicit formulation 
and the use of the term as such, entered the political debate 
through the Trade Unions in the US in order to give workers com-
67 COM (2019) 640 final.
68 CAMERON, Aliénor and CLAEYS, Grégory et al.: «A Fond for Fair Transition: the best 
way to put the European Union budget to good use to be conducive to the necessary 
transition from fossil fuels to sustainable energy». Report requested from Bruegel by 
the European Parliament´s Budget Commission. April 2020. Available at https://www.
europarl.europa.eu/committees/es/supporting-analyses-search.html (Consultation 
Date, January 2021).
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pensation for the loss of jobs as a result of environmental pro-
tection. After it became included in the annual debates of the 
Conferences of the Parties in the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change and the ILO’s publication in 2015 of 
its «Guidelines for a Fair Transition», it was included in the pre-
amble to the Paris Agreement in 2016. In the heart of the EU, 
the concept is based on several legal and political texts: ranging 
from Juncker’s Energy Union package to the 2018 Governance 
Regulation69.
The EGD includes a mechanism for a fair transition that seeks to 
support the sectors and regions most affected and exposed, so 
that nobody will be left behind. This mechanism endeavours to 
compensate the regions and sectors most affected, given their 
dependence on fossil fuels, including coal, peat and bituminous 
shale or GHG-intensive industrial processes. Some of these sec-
tors will disappear, while others will be reduced and some will 
have to change, investing in alternative technologies that clean 
the emission-intensive processes70.
In January 2020, the Commission proposed the Just Transition 
Fund (JTF) to support the regions most affected, and provided 
this Fund with €7.5 thousand million, which would be supple-
mented, within the Mechanism, by budgetary funds and by cof-
inancing with the Member States. This proposal was reformed 
and increased in May 202071 to adapt it to the Recovery Plan. At 
the meetings held between 17 and 21 July, the European Council 
agreed to a lower amount for the Recovery Plan and the Multian-
nual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021-2027, thus reducing the 
JTF, something that received strong criticism from the Parliament 
that in the plenary session on 23 July challenged the Council to 
69 REGULATION 2018/1999 concerning governance of the Energy Union and Climate 
Action.
70 The coal infrastructure lies in 108 European regions with approximately 237,000 
people working in coal-related activities, whereas almost 10,000 people are employed 
in peat-extraction activities and about 6,000 people are employed in the bituminous 
shale industry. COM (2020) 22 final. Proposal of RESOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN PAR-
LIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL whereby the JTF is established.
71 After COVID-19, in May 2020, the Commission published a new proposal of Reso-
lution jointly with the Parliament whereby the JTF is established and in its explanation 
of the reasons considers that «… in order to prevent the increase of disparities and an 
unequal recovery process, it is necessary to provide further support to the Member 
States and the regions in the short- and medium-term, with a view to helping their 
economies and societies to weather the situation , as well as to guarantee a rapid and 
sustainable recovery of their economies». COM (2020) 460 final.
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justify the massive reductions made to the JTF budgets and to the 
«InvestEU» programme72 in the context of the EGD, considering 
that it was a long-term European priority that should not be jeop-
ardised. After the plenary session’s resolution in September, the 
negotiations with the Council and the Commission about all the 
points —–except the financial endowment, which would be agreed 
on in the parallel negotiations about the MFF, according to a rec-
ommendation from the Parliament – should commence as soon 
as possible. In December 2020, the Parliament and the Council 
reached a political agreement about the Commission’s proposal to 
endow the JTF with €17.5 thousand million, of which 7.5 will be 
charged to the MFF and 10 charged to the NextGenerationEU73.
The mechanism will be supported by two more pillars, in addition 
to the JTF. As a whole, the Mechanism will consist of:
1)  A specific fund for a Just Transition, run as a joint man-
agement system, which will focus on economic diversifi-
cation in the most affected territories.
2)  A specific system in InvestEU, that provides a guarantee 
charged to the Union’s Budget, intended to support the 
investments and the access to EU financing for energy 
and transportation projects; and
3)  A mechanism for loans to the public sector through the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) for general measures 
that facilitate transition to climate neutrality.
The characteristics considered suitable for this mechanism are that 
it must be promoted at a local level, it must include specific wel-
fare and labour policies, must form part of a long-term strategy 
towards decarbonisation and the development of local economies, 
and it must allow for periodical assessments and modifications74.
72 InvestEU is a European programme that, following the Investment Plan model un-
der the Juncker Plan, brings together a series of European funds to mobilise public and 
private investments with the guarantees covered by the European budget. It consists 
of a hub for providing consultancy services and support for projects that seek financ-
ing, a database accessible for investors and projects and the aforementioned guaran-
tees charged to the European budget. 
73 Next GenerationEU is a temporary recovery instrument that came into existence 
endowed with €750,000 million to contribute to repairing the economic and social dam-
age caused by the coronavirus pandemic. Together with the MFF, finally adopted on 17 
December 2020, it constitutes a total of €1.8 million million earmarked to reconstruct 
a Europe that will be more ecological, digital and resilient.
74 These characteristics must be developed in the regulation concerned, and so far 
only constitute the opinion of the Bruegel Report, stated in CAMERON, ALIÉNOR and 
GRÉGORY CLAEYS et al. Ibid.
Miguel Ángel Lasheras Merino
144
Mobilising the finance required
If establishing the JTF endowments to finance the just transi-
tion was only possible after hours of discussions and negotiations 
throughout 2020 in the heart of the European institutions, reach-
ing an agreement regarding the suitable framework for moving 
all the financing needed to cover the requirements of the EGD 
would also appear to be a difficult task. It is estimated that every 
year, the investments associated with the EGD will reach 1.5% of 
the EU’s GDP (16% in 10 years until 2030). This will amount to 
between 175 and 290 thousand million Euros of extra investment 
per year during the coming decades; this means that the current 
financial instruments, not only the UE’s but also the EIB’s, the 
capital markets, the private banking and other financial institu-
tions, will be subjected to considerable stress, as they will have 
to attract more resources and there will probably be major real-
locations in their relative weight75. This investment will have to 
be covered with both, public resources, charged to the budgets 
of the Union and the Member States, and by means of private 
resources provided through different financial instruments.
After March 2019 and once the EGD had become the backbone of 
the European recovery strategy, the agreements reached in the 
Commission, the Parliament and the Council at the end of 2020 
will mobilise in the next few years, a volume of resources charged 
to the EU budget that will be «the largest ever financed»76. More 
than 30% of these funds will be allocated to combat climate 
change, being added to the public and private resources needed 
to finance the EGD, which are calculated to be around 260,000 
million Euros per year, for each one of the years from now to 
2030 (about 2.6 million million Euros in the next 10 years).
To reach this amount, the EU will have to make an effort in defin-
ing the different financing modes to be utilised and in mobilis-
ing them. Regarding the public part for which the EU is directly 
responsible, the €1.8 billion will be obtained by combining, for the 
first time in its history, loans obtained on the financial markets 
backed by the EU as a whole, with its own taxation resources, 
obtained directly from firms and citizens (frontier adjustment 
75 See LEHMAN, ALEXANDER and BRUEGEL: Ibid.
76 As has already been pointed out, the package amounting to a total value of €1.8 
billion (€1.8 million million) includes 0.75 billion from the NextGenerationEU recovery 
fund and 1.074 billion from the MFF 2021-2027 https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/
recovery-plan-europe_es
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mechanism for carbon emissions, digital tax, emission rights sys-
tem, financial transactions tax and a new common taxable base 
for the corporate tax). The Member States will be responsible for 
part of the rest (about €114,000 million) and another part will 
necessarily have to be financed through private capital, albeit 
with aid or guarantees from the EIB, or with some kind of public 
support for covering the risks associated with the investment.
Moreover, the EU is considering several initiatives and regula-
tory instruments to encourage private investment and channel it 
towards the EGD targets:
 – The first initiative is to have a taxonomy, i.e. a means for 
classification, or a set of consistent criteria for being able to 
determine whether or not a particular economic activity can 
be regarded as environmentally sustainable for political, in-
dustrial and investment purposes77.
 – The second one is to improve the obligation that the creators 
of financial products, their advisors and distributors have to 
inform about the impact of environmental sustainability on 
financial profitability and the risks affecting the financial prod-
ucts they issue, give advice about or distribute78.
 – The third consists of regulating the reference indexes that in-
form about the carbon impact of investment portfolios and 
financial products that can be sold across frontiers: these in-
dexes are grouped into those that inform about the climate 
transition in the EU, and those that inform about compliance 
with the Paris Agreements79.
 – Other initiatives that have still not taken the legal form con-
cern fostering international cooperation, establishing a stand-
ard criterion for issuing green bonds80, requiring the financial 
77 In May 2018, the Commission published a proposal of Taxonomy for grading green 
projects. In 2019, an experts’ report was issued on the criteria for establishing this 
taxonomy of sustainable products; i.e., …a list of economic activities rated and classi-
fied on the basis of the contribution they make to the aims of the EU’s sustainability 
policies. In December 2019, the European Parliament and the Council agreed to go 
ahead with a Regulation of the Taxonomy. The Regulation was ultimately approved on 
18th June 2020: REG (EU) 2020/852. 
78 REG (EU) 2019/2088
79 REG (UE) 2019/2089
80 Green bonds are bonds issued by a variety of institutions (firms, banks, local bodies, 
governments, etc.) to finance investments in assets that comply with certain require-
ments, for improving the environment; the best-known of these instruments are the 
Green Bond Principles (GBPs) of the International Capital Market Association (ICMA). 
https://www.icmagroup.org/sustainable-finance/ (Consultation Date January 2021). 
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institutions to take into account their clients’ preferences as 
far as sustainability is concerned, improving the transpar-
ency of the companies’ public information and incorporating 
sustainability into the integration of the risks involved in the 
financial decisions and into the need to adapt the caution cri-
teria in the treatment of assets81.
In November 2020, the IEB gave its approval to a roadmap to be 
implemented between 2021 and 2025, for turning the bank into 
a genuine climate bank where its investment programmes are 
concerned. To attain this, it will give its support to investments 
in climate action and environmental sustainability amounting 
to €1 trillion in the decade until 2030. All its activities as from 
the end of 2020 will be aligned with the objectives of the Paris 
Agreement. The Bank hopes that in 2025 more than 50% of its 
financing programmes will be earmarked for green investments. 
Consultancy and financing services rendered for low-emission 
technologies will increase and it will give its support to the green 
financial product markets, adapting them to climate change and 
to projects included in the JTF.
One of the most widely used financing sources, not only in the EU 
but also in the rest of the world, has been green bonds82, since 
in 2009 the World Bank launched the first issue of these bonds. 
The problem is that in the initial years, the criteria for entitle-
ment to issue green bonds were too extensive and concerned 
the individual projects rather than companies, which would have 
prevented making up for the reduction of emissions in a specific 
81 These mechanisms are currently under study and are being submitted to public 
consultation process. One of the proposals consists of relaxing the financial institutions’ 
capital obligations to back green credits, including those allocated to making improve-
ments in building efficiency. However, the Bruegel European think-tank is highly critical 
of these types of support mechanisms, given that it thinks they are not effective and 
not sufficiently justified because of the problems of moral risk and the incentives to 
undervalue risks that they might cause. See LEHMAN, ALEXANDER and BRUEGEL: 
«European green finance is expanding, a discount on bank capital would discredit it». 
Blog Post 15 January 2020. Accessible at: HTTPS://WWW.BRUEGEL.ORG/2020/01/EU-
ROPEAN-GREEN-FINANCE-IS-EXPANDING-A-DISCOUNT-ON-BANK-CAPITAL-WOULD-
DISCREDIT-IT/ (Consultation Date January 2021).
82 In October 2020, the journal Funds&Markets stated: At present, the world market 
for green bonds -bonds that are similar to the traditional ones but that are used to fi-
nance projects with environmental benefits -, amounts to around €662,000 to 672,000 
million and this figure is expected to rise to € one billion by the end of 2021 and to 2 
billion by the end of 2023, according to calculations made by NN Investment Partners. 
https://dirigentesdigital.com/bolsas-y-mercados/el-mercado-de-bonos-verdes-alca-
nzara-los-dos-billones-de-euros-en-tres-anos (Consultation Date January 2021).
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area or activity with an increase in other adjacent areas or activ-
ities, could it be for the same emitting company83. In June 2019, 
concern over the need to have more clearly defined standards, 
led a group of EU experts (TEG) to publish a report, at the Com-
mission’s request, recommending a European standard to classify 
the assets whose financing would be considered eligible for green 
bonds. The report proposed this standardisation with a view to 
improving transparency, effectiveness, comparability and credi-
bility in the Green Bonds Market84.
Geopolitical consequences of the EGD
The consequences of such an ambitious programme as the Euro-
pean EGD are considerable and difficult to pinpoint with a com-
plete and detailed list. Yet, once the objectives, policies and 
requirements of the EGD have been described, it is advisable to 
83 EHLERS, TORSTEN and BENOIT MOJON and FRANK PACKER: «Green bonds and 
carbon emissions: exploring the case for a rating system at the firm level». BIS Quar-
terly Review, September 2020.
84 This Report from the Technical Expert Group (TEG)´s Commission, issued in June 
2019, contained certain recommendations that the TEG itself used to prepare a «Use 
Guide» in March 2020, and in June 2020 the Commission launched an Initial Impact 
Assessment and a public consultation to evaluate whether they should begin work on a 
legislative initiative to be implemented throughout 2021 and 2022. 
Figure 3: Main lines of work for the EIB’s roadmap to becoming a Climate 
Bank. Source: EIB.
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mention some of the programme’s main consequences, which will 
affect not only the EU’s relations with other world power blocks, 
but also the internal relations between the EU’s Member States. 
This description will give us an idea of the scale and the diffi-
culties involved in applying this strategic axis of European pol-
icy, doing so from a geopolitical perspective. It will also give us 
insight into its ability to transform and its potential for mobilising, 
when attempting to achieve a world that is sustainable and bal-
anced, which can lead us away, at least in the immediate future, 
from a path towards potential self-destruction.
Reinforcing international financial flows
So far, the green financing experience in the world is ambivalent, 
showing successes and failures. At the 2009 meeting in Copenha-
gen, the OECD´s developed countries promised US$100 thousand 
million per year to the countries in the South, for clean energy 
development projects. However, in the seven years between 2010 
and 2016, the investments of these developed countries in for-
eign countries, including the developing countries, only reached 
US$112 thousand million throughout that seven-year period85.
It is calculated that annual investments of nearly US$1 trillion will 
be needed to finance the world’s green transition. In 2017 it was 
estimated that investments in infrastructures for energy, trans-
port, drinking water and sanitation, together with telecommuni-
cations, over the next 15 years, would have to reach US$80 to 
90 trillion. These investments are basically long-term risk assets 
that are intensive in the use of capital, so they have long matu-
rity periods that will be difficult to meet at the start of the green 
transition, especially by private financial institutions, since they 
usually have investment opportunities that are just as profitable 
or more profitable, with more liquidity, shorter maturity dates 
and, therefore, with apparently less risk.
Financing the investment volume demanded by the energy tran-
sition will not only need public support policies and regulations 
that remain stable in time, but will also need specialized institu-
tions. The public Development Banks (generally local) that pro-
vide cofinancing for these investments, especially during the first 
85 HARRIS, Jerry: «Can China’s Green Socialism transform global capitalism?» Civitas, 
Porto Alegre, v. 19, n. 2, P. 354-373, May-Aug. 2019. https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-
7289.2019.2.31972 (Consultation Date, January 2021)
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years of the transition, are specialising in investments of this 
type86. However, what is needed is a global institutional mobili-
sation. According to the United Nations, it will only be possible 
to finance the resources required if multiple and diverse agents, 
financial markets, banks, private investors, insurance firms, the 
public sector, etc., are involved.
In recent years, the Chinese experience in mobilising financial 
resources allocated to supporting the green transition and the 
Sustainable Development Goals is one of the most outstanding 
examples. Chinese companies (state and private) have been the 
most active when it comes to issuing green bonds. Between 2010 
and 2020, 172 issuances of green bonds were registered amount-
86 XU, Jianjun and KEVIN P. GALLAGHER: «Leading from the South. Development 
Finance Institutions and Green Structural Transformation». Global Development Policy 
Center (Boston University) and The Center for New Structural Economics. CEGI Policy 
Brief. October 2017.
Figure 4: Stakeholders in green financing. Source: UN Environment Program.
https://www.unenvironment.org/regions/asia-and-pacific/regional-
initiatives/supporting- resource-efficiency/green-financing.
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ing to US$10.4 million87. China has been leading these issuances, 
accounting for approximately 40% of the total. In September 
2016, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) published its guide to 
establishing a Green Finance System. It was the first time any-
where in the world that guidelines of this type were published. 
However, it must be pointed out that the Green Bond Catalogue, 
endorsed by the PBC, includes the «clean use of coal» and, dur-
ing the first half of 2019, the Chinese financial institutions pro-
vided funds for a value greater than US$ one thousand million for 
coal projects, described as green by their own standards88. All 
in all, the estimates made by the PBC regarding the investment 
needs in China for projects associated with emission control and 
climate change mitigation range from US$310 to 620 thousand 
million per year for the next few years89.
Although this entire financial mobilisation will be received favour-
ably as long as the interest rates are low, there will also be dif-
ficulties and risks. Apart from the traditional macroeconomic 
barriers, such as exchange rate volatility, possible inflation, capi-
tal controls and GDP growth rate volatility. Fiscal disciplines often 
prevent the provision of the public funds that are necessary to 
support the first years of the transition. In some developing coun-
tries and in emerging markets, access to international financial 
markets is difficult and fraught with constraints, while the local 
markets do not offer sufficient maturity to cope with these long-
term investments. In addition to all these risks, there are also 
political risks such as a lack of institutional stability, regulatory 
risks and distorting policies90.
Moreover, should the announced quantities of funds needed for 
green investments be mobilised, the world debt will continue to 
rise, to the extent that world investments continue to be greater 
87 INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION: «Green Bond Impact Report Financial 
Year 2020». World Bank Group. October 2020.
88 The international standards for qualifying an issuance as being a «green bond» 
issuance do not include those earmarked for financing coal projects. https://chinesecli-
matepolicy.energypolicy.columbia.edu/en/green-finance
89 As described in the preceding section, the European experience has been aiming at 
obtaining a stricter common taxonomy and a set of regulations concerning information 
and risks so that green financing can guarantee the EGD goals and specifically that the 
financing is allocated to obtaining real incentives to reduce emissions. To achieve this, 
what probably makes more sense is to establish standardisation by companies, rather 
than by projects. EHLERS, TORSTEN and BENOIT MOJON and FRANK PACKER: Ibid. 
90 BERENSMANN, Kathrin et al.: «Fostering sustainable global growth through green 
finance – what role for the G20?». G20 Insights. 12 April 2017.
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than the savings levels. Four years ago, the IMF calculated a total 
world non-financial debt amounting to US$152 million million, 
equivalent to 225% of the world GDP. According to the same 
source, and considering the expectations existing before the 
irruption of the COVID-19 pandemic, the average debt in 2020 
would grow by 17% of the GDP in the advanced economies, 12% 
in the emerging economies and 8% in the countries with the 
lowest income91. In a report on the fiscal situation of the world 
economy issued in October 2020, the IMF estimated that, in the 
whole world, around US$12 trillion had been spent on «cushion-
ing the blow» caused by COVID-19. Nearly all the economies in 
all the countries the world over relaxed their budget restrictions 
and, at least 30 countries, face a debt greater than 100% of their 
GDP. As has already been pointed out, this world debt explosion 
coexists with interest rates that have historically never been as 
low, that, for some considerable time (approximately since the 
years following the financial crisis of 2007-2008), are being sus-
tained together with expansive monetary policies by the Central 
Banks. Although in the short-term maintaining these monetary 
and fiscal policies may keep prices stable, in the medium- and 
long-term, only the success in terms of economic growth of the 
current recovery programmes – and specifically in the EU the 
Recovery and Resilience Programme,92 closely linked to the EGD 
– can offer certain security to an absorption or renegotiation of 
the current debt levels without causing hyperinflation, restruc-
ture or a multiple default.
New framework in trading relations between power blocks
Article 3 of the TFEU establishes that the Union has exclusive 
jurisdiction over the Common Trade Policy. This Policy is exer-
cised through bilateral agreements with other countries as a 
counterpart or unilaterally through the institutional framework 
of its own regulation93. In recent years, the international trade 
in goods and services in this institutional framework has reached 
records in both volume and economic weight, and the EU has 
91 https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/10/01/sp100120-resolving-global-
debt-an-urgent-collective-action-cause (Consultation Date January 2021).
92 https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/recovery-plan-europe_es (Consultation Date 
January 2021).
93 For example, Regulation (EU) 2015/478 concerning common rules for imports and 
Regulation (EU) 2015/479 concerning common rules for exports.
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played one of the main roles. In the EU-27, imports and exports 
of goods with other countries (excluding intra-community trade) 
almost doubled between 2009 and 201994. In 2019, China, the 
USA and the EU accounted for 42% of the total world exports 
of goods and 43% of the total imports. In foreign trade, the EU 
27 had a fairly balanced coverage ratio, with slight deficits in 
2018 and surplus in 2019. China and Russia had the greatest 
surpluses, whereas the USA, the UK and India were the countries 
with the largest deficits95. The importance of these trade flows to 
economic growth has been stressed in traditional economics liter-
ature, such importance being based on the theory of the compar-
ative advantages that some countries have over others96. Yet this 
theory ceases to be valid in a world with externalities, as is the 
case when costs are incurred from protecting the environment 
and combatting climate change.
The upward trend in trade has been temporarily interrupted by 
the effects of COVID-19, which were observed especially in the 
months of March, April and May 2020, a slight recovery being 
detected as from June. Trade was directly affected by COVID-
19 because of the export bans and the restrictions that were 
applied to medical equipment/healthcare material such as test 
kits, masks and protective equipment. The EU, specifically the 
Commission, has been trying to ensure that these measures do 
not affect intra-community trade, although this has not always 
been successful97. The indirect effect was a general downward 
trend in economic activity, as can be seen in Figure 5.
94 In 2009, exports stood at 1,184 thousand million Euros and in 2019 reached 2,132 
thousand million Euros. Goods imports rose from 1,193 in 2009 to 1,935 thousand mil-
lion in 2019. International trading of services accounted for one third of the figure for 
goods. EUROSTAT: «International Trade in Goods» Statistics Explained. 14 October 2020. 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/ (Consultation Date, January 2021).
95 EUROSTAT: Ibid. 
96 In 1817, the economist David Ricardo explained that international trading advan-
tages stemmed from the fact that countries tended to produce and export those goods 
and services in which they used less relative resources, importing the rest, thereby 
being conducive towards global welfare. This basic idea has given support to many 
international trade studies, but it has also been criticised because it is based upon 
hypotheses that are not very realistic, such as for example the perfect mobility of the 
production factors, the absence of financial expenses and, above all, and this is what 
is of interest to us regarding international trade that is compatible with the EGD, that 
there are no externalities whatsoever. 
97 PIRKER, Benedikt: «Rethinking Solidarity in View of the Wanting Internal and External 
EU Law Framework Concerning Trade Measures in the Context of the COVID-19 Crisis». 
European Papers Vol. 5, 2020, No 1, Page 573-585 (European Forum, 25 April 2020).
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COVID-19 has also brought to light the plight affecting the EU’s 
current trading institutions and the difficulties of the international 
order when it comes to finding globally supportive and cooper-
ative solutions. It is true to say that the world trade institutions 
were already questioned before COVID-19. The EU was being 
left relatively alone in their sustainment. The Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Interna-
tional Standards Organisation (ISO), the World Trade Organi-
sation (WTO) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) have been issuing standards supporting the opening up 
of trade for more than 70 years, ever since the GATT was estab-
lished. Upon such background, the EU Member States have been 
particularly active within these institutions. It is to be hoped that 
not only the Member States but also the EU institutions (Com-
mission, Council and Parliament) will keep up this level of activity 
and leadership and that they will work with their closest allies 
towards obtaining a new international trading framework that is 
compatible with the emission-neutral sustainable growth sought 
after by the EGD98.
China´s escalation and the US’s perception that the set of rules 
prevailing in the trade order did not guarantee a balance com-
patible with the US’s interests, prompted the Trump Administra-
98 WOOLCOCK, Steve: «The Role of the European Union in the International Trade and 
Investment Order». Discussion Papers. Nº 2019/02. Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence 
in International Trade and Globalization. The University of Adelaide. 2019. 
Figure 5: Goods imports and exports in the EU 27.
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tion to abandon trading multilateralism represented above all by 
the WTO, this action being one of the key features of Trump’s 
Government. China could certainly have been able to exploit the 
advantages of «free» trade, as the country is a «non-liberal» 
one, and the country’s sharp growth has served as a flag «for 
countries disappointed with the European and American model of 
liberal democracy»99. That is why it is hardly surprising that the 
Trump Administration viewed international trade as a scenario 
that enabled China to obtain advantages over the US. However, 
it is also true to say that this view has been criticised from the 
US as being excessive, given that it does not consider the eco-
nomic benefits of helping the national economy to become more 
export oriented, while at the same time offering consumers more 
options at a lower cost and keeping the domestic inflation rates 
low100.
Moreover, the concentration of materials in the hands of just a few 
producers, as in the case of Rare Earth Elements (REE), and their 
geopolitical use, cause world prices to be susceptible to instability 
and can lead to price bubbles that transfer inefficiencies to public 
policies and to private investment decisions. By 2028, lithium 
and graphite anodes production are expected to increase ninefold 
when compared to the 2017 levels, cobalt production is expected 
to increase fivefold and nickel production is likely to go higher 
than a fivefold increase to cater for the expected rise in demand 
for electric vehicles101. It is very unlikely that such a scenario will 
be compatible with stable prices and geopolitical balance, even 
less so if the multilateral international trading institutions are still 
weak.
All of this begs the question of whether the geographical concen-
tration of raw materials that are indispensable for the technol-
ogies required by the green transition, will play in the future a 
role similar to the one played by the OPEC, and will give rise to 
a new organisation of REE exporting countries trying to control 
the world market in these materials and trying to use them as 
a way of exercising power. From a geopolitical perspective, the 
99 ECONOMY, Elisabeth: «The Third Revolution. Xi Jinping and the New Chinese 
State». Oxford University Press. May 2018.
100 HAASS, Richard: Ibid.
101 OXFORD INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY STUDIES. «Electricity, Electric Vehicles, and 
Public Policy: Eight Key Takeaways». Second workshop on the impact of disruptive 
change in the transport sector. Takeaways compiled by Anupama Sen, Senior Research 
Fellow. February 2019. 
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power will lie in possessing and exploiting these raw materials or 
in dominating the technology, holding the patents and controlling 
the know-how, all of it essential for extracting these elements 
and giving value to them. Yet this hypothesis must be qualified. 
The extent to which there could be a geopolitical risk due to a 
geographical concentration of REEs, depends on whether there 
will be alternatives that can be used to replace the rare earths 
currently being utilised for renewable energies. For example, it 
is unlikely that lithium, which is used in electric batteries, will 
be affected by unlimited price explosions in the future, because 
batteries can be replaced as means for storing electricity (energy 
cells or, for high power solutions, the hydraulic alternative). This 
hope is based on the idea that the demand for REEs will not prove 
to be as rigid as the demand for fossil fuels has been in recent 
decades, so the exporting countries will be able to wield much 
less geopolitical power102.
The EGD, as it has been formulated by the EU, is a window of 
opportunity that is particularly suitable for laying new foundations 
on which to consolidate the international trade order and modify 
the current institutions, especially the WTO and the GATT. The 
inclusion of clauses regarding compliance with the Paris Agree-
ments and possibly other clauses concerning the Carbon Border 
Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) make it necessary to adapt the 
trading rules to the progress of the EGD. If the EU wishes to lead 
the green transition it must turn the trading policy into one of the 
main instruments for this transition. To do this, the Commission 
«…will use its economic influence to draft international stand-
ards that are in keeping with the EU’s environmental and climatic 
ambitions»103. International cooperation and multilateralism are 
essential if the EGD’s goals are to be achieved. The European 
ecologist sectors argue that the order of priority for approaching 
this international cooperation from the EU must be reversed: it 
must first serve to guarantee compliance with human rights and 
protecting citizens and the planet, and in doing this promote and 
encourage trade, not the other way around104.
102 MÄNBERGER, André and BENGT JOHANSSON: «The geopolitics of metals and 
metalloids used for the renewable energy transition». Energy Strategy Review 26. 
Elsevier. (2019). 
103 COM (2019) 640 final.
104 DUPRÉ, Mathilde: «European Trade Policy and the Green Deal». Green European 
Journal. 17 March 2020. Accessible at https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/ (Consul-
tation Date, January 2021).
Miguel Ángel Lasheras Merino
156
In view of the fact that the EU could hardly be described as a 
commercial superstate like China or the US, its trade policy is 
constructed on the basis of it acting as a multilevel and supra-
national organisation. Therefore, its experience has to be very 
«exportable» for the construction of international trading rules 
that make it possible to include in international contracting, the 
external costs incurred as a result of the green transition and 
climate change policies.
Nationalism in the electrical generation mix
The five years following the Paris Agreements have witnessed a 
major increase in installing renewable generation plants all over 
the world. However, their combination with energy provided by 
fossil or nuclear fuels ranges greatly from one country to another, 
even within the EU. Europe has risen from 322 GW renewable 
generation installed in 2010 to 574 GW in 2019. In photovol-
taic solar energy alone, the annual installed capacity increased 
twofold, rising from 8.2 GW in 2018 to 16.7 GW in 2019. As 
has already been mentioned, Article 194 of the TFEU establishes 
that the energy mix is the exclusive competence of each Member 
State, so the targets for renewable facilities taken on by the EU 
are mandatory for the Union as a whole, but not specifically for 
each individual Member State.
What is more, by deploying renewables, the EU has sought to use 
its influence, its technical expertise and its financial resources to 
mobilise its neighbours and partners and get them to join forces. 
The fact of the matter is that between 2010 and 2018, generation 
from renewable sources rose in the world by around 2,000 TWh/
year105 and in the last ten years, the installed capacity for renew-
ables practically doubled, and in Asia the figure tripled during 
this period. IRENA defined this growth process affecting renewa-
bles all over the world as unprecedented for generation by wind, 
sun and other renewable sources,106 yet despite these promis-
ing beginnings, there is a less optimistic side to the matter that 
might affect its continuity.
105 https://www.irena.org/Statistics/View-Data-by-Topic/Capacity-and-Generation/
Regional-Trends
106 It also accepted that: «Innovations affecting digitalisation and energy storage are 
increasing the potential for renewable energies to prosper in a way that was unimag-
inable just a decade ago». IRENA. «A New World: The Geopolitics of the Energy Trans-
formation». Global Commission on the Geopolitics of Energy Transformation. 2019.
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China, where promoting renewables commenced with the 2005 
Renewable Energies Act, doubled its installed wind capacity 
annually from 2006 to 2008. Even so, the Chinese commitment 
is ambiguous because it does not renounce anything: 1) despite 
its spectacular increase, the share of renewables in the total 
installed capacity has fallen, whereas the total traditional thermal 
generation with coal has risen. Between January 2018 and June 
2019 it grew by 42.9 GW, when it fell in the rest of the world by 
8.1 GW107; 2). many wind generation facilities are not connected 
to the grid, so their generation is frequently wasted; and 3) their 
energy efficiency is poor (the generation produced by each MW 
of installed capacity is very low)108.
The year 2019 was the first ever in the US that generation by 
renewable sources exceeded coal-generated sources. Despite 
Trump’s pro-hydrocarbons stance, in June 2019, 29 States plus 
the District of Columbia had clauses in force requiring them to 
obtain a certain proportion of renewable energy in their energy 
purchases (Renewable Portfolio Standard or RPS) or other similar 
policies supporting green energies. A further eight states had 
applied voluntary schemes to promote these energies109. The 
commitment of these States, especially California, in the face of 
an erratic federal policy, has sustained the growth of renewable 
energies in the US in recent years.
Yet the increase in renewable generation in the EU has not led to 
a convergence in the combination of electricity generation costs 
between the Member States. In 2018, the energy mix in the 
EU basically consisted of five technologies: Oil and derivatives 
(36%), natural gas (21%), solid hydrocarbons (15%) and renew-
able energy (15%) and nuclear (13%). Being an average mix, 
there were major differences from one Member State to another. 
For example, nuclear energy accounted for 42% of the total in 
France and 32% in Sweden. The percentage of coal amounted 
107 More data: Chinese firms are committed to constructing about 700 coal plants, of 
which 20% will be built beyond its frontiers. Since 2001, China has participated in 240 
coal based thermal generation projects in 25 countries, many of them in the framework 
of the One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR) proposed in 2013. HARRIS, Jerry: Ibid.
108 WANG, Feng and HAITAO YIN and SHOUDE LI: «China’s renewable energy policy: 
Commitments and challenges». Energy Policy 38. 1872-1878. April 2010.
109 ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION: «Portfolio standards: What are renew-
able portfolio standards?». Renewable energy Explained. https://www.eia.gov/ener-
gyexplained/renewable-sources/portfolio-standards.php (Consultation Date January 
2021).
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to 47% in Poland and 72% in Estonia110. Natural gas accounted 
for more than one third of the energy produced in Italy and the 
Netherlands. This lack of uniformity leads to major differences 
in the electricity supply generation costs of each Member. State, 
and hence to disproportionate production costs for the goods 
and services that use electricity for their production, especially 
in those goods and services that use electricity intensively. Such 
disproportions give rise to very different interests and positioning 
from one Member State to another with respect to the rate at 
which traditional technologies are replaced by renewables. The 
EGD will have to live with these differences and try not to cause 
«nationalistic» resistances when it comes to replacing «dirty» 
technologies with clean ones, distancing itself from the targets 
indicated for the Union as a whole.
As intermittent generation depending on climatic factors as the 
sun and wind increases, the composition of the electrical system 
cost function will change and new inequalities will emerge between 
combinations of different technologies, whose long-term conver-
gence can only come from an economically efficient combination 
of green technologies, zero-emission backup generation and an 
active demand with a considerable storage capacity. Until then, 
nuclear generation111 and natural gas seem to be energy sources 
that can coexist and adapt to the rate of change that is imposed 
by the Union as a whole and by each Member State individually, 
which is unlikely to be the same in different zones of the Union.
The deployment of renewables is also making it necessary to 
carry out major changes in the energy spot markets developed 
in the EU during the 1990s and 2000s. Daily prices have not 
proved to be good benchmarks for investment purposes and are 
too volatile to simultaneously remunerate backup technologies 
(with high variable costs) and renewable technologies (with a low 
variable cost, almost zero). The EGD, which considers efficient 
energy consumption to be a basic objective, needs the electri-
cal sector to change from a situation in which it is generation 
flexibility that responds to the unpredictable movements of the 
110 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/energy/bloc-2a.html (Consulta-
tion Date January 2021).
111 In the EU in 2020, there are some 126 nuclear reactors for electrical generation in 
14 Member States and 5 more that are under construction. Nuclear generation reaches 
25.2% of the energy generated in the EU as a whole. EURATOM SUPPLY AGENCY AD-
VISORY COMMITTEE: «Analysis of Nuclear Fuel Availability at EU Level from a Security 
of Supply Perspective». Report. March 2020. 
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demand, to another situation where it is the flexibility of the 
demand that also responds to the unpredictable movements of 
the supply, inherent to energy mixes with abundant renewable 
energy and an active demand112. The differences between gen-
eration structures, in grants and subsidies, in the payments for 
capacity or in the market design, will generate cost differences 
that will be transferred to the Union’s entire production structure 
during the EGD’s transition process113.
Managing these differences without affecting the unity and coop-
eration required to position the EU at the head of the green tran-
sition process, is a challenge that will have to be responded by 
the Union´s institutions and the regulatory bodies of the different 
Member States, and particularly by the Government of each Mem-
ber State. Seeking uniformity is no solution, but neither is smooth-
ing over the disproportions. As Acemoglu stated when commenting 
on climate activism: «The markets do not have to stand in our 
way. Quite the contrary, they can be a powerful ally»114
Slowing up the transition: the OPEC strategies
The Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
has been a part of the geopolitical world ever since it was founded 
in the 1970s, when as a consequence of the Yom Kippur War, the 
OPEC responded by cutting off the oil supply and causing the first 
oil crisis. From the very outset, the OPEC’s and the oil market’s 
trajectory have been a succession of ups and downs alternating 
from strategic cuts in production capacities, often for political 
reasons, and production increases to obtain stable prices that 
would facilitate world economic growth.
At present, it is undeniable that the way prices evolve on the 
hydrocarbon markets will condition the rate of the energy tran-
112 ROBINSON, David and MALCOLM KEAY: «Glimpses of the future electricity sys-
tem? Demand flexibility and a proposal for a special auction». Oxford Energy Com-
ment. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. October 2020.
113 For example, different regulations that affect the participation of electrical de-
mands on the spot markets can lead to different incentives to promote electric vehicles 
in each Member State. OXFORD INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY STUDIES. «Electricity, Electric 
Vehicles, and Public Policy: Eight Key Takeaways». Ibid.
114 ACEMOGLU, Daron: «Are the Climate Kids Right?». Project Syndicate. 5t Novem-
ber 2019. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/climate-change-econom-
ic-growth-by-daron-acemoglu-2019-11?barrier=accesspaylog (Consultation Date, 
January 2021).
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sition towards a decarbonised world. High oil prices cheapen the 
cost of the transition making it economically more appealing to 
investors and consumers. The opposite occurs when prices are 
low. The OPEC has been defending a «balanced and stable» tran-
sition through a «gradual and orderly» process of change.
The OPEC undoubtedly and unambiguously supports the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the energy effi-
ciency improvements, but: «the world must be aware that oil 
and gas are still essential and are going to be at the heart of the 
energy mix for the coming years. The impact of a ´perception 
crisis´ on long-term investments in the oil and gas industry, if it 
continues, could lead to supply shortfalls. This in turn would hurt 
national economies, threatening energy security and potentially 
creating social disruptions by making energy less affordable»115. 
So, the problem is finding the price level, not too high and not 
too low, that makes this difficult balance sustainable throughout 
the coming years.
For many years, the oil-exporting countries – -especially those in 
the Middle East – have been facing up to the challenge of diver-
sifying their economies to find sources of revenue other than 
those obtained from oil exports. However, the results of these 
strategies are slow in coming and do not dispel the temptation to 
monetise the oil reserves as soon as possible if the green tran-
sition´s horizon approaches, or to withdraw part of the supply 
in order to obtain greater income through higher prices if that 
horizon recedes.
Managing to diversify their economies is no easy task for the oil 
exporting countries. The success with which such diversification 
can be achieved and the rate at which it can be implemented 
are shrouded in uncertainty. The exporting countries generally 
require far-reaching structural reforms and need to remove sub-
sidies that are deeply rooted, and this will take time. The most 
likely outcome is that the countries whose economies depend on 
oil exports will adopt a hedging strategy to cope with the risks 
of transition by choosing conservative options aimed at retain-
ing the competitiveness of their traditional energy sector and 
simultaneously increasing their resilience, through investments 
115 OPEC: «Oil industry ready and willing to tackle climate change issues». Bulletin 
Commentary October-November 2019. https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_
room/5772.htm (Consultation Date January 2021).
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in decarbonisation, to face up to the potential risk of disruptions 
associated with the green transition116.
Russia, now virtually a member of the OPEC, as it has recently 
demonstrated, is prepared to compete in oil and gas prices with 
the traditional producing countries and also specifically with the 
US. Its negotiating capacity is not at all inconsiderable because it 
is one of the biggest suppliers of these energy sources, mainly to 
Europe, but also to Asia117. Russia is prepared to compete in prices 
in its supplies to the EU and, together with the rest of the mem-
bers of the OPEC, it is also in favour of a smooth transition rate.
The US, after the emergence of the new extraction technolo-
gies through fracking to obtain oil and gas, has almost become 
self-sufficient in hydrocarbons and is the biggest producer of 
crude oil in the world. The Trump Administration sought to reduce 
the cost of energy for US consumers by applying a foreign pol-
icy conducive to obtaining sufficiently low oil prices, instead of 
promoting higher prices in the world market and orienting its oil 
production to export. Unconventional oil is extracted at a varia-
ble cost around US$50 /bbl, which prevents –- even under the 
hypothesis that US companies were to flood the world markets 
– a significant disruption to the world prices that, nevertheless, 
are still sensitive to the production modifications made by the 
«swing producers» (Saudi Arabia especially with oil and Russia 
with natural gas)118.
The EU is finding itself in a certain ambiguity where Russia is 
concerned: the (intended) competition policy defended by the 
Commission together with the Russian response, are leading to 
greater dependence on Russian gas (not so intended). Moreover, 
if the EU wishes to control and secure this dependence, it has to 
apply an ad-hoc regulation adapted to the reality of its relations 
116 FATTOUH, Bassam: «The Energy Transition & Adaptation Strategies for Oil Export-
ers», Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. OPEC Technical Workshop, 29 September 2020.
117 Gazprom is the gas supplier to the EU with the lowest marginal production costs, 
so Russia can hold on a low prices policy in competition with other sources and, es-
pecially, with the LNG coming from the US shale gas. Russia supplies 32.6% of the oil 
imports into Europe and 38.7% of the gas imports (in Germany this amounts to over 
60%). It is also a fact that the European market guarantees over half of Russia’s reve-
nue from exporting gas, which balances this bargaining power. 
118 LASHERAS, Miguel: «Give peace a chance: New opportunities in Saudi Arabia’s 
geoeconomy». Energía y Geoestrategia. 2019. Instituto Español de Estudios Estraté-
gicos. Comité Español del Consejo Mundial de la Energía. Club Español de la Energía. 
Ministerio de Defensa. 2019.
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with Russia, taking particularly into account Germany’s interests 
and position. For example, in line with the regulatory principles 
and standards in force in the EU119, at no time have the offi-
cials of the Commission proposed capacity auctions in the way 
established by the current Network Code on Capacity Allocation 
Mechanisms in gas transmission networks. Had they done so, this 
would have required the Ukrainian regulators, when renegotiating 
the contract between Naftogaz and Gazprom that was ultimately 
signed in December 2019120; to organise an «open season», that 
is, the auction of annual capacity trenches for the next fifteen 
years, finding out the demand level to boost a domestic energy 
market and guarantee the gas supply from abroad.
Conflicts over the major energy corridors
Energy corridors are of vital importance for the green transi-
tion rate followed by the EU and for the way the EU handles 
the relationship with other countries, especially Russia, where 
the economic influence of the energy sector is very high: energy 
accounts for over 60% of its exports. Energy also amounts to 
16% of the GDP and brings in 70% of the revenue in the federal 
budget121. To conserve this source of wealth and the geopolitical 
power that goes with it, it is essential to have transport routes or 
corridors that can convey the energy generated or extracted to 
its consumption points, currently and mainly in the EU.
Russian gas reaches Europe basically via three gas pipelines: 
Yamal, which crosses Belarus and Poland and first conveyed gas 
to Germany in 1997 before it was completed in 2005; Broth-
erhood, which is the oldest, entering the EU via Slovakia after 
running through Ukraine; and, since 2012, ‘Nordstream 1’ (NSI), 
which runs along the Baltic seabed122. Geopolitically, the NS is the 
119 REG (UE) 2017/459 issued by the Commission
120 The Commission’s position, according to Vice-President Sefcovic in April this year, 
was to consider that the main priority was to guarantee a long-term transit contract 
with a horizon of at least ten years.
121 JIMENEZ BAEZ, Alberto: «El estado de la dependencia energética europea: La 
interdependencia rusa». Círculo de Análisis Euromediterráneo. Energía y Medioambien-
te. 23 November 2018. http://circuloeuromediterraneo.org/el-estado-de-la-dependen-
cia-energetica-europea-la-interdependencia-rusa/ (Consultation Date January 2021).
122 MARTIN PEREZ, Idafe: «Nord Stream II, la clave de las tensiones Moscú-Berlín». 
El Tiempo. 8 September 2020. https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/europa/Germa-
ny-amenaza-por-primera-vez-a-Russia-con-interrumpir-nord-stream-2-536383 (Con-
sultation Date January 2021).
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gas pipeline that offers least dependence as regards its passage 
through third countries, so it is the route preferred by Russia and 
Germany, its original developers. NSI, with a capacity for 27,500 
million cubic metres per year, could not originally compete with 
the other gas pipelines that cross Eastern Europe, so a decision 
was taken to double its capacity by constructing NSII. The two 
Nordstreams combined will be able to send 55,000 million cubic 
metres of gas every year from Russia to Germany, approximately 
half of Germany’s annual consumption.
The construction of NSII has been interrupted as a result of 
penalties being imposed on the contracting and investing com-
panies. The sanctions were decreed by the USA under ad-hoc 
legislation123 and remained in force after the December 2019 
Agreement between Gazprom (Russia) and Naftogaz (Ukraine) 
regarding gas transit. Despite these sanctions, NSII will be oper-
ational throughout 2021. As soon as it comes into operation, NSII 
will supply gas across the German-Czech border, to the Austrian 
hub in Baumgarten (Austria). From Baumgarten, the gas will 
reach Northern Italy, one of the major European destinations for 
gas exported by the Russian firm Gazprom, replacing the current 
flows that arrive via Ukraine, Slovakia and Austria itself.
The Eastern European countries such as Bulgaria, Poland, Hun-
gary and Slovakia have all decidedly supported the policy of 
diversification at source of the imports, in order to alleviate the 
situation whereby they are dependent from Russia, whereas the 
major countries in Western Europe, Germany, France and Italy, 
have shown themselves to be in favour of strengthening their 
bilateral energy ties with Russia, and as a result, have given 
their backing to the construction of NS (I and II) and, albeit to 
a lesser extent, the construction of its «twin» via the south: the 
Turk Stream124 which connects Russia to Turkey under the Black 
Sea. That is why in 2015 the EU withdrew its support from the 
Nabucco Gas Pipeline that links Austria with the Central Asia’s 
123 This legislation consists of the National Defense Authorization Acts, the Counter-
ing America´s Adversaries through Sanctions Act and the Protecting Europe´s Energy 
Security Act. Based on the legal cover provided by these standards, the Department of 
State updates the dates, terms, conditions and quantities that give formality to these 
sanctions. The last one dates from 15th July 2020 with subsequent clarifications issued 
on 20th October. The EU understands that these sanctions are contrary to International 
Law, and thus, it does not recognise them.
124 SEGOVIANO, Soledad: «España ante el reto de la seguridad energética». Working 
Document 56/2011. Fundación Alternativas. Observatorio de Política Exterior Española. 
2011.
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gas resources, also via Turkey, which would have operated as 
an alternative to the Turk Stream. Germany thinks that Russia 
is better tied to Europe than isolated, and so, regardless of the 
importance the EU institutions attach to energy diversification, 
it has played an active part in promoting these gas pipelines to 
transport gas coming from Russia.
In this process, Turkey has emerged as a new and major stake-
holder. Both the Turk Stream and the TANAP gas pipeline – a 
Trans Adriatic gas pipeline involving ENAGAS (16%), BP (20%), 
the Azerbaijan firm SOCAR, the Italian firm Snam (20%), the Bel-
gian firm Fluxys (19%) and the Swiss firm Axpo (5%) – which will 
transport Azerbaijan gas to Europe, grant Turkey, with respect to 
the EU, similar power to that which Ukraine has held in recent 
years. Turkey hopes to become a gas hub that channels to the 
EU, gas coming from Russia, Azerbaijan and even Iran125.
However, certain contradictions become apparent in the natural 
gas horizon, as the EGD advances and is developed. On the one 
hand, a remunerative framework adapted to the new investments 
(NSII and the TANAP gas pipeline) is required as an alternative to 
the new transit agreement signed by Gazprom and Naftogaz126. 
Furthermore, between 2030 and 2050, natural gas should almost 
disappear as an energy source in the EU, theoretically giving way 
to hydrogen and renewable gases. Although in the immediate 
future, due to the implementation and development of the EGD, 
the EU will still need Russian gas, Russia began years ago consol-
idating its exports to China127.
Furthermore, the EU’s major gas and electric corridors are old, 
and largely obsolete, and are currently being extensively modern-
ised. They are not sufficient to support the needs for a demand 
that is in keeping with climate neutrality and decarbonisation tar-
125 SANCHEZ TAPÌA, Felipe: «Geopolítica en el Mediterráneo Oriental: algo más que 
gas». Energía y Geoestrategia 2020. Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, Comité 
Español del Consejo Mundial de la Energía y Club Español de la Energía. Felipe Sánchez 
Tapia. Ministerio de Defensa, 2020.
126 PIRANI, Simon and JACK SHARPLES et al. «Implications of the Russia-Ukraine gas 
transit deal for alternative pipeline routes and the Ukrainian and European markets». 
Energy Insights nº 65. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. March 2020.
127 In 2014, Russia signed a $368,000 million contract with China to send 38,000 
million cubic metres of gas per year to the latter, for 30 years, and, in December 2019 
China received the first shipment of gas under this contract, via the Power of Siberia 
gas pipeline. See https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-50647056 (Con-
sultation Date January 2021).
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gets and that competes with the major international energy cor-
ridors and the smart networks. An investment of approximately 
€140 billion in electricity and at least €70 billion in gas128 will be 
required in the next few years to update the current networks 
and construct new ones.
Between 2014 and 2020, the EU used its Connecting Europe 
Facility (CEF) programme to invest €55.5 billion in large corri-
dors, of which €7 billion were for the energy sector (less than 
4% to Smart Grids) and most of it, €48 billion, was allocated 
to transport corridors129. It is not going to be easy to make the 
effort required by necessary investments in the next few years, 
and to a large extent, success will depend on these investments 
being suitably remunerated throughout their working life, which 
in turn depends on the regulatory system that each Member 
State had established. A recent European study that compared 
the different regulations concerning remunerations of gas and 
electricity grids concluded that, although investments associated 
with security of supply were sufficiently covered, those involving 
innovation and development were not. In particular, for exam-
ple, those concerning «smart grids», because they reduce the 
need for physical investment and lower the financial return of the 
Transmission System Operators (TSOs) under the current remu-
neration framework130.
In addition to the grids and gas pipelines, the maritime LNG 
distribution routes will also act as vital strategic corridors for 
supporting electrification by means of natural gas in the next 
few years. The Arctic is expected to become one of the main 
energy corridors between Asia and the West. The agreements 
for exploiting the Arctic have proved to be one of the best exam-
ples in recent years, of the effective combination by the power 
128 https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/connecting-europe-facility/ECf-Energy (Consulta-
tion Date January 2021). 
129 EUROPEAN COMMISSION: «Investing in European networks. The Connecting Eu-
rope Facility. Five years supporting European infrastructures». Innovation and Net-
works Executive Agency. July 2019. 
130 The EU has set as the target, interconnections for at least 10% for 2020, in order 
to encourage the Member States to connect their installed capacity. This goal for 2020 
was a result of a call from the European Council in October 2014. At the same time, 
the Council also called the Commission to regularly inform about how to manage to 
increase this interconnection capacity to 15% by 2030. EUROPEAN COMMISSION: «Do 
current regulatory frameworks in the EU support innovation and security of supply in 
electricity and gas infrastructure? Directorate-General for Energy. Directorate B – In-
ternal Energy Market Unit B.1 – Networks & Regional Initiatives. March 2019.
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blocks of strategies of political cooperation and strategies of 
conflict and sanctions. In 1996, the States with an Arctic fron-
tier (Canada, Norway, Russia, the US, Denmark, Iceland, Swe-
den and Finland)131 established a forum from which to tackle 
environmental protection and sustainable development in the 
Region.
Although the US Geological Service estimates that there are 
energy reserves of more than 400 billion barrels of oil equivalent, 
which amounts to 10% of the world´s crude oil reserves to be 
discovered and 25% of the gas reserves, the greatest interest in 
the Arctic at present revolves around the fact that the thawing 
which has recently taken place is turning the Northwest Passage 
and the Russian Northern Sea Route (NSR) into appealing acces-
sible and transitable alternatives for commercial navigation. In 
some cases, these routes make the length of the journey 1.5 to 
2 times shorter than the routes used until now.
In the first years of operation, the Arctic Council managed to 
achieve a certain balance between Russia and the US based 
on the limits imposed on hydrocarbon exploration in the Arctic, 
especially in the part belonging to Russia, to whom almost half 
the Arctic coastline and coastal zone belongs. This balance has 
also encouraged Russia to change its priorities, aiming them at 
opening up trade routes and, particularly, LNG corridors132.
The interests of the EU have recently come into play. The Euro-
pean Union has never given up its aspiration to join the Arc-
tic Council as an observer. In contrast to Russian interests, the 
EU has ambitious plans to develop a transport centre or hub in 
Kirkenes, which would be competing against the Russian ports on 
the Northern Sea Route (NSR). According to the Finnish project 
called the Arctic Corridor Project133 the route would run from the 
north coast of Norway to the tunnel planned underneath the Gulf 
of Finland as far as to Estonia and then to Berlin. By connect-
ing this Arctic route to a navigable waterway via the NSR, the 
EU hopes to make Kirkenes the main logistics hub for European 
131 These States were joined by China, Japan, South Korea, India and Singapore 
as observers in 2003. KUERSTEN, Andreas: «The Battle for the Arctic». The National 
Interest. https://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/why-russia-should-not-be-feared-
the-arctic-18192 (Consultation Date, January 2021).
132 KADOMTSEV, Andrei: «Battle for the Arctic: Friends and Foes». Modern Diplomacy. 
17 August 2019. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/category/regions/russia-fsu/ (Reference 
Date, January 2021).
133 https://arcticcorridor.fi/ (Reference Date, January 2021).
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goods coming from and going to China and would thus form part 
of the Polar Silk Road Project134.
China views Russia’s energy resources as a way of diversifying 
its sources, whereas the Europeans seek to associate themselves 
with the Asian nations to develop high-speed corridors for Inter-
net and maritime seaways along the NSR135. Although the Arctic 
Council has functioned as a cooperation forum, growing tensions 
regarding control over critical minerals that are essential for the 
new technologies, the dispute over the new navigation routes 
and China’s increasing involvement in the zone are piling pres-
sure on the Region’s governance framework. Once these tensions 
have been overcome, there are those who see the opening up of 
new transport routes in the Arctic as being an excellent opportu-
nity for achieving seaways that internalise, from the beginning, 
the cost of the emissions that they release, restricting access 
to vessels that pollute and constructing infrastructures for using 
clean fuels in the ports that are constructed136.
Not only the major European gas corridors, whether existing or 
new ones that might appear either via the LNG routes – espe-
cially in the Arctic – or because of the new gas pipelines that 
connect the EU with the exterior, but also the intracommunity 
energy transport structures that interconnect the Member States, 
will cause geopolitical tensions. In the former case to keep their 
operation stable and at peace, and in the second case to make 
the investments that are necessary to bring the green transi-
tion to fruition and guarantee security of supply, combining them 
with the development of a domestic energy market that operates 
under the principles of concurrence, non-discrimination and com-
petition. Russia and the EU are condemned to understand each 
other and adjust their green transition rates to make recovering 
their investments in gas pipelines compatible with the decarbon-
isation of their economies. With a view to this, natural gas or 
134 It must be remembered that, although committed to promoting sustainable proj-
ects, promoting ports, motorways, railways, dams, airports, trade & production in the 
One Belt One Road (OBOR) framework means higher emissions of CO2, more pollution 
of the oceans and the atmosphere, more trees being chopped down, greater use of 
natural resources and burning of fossil fuels. HARRIS, JERRY: Ibid
135 FOREIGN POLICY: «Power Maps». https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/13/arc-
tic-competition-resources-governance-critical-minerals-shipping-climate-change-pow-
er-map/?utm_source=PostUp&utm_m (Consultation Date, January 2021).
136 THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON CLEAN TRANSPORTATION: «VISION 2050: A 
strategy to decarbonise the global transport sector by mid-century». White Paper. Pub-
lished on 21 September 2020. 
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green hydrogen will flow through the gas pipelines, but in either 
case it will basically come from Russia, so the hydrogen option 
cannot be solely European (or German).
Jurisdiction over taxation and the costs of CO2
Tax harmonisation is one issue that will generate internal tensions 
and inconsistencies in the cost of production when compared the 
EU to other geopolitical areas of the world, mainly regarding the 
application of the green transition to taxes on energy and CO2 
emissions. The current European framework for energy taxation, 
based on the 2003 Directive137, has remained unchanged in recent 
years and is clearly obsolete. The Commission hopes to update it 
in Summer 2021, mainly in order to remove any fuel fossil subsi-
dies that might still be lingering and to adapt the framework to the 
EGD. Subsidies and aid amounting to approximately €137 billions 
per year have persisted under this Directive, allocated to such sec-
tors as aviation, maritime transport, land transport and the use of 
these types of fuels for electricity production. However, it will not 
be easy to find the required consensus. According to the TFEU, 
taxation decisions have to be unanimous if they are to be approved 
and modified. Poland and the Czech Republic have already stated 
that they are against the review of the Directive and Sweden does 
not appear to be in favour of abolishing the unanimity rule where 
taxation matters are concerned. The positions of Germany and 
France will be extremely important in this attempt to get the EGD 
to move forward in one of its vital aspects, i.e. energy taxation138.
With regard to limiting emissions through taxation and the price 
of CO2, despite the deployment of renewables and the efforts 
made in the years before, no significant changes were observed 
in GHG emissions in 2019. As was announced in the COP 25 
Summit held in Madrid at the end of 2019, carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions reached a record figure in that year, after three years 
of observing successive increases. Moreover, the relationship 
between economic growth and GHG emissions is difficult to 
decouple, even though the implementation of the emissions trad-
ing system in the EU (in 2005) and in other parts of the world. 
137 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2003/96/EC, dated 27 October 2003 restructuring the Com-
munity´s framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity.
138 INVESTIGATE EUROPE: «The EU’s broken Energy Taxation Directive: ripe for re-
vision», 20 August 2020. https://www.investigate-europe.eu/en/2020/energy-taxa-
tion-directive-explained/ (Consultation Date January 2021).
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Although CO2 emissions decreased slightly in many industrialised 
countries, including the European Union, they increased in the 
world as a whole. Preliminary estimates indicate a drop of −1.7% 
for 2019, (−0.8%/year for the period 2003 to 2018) and for 
the US (also −1.7% in 2019, and also 0.8%/year for the period 
2003 to 2018), together with a growth in India (+1.8% in 2019, 
+5.1%/year for 2003 to 2018), China (+2.6% in 2019, +0.4%/
year for 2003 to 2018), and the rest of the world ((+0.5% in 
2019, +1.4%/year for 2003 to 2018)139.
The main issuers of rights or titles that enable CO2 to be released 
into the atmosphere are the EU and China. China is aiming to be 
the biggest market for emission rights, accounting for 3.3 billion 
tonnes per year. Yet the EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS) is 
still the biggest in the world and annually reaches 5% of the world 
emissions and 45% of the EU’s (around 1.3 billion Tm/year). If the 
mechanism is to prove effective in reducing CO2 emissions, every 
year the number of titles live or in circulation must decrease. As 
from 2021, the EU will apply a linear reduction of 2.2% every 
year, higher than the 1.7% applied in the previous years. This 
reduction factor is compatible with the emissions reduction tar-
get of 40% by 2030, compared with the emission levels in 2005. 
Although this goal falls within the margins set for the EU by the 
Paris Agreement, it does not reach the most ambitious reduction 
of up to 55% that was adopted in 2020. To attain the latter, the 
emissions limits associated with the living rights every year will 
have to be restricted even more for the 2021 to 2030 period.
The EGD proposes starting to put a price on CO2 in such sectors 
as transport and building construction materials, making them 
converge with the general mechanism for trading emissions 
rights for 2030. Other aims of the Commission are to gradually 
phase out coal as an energy resource and ban any subsidies for 
hydrocarbons through the aforementioned updating of the 2003 
Directive. But it is the promise of a Carbon Border Adjustment 
Mechanism (CBAM) that will have the greatest impact on the EU’s 
relations with the rest of the world. The CBAM involves placing a 
carbon levy on the entry of goods on the basis of the CO2 that 
has been emitted in each case, and doing so by applying rules 
that have to be compatible with the WTO.
139 JACKSON, R. B. and P. FRIEDLINGSTEIN et al.: «Persistent fossil fuel growth 
threatens the Paris Agreement and planetary health.» Environmental Research Let-
ters. 14.121001. 2019. https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/ab57b3 
(Consultation Date January 2021).
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According to the European lobby of carbon producers «Carbon 
Market Watch», the most suitable design for the CBAM is as an 
extension to the EU ETS for imports, in such a way that either the 
non-Community producers or the Community importers have to 
obtain the rights concerned on the basis of the carbon footprint 
associated with each one of the products imported (calculated by 
checking the processes utilised or by applying generally accepted 
standards)140.
The collaboration of the countries or blocks that trade with the EU 
will be necessary when implementing the CBAM. A free-flowing 
dialogue will be needed that enables the CBAM to act as a coop-
eration mechanism between the parties and not one that leads 
to confrontation. Let us take into account that any CO2 border 
adjustment mechanism will inevitably be inconsistent with the 
non-discrimination clauses of the GATT because, by definition, 
it will mean distinguishing between products that are similar or 
comparable from a consumption or utilisation perspective, merely 
because one has a different carbon footprint from the other141.
Moreover, the EU ETS could have asymmetrical effects within the 
Union if the different Member States draw up their policies sup-
porting investment in renewables and decarbonisation without 
considering the «waterbed» effect, which occurs when support is 
given to investments to reduce emissions in sectors already cov-
ered by the EU ETS. When supporting an investment in renewable 
generation the rights to the emissions reduced by that invest-
ment must be cancelled. If this is not done the playing field will 
be unlevelled between economically similar sectors belonging to 
different Member States142. No technical problems are involved 
140 CARBON MARKET WATCH: «10 Key Principles for a Carbon Border Adjustment 
Measure (CBAM)», Positioning Paper, October 2020.
141 MARCU, ANDREI and MICHAEL MEHLING and AARON COSBEY: «Border Carbon 
Adjustments in the EU. Issues and Options». Roundtable on Climate Change and Sus-
tainable Transition. 30 September 2020. https://ercst.org/border-carbon-adjustments-
in-the-eu-issues-and-options/ (Consultation Date, January 2021).
142 GROSS, Daniel and MILAN ELKERBOUT: «Financing Europe’s Green Deal: beware 
of the waterbed effect». CEPS. 4 March 2020. https://www.ceps.eu/financing-europes-
green-deal-beware-of-the-waterbed-effect/ (Consultation Date, January 2021). For ex-
ample, constructing or support the construction of a wind farm with public money may 
appear to be a green investment. Yet in a system like the UE ETS, all that is achieved is to 
help other energy generators to carry on emitting as before. This also applies to the subsi-
dies for using coal in electrical generation, as is the case in Germany. Removing subsidies 
amounting to €50 thousand million only makes economic sense if the emission certificates 
for those coal plants are recovered and they are removed from the emissions market.
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in controlling GHG emissions and removing subsidies from fossil 
fuels, and neither do either of them require new and sophisticated 
technologies. Even so, this is one of the aspects that receives 
most criticism for the progress of the EGD, and opposition is both 
internal, from the Member States with the highest emission lev-
els, and external, from those who oppose border adjustments.
Asymmetries in traditional industries and new industries
One key sector for progressing with the green transition is the 
transport sector in all its different aspects. According to the Inter-
national Energy Agency (IEA), this sector is responsible for 24% 
of the CO2 emissions on the planet, exactly 8.1 Gt, of which 
44.4% are attributed to road passenger transport, 29.6% to road 
freight transport, 0.11% to air transport and the same percent-
age to sea transport, and 0.01% to rail transport143. The IEA 
understands it will be possible to completely decarbonise some 
of these transport subsectors in the coming decades through 
technologies that allow for greater electrification and the use of 
hydrogen: two-wheeled vehicles by 2040, trains by 2050, small 
lorries by 2060 and, even if the emissions from the rest of the 
wheeled transport (automobiles and buses) are not completely 
decarbonised until 2070, the IEA’s scenario accepts that certain 
countries in the world, such as the United States, the EU, China 
and Japan, may ban the use of conventional engines by 2040144.
The International Council on Clean Transport (ICCT) estimates 
that in the most optimistic decarbonisation scenarios, more than 
two thousand million vehicles driven by internal combustion will 
be sold over the next 30 years. The first conclusion to be drawn 
from this estimate is that it is essential that these vehicles are as 
efficient as possible in terms of emissions. The second conclusion 
is that it is difficult to demand a radical change in little more than 
one generation, in a sector that depends almost exclusively on 
one single energy source, oil, and that operates using infrastruc-





144 https://ourworldindata.org/co2-emissions-from-transport (Consultation Date Jan-
uary 2021).
145 ICCT: «Vision 2050». Ibid.
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Progress towards the use of electric vehicles (EVs) is unstoppable, 
but … at what rate? The decrease in the cost of the batteries used 
and support for favourable public policies have made the use of EVs 
the main change factor for transport in recent years. Use of EVs has 
risen spectacularly in urban environments, albeit unequally. In the 
third quarter of 2020, almost one out of every ten passenger vehi-
cles sold in the EU was rechargeable (9.9%), whereas in the same 
period in the year before the percentage was only 3.0%146. During 
the first three months of 2020, the sale of EVs in the EU nearly 
doubled, rising from 250,079 between January and July 2019 to 
570,278 for the same period in 2020. Even so, the sales of vehicles 
with traditional petrol and diesel engines remained steady at 75%. 
Approximately 97% of the world sales of EVs take place in four 
countries or regions (China, the US, the EU and Japan) and it is in 
some cities within these countries, such as Shanghai, Beijin and 
Los Angeles, where the highest proportion of sales occur147.
It is essential to rally public support that can help and encourage 
the process of transformation towards EVs. The main promotion 
measures consist of financial incentives to make up for the differ-
ence in cost between EVs and conventional combustion vehicles; 
infrastructure deployment programmes; and information cam-
paigns to put across to consumers the advantages and benefits of 
driving EVs148. These measures must be applied with a minimum 
of regional and social inequalities being caused and, when it is 
essential to do so, these must be assisted with compensation and 
mitigation programmes.
The percentage of people employed in the automobile industry 
in the manufacturing sector exceeds 20% in fourteen European 
regions. Five of those regions are in Germany. The rest are in 
Slovakia, Hungary, Italy, the Czech Republic, Romania and Swe-
den. There is no room for the internal combustion engine in a 
carbon neutral EU, so the entire European industrial model for 
vehicle production must adapt149. However, the adaptation rate 
146 ACEA: «New passenger car registrations by fuel type in the European Union». 
Quarter 3. November 2020.
147 OXFORD INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY STUDIES. «Electricity, Electric Vehicles, and 
Public Policy: Eight Key Takeaways». Ibid.
148 WAPPELHORST, Sandra and DALE HALL et al.: «Analyzing policies to grow the 
electric vehicle market in European cities». White Paper. International Council on Clean 
Transportation. February 2020.
149 CAMERON, Aliénor and GRÉGORY CLAEYS et al. (BRUEGEL): «A Just Transition 
Fund: the best way to make the most of the European Union budget to enhance the 
necessary transition from fossil fuels to sustainable energy». Ibid.
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will depend on what is happening both in the EU and in the rest 
of the world, where emerging markets, such as China, seek to 
lead the race for electric vehicles, associating them with broader 
industrialisation and energy security targets. In both Europe and 
the United States, most drivers and purchasers of EVs obtained 
these vehicles to replace their previous vehicles with traditional 
technology, in such a way that the EVs are being demanded as 
replacements (and as they are depreciated) for vehicles with tra-
ditional engines. By contrast, in countries with emerging markets 
like China and India, the purchasers are generally buying a car 
for the first time, so choosing vehicles that are 100% plug-in or 
mixed would make more sense to them150.
Within the EU, there is no general consensus either between the 
Member States regarding the elimination of vehicles that are 
driven by traditional combustion. Although some of them, like 
Denmark, have individually incorporated their elimination targets 
into Laws, it is not clear how to enforce these targets in a way that 
results compatible with European regulations. Outside Europe, 
there are only two known experiences in the world, and both are 
local in nature, with binding and compulsory targets. One is in 
China (Hainan) and the other in Canada (British Columbia).
Yet apart from the characteristics of the demand and regulation, 
there are also structural differences in the sector that can cause 
asymmetries or a lack of uniformity between the different mar-
kets. For example, promoting EVs could be adversely affected by 
intermediaries or dealers who are not bundled with the manufac-
turers, since they may receive incentives to promote vehicles with 
traditional combustion engines before promoting electric vehicles 
(purchasing electric vehicles will involve consumers asking more 
questions and greater effort will be required to sell them, even 
though the cost of maintenance will be lower)151.
The hydrogen sector is another emerging industrial sector that, 
like the automobile sector, is closely associated with the EGD, and 
it is a sector that has a strategy defined by the EU152. The EU’s 
strategic target is to install at least 6 GW of renewable hydrogen 
150 OXFORD INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY STUDIES. «Electricity, Electric Vehicles, and 
Public Policy: Eight Key Takeaways». Ibid.
151 This has been demonstrated in the market analyses conducted in the Nordic coun-
tries. OXFORD INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY STUDIES. «Electricity, Electric Vehicles, and 
Public Policy: Eight Key Takeaways». Ibid.
152 COM (2020) 301.
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by electrolysis by 2024 and at least 40 GW by 2030. The hydro-
gen will mainly be applied to industry and mobility. By 2050, the 
cumulative investment in renewable hydrogen facilities will lie 
between €180 to 479 billion153.
According to EU predictions, hydrogen will cater for 24% of the 
total energy demand by 2050, i.e., approximately 2,250 TWh/
year. This energy would be the fuel used for 42 million grand 
touring cars, 1.7 million lorries, approximately a quarter of a mil-
lion buses and more than 5,500 trains. It could heat over an 
equivalent of 52 million homes (about 465 TWh) and supply up to 
10% of their electricity demand. In industry, roughly 160 TWh of 
hydrogen would produce high-power heat and a further 140 TWh 
would replace coal in steel mills. Hydrogen combined with cap-
tured carbon or carbon obtained from biomass could also provide 
the raw materials for 40 Mt of chemical products in 2050. It could 
also play a major role as a raw material for synthetic fuels (syn-
thetic methane to be mixed with natural gas, ammonia poten-
tially for sea transport and synthetic fuel for air transport)154.
These targets can only be reached if a major transformation 
is made to the EU’s industrial and economic fabric on the sup-
ply side, and to the uses and preferences of consumers on the 
demand side. As an energy source, it is estimated that hydrogen 
can create a fuel and associated equipment industry of around 
€130 billions for European companies by 2030, and that this 
would reach €820 billions by 2050. As a whole, the European 
hydrogen industry could create one million jobs for highly skilled 
workers by 2030 and would reach 5.4 million by 2050155.
.However, these estimates could be very optimistic. Apart from 
the problems associated with the high cost of producing green 
hydrogen based on the technologies currently available, the out-
look for this fuel faces two other problems. The first is that, as 
153 The same communication from the Commission COM (2020) 301 gives information 
about the current cost of producing hydrogen using different technologies: 1.5 €/kg 
(38 €/MWh) for current production methods (without taking into account the cost of 
the CO2). 2 €/kg (50 €/MWh) for «blue» hydrogen with carbon capture; and 2.5-5.5 €/
kg (65–135 €/MWh) for «green» hydrogen obtained from renewable sources.
154 LAMBERT, Martin: «Hydrogen and decarbonisation of gas: false dawn or silver 
bullet?». Energy Insight nº 66. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. March 2020.
155 FUEL CELLS AND HYDROGEN JOINT UNDERTAKING: «Hydrogen Roadmap Europe: 
a sustainable pathway for the European energy transition». Prepared by McKinsey 
& Company. January 2019. Accessible at https://www.fch.europa.eu/ (Consultation 
Date, January 2021).
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has already been pointed out, Russia will have to accompany 
the transition in the EU and replace the gas it sends with hydro-
gen156. Either the transitions in the two areas must keep in step 
with each other or the gas pipelines will merely be assets with 
sunk costs, unless natural gas continues to make incursions into 
the European markets without leaving any room for hydrogen 
and, in both cases, hinders progress with the transition in the EU. 
Furthermore, if gas and CO2 prices in the future are relatively 
low, around US $ 2 MMBTU and 25-30 €/Tn157, it will be diffi-
cult the replacement of gas by fuels such as hydrogen and other 
renewable gases. The second problem is how a hydrogen econ-
omy subsidised and strongly supported by the public sector can 
live together the transnational, extensive, competitive and liquid 
market that the European Hydrogen Strategy for a climatically 
neutral Europe is opting for in the long term.
Nevertheless and according to the Commission: «…hydrogen 
plays an essential part in supporting the EU’s commitment to 
achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 and in the global efforts to 
implement the Paris Agreements»158.
Individual mobilisation to achieve efficiency in buildings and 
constructions
In December 2018, Directive EU 2018/2002 established a target 
for saving at least 32.5% through energy efficiency by 2030. The 
construction sector in the EU accounts for approximately 40% 
of its energy consumption, 36% of the total CO2 emissions and 
about half of the total emissions not covered by the EU ETS. Most 
of the energy currently used in buildings is lost due to construc-
tion practices that are now obsolete, the use of inefficient devices 
156 It is interesting to note that Germany is the first country in the EU to disclose 
a National Strategy for developing energy from hydrogen. The Federal Government 
opted for this strategy in 10 June 2020. On that very same day, the Russian Govern-
ment published the Russian Federation’s Energy Strategy, in which it stated that it was 
hoped Russia would be exporting 0.2 million tonnes of hydrogen per year by 2024 and 
2 million by 2035. According to the Minister of Energy’s Plans issued by the Minister of 
Energy, Russia hopes to capture 16% of the European hydrogen market. 2006 Russia 
and Hydrogen.
157 FULWOOD, Mike: «$2 Gas in Europe: Groundhog Day?». Oxford Energy Comment. 
The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. October 2020.
158 EUROPEAN COMMISSION: Powering a climate-neutral economy: Commission sets 
out plans for the energy system of the future and clean hydrogen. Press Release. Brus-
sels 8 July 2020.
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and systems and a lack of effective control systems. From a 
technical viewpoint, this inefficiency can easily be overcome with 
thermal insulation, double glazing, preventing leakage and using 
efficient heat and cooling generation and distribution systems. 
Smart metering systems and distributed generation can also help 
to cause the demand to behave proactively in making the energy 
efficiency improvements that are needed.
The biggest problem that is expected for achieving these goals 
lies in the difficulties involved in mobilising the private financing 
required to pay for these investments in assets that will generate 
efficiency. It is estimated that approximately €275 billions will be 
needed yearly between now and 2030 to achieve the efficiency 
targets taken on for 2030. As individual projects are relatively 
small and the economic saving is obtained after relatively long 
periods of time, private investors and funders tend to overesti-
mate the cost of the risk, what makes financing difficult. A feeling 
of uncertainty, potential regulatory risks and an unwillingness to 
join projects which will take a long time to reach fruition are all 
factors that can deter electricity consumers. If deficient infor-
mation, complex decision processes and, at times, a relatively 
high outlay – -when compared to the energy saving through-
out the useful life of the assets- are added to the aforemen-
tioned factors, they all constitute major barriers to motivating 
consumers and funders to take investment decisions that lead 
to energy efficiency. The solutions are not easy, but technical 
and legal standardisation at the different phases of the construc-
tion and investment processes would be of considerable help in 
mobilising the required resources, as several Community insti-
tutions have already pointed out159. The Commission has taken 
a series of initiatives to facilitate investments in efficiency and 
to overcome the barriers and difficulties that it has found in the 
wealth of experience it has gathered in promoting energy effi-
ciency programmes:160
In conjunction with the EIB, the Commission is developing a flex-
ible guarantee model to be implemented domestically as part of 
159 EUROPEAN COMMISSION: «Private financing of energy efficiency: new solutions 
for financing Europe’s energy transition». CORDIS. EU research findings. https://
cordis.europa.eu/article/id/422225-private-finance-for-energy-efficiency-new-solu-
tions-for-funding-europes-energy-transition/es (Consultation Date, January 2021).
160 The first regulation goes back to 1974. Council Resolution 75/C 153/2 dated 17 
December 1974 concerning energy policy targets for 1985. The most important mile-
stone was the 2012 Energy Efficiency Directive (Directive 2012/27/EU).
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the initiative Smart Finance for Small Buildings (SFSB). Its aim 
is to facilitate a combination of different lines of public financing 
(such as the funds from the European Fund for Strategic Invest-
ment and from the European Structural and Investment Fund) in 
order to obtain the best possible results.
Particularly useful in overcoming the difficulties involved in 
assessing the risks associated with these investments, are the 
shared databases and the tools to assess the risks. They have all 
been brought together as one single tool, namely the De-Risk-
ing Energy Efficiency Platform (Underwriting Tool), which was 
launched by the Commission in collaboration with the Energy 
Efficiency Financial Institutions Group (EEFIG). Moreover, experi-
ences of this kind are worthwhile because they can be exported 
to other zones and applied in non-European environments.
According to the IEA161, 10% of the funds contributed by the EU´s 
Recovery & Resilience Plan, which as has already been mentioned 
considers around €750 thousand million as NextgenerationUE 
funds to be spent in the next few years, will be earmarked for 
energy efficiency, This amounts to approximately €75,000 bil-
lions in direct grants and credits under advantageous terms to 
reinforce the rest of the measures aimed at achieving energy 
efficiency in the EU. This European effort accounts for 86% of the 
public encouragement announced in the world for recovery pro-
grammes associated with energy efficiency. The IEA’s Sustaina-
ble Recovery Plan suggests for the rest of the world outside the 
EU, that they must also increase their energy efficiency-oriented 
recovery activities, because of their ability to create new employ-
ment (about 4 million extra jobs)162.
EU’s World Leadership
For the EGD to be the backbone of the EU’s political strategy, 
there has to be de-escalation in the relations between the US 
and China. These new relations have to take the form of a new 
bipolarity very different from the type that existed during the 
Cold War in the 1950s and 60s. In the current situation, the Chi-
161 https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/next-generation-eu-total-and-ex-
pected-climate-and-energy-related-spending-2021-2023 (Consultation Date, January 
2021).
162 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY: «Energy Efficiency, 2020». December 
2020. https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-efficiency-2020/tracking-policy-respons-
es-to-the-crisis (Consultation Date January 2021).
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nese may be more concerned about defending themselves from 
US influence in Asia than about achieving and consolidating their 
world domination through confrontation. In the recent past, high 
growth rates have not caused Chinese society to take on the val-
ues inherent to the European welfare states, and that has created 
an uneven commercial and social arena. However, in the coming 
years, the Chinese «dual circularity» policy needs to raise the 
lowest salaries and improve social protection levels in order to 
achieve a sustained growth in domestic consumption and internal 
demand. This should help to attain more balanced trade relations 
with the West. If the US limits its responses and ignores certain 
calls to take preventive and military measures against the Chi-
nese threats163, the creation of a multipolar international order, 
with a balanced domination by China and the US, could assist the 
progress of the European EGD. These two countries are the only 
ones on the planet that are disputing the leadership of a fourth 
industrial revolution (5G, artificial intelligence, quantum Internet, 
etc.). If, as established in the EGD, the EU can make the most 
of its strong points as world leader in taking measures on the 
climate and the environment, protecting consumers and workers’ 
rights it is essential for it to be able to count on the US and China 
to promote global projects and offer the public assets referred 
to in the EGD. In line with this, and as the EGD communication 
states, the EU must orient the common security and defence pol-
icy towards third countries, trying to ensure that the world chal-
lenges concerning climate and the environment do not serve as 
an «important magnifier» to increase tensions. It is essential «…
to prevent these challenges from becoming sources of conflict, 
food insecurity, population displacement and forced migration, 
and support a just transition globally»164
In Section 3 of the EGD entitled, «The EU as world leader», its 
institutions are called to promote mobilising the countries in the 
world to adopt its policy of encouraging sustainable development. 
The European Council accepts that «international involvement is 
crucial for successfully tackling climate change. (…) and it appeals 
to the Commission and the High Representative to pay special 
attention to climate diplomacy.»165 This EU’s diplomacy as part 
of the Green Deal, together with trading policy, development aid 
163 KAGAN, Robert ibid 
164 COM (2019) 640 final. Page 25.
165 CROATIAN PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: «Subject: 
Long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategy of the European Union 
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and other policies directed to the exterior, must also mobilise the 
G7, the G20, the WTO and other forums, the closest neighbours 
(e.g. Western Balkans), those in the South, the rest of Africa, 
Latin America, the Caribbean and Pacific Asia, and do so not only 
through bilateral channels but also through the United Nations’ 
multilateral channels.
A basic aim that the EU’s foreign policy must seek to achieve is to 
facilitate the export, with the due adaptations, of its experiences, 
especially with respect to governance and supranational tools, to 
third countries «…to establish international standards that are in 
harmony with the EU’s environmental and climate ambitions».
The international role of the EU, in a world dominated by bipolar 
tension between China and the USA will be to find a policy of its 
own («on my way»)166 different from the sum total of the for-
eign policies of the different Member States and that manages to 
consolidate its leadership in encouraging the ecological transition 
without upsetting the balance between China and the US. China’s 
sudden appearance, with its economic dynamism, its ideological 
distancing and its singular international expansionism, are mak-
ing western climate diplomacy face an CPSL and uncertain future 
in a world where international cooperation and multilateralism 
will must overcome unilateralism and nationalism.
This need to promote from the EU international cooperation in 
the midst of this difficult geopolitical balance is described by 
Josep Borrell167 in the following way: «As the EU, we have done 
and must do more to develop a level playing field in what human 
and social rights are concerned, by improving the so-called «due 
diligence» requirements demanded of the economic operators 
throughout their contracting chain. We must strengthen our 
trading policy to make sure the commitments taken on by our 
counterparts and trading partners with regard to social and envi-
ronmental standards are adhered as a whole. We also have to 
reflect on the implications of a border carbon tax, without which 
the Green Deal would lead either to carbon leaks or to competi-
and its Member States». Submission by Croatia and the European Commission on be-
half of the European Union and its Member States. Zagreb, 6 March 2020.
166 BORRELL, Josep: «The Sinatra Doctrine». Política Exterior nº 197. 1 September 
2020. https://www.politicaexterior.com/producto/la-doctrina-sinatra/ (Consultation 
Date, January 2021).
167 Josep Borrell is the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
and Vice-President of the European Commission for the period from 1December 2019 
to 31 October 2024.
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tive disadvantages. And of course, we must continue to lead the 
world in the struggle against tax havens.»168 The truth is that 
the EGD as an EU commitment to the current world is an «all or 
nothing» wager that is credible because its very existence as a 
political entity is at stake.
Conclusions
With an international order in the process of transition towards 
a new equilibrium and determined to take action against climate 
change that needs new types of international cooperation and 
multilateralism, the European Institutions have directed their 
strategy for emerging from the crisis caused by COVID-19, 
towards investments that can lay the foundations for a modern 
and sustainable Europe that is leading the way. The backbone of 
this strategy is the EGD drawn up in December 2019 and per-
fected during the course of 2020. However, this ambitious strat-
egy is not without its pitfalls. Probably the biggest of these is 
that from within the Union the support of the Member States 
breaks down and weakens it. That is why it is essential to set in 
motion the Just Transition System to make up for the economic 
and social imbalances caused by the green transition and in order 
to ensure that nobody is left out. If this internal unity is to remain 
intact, it is vital that the EGD adapts to the rate at which the for-
eign energy systems closest to the EU are progressing, especially 
the rates of Russia, Turkey and the «neighbours to the south», 
which are particularly sensitive to the period of time during which 
natural gas can be used and the potential that green hydrogen 
has for entering large-scale production. Security of Supply has to 
be compatible with the progress made by the domestic energy 
market; with the way it is designed and regulated; and with the 
ad-hoc contracts for guaranteeing supply from Russia. Electrifica-
tion, the deployment of electric vehicles, the use of green gases 
such as hydrogen or the financing of the consumers’ investments 
to improve efficiency and actively manage the demand, have to 
be compatible with not only supply but also demand being able 
to act with sufficient freedom to enable them to bear the cost and 
enjoy the benefits of their own decisions.
168 BORRELL, Josep: «Building Global Europe», European External Action Service. 
From the Blog. 9 September 2020. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquar-
ters-homepage_en/84888/Building%20Global%20Europe (Consultation Date, January 
2021). 
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The other major threat is that the EGD might not receive suf-
ficient cooperation from other geopolitical power zones and 
especially from China, Russia and the United States. What inter-
national cooperation needs is for a new multilateralism to come 
into operation that can overcome the difficulties and problems 
with which the old international order was fraught. The tradi-
tional and inflexible respect for national sovereignty will have 
to be relaxed and broken down with the aid of the multilateral 
institutions. The potential strategic utilisation of REE monopolies 
must be lessened and its effects reduced. The principles of the 
GATT and the WTO have to be made compatible with CO2 bor-
der adjustments and fossil fuel subsidies must be curtailed. The 
international trade institutions have to make all these objectives 
attainable as soon as possible.
Joe Biden’s triumph in the US will not eliminate the need for the 
new Administration to concentrate on its internal challenges. The 
US is returning to the Paris Agreement, but the EU cannot, and 
must not expect this return to put the two blocks in a similar 
situation to the 1970s and 1980s. Although a second triumph for 
Trump might have initiated an irreversible period of confronta-
tion169 probably with falls in world trade, new arms races and less 
effort in the policies aimed at encouraging the ecological transi-
tion, President Biden will be focusing most of his attention on the 
task of calming the country down and unifying it. The US’s path 
in the green transition will be different from the European path 
and, in certain aspects they will even be competing against each 
other. Even so, the US is an essential ally for ensuring that the 
oil-producing countries do not slow down the rate at which the 
green transition is progressing. The strategic capacity that the 
US’s oil and gas production offers using fracking techniques is, in 
the medium-term, necessary for preventing extreme strategies 
being used by the OPEC, especially Saudi Arabia and Russia.
One of the major paradoxes of China´s present time is the effort 
made by Xi Jinping to position himself as the champion of glo-
balisation and decarbonisation, while at the same time imposing 
limits on the free movement of capital, information, goods and 
services170. The plans to relaunch the economy after the pan-
169 More Hobbesian, according to HAASS, RICHARD: Ibid.
170 In September 2021, in the UN General Assembly, the President of China, Xi Jinping, 
announced China’s commitment to becoming CO2 neutral by 2060. This announcement 
amounted to a radical about-turn when compared to previous positions, which were 
much more radically in defence of coal as an energy fuel. ROWLATT, Justin: «Why 
Miguel Ángel Lasheras Merino
182
demic would appear to indicate that China is still not taking very 
seriously the efforts that the green transition requires, although 
facing the outward, it seems the opposite171. The time for this 
ambiguous behaviour could be coming to an end as long as the 
EU and the US are clear and firm in their progress towards energy 
transition. Whatever happens at the COP26 in Glasgow at the 
end of 2021, it seems vital to push a more committed Chinese 
position.
Furthermore, the EU must find its own way, which has to be sound 
and sustainable, preventing a global polarization as a result of 
the conflict between the USA and China, as well as Brexit172, or 
the governments of the Member States, such as the autocracies 
in Hungary or Poland, do not weaken its unity from within. The 
EU has long-standing experience in making both the right and 
wrong decision in defining and developing energy-policy goals 
and measures applied while trying to maintain difficult balances 
between the sovereignty of the Member States and the Union’s 
«supranational» institutions. This experience with mechanisms 
of governance that are compatible with national sovereignty; 
with statistical flexibility for financing green projects; with EU 
ETS schemes or with standardising sources of information and 
data, as well as experience with taxonomic or standardisation 
criteria for green projects, must all be valued for their «export» 
and consolidate their role in the geopolitics of the coming dec-
ades. With respect to the other power blocks, the EU has to act 
with a combination of unilaterality and cooperation, endeavour-
ing to find the best solutions after analysing each particular case. 
Josep Borrell has defined this modus operandi in the following 
way: «We need to strengthen our capacities to act autonomously. 
The concept of ‘Strategic Autonomy’ is not about protectionism 
2021 could be turning point for tackling climate change». BBC News. 1 January 2021. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-55498657?utm_campaign=IEA%20
newsletters&utm_source=SendGrid&utm_medium=Email (Consultation Date January 
2021).
171 ANDREWS-SPEED, Philip et al.: «Does 2020 mark a critical juncture in China’s 
low-carbon energy transition?». Energy Insight 76. The Oxford Institute for energy 
Studies. October 2020.
172 Although it is difficult to imagine a regulatory alignment between the EU and the 
UK after Brexit, the two are in perfect harmony in terms of environmental targets 
and ambitions. BRYDEN, DOUG and SARAH-JANE DENTON: «The European Green Deal 
–- A status report», Travers Smith. https://www.traverssmith.com/knowledge/knowl-
edge-container/the-european-green-deal-overview-and-status-report/ (Consultation 
Date January 2021).
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but about having the capacity to defend our interests and values 
by acting multilaterally whenever we can but being ready to act 
autonomously whenever we must.»173
Be that as it may, unilateral policies and uncooperative, author-
itarian, autocratic and xenophobic polices may come to prevail 
over values that support the ecological transition. This threat is 
even greater after COVID-19. However, this is not new and much 
less inevitable. As was recently pointed out in Foreign Policy: At 
the end of World War II, it was hardly preordained that Western 
Europe would be free, united, and prosperous. When the Cold 
War ended, a peaceful transition was anything but guaranteed174. 
Today, the Green Deal may appear to be utopian, but from old 
Europe, especially since World War II, it will not be the first time 
that ceilings that seemed insurmountable have been broken.
173 BORRELL, Josep: «Building Global Europe», From the Blog. European External 
Action Service. 25 November 2020. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquar-
ters-homepage_en/84888/Building%20Global%20Europe (Consultation Date January 
2021).
174 FUCHS, Michael H.: «A Foreign Policy for the Post- Pandemic World How to Prepare 
for the Next Crisis», Foreign Affairs. 23 July 2020. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
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Abstract
Hydrogen and derived gases (such as ammonia and methanol) 
are currently enjoying renewed political and business momentum, 
based on the declining cost of renewable electricity and surging 
interest in deep decarbonization, as more and more countries 
rally behind net zero emission targets by mid-century. This chap-
ter presents an overview of the geopolitical dimensions of hydro-
gen as a clean energy carrier. To that end, it first reviews the 
technical characteristics, different production methods and areas 
of application of hydrogen. Next, the chapter examines whether 
and how hydrogen and derived fuels could become globally traded 
energy commodities, and which countries are poised to become 
the hydrogen superpowers of the future. Finally, this chapter 
identifies six areas where hydrogen might shape geopolitics in 
the coming years: technology dominance, geo-economic compe-
tition, the future of petrostates, new interdependencies, carbon 
lock-in, and global governance. The chapter finds that hydrogen 
has the potential to become a global commodity, although the 
size and scope of that market is still very contested and uncer-
tain. While the geopolitical stakes in this emerging business are 
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high, hydrogen will not become a zero-carbon version of oil, con-
trary to popular belief. If anything, it will bear more resemblance 
to the liquefied natural gas (LNG) market.
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Introduction
For decades, international relations (IR) pundits used the word 
«hydrogen» only in relation to the hydrogen bomb, a weapon of 
mass destruction that is many times more powerful than the con-
ventional atomic weapons that destroyed Hiroshima and Naga-
saki. Today, a more peaceful application of hydrogen has entered 
the lexicon of IR specialists: that of hydrogen as an energy car-
rier and a feedstock. Since 2017, hydrogen gas and its many 
derivative forms (e.g., hydrogen-based methanol or ammonia) 
are back in vogue as critical solutions for moving our economies 
towards net zero emissions by the middle of the century.
This is not the first wave of interest in hydrogen as an energy 
carrier. Hydrogen gases sparked a first wave of enthusiasm in 
the wake of the petroleum shortages experienced by the West in 
the 1970s. Hydrogen produced from coal and nuclear was touted 
as a means of replacing vulnerable oil imports, especially as a 
transportation fuel. Enthusiasm for hydrogen waned as oil prices 
declined, but a new wave of interest arose in the 1990s, this time 
spurred on by concern about climate change. Yet, persistent low 
oil prices stifled many hydrogen projects. By the early 2000s, the 
hydrogen hype returned, amid widespread fears over peak oil. 
After 2010, as oil scarcity fears subsided, hydrogen again faded 
into the background1.
Today, two evolutions have dramatically shifted the outlook for 
hydrogen. First, the dramatic cost reductions for renewable 
energy technologies such as solar and wind have improved the 
prospect of «green hydrogen» (produced from electrolysis of 
water powered with renewables) one day becoming competitive 
with fossil fuels – by as soon as 2030 according to the Interna-
tional Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)2. For most places in the 
world, renewables are now the cheapest source of electricity3. 
1 International Energy Agency (IEA), «The Future of Hydrogen», Paris: OECD/IEA. 
Available at: https://www.iea.org/reports/the-future-of-hydrogen. Accessed: 11 Jan-
uary 2021.
2 International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), «Green Hydrogen Cost Reduc-
tion: Scaling Up Renewables to Meet the 1.5°C Climate Goal», Abu Dhabi: IRENA, 17 
December 2020. Available at: https://irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publica-
tion/2020/Dec/IRENA_Green_hydrogen_cost_2020.pdf. Accessed: 13 January 2021. 
3 International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), «Renewable power genera-
tion costs in 2019», IRENA, June 2020. Available at: https://www.irena.org/publica-
tions/2020/Jun/Renewable-Power-Costs-in-2019. Accessed: 11 January 2021. 
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The IEA now refers to solar photovoltaics (PV) as «the cheapest 
source of electricity in history»4. Just like solar and wind, elec-
trolysers are on technology learning curves, and can experience 
similar cost reductions like those we have seen for renewable 
technologies. Green hydrogen is technically a subcategory of 
renewable electricity, from which it is produced. As such, hydro-
gen might enable the penetration of cheap renewable electricity 
sources into other end-use sectors like industry, transport and 
buildings where it might displace fossil fuels.
Second, governments have adopted the Paris Agreement in late 
2015, which states the aim of limiting global warming to well 
below 2° Celsius and pursuing efforts to keep it under 1.5°C. 
Even though the initial nationally determined contributions 
(NDCs) fell well short of that temperature goal, governments 
seem increasingly serious about climate mitigation. If the incom-
ing Biden administration follows through on its promise, soon 
more than two-thirds of global CO2 emissions will be under a net 
zero commitment by the middle of the century5. To achieve this 
goal, zero-carbon hydrogen could be an important or even indis-
pensable technical solution to decarbonise sectors which are hard 
to electrify, such as shipping, aviation, long-haul transport, and 
high-heat industrial processes6.
Thanks to these evolutions, this time may be different, and the 
hydrogen industry may finally take off after several false starts. 
Hydrogen may even give way to large, new international trade 
flows. Big, industrialised countries like Japan, Korea, Germany 
and the rest of the European Union (EU) are betting on large-
scale imports of hydrogen to meet their net zero commitments. 
Hydrogen could thus give way to a large and potentially lucrative 
new commodity market, and this is attracting the attention of 
governments and the boards of large corporations. If hydrogen 
is set to become an important energy carrier in the future, a 
zero-carbon version of oil, the industry is surely one of high risks 
and immense geopolitical stakes.
4 International Energy Agency (IEA), «World Energy Outlook 2020», Paris: OECD/
IEA, p. 214. 
5 United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), «Emissions Gap Report 2020», p. 
xvii. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/EGR20.pdf. 
Accessed: 13 January 2021. 
6 Ronnie Belmans and Pieter Vingerhoets, «Molecules: Indispensable in the Decarbon-
ized Energy Chain», EUI RSCAS PP, 2020/01, Florence School of Regulation. Available 
at: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/66205. Accessed: 18 January 2021. 
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What makes hydrogen so appealing to policymakers is that it can 
provide a secure and reliable supply of energy and heat at all 
times, night or day, winter or summer, at a cost that is bound to 
come down and without emitting carbon dioxide (if produced from 
renewables or nuclear)7. It is a key enabler of sector coupling, as 
well as a storable and dispatchable energy carrier (in contrast to 
intermittent sources of electricity from solar and wind). Since it 
can be stored in unlimited quantities, hydrogen is the only solution 
that can provide deep resilience to the highly electrified net-zero 
economy of the future8. Unlike oil and gas, it can be produced 
anywhere in the world, reducing the risks of asymmetric trade 
relationships that can be politically exploited by either side.
This chapter seeks to expose the geopolitical dimensions of 
hydrogen. To that end, it proceeds in five parts. The next sec-
tion reviews the technical potential and economic cost of differ-
ent hydrogen value chains, covering both hydrogen’s production 
methods and its potential use cases. The subsequent section 
attempts to identify the key players in the global hydrogen game, 
combining a general overview with case studies of Japan, the 
European Union, Australia and Chile. Next, we move on to dis-
cuss the geopolitical drivers and implications of current hydrogen 
developments. Six geopolitical dimensions of hydrogen are iden-
tified and discussed at length:
• The race to attain technological leadership;
• Trade frictions and competitive industrial strategies;
• Impact of hydrogen on the future of petrostates;
• New interdependencies arising from international hydrogen 
trade;
• Risks of carbon lock-in and stranded assets;
• Competitive regulation and governance of hydrogen markets.
What is hydrogen?
Technical characteristics
To fully apprehend the revolution that hydrogen may unlock, it is 
important to understand a few basic scientific principles regarding 
7 Thierry Lepercq, Hydrogen is the New Oil: How 7 Energy Battles are Giving Birth to 
a Carbon-Free World. Paris: Cherche Midi, 2019. 
8 Michael Liebreich, «Separating Hype from Hydrogen – Part Two: The Demand 
Side», 16 October 2020. Available at: https://about.bnef.com/blog/liebreich-separat-
ing-hype-from-hydrogen-part-two-the-demand-side/. Accessed: 22 December 2020.
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hydrogen. Hydrogen is the lightest and most abundant element 
in the universe. It is a diatomic gas designated with the molecu-
lar formula H2. It is nontoxic, non-metallic, odourless, tasteless, 
carbon-free, and highly combustible. Hydrogen rarely occurs as 
a free molecule in nature, but tends to be associated with other 
elements, notably oxygen (to from water, or H2O) and carbon (to 
form various forms of hydrocarbons, including fossil fuels, such 
as methane or CH4).
Today, hydrogen is almost exclusively used as a feedstock for 
other chemical products, including ammonia (NH3), a critical input 
product to make nitrogen fertilizers, methanol (CH3OH), ethanol 
(C2H5OH). At oil refineries, it is also added to heavier oil to pro-
duce transport fuels. At present, the production of ammonia and oil 
refining accounts for two-thirds of global hydrogen use9. Industrial 
demand for hydrogen is already a very important global market, 
with a total demand of around 115 metric million tons in 201810, 
worth 135.5 billion dollars,11 and is experiencing rapid growth.
Yet, hydrogen also has a lot of potential as a chemical energy 
carrier, or an energy vector. It contains more energy per unit of 
weight than fossil fuels. As a fuel, hydrogen can be reconverted 
into electricity or heat through the following chemical reaction: 
2H2 + O2 → 2H2O + electricity + heat. This can be achieved 
through actual combustion (just like natural gas or coal in power 
plants or oil in vehicle engines) or through oxidation in fuel cells. 
In both cases, hydrogen does not produce any carbon dioxide 
(CO2), particulate matter (PM), sulphur oxides (SOx), nitrogen 
oxides (NOx), nor does it raise ground-level ozone (O3). Its only 
side-product is water vapor (H2O), which is completely innocu-
ous. The benefits of hydrogen for mitigating climate change and 
local air pollution are thus widely cited.
It is very important, however, to underline that hydrogen is not 
an energy source. It cannot be extracted from the ground or the 
atmosphere like crude oil or solar irradiation. Instead, it is an 
energy carrier or energy vector, just like electricity. This means that 
it needs to be produced, using other energy sources. Currently, 
9 International Energy Agency (IEA), «The Future of Hydrogen», Paris: OECD/IEA. Avail-
able at: https://www.iea.org/reports/the-future-of-hydrogen. Accessed: 11 January 2021.
10 IEA, «The Future of Hydrogen», p. 18. 
11 Baker McKenzie, «Shaping Tomorrow’s Global Hydrogen Market Via De-Risked In-
vestments», January 2020. Available at: https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/
files/insight/publications/2020/01/hydrogen_report.pdf?la=en. Accessed: 11 January 
2021. 
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more than 99% of all dedicated hydrogen production is from fossil 
fuels12, thus leaving a substantial CO2 footprint. In fact, hydrogen 
production is currently responsible for annual emissions equivalent 
to those of the United Kingdom (UK) and Indonesia combined13. 
With current production methods, hydrogen has no role to play in 
global decarbonization efforts. However, there are other produc-
tion methods, which will be reviewed in the next subsection.
Production methods
The various ways of producing hydrogen are typically described 
by using different colour codes (see Table 1). «Grey» is used to 
refer to the production of hydrogen from fossil fuels. It is some-
times also be referred to as «brown» hydrogen (if it’s based on 
brown coal or lignite) or «black» hydrogen (if it’s based on black 
coal). By far the biggest chunk of hydrogen (around 75%) is 
produced through steam methane reforming (SMR), which brings 
together natural gas and heated water in the form of steam. The 
output is hydrogen and carbon dioxide. Coal gasification comes 
next, accounting for an additional 23% of hydrogen production14. 
Given the large CO2 emissions implied by these production meth-
ods, they are unsuitable for reaching net zero emission targets.












Natural gas or coal Low
Turquoise 
hydrogen
Pyrolysis Natural gas Close to zero if 










Electrolysis Nuclear electricity Close to zero
Table 1. The main shades of hydrogen
12 IEA, Future of Hydrogen, p. 32. 
13 IEA, «Future of Hydrogen», p. 14.
14 IEA, «Future of Hydrogen», p. 38.
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In theory, both production processes could be equipped or ret-
rofitted with carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology, in 
which case it is referred to as «blue» hydrogen. CCS technologies 
allow only to capture 85-95% of CO2 emissions at best15, mak-
ing blue hydrogen far less carbon intensive than its grey or black 
counterparts, but still not carbon neutral. In addition, continued 
reliance on natural gas extraction implies a risk of upstream leak-
ages of methane, a far more potent greenhouse gas than CO2. 
Moreover, such retrofitting involves additional costs for capturing, 
transporting and storing CO2, and may face social acceptance 
issues16. In energy security terms, blue hydrogen still relies on 
a finite resource base, is exposed to fossil fuel price fluctuations, 
and may involve a continued reliance on imports from unstable 
supplier countries.
Another production route is called «turquoise» hydrogen. It uses 
natural gas as a feedstock but does not produce any CO2 emis-
sions. Through the process of pyrolysis, the methane or natural 
gas (CH4) breaks down in gaseous hydrogen (H2) and solid car-
bon (C). Interestingly, a market for solid carbon already exists, 
which gives opportunities to tap into an additional revenue 
stream. The same can be said about CO2 in schemes that pro-
vide for the utilization of captured carbon dioxide, but solid car-
bon can be more easily stored than gaseous CO2. To make this 
production technique carbon neutral, the high-temperature heat 
must be generated through renewables or nuclear and the carbon 
residue must be permanently bound. At the moment, turquoise 
hydrogen is still at the pilot stage.
«Green» hydrogen is made through water electrolysis based 
on renewable-generated electricity. Electrolysis was invented 
by two British chemists back in 1800. It is a process that uses 
electrical current to split water into hydrogen and oxygen. Elec-
trolysers consist of two electrodes (anode and cathode) sepa-
rated by an electrolyte. There are different types of electrolysers 
mainly based on the type of electrolyte material involved. The 
full life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions of hydrogen production 
via electrolysis are close to zero if the electricity is produced from 
renewables such as solar and wind. However, in most cases, grid-
15 International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), «Green Hydrogen Cost Reduc-
tion: Scaling Up Renewables to Meet the 1.5°C Climate Goal», Abu Dhabi: IRENA, 17 
December 2020, p. 16. 
16 International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), «Green Hydrogen: A Guide To 
Policy-Making», Abu Dhabi: IRENA, November 2020, p. 9. 
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based electricity comes from a mixture of sources. This is why 
the European Commission, in its Hydrogen Strategy, makes a 
distinction between «electricity-based hydrogen» and «renew-
able hydrogen»17. Renewable hydrogen may also be produced 
through the reforming of biogas or biochemical conversion of 
biomass.
Another colour in the spectrum of hydrogen technologies is 
«pink», referring to hydrogen made from nuclear electricity, 
also through electrolysis. Pink hydrogen is rarely mentioned in 
European hydrogen strategies, but it might become an impor-
tant mainstay of hydrogen industries in countries like Russia and 
China18. After this, the colours get a little bit blurry. «Yellow» 
hydrogen is used by some to describe electrolytical hydrogen 
using a mix of renewable and fossil power. «White» hydrogen, 
finally, is naturally occurring geological hydrogen found in under-
ground deposits and created through fracking, although there are 
currently no viable exploitation strategies.
Areas of application
One of the most appealing aspects of hydrogen is its versatility. 
It can be fed into the gas network, used in fuel cell vehicles, 
converted to other synthetic fuels, or converted into electricity 
for the grid. By enabling the conversion of electricity into mole-
cules (through electrolysis), and back again (through fuel cells), 
it is a key enabler of «sector coupling», one of the buzzwords in 
energy circles which refers to the integration of different ener-
gy-consuming sectors (e.g., buildings, transport, and industry) 
with the electricity sector. Hydrogen allows renewable electricity 
to be converted to gas molecules (a process referred to as «pow-
er-to-gas») which in turn allows to decarbonize parts of industry 
and transport, which cannot be electrified.
There are also important synergies between hydrogen and a 
renewable-powered electricity system. Hydrogen broadens the 
reach of renewable solutions, for example in industry. It is also 
virtually the only way provide seasonal and carbon-neutral stor-
17 European Commission, «A hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe», Brus-
sels, 8 July 2020, pp. 3-4. 
18 Noussan, Michel, Pier Paolo Raimondi, Rossana Scita, and Manfred Hafner. «The 
Role of Green and Blue Hydrogen in the Energy Transition – A Technological and Geo-
political Perspective», Sustainability 13, no. 1 (2021): 298.
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age of renewable electricity19, and thus has an edge over bat-
teries, which can provide storage for a few hours at most. Some 
have suggested that hydrogen could also potentially provide a 
means to deal with the issues of curtailment of variable renew-
able generation and negative electricity prices, but research has 
found that building electrolysers to store curtailed power may 
not always make sense20. On the other hand, electrolysers could 
add an element of demand side flexibility («peak shaving») to 
balance the grid at all times21. Finally, hydrogen allows to ship 
renewable energy over much longer distances than high-voltage 
direct current cables are able to do. This aspect is called «ship-
ping the sunshine» in Germany’s national hydrogen strategy22.
Some proponents have an expansive view of the role of hydrogen 
in society, and advocate its use across all sectors of the economy. 
Japan’s national hydrogen strategy has the explicit aim of turn-
ing the country into the world’s first hydrogen society23. Yet, one 
of the disadvantages of hydrogen is that with each conversion 
comes an energy loss. The laws of thermodynamics dictate that 
the energy content which comes out of the hydrogen production 
process is always less than the electricity or natural gas that went 
in. Roughly, this translates into the following, simple arithmetic: 
the conversion of electricity, green or not, into hydrogen implies 
a loss of about 30% of the energy content of electricity. What-
ever subsequent step is taken to put the hydrogen into practical 
use (e.g., fuel cells or hydrogen combustion) will involve another 
30% loss (of the 70% energy remaining in the hydrogen), alto-
19 DNV GL, «The Promise of Seasonal Storage», Position Paper, February 2020. 
Available at: https://www.dnvgl.com/publications/the-promise-of-seasonal-stor-
age-168761. Accessed: 18 January 2021. 
20 UK National Infrastructure Commission (NIC), «Net Zero: Opportunities for the 
Power Sector», 6 March 2020. Available at: https://nic.org.uk/app/uploads//Net-Zero-
6-March-2020.pdf. Accessed: December 22, 2020. 
21 International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), «Hydrogen: A Renewable En-
ergy Perspective», Report prepared for the 2nd Hydrogen Energy Ministerial Meeting 
in Tokyo, Japan, September 2019. Available at: https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/
IRENA/Agency/Publication/2019/Sep/IRENA_Hydrogen_2019.pdf. Accessed: 11 Janu-
ary 2021. 
22 The German Federal Government, «The National Hydrogen Strategy», Federal Min-
istry for Economic Affairs and Energy, June 2020. Available at: https://www.bmbf.
de/files/bmwi_Nationale%20Wasserstoffstrategie_Eng_s01.pdf. Accessed: 11 January 
2021. 
23 Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, «Basic Hydrogen Strategy», 
December 26, 2017. Available at: https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2017/pd-
f/1226_003b.pdf. Accessed: 11 January 2021. 
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gether leaving about half the energy in the original electricity 
being available for useful purposes24.
If one compares different passenger vehicle drive technologies, 
as shown in Figure 1, battery-electric vehicles (BEV) have the 
highest efficiency rating (69%). Hydrogen fuel cell electric vehi-
cles (FCEV), by contrast, have conversion losses that amount 
to 74% and this even increases to a staggering 87% for cars 
that burn hydrogen-derived synthetic fuels. This means that it 
requires approximately 2.5 times as much electricity to drive the 
same 100 km with a FCEV as it would with a BEV, and about five 
times as much electricity to run the same vehicle with synthetic 
fuels. The reason is very simple. Cars with fuel cells are basically 
electric vehicles, but there are two extra conversion steps com-
pared to battery powered EVs: energy must move from wire to 
gas to wire in order to power a car. A similar story applies when 
comparing electric heat pumps with hydrogen boilers or fuel cell 
heating systems (Figure 2).25
24 Jorgen Henningsen, «Why hydrogen is no magic solution for EU green deal», EU 
Observer¸ 4 August 2020. Available at: https://euobserver.com/opinion/149089. Ac-
cessed: 11 January 2021. 
25 Agora Energiewende and Frontier Economics, «The Future Cost of Electricity-Based 
Synthetic Fuels», 19 September 2018, p. 12. Available at: https://static.agora-en-
ergiewende.de/fileadmin2/Projekte/2017/SynKost_2050/Agora_SynKost_Study_EN_
WEB.pdf. Accessed: 11 January 2021. 
12
Both figures demonstrate the relatively high conver-
sion losses associated with the use of synthetic fuels.
In the absence o  clear evidence that this indisputa-
ble, physics-based disadvantage of synthetic fuels is 
more than offset by other advantages – i.e. avoidance 
of infrastructure costs – then the obvious strategy 
would be to first pursue technological solutions with 
lower conversion losses.12 
12 Additional research is needed, particularly concerning 
infrastructure costs. Initial work in this area has been 
undertaken by FNB Gas (2017). 
In the heating and transport sectors, synthetic fuels 
should predominantly be used in areas in which the 
direct and efficient use of electricity is not possible.
In the transport sector, electric motors are the best 
solution in terms of efficiency and cost for power-
ing trains, cars, light utility vehicles, municipal buses, 
and trucks operating over short distances and with 
good charging options. With respect to heavy trucks 
operating over extended distances, one needs to make 
distinctions. This is because the vehicle batteries in 
mass production are not sufficiently strong as a sin-
gle source of power, nor are they expected to become 
strong enough in the coming years. As a result, heavy 
trucks operating over long distances will need to be 
operated with overhead power lines – or, alternatively, 
Individual and overall efficiencies for cars with different vehicle drive technologies,  
starting from renewable electricity Figure 2
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Note: Individual efficiencies are indicated in parentheses. Multiplied together, the individual efficiencies yield the overall 
cumulative efficiencies in the boxes. 
Agora Verkehrswende and Agora Energiewende | Conclusions Drawn
Figure 1. Conversion fficiencies for cars with different drive technologies25.
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For some, hydrogen is the answer to every energy question. In 
reality, though, as Michael Liebreich, CEO of Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance, recently observed: «it is going to have to win, 
use-case-by-use-case, but it will not be easy.» He concludes 
that «hydrogen’s role in the final energy mix of a future net-zero 
emissions world will be to do things that cannot be done more 
simply, cheaply and efficiently by the direct use of clean electric-
ity and batteries.»27 These sectors will probably include heavy 
industry, particularly chemicals, fertilizer, refineries and steel, as 
well as shipping, long-haul aviation, freight transport, pipeline 
and power infrastructure. Some of these sectors, like shipping, 
are «captive markets», which means that they really have no 
other option but to go for hydrogen-based fuels. It is a sector 
which could drive demand and help to bring down the costs of 
hydrogen and related fuels.
26 Agora Energiewende and Frontier Economics, «The Future Cost of Electricity-Based 
Synthetic Fuels», 19 September 2018, p. 13. Available at: https://static.agora-en-
ergiewende.de/fileadmin2/Projekte/2017/SynKost_2050/Agora_SynKost_Study_EN_
WEB.pdf. Accessed: 11 January 2021. 
27 Michael Liebreich, «Separating Hype from Hydrogen – Part Two: The Demand 
Side», 16 October 2020. Available at: https://about.bnef.com/blog/liebreich-separat-
ing-hype-from-hydrogen-part-two-the-demand-side/. Accessed: December 22, 2020. 
STUDY | The Future Cost of Electricity-Based Synthetic Fuels 
13
with combustion engines or fuel cells. A combination 
of various propulsion technologies might make sense 
to handle geographic areas in which overhead wires 
have not yet been installed. In the absence of a com-
preh nsive ov rhead wire network, the decarbonised 
transport system of the future will necessarily contain 
long-distance trucks that are reliant on synthetic fuels. 
According to current expert opinion, direct electric-
ity use is also not an option for air or maritime trans-
port, except on an ex remely limited basis.13 These two 
subsectors will thus require climate-neutral synthetic 
13 Agora Verkehrswende (2017), p. 60; Umweltbundesamt 
(2016), p. 1; see Flugrevue (2017), Maritime Journal (2017); 
acatech et al. (2017b). 
fuels, namely hydrogen to power fuel cells as well as 
CO2-based synthetic methane or liquid fuel to power 
combustion engines (see rows 2 and 3 in Table 1). Syn-
thetic fuels will also be required to operate construc-
tion equipment and heavy agricultural vehicles, as it 
will only be possible in select cases to directly power 
these vehicle types with electricity.14
In the heating sector for buildings the most efficient 
option is to directly use renewable energy (e.g. by 
installing deep geothermal and solar thermal 
14 See Electrive (2017).
Individual and overall efficiencies for different heating systems,  
starting from renewable electricity Figure 3








Transmission (95 %) Transmission (95 %)

























*  Efficiencies: 80% (compression/transport) and 85% (total fuel cells; 45% heating, 40% power)
Note: Individual efficiencies are indicated in parentheses. Multiplied together, the individual efficiencies yield the overall 
 cumulative efficiencies in the boxes. For heat pumps, we have assumed an annual performance factor of 3.
Figure 2. Conversion efficiencies for different heating systems26.
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Nonetheless, many companies are still pursuing hydrogen solu-
tions for sectors that can be electrified. Japanese and Korean 
car manufacturers Toyota and Hyundai, as well as their home 
governments, have announced ambitious plans to scale up the 
production and sales of hydrogen cars. Plans to develop hydro-
gen-powered trains are underway in the UK, Austria, France and 
Japan. There are at least 37 projects across the world to blend 
hydrogen into the existing gas distribution network28. In some 
cases, these plans may still be pursued because companies have 
already committed a lot of money into research and develop-
ment for several use-cases, and it might be costly to abandon 
such programs. In other cases, certain industrial actors (e.g., 
the gas lobby) are able to influence policymakers through lobby-
ing and thus acquire public support (e.g., on hydrogen blending 
mandates)29.
All in all, there are widely diverging estimates for the market 
potential of hydrogen. As Table 2 (below) shows30, BNEF is the 
most bullish about hydrogen, estimating that it can meet up to 
24% of final energy demand in 2050. Others, like Shell, estimate 
that hydrogen will only provide 2% of energy demand. The Inter-
national Energy Agency (IEA) projects that demand for low-car-
bon hydrogen would be 11 EJ (or 75 million tonnes) by 2040, at 
least in its Sustainable Development Scenario31. At the moment, 
only 0.002% of all hydrogen currently produced is used as an 
energy carrier32, so some of these projected demand figures 
imply a very rapid compound annual growth rate.
28 Carbon Brief, «In-depth Q&A: Does the world need hydrogen to solve climate 
change?» 30 November 2020. Available at: https://www.carbonbrief.org/in-depth-
qa-does-the-world-need-hydrogen-to-solve-climate-change. Accessed: 22 December 
2020. 
29 Corporate Europe Observatory, «The hydrogen hype: Gas industry fairy tale or cli-
mate horror story?» 7 December 2020. Available at: https://corporateeurope.org/en/
hydrogen-hype. Accessed: 22 December 2020. 
30 This table is adapted, expanded and updated from: Pflugmann, Fridolin, and Nico-
la De Blasio. «The Geopolitics of Renewable Hydrogen in Low-Carbon Energy Mar-
kets», Geopolitics, History, and International Relations 12, no. 1 (2020): 9-44.
31 IEA, «World Energy Outlook 202», p. 294. 
32 DNV GL, «Hydrogen as an energy carrier: An evaluation of emerging hydrogen 
value chains», 2018, p. 4. Available at: https://www.dnvgl.com/publications/hydro-
gen-as-an-energy-carrier-134607. Accessed: 12 January 2021. 













BNEF (2020)34 27-195 EJ 7-24%
DNV GL (2020)35 24 EJ 6%







For comparison, current annual demand for:
Hydrogen IEA (2019) 9-11 EJ ~0%
Oil BP (2020) 193 EJ 33%
Natural gas BP (2020) 141 EJ 24%
Table 2. Estimated market potential for hydrogen by 2050.
Notes with Table 2: an exajoule (EJ) is 1 quintillion Joules (J). It is 
equivalent to roughly one day of the world’s total final energy demand, 
or about 170 million barrels of oil38. Estimated annual hydrogen demand 
includes demand for hydrogen (of all colours) as an energy carrier and as a 
feedstock. Estimated share of hydrogen in final energy demand only covers 
the supply of hydrogen as an energy carrier.
33 Hydrogen Council, «Hydrogen – Scaling Up: A Sustainable Pathway for the Global 
Energy Transition», 2017, p. 20. Available at: https://hydrogencouncil.com/wp-con-




35 DNV GL, «Energy Transition Outlook 2020», September 2020, p. 100 and p. 103. 
Available at: https://download.dnvgl.com/eto-2020-download. Accessed: 12 January 
2021. 
36 Shell, «Shell Scenarios – Sky: Meeting the Goals of the Paris Agreement», numbers 
available at: https://www.shell.com/promos/business-customers-promos/numbers-be-
hind-sky/_jcr_content.stream/1530643757647/c6daf2e0c93fd3d724f2804837d053fd-
d24e0553/shell-sky-scenario-data-2018.xlsx. Accessed: 12 January 2021. 
37 International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), «Global Renewables Outlook: 
Energy Transformation 2050», April 2020, Abu Dhabi, IRENA. Available at: https://
www.irena.org/publications/2020/Apr/Global-Renewables-Outlook-2020. Accessed: 13 
January 2021. 
38 Hydrogen Council, «Hydrogen – Scaling Up: A Sustainable Pathway for the Global 
Energy Transition», 2017, p. 20. Available at: https://hydrogencouncil.com/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2017/11/Hydrogen-scaling-up-Hydrogen-Council.pdf. Accessed: 12 Jan-
uary 2021. 
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Towards an international hydrogen market
Hydrogen could well develop into an internationally traded com-
modity, just like crude oil, oil products, and natural gas. At present, 
the two biggest contenders to provide clean energy molecules in 
the future are blue and green hydrogen. In the case of blue hydro-
gen, international trade would still be required to ship it from pro-
ducers to destination markets. In the case of green hydrogen, the 
single largest cost component is the cost of renewable electricity, 
so cheap electricity is an absolute prerequisite to be a competitive 
green hydrogen producer – cheap electrolysers alone do not suf-
fice39. This creates an opportunity to produce green hydrogen at 
those locations in the world that have optimal renewable sources 
and export it from there to large demand centres.
Transportation options
Hydrogen’s low energy density per volume makes it considerably 
more expensive to store and to transport. There are, however, 
different options for transport. According to the IEA, hydrogen 
transport via pipelines is the most cost-effective way if distances 
are less than 1.500 km, except for very small volumes, which 
may be delivered by trucks. For longer distances, and particularly 
for overseas trade, hydrogen could be moved across borders in 
ships or pipelines, either in pure form or chemically bound or 
converted into different fuels.
Pipelines
For countries with close geographic proximity, hydrogen may 
be shipped through pipelines, which is the cheapest method to 
deliver hydrogen in the long run. In North-western Europe, there 
exist already more than 4,500 km of hydrogen pipelines, includ-
ing a 900 km hydrogen-pipeline network connecting the ports of 
Rotterdam (the Netherlands), Antwerp (Belgium), and Dunkirk 
(France). The US currently has 1,200 km of hydrogen pipelines40. 
39 International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), «Green Hydrogen Cost Reduc-
tion: Scaling Up Renewables to Meet the 1.5°C Climate Goal», Abu Dhabi: IRENA, 17 
December 2020. Available at: https://irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publica-
tion/2020/Dec/IRENA_Green_hydrogen_cost_2020.pdf. Accessed: 13 January 2021.
40 Shell and Wuppertal Institute, «Shell Hydrogen Study: Energy of the Future?», 
2017. Available at: https://www.shell.com/energy-and-innovation/new-energies/hy-
drogen. Accessed: 14 January 2021.
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German gas pipeline operators have recently unveiled a blueprint 
for a 5,900 km hydrogen grid, dubbed «H2 Startnetz», based on 
converted natural gas pipelines. By 2030, some 1,200 km should 
be operational41. The new grid would also branch out into the 
Netherlands, where it could tie in to the existing H2 grid. While 
these plans sound ambitious, their size pales in comparison to 
the existing natural gas infrastructure. In Germany alone, the 
natural gas network is more than 530,000 km long42.
One shortcut is to retrofit the existing natural gas transmission 
and distribution network so that it can carry hydrogen. A short-
term and low-cost step could be to convert existing pipelines so 
they can ship a blend of natural gas and hydrogen (with up to 
15% of hydrogen) with only modest modifications. Converting 
natural gas pipelines to deliver pure hydrogen is more challeng-
ing, however, since hydrogen can embrittle the steel and welds 
of the pipeline, poses threats of leakage and safety hazards, and 
requires costly compression technologies43. The suitability of 
existing pipelines for conversion to hydrogen must be assessed 
on a case-by-case basis and will depend on the type of steel used 
and the purity of hydrogen44. Nonetheless, the gas transmission 
industry is confident that such retrofitting is technically feasible, 
at affordable cost45.
If such retrofitting would be technically feasible at affordable cost, 
Europe would benefit from its established gas transmission con-
nections with Norway, Ukraine, Russia, and North Africa (Algeria 
and Libya). The upshot is that, akin to natural gas, hydrogen 
could be traded more on regional markets than on global mar-
kets. All in all, transporting hydrogen is an order of magnitude 
more expensive than transporting natural gas, which is itself 
41 Bernd Radowitz, «German pipeline operators present plan for world’s largest hy-
drogen grid», Recharge, 18 May 2020. Available at: https://www.rechargenews.com/
transition/german-pipeline-operators-present-plan-for-world-s-largest-hydrogen-
grid/2-1-810731. Accessed: 14 January 2021. 
42 Gasunie, «Infrastructure in Germany: status quo», no date. Available at: https://
www.gasunie.de/en/infrastructure/infrastructure-in-germany/statusquo. Accessed: 14 
January 2021. 
43 US Department of Energy, «Hydrogen Pipelines», no date. Available at: https://
www.energy.gov/eere/fuelcells/hydrogen-pipelines. Accessed: 14 January 2021. 
44 International Energy Agency (IEA), «The Future of Hydrogen», Paris: OECD/IEA, 
p. 77. Available at: https://www.iea.org/reports/the-future-of-hydrogen. Accessed: 11 
January 2021.
45 Enagás, Energinet, Fluxys Belgium, Gasunie, GRTgaz, NET4GAS, OGE, ONTRAS, 
Snam, Swedegas, Teréga (2020). European Hydrogen Backbone, July 2020. 
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more expensive than shipping oil. It also remains to be seen 
whether hydrogen pipelines can compete with (ultra-)high volt-
age direct current transmission lines, which can also transport 
renewable power to demand centres. One of the projects cur-
rently in the planning stage is Sun Cable, which aims to connect 
a 10GW solar plant in South Australia with Singapore through a 
3,750km subsea cable46.
Shipping
Hydrogen could be moved across continents in ships in roughly 
three ways. A first way to ship hydrogen is to liquefy it. For that, 
the hydrogen molecules need to be cooled to minus 252°C at 
port terminals before being loaded onto highly insulated tanker 
ships. The liquefaction process consumes between around 25% 
and 35% of the initial quantity of hydrogen. This is considerably 
more energy than is required to liquefy natural gas into LNG, 
which requires cooling to minus 160°C and consumes around 
10% of the energy content of the initial quantity of natural gas47. 
There is currently only one ocean-going ship in the world that 
can transport pure hydrogen, the Hydrogen Frontier, launched by 
Kawasaki in late 201948.
The second mode is by means of liquid organic hydrogen car-
riers (LOHC). LOHC refers to a slate of different organic com-
pounds – e.g., methanol (CH3OH) or toluene (C7H8) – which can 
absorb and release hydrogen through a chemical reaction. LOHC 
can therefore serve as a storage and transportation medium for 
hydrogen. In a first step, the hydrogen is loaded into the LOHC 
molecule (a process called «hydrogenation»). The key advan-
tage of using «carrier» molecules is they can be transported as 
liquids without the need for cooling. That is why they are some-
times called «liquid hydrogen batteries»49. LOHCs are very sim-
ilar to crude oil and oil products and the existing oil transport 
46 For more information, see: https://suncable.sg/. 
47 International Energy Agency (IEA), «The Future of Hydrogen», Paris: OECD/IEA, 
p. 74. Available at: https://www.iea.org/reports/the-future-of-hydrogen. Accessed: 11 
January 2021.
48 Robin Harding, «Japan launches first liquid hydrogen carrier ship,» Financial Times, 
11 December 2019.
49 Aakko-Saksa, Päivi T., Chris Cook, Jari Kiviaho, and Timo Repo. «Liquid organic 
hydrogen carriers for transportation and storing of renewable energy–Review and dis-
cussion.» Journal of Power Sources 396 (2018): 803-823.
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infrastructure could even be adapted to transport LOHCs50. After 
transport and storage, the hydrogen is liberated again from the 
LOHC («dehydrogenation»). The downside is that the conversions 
consume about 35-40% of the energy content of the hydrogen 
itself51. In addition, the carrier molecules can be expensive and 
need to be shipped back to their place of origin. In April 2020, 
a first demonstration shipment delivered hydrogen over a dis-
tance of 4,000 km, from Brunei to Japan, using toluene as carrier 
molecule.
The third way to ship hydrogen is to convert it into «synthetic 
fuels» or «synfuels», also referred to «electro fuels» or «e-fuels» 
if they are produced with hydrogen that is obtained through the 
electrolysis of water. The advantage of these e-fuels is that they 
can be used directly by the end consumer. Some major types 
of hydrogen-derived synfuels are ammonia, methanol, synthetic 
methane and synthetic liquids. The latter two are chemically 
identical to natural gas and oil products, respectively, and can be 
handled through the existing storage and distribution infrastruc-
ture. Producing them requires a source of CO2. If this source 
comes from direct air capture (DAC) or bioenergy with CCS, then 
such synthetic fuels can be carbon neutral. The first two types, 
ammonia and methanol, deserve a longer treatment.
Ammonia is sometimes referred to as «the other hydrogen» as 
it is, much like hydrogen, a carbon-free fuel (NH3). Hydrogen 
can be turned into ammonia by reacting with nitrogen from the 
air through the Haber-Bosch process. In other words, this car-
bon-free fuel can be made only with electricity, water and air. 
Ammonia has a much higher energy density compared to hydro-
gen and there is a well-established international trade in ammo-
nia52. Ammonia is currently used as a feedstock, notably to make 
fertilisers, but it could also be used as decarbonization fuel, for 
instance in the shipping industry. The downside is that ammonia 
is toxic if leakages occur and is also a potential source of nitrogen 
oxide emissions. In September 2020, Saudi Arabia sent its first 
50 Niermann, M., Sebastian Drünert, Martin Kaltschmitt, and Klaus Bonhoff. «Liquid 
organic hydrogen carriers (LOHCs)–techno-economic analysis of LOHCs in a defined 
process chain.» Energy & Environmental Science 12, no. 1 (2019): 290-307.
51 International Energy Agency (IEA), «The Future of Hydrogen,» Paris: OECD/IEA, 
p. 75. Available at: https://www.iea.org/reports/the-future-of-hydrogen. Accessed: 11 
January 2021.
52 Royal Society, «Ammonia: Zero-Carbon Fertiliser, Fuel and Energy Store,» Policy 
Briefing, February 2020. 
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shipment of «blue ammonia» (made from natural gas with car-
bon capture and storage) to Japan where it was used to produce 
electric power.
Methanol, the simplest form of alcohol can be produced with 
hydrogen and CO2. With half the energy density of heating oil, 
this fuel would be very suitable for transport applications. The 
largest methanol synthesis plant is located in Iceland where it 
uses a combination of geothermal and hydropower to generate 
more than five million litres of methanol per year, part of which 
is exported to The Netherlands. As the energy comes from volca-
noes, the green methanol is branded as «Vulcanol»53.
Hydrogen hubs and valleys
While hydrogen could develop into a global commodity, the initial 
steps are likely to be more modest. At present, around 85% of all 
hydrogen is still produced and consumed on specific sites (e.g., 
refineries). Scaling up both supply and demand infrastructure for 
hydrogen could be achieved through industrial clusters, especially 
in different coastal areas. Various national hydrogen strategies 
are geared towards establishing such «hydrogen valleys» or hubs 
(e.g., ports or cities). From there, «hydrogen corridors» could be 
developed that connect regions with high renewable potential to 
demand centres.
Over time, then, the hydrogen market could come to mimic the 
natural gas market: North America largely self-sufficient, Europe 
importing some piped hydrogen from neighbouring countries, 
and Japan relying on sea-borne shipments of hydrogen. A key 
difference with natural gas, however, is that all major countries 
(including importers like Europe, Korea and Japan) will be «pro-
sumers» – that is, they will both be producers and consumers 
of hydrogen and derived products. Another difference is that cli-
mate-conscious importers will want to have certificates or guar-
antees of origin to make sure that the hydrogen they get is of 
the right «colour». Here, there are some differences between dif-
ferent importers. Future Asian importers seem to be adhering to 
the «first grey, then blue, then green» hydrogen strategy, while 
Germany in particular is keen on leapfrogging directly to green 
hydrogen as quickly as possible.
53 Carbon Recycling International. Available at: https://www.carbonrecycling.is/. Ac-
cessed: 13 January 2021. 
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Key players in the geopolitics of hydrogen
In his influential work, The Prize, Daniel Yergin recounts the story 
of how oil became the world’s most important energy source. 
He describes how oil is a game of «huge risks and monumen-
tal rewards»54, both commercially and geopolitically. Hydrogen 
seems well-placed to become the «next great prize», a zero-car-
bon version of oil55. Just as in the petroleum industry, both private 
companies and countries are jockeying to control or at least gain 
a foothold in this emerging and potentially lucrative business, 
which has the potential to «fundamentally redraw the geogra-
phy of global energy trade, create a new class of energy export-
ers, and reshape geopolitical relations and alliances between 
countries.»56
Who will be the hydrogen superpower?
The past two years in particular represent a potentially 
game-changing moment for the hydrogen industry. More 
than 20 governments have announced, drafted or published 
national hydrogen roadmaps or strategies over the past two 
years57, including France (2018, updated in 2020), Japan and 
Australia (2019), and Norway, Germany, the EU, Portugal, 
Spain, Chile and Finland (all in 2020)58. Hydrogen plans have 
also been drawn up at other political scales, including states 
like California59, regions like Northern England60, and cities 
54 Daniel Yergin. «The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power». New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1991. 
55 Thijs Van de Graaf, «The Next Price: Geopolitical Stakes in the Clean Hydrogen 
Race,» Oxford Energy Forum, forthcoming. 
56 Thijs Van de Graaf, Indra Overland, Daniel Scholten, and Kirsten Westphal. «The 
new oil? The geopolitics and international governance of hydrogen.» Energy Research 
& Social Science 70 (2020): 101667.
57 Kosturjak, Anthony, Tania Dey, M. Young, and Steve Whetton. «Advancing Hydro-
gen: Learning from 19 plans to advance hydrogen from across the globe.» Future Fuels 
CRC (2019).
58 International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), «Green Hydrogen: A Guide To 
Policy-Making,» Abu Dhabi: IRENA, November 2020, p. 22.
59 Renewable Hydrogen Roadmap, report prepared by Energy Independence Now 
for California Hydrogen Business Council, May 2018. Available at https://einow.org/
rh2roadmap. Accessed: 12 January 2021.
60 H21: North of England, report commissioned by Northern Gas Networks, Equinor 
and Cadent, 2018. Available at: https://www.northerngasnetworks.co.uk/event/
h21-launches-national/. Accessed: 12 January 2021.
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like London61. Some post-covid-19 recovery packages have 
also included support for (clean) hydrogen62.
What these national and subnational plans reveal is that some 
countries are gearing up to become large-scale hydrogen import-
ers (notably, Japan, Germany, and Korea), whereas others aspire 
to become large-scale exporters (notably, Australia, Chile, and 
Morocco) – sometimes referred to as «renewable energy super-
power regions»63. Some fossil fuel exporting countries (like Saudi 
Arabia) are beginning to place tepid bets on hydrogen to possibly 
replace the export revenues from oil and gas, as more and more 
countries race to net zero. What is notable, though, is these are 
all middle powers. Most of the great and emerging powers of 
today (the US, China, Russia, India, and Brazil) can probably aim 
for hydrogen self-sufficiency.
In a recent paper, Harvard scholars Pflugmann and De Blasio 
draw the geopolitical map of renewable hydrogen. Based on 
three parameters – renewable energy resource potential, renew-
able freshwater endowment, and infrastructure potential (meas-
ured by the country’s infrastructure score in the World Economic 
Forum’s competitiveness index) – they identify five archetypical 
























61 Element Energy Ltd. (2016), London: a capital for hydrogen and fuel cell technolo-
gies, report prepared for Hydrogen London. Available at: http://www.hydrogenlondon.
org/hydrogen-londonprojects-events-and-publications/publications/. Accessed: 12 
January 2021. 
62 International Energy Agency (IEA), «World Energy Outlook 2020,» Paris: OECD/
IEA, footnote 8 at page 290.
63 Michael Liebreich, «Separating Hype from Hydrogen – Part One: The Supply 
Side», 8 October 2020. Available at: https://about.bnef.com/blog/liebreich-separat-
ing-hype-from-hydrogen-part-one-the-supply-side/. Accessed: 13 January 2021. 
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Table 3. Archetypical country roles play in renewable hydrogen markets 
Source: adapted from Pflugmann and De Blasio (2020)64.
In a slightly more sophisticated approach, which takes into 
account additional variables like population density, business 
environment, political stability, and available surface area, a Ger-
man-based consultancy identified no less than 23 countries with 
strong potential for Power-to-X (PtX) exports. They are depicted 
in Figure 3.
A comprehensive review of each of those players is beyond the 
remit of the current chapter. However, the following sections will 
home in on a selection of pioneering countries in developing mar-
kets for hydrogen (future importers) and in developing hydrogen 
production (future exporters). The two most promising regions 
for establishing international hydrogen trade are (1) the Asia-Pa-
cific where Japan, Korea, Singapore, and China could emerge as 
major demand centres and Australia, Brunei, and New Zealand 
could become suppliers; and (2) Europe where countries such 
as Germany, The Netherlands, France and Belgium could source 
imports from Norway, North Africa and the Middle East.
Selected frontrunner countries
Japan
Japan is the absolute pioneering country when it comes to hydro-
gen. In 2017, it announced its ambition to become what it calls 
a «hydrogen-based society», envisaging widespread usage 
64 PFLUGMANN, Fridolin, and Nicola De Blasio. «The Geopolitics of Renewable Hy-
drogen in Low-Carbon Energy Markets.» Geopolitics, History, and International Rela-
tions 12, no. 1 (2020): 9-44.
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of hydrogen, across all sectors of the economy6566. This plan is 
backed up by considerable government investment in hydrogen 
technologies and infrastructure. In 2019, Japan elevated hydro-
gen to the top of the international agenda, by convening a G20 
ministerial on hydrogen. To showcase its commitment to hydro-
gen, Japan built the Athlete’s Village for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics 
(now postponed to 2021 due to covid-19) as a miniature hydro-
gen society. The Olympic torch was also fuelled by hydrogen. As 
the Governor of Tokyo noted: «The 1964 Tokyo Olympics left the 
Shinkansen high-speed train system as its legacy. The upcoming 
Olympics will leave a hydrogen society as its legacy»67.
65 Frontier Economics, «International Aspects of a Power-to-X Roadmap: A report pre-
pared for the World Energy Council Germany,» 18 October 2018. Available at: https://
www.frontier-economics.com/media/2642/frontier-int-ptx-roadmap-stc-12-10-18-fi-
nal-report.pdf. Accessed: 13 January 2021. 
66 Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, «Basic Hydrogen Strategy,» 
26 December 2017. Available at: https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2017/pd-
f/1226_003b.pdf. Accessed: 11 January 2021.
67 Fuel Cell & Hydrogen Energy Association, «Japan’s Hydrogen Olympics», 25 May 
2020. Available at: http://www.fchea.org/in-transition/2020/5/25/japans-hydro-
gen-olympics. Accessed: 12 January 2021. 
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 INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF A POWER-TO-X ROADMAP 
Figure 1 Snapshot of the variety and diversity of potential PtX producing countries  
 
Source: Frontier Economics 
Note: Illustrative presentation of the strongest RES potentials only; not an extensive list of all countries.                                                   
Each country will have an individual story and diverse incentives as to why it would 
choose to play a part in a global PtX market and at which stage it might be ready 
and willing to enter. Indicatively, we identify certain categories of “PtX types” 
according to the countries’ current stage of engagement with PtX, their possible 
motivations to produce synthetic fuels and their potential role in a global market. 
We identify “frontrunners” (e.g. Norway), “hidden champions” (e.g. Chile), “hyped 
potentials” (e.g. Morocco), “converters” (e.g. Saudi Arabia), “gi nts” (e.g. Australia) 
and “uncertain candidates” (e.g. China) (Figure 2). The countries are analysed in 
more depth for illustrative purposes and were selected as representatives for a 
group of other countries with similar characteristics and PtX potentials. Similarly, 
the allocation of these candidate countries to a specific type is not necessarily fixed 
and confined, and elements of other types might also apply. Equally, some 
countries may be categorised in a number of types as they are not mutually 
exclusive and may com lement eac  other. 
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Figure 3. Countries with the strongest potential for PtX exports
Source: Frontier Economics (2018), p. 4365.
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Japan is currently importing all of its oil and gas needs, and it looks 
prepared to import a substantial share of its hydrogen needs as 
well. It has deployed a wide-ranging hydrogen diplomacy to find 
international partners to build a hydrogen supply chain, increase 
the scale of production, and decrease costs. Japan was the first 
country to begin looking for foreign partners that could export 
hydrogen. Its industrial stakeholders are engaging partners in 
Australia, Brunei, Norway and Saudi Arabia on hydrogen fuel pro-
curement68. This has already led to some notable results. In June 
2020, Japan received a first cargo of liquid organic hydrogen car-
rier (LOHC) from Brunei (based on natural gas), and is set to begin 
with trial shipments from Australia soon (based on coal). In Sep-
tember 2020, Saudi Arabia sent a first demonstration shipment of 
«blue ammonia» (made from natural gas with carbon capture and 
storage) to Japan where it will be used to produce electric power.
It looks like Japan will be once again a global gas market pioneer. 
It once helped to create a global market for liquefied natural gas 
(LNG). Now it looks set to repeat that success story with hydro-
gen69. The underlying goal is to achieve cost parity for hydro-
gen with LNG, the major fuel in Japan’s electricity mix following 
the Fukushima nuclear disaster. To that end, Japan is looking 
to develop long-term supply agreements like those that spear-
headed LNG trade70.
European Union
The European Union, which is aiming for carbon neutrality by 
2050, is also envisaging large-scale hydrogen imports. A Euro-
pean industry alliance has developed a plan to develop 2x40 GW 
of electrolysers by 2030, 40 GW in Europe and 40 GW in Europe’s 
neighbourhood for export of hydrogen to the EU71. This proposal 
was reiterated in the EU’s Hydrogen Strategy, which was released 
in July 2020, and included the ambitious goal of installing 40 GW 
68 Monica Nagashima, «Japan’s Hydrogen Strategy and Its Economic and Geopoliti-
cal Implications», IFRI, October 2018. Available at: https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/
files/atoms/files/nagashima_japan_hydrogen_2018_.pdf. Accessed: 12 January 2021.
69 Thijs Van de Graaf, Indra Overland, Daniel Scholten, and Kirsten Westphal. «The 
new oil? The geopolitics and international governance of hydrogen.» Energy Research 
& Social Science 70 (2020): 101667.
70 Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, «Basic Hydrogen Strategy,» 
December 26, 2017. Available at: https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2017/pd-
f/1226_003b.pdf. Accessed: 11 January 2021.
71 https://www.hydrogen4climateaction.eu/2x40gw-initiative. 
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of renewable hydrogen electrolysers in the EU by 203072. Europe 
has a clear preference for green hydrogen, in contrast to emerg-
ing Asian demand centres (Japan, Korea and China), which bet 
on grey, blue and green hydrogen in the coming decades to scale 
up the market73.
Germany’s national hydrogen strategy not only foresaw €7 billion 
earmarked for domestic production of green hydrogen, but also 
€2 billion for overseas production. 74 Germany is currently explor-
ing imports from countries as diverse as Morocco, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), and even remote Australia. It may 
make sense, however, to focus first on imports from southern 
and eastern Europe, as well as Ukraine. After all, those countries 
are integrated into the common energy market at the regulatory 
level (e.g., through the European Energy Community), and in 
many cases there are already existing (gas) infrastructure net-
works that could be used for hydrogen trade75.
Some countries within the EU could develop into net hydro-
gen exporters, though. The hydrogen strategy of Portugal, for 
instance, is benchmarked on the country becoming a hydrogen 
exporter by 2030. The country can take advantage of very com-
petitive prices for renewable electricity production and a strategic 
geographical location for export. It has already signed an agree-
ment with The Netherlands to export green hydrogen from the 
port of Sines to Rotterdam, a project that has been designed as a 
strategic priority by the EU76. Spain, too, has ambitions of becom-
ing an exporter of green molecules. Spanish power company 
Iberdrola and fertilizer maker Fertiberia have unveiled a plan for 
72 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, «A hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe», 
Brussels, 8 July 2020.
73 NOUSSAN, Michel, Pier Paolo Raimondi, Rossana Scita, and Manfred Hafner. «The 
Role of Green and Blue Hydrogen in the Energy Transition—A Technological and Geopo-
litical Perspective.» Sustainability 13, no. 1 (2021), p. 297.
74 The German Federal Government, «The National Hydrogen Strategy,» Federal Min-
istry for Economic Affairs and Energy, June 2020. Available at: https://www.bmbf.
de/files/bmwi_Nationale%20Wasserstoffstrategie_Eng_s01.pdf. Accessed: 11 January 
2021.
75 Kirsten Westphal, Susanne Dröge, and Oliver Geden, «The international dimensions 
of Germany’s hydrogen policy,» SWP, Berlin, June 2020. Available at: https://www.
swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2020C32_HydrogenPolicy.pdf. 
Accessed: 12 January 2021.
76 Memorandum of understanding between Portugal and the Netherlands concerning 
green hydrogen. 17 August 2020. Available at: https://www.government.nl/documents/
publications/2020/09/23/memorandum-of-understanding-between-the-nether-
lands-and-portugal-concerning-green-hydrogen. Accessed: 12 January 2021. 
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large-scale exports of green ammonia77. These two countries, as 
well as Italy, could develop into a significant hydrogen gas tran-
sit countries, importing hydrogen from solar and wind power in 
North Africa and exporting it to other European countries through 
existing gas infrastructure78.
Australia
Few countries are better positioned than Australia to become a 
world-class exporter of green hydrogen and derived molecules 
(ammonia, methanol), thanks to its massive renewable energy 
endowment and coal reserves. Australia’s National Hydrogen 
Strategy, released in late 2019, prioritizes to build a competitive 
hydrogen export industry to serve the markets of Japan, Korea, 
Singapore and Taiwan79.
The Asian Renewable Energy Hub, an enormous green hydrogen 
project is now in advanced planning stages. It aims to build the 
world’s biggest solar and wind farm (and indeed the largest power 
station on earth) on a 6,500 square km site in the Pilbara, a remote 
desert region in Western Australia80. Once finished, the installation 
will have a 23GW capacity to churn out green hydrogen and green 
ammonia, the bulk of which would then be exported to Asia81.
Chile
Another sunlit nation, Chile, is also aiming to become a green 
hydrogen and ammonia exporter, mostly to serve emerging 
markets in Europe, at least initially. Chile can boast one of the 
best solar resources in the world in regions such as the Atacama 
desert, with more than 3,000 sun hours and less than 2 milli-
metres of rainfall per year. The country is taking a more modest 
77 Laura Millan Lombrana, «Spain Could Become Green-Ammonia Exporter With 
Hydrogen Project», 28 October 2021. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2020-10-28/spain-could-become-green-ammonia-exporter-with-hydro-
gen-project. Accessed: 12 January 2021. 
78 SNAM, «The Hydrogen Challenge: The potential of hydrogen in Italy», Position 
Paper, 10 October 2019. Available at: https://www.snam.it/it/hydrogen_challenge/re-
pository_hy/file/The-H2-challenge-Position-Paper.pdf. Accessed: 12 January 2021. 
79 Commonwealth of Australia, «Australia’s National Hydrogen Strategy», 2019. Avail-
able at: https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-11/australias-nation-
al-hydrogen-strategy.pdf. Accessed: 13 January 2021.
80 Jamie Smith, «Australia backs desert project to export green hydrogen to Asia», 
Financial Times, 22 October 2020. 
81 Asian Renewable Energy Hub. Available at: https://asianrehub.com/about/. Ac-
cessed: 13 January 2021. 
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start compared to Australia: it hopes to reach 5GW of electro-
lysers capacity by 2025, produce the world’s cheapest hydrogen 
by 2030, and become one of the top 3 hydrogen fuel exporters 
by 204082. The Chilean proposition is based on a combination 
of photovoltaic (PV) and concentrated solar power (CSP), which 
would give a combined capacity factor of more than 50%, and 
would be able to produce hydrogen at a levelized cost of around 
$2.7/kg according to IRENA,83 although McKinsey places it at 
a level of $1.3/kg84. According to Energy Minister Juan Carlos 
Jobet, the country could be exporting $30bn of green hydrogen 
by 203085. That is about the size of current copper exports, the 
current linchpin of Chile’s economy.
Geopolitical dimensions of hydrogen
For decades, the geopolitics of energy has revolved around fos-
sil fuels, and oil in particular86. As new energy sources, particu-
larly solar and wind, have achieved spectacular cost reductions, 
the contours of a new energy order begin to emerge. For large 
chunks of our energy demand, electrification will be the most 
efficient route to abate emissions. The decarbonization of other 
sectors, however, will require different solutions, based on mol-
ecules rather than electrons. Many of the pathways towards car-
bon-neutral molecules involve hydrogen, either in pure form (H2) 
or as a compound (for example, ammonia or NH3).
Here, I identify and describe six geopolitical dimensions of 
hydrogen:
 – First, hydrogen is already triggering a race for technological 
leadership. For strategic reasons, countries want to be a tech-
82 Etienne Gabel, «Big ambitions: How Chile aims to be among the largest export-
ers of green hydrogen in the world», IHS Markit, 22 December 2020. Available at: 
https://ihsmarkit.com/research-analysis/big-ambitions-how-chile-aims-to-be-among-
the-largest-exporters.html. Accessed: 13 January 2021. 
83 IRENA, «Hydrogen: A Renewable Energy Perspective», Report prepared for the 2nd 
Hydrogen Energy Ministerial Meeting in Tokyo, Japan, September 2019, p. 36. Available 
at: https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2019/Sep/IRENA_
Hydrogen_2019.pdf. Accessed: 11 January 2021.
84 Gobierno de Chile, «Estrategia Nacional De Hidrógeno Verde», November 2020. 
Available at: https://energia.gob.cl/sites/default/files/estrategia_nacional_de_hidrog-
eno_verde_-_chile.pdf. Accessed: 13 January 2021.
85 Benedict Mander, «Chile seeks to turn solar boom into green hydrogen bonanza», 
Financial Times, 31 August 2020. 
86 Thijs Van de Graaf and Benjamin K. Sovacool, Global Energy Politics, Polity, 2020. 
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nology maker, not a technology taker, in key technologies of 
the future – and hydrogen is no exception to that.
 – Second, countries are in parallel also deploying new (green) 
industrial policies, often supported by (protective) trade poli-
cies. Hydrogen is an important element of discussions around 
industrialization (in developing and emerging economies) and 
around preventing delocalisation of industries or even reshor-
ing «lost» industries (in industrialised economies).
 – Third, hydrogen raises both threats and opportunities to fossil 
fuel producer countries. Some of them, like Saudi Arabia or 
the UAE, seem interested in joining the hydrogen bandwag-
on. While this may make them more supportive actors in the 
global climate regime, there is a risk that they pursue the blue 
hydrogen or blue ammonia route, which in the long term is 
not compatible with net zero targets.
 – Fourth, hydrogen could foster new interdependencies between 
countries. As a result, political relations and alliances could 
shift, and new security of supply risks may emerge.
 – Fifth, hydrogen infrastructures are capital intensive but can 
take completely different routes. In a carbon-constrained fu-
ture, the key contenders will be blue and green hydrogen. 
Overinvestment in the blue hydrogen pathway could, how-
ever, result in carbon lock-in (thus posing a threat to climate 
mitigation) or result in stranded assets (if climate mitigation 
policies are strongly pursued).
 – And sixth, geopolitical competition is also evident in the 
sphere of market regulation and governance. Countries and 
companies clash over issues like technical standards, certifi-
cation schemes and guarantees of origin. There is no single 
institutional venue in global governance where hydrogen is 
discussed, opening space for inter-institutional competition.
 – The following sub-sections will discuss each of those dimen-
sions in turn.
The race for technological leadership
Controlling the value chains of low-carbon energy technologies 
is vital for every country’s economic competitiveness, national 
security, and energy independence. Early movers in the hydrogen 
industry might be able to sell their technology to the rest of the 
world. Technology leadership might be developed around many 
aspects of the hydrogen value chain, including membranes for 
fuel cells, electrolysers, or high-pressure storage tanks.
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The anticipated boom in hydrogen could create large new mar-
kets, and spur a race for technological leadership. McKinsey and 
the Hydrogen Council estimate that, by 2050, sales of hydrogen 
as a commodity and related equipment (such as electrolysers, 
hydrogen refuelling stations, and fuel cells) could be worth 2.5 
trillion dollars per year, and generate 30 million jobs87. Bloomb-
erg New Energy Finance (BNEF) believes hydrogen could open 
up 11 trillion dollars of investment opportunity over the next 30 
years88.
As such, hydrogen is just another battleground for technologi-
cal and economic supremacy between the established and rising 
powers of this world. Just as the US ascent to global supremacy 
in the 20th century was inseparable from oil, countries are now 
vying to control the key energy technologies of the future: not 
just hydrogen, but also solar, batteries, digital networks, electric 
vehicles, and so on. Countries have a strategic interest to be a 
technology maker, not a technology taker in these critical areas.
This geo-economic calculus is already influencing hydrogen poli-
cies. Germany’s massive green hydrogen push, for example, is a 
clear bid to outcompete China, mindful of the painful experience 
of losing its solar PV manufacturing industry to China a few years 
ago89. While China has done a lot to drive down the unit costs of 
photovoltaics and wind, it has also acquired dominant positions 
in the value chains of these and other energy technologies, like 
electric vehicles and rare earths. China produces over a third of 
wind turbines, more than half of all electric vehicles and over 
70% of the world’s solar panels90.
Electrolysers have the same kind of modularity as PV solar pan-
els or batteries and could thus experience the same kind of price 
deflation that we have seen for those technologies. BNEF esti-
mates that, as of 2019, electrolysers were already 83% cheaper 
to produce in China than in Western countries91. Admittedly, 
Chinese manufacturers focus on the more standard alkaline 
87 Hydrogen Council (2017). Hydrogen scaling up: A sustainable pathway for the 
global energy transition. November 2017. 
88 BNEF (2020). Hydrogen Economy Outlook. March 30, 2020. 
89 Sören Amelang (2020). Europe vies with China for clean hydrogen superpower 
status. Clean Energy Wire, July 24, 2020. https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/
europe-vies-china-clean-hydrogen-superpower-status. 
90 Sarah Ladislaw and Nikos Tsafos, «Beijing is Winning the Clean Energy Race», For-
eign Policy, 2 October 2020. 
91 BNEF (2020). Hydrogen Economy Outlook. March 30, 2020.
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electrolysers, which are less flexible than the solid oxide and 
proton exchange membrane technologies that European firms 
have focused on. But in many respects it looks like the race has 
already been run. It will be hard for European manufacturers to 
beat China on costs.
The race for technology leadership is clear in many countries and 
sectors. Consider automotive: Japanese car makers Honda and 
Toyota are betting that fuel cell vehicles will triumph over batteries, 
especially in terms of range, while Chinese car makers are mak-
ing big strides in electric vehicles, and German car makers have 
long focused on making diesel-powered combustion engines more 
efficient. In many cases, public money is underpinning efforts to 
deploy hydrogen value chains, making this even more the territory 
of geo-economic competition. That is why the EU Commission has 
announced that it will shortly launch an EU Hydrogen Alliance in a 
recent document on a «new industrial strategy for Europe»92. In a 
similar vein, the EU has recently launched an EU Battery Alliance 
and a Raw Materials Alliance to try and catch up with China.93
Just as other parts of the clean energy transition, hydrogen 
value chains are also mineral and metal intensive. Around 30 raw 
materials are needed to produce fuel cells and hydrogen storage 
infrastructure, 13 of which are deemed critical by the EU: cobalt, 
magnesium, rare earth elements, platinum, palladium, borates, 
silicon metal, rhodium, ruthenium, graphite, lithium, titanium 
and vanadium. Figure 4 depicts some of the relevant raw mate-
92 EU Commission (2020). A New Industrial Strategy for Europe. COM (2020) 102 
final. 10 March 2020.
93 European Commission, «Critical Raw Materials for Strategic Technologies and Sec-
tors in the EU: A Foresight Study», 3 September 2020. Available at: https://ec.europa.
eu/docsroom/documents/42882. Accessed: 14 January 2021. 
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the recent years. Due to active dematerialisation efforts, the 
PGM intensities in PEM FCs fell by 80% since 2005 (Lead-
er, Gaustad, and Babbitt, 2019). According to the European 
Commission’s FC and hydrogen joint undertaking (FCH JU), 
the amount of platinum in the next generation of FC vehicles 
will reach similar levels to that used in the catalytic convert-
ers of diesel vehicles, which corresponds to 3-7 grams (Re-
uters Business News, 2018). This could significantly enable 
large-scale commercialisation of FC-powered vehicles.
Most FCs have a standard design in which two electrodes are 
separated by an ion-conducting electrolyte. The heart of a 
PEM FC is the membrane electrode assembly (MEA), which 
includes five basic components: membrane, anode catalyst 
layer, cathode catalyst layer and two gas diffusion layers 
(GDLs) one for each electrode. 
On overview of the raw materials adopted in FCs is shown 
in Figure 14. The materials and components related to the 
hydrogen production and storage were also considered in this 
analysis.
Figure 14. Relevant raw materials used in in fuel cells (FCs)
Critical Raw Material
Aluminium: for thermal 
management of the stack and as 
base plate material
Al
Titanium: for metallic bipolar plate 
and as anode composition of SOFC
Ti
Strontium: in the composition of 
anode (together with Ti) in SOFC
Sr
Palladium: as catalyst replacing 
part of Pt (e.g. as Pt-Pd alloy)
Pd
Platinum: the most effective 
electrocatalyst for both the cathode 
and anode
Pt
Nickel: for coating the bipolar 
plates, in the composition of 
stainless steel or as anode
Ni
Copper: in alloys with Ni for anode 
catalyst (SOFC), in wires and 
conductive parts
CuCobalt: as catalyst replacing the 
more expensive platinum in PEM 
fuel cell 
Co
Graphite: leading material for 
construction of bipolar plates
C
2.2.1 Current supply bottlenecks along the value chain
Around 30 raw materials are needed for producing FCs and 
hydrogen storage technologies. Of these materials, 13 mate-
rials namely cobalt, magnesium, REEs, platinum, palladium, 
borates, silicon metal, rhodium, ruthenium, graphite, lithium, 
titanium and vanadium are deemed critical for the EU econ-
omy according to the 2020 CRM list. Materials and compo-
nents along the supply chain are presented in Figure 15.
The unique chemical and physical properties make PGMs ex-
cellent catalysts for the automotive industry. Today, platinum 
demand for FC applications is insignificant compared with 
other end-use applications. However, a FC vehicle needs 10 
times more than the PGM loading of an average gasoline or 
diesel vehicle (Hao et al., 2019).
The high price of platinum is one of the major challenges 
faced by the FC producers; platinum represents about 50% 
of the cost of a FC stack. Hence, researchers are continuous-
ly trying to reduce the need for platinum in FCs. The sup-
ply of raw materials required in FC technology is diversified 
with more than half of the materials coming from a variety 
of suppliers, each with a small supply share of less than 7%. 
China, with more than 20% share, is the major supplier of 
raw materials, followed by South Africa and Russia. Platinum 
is produced mainly in South Africa (71% of global produc-
tion), followed by Russia (16%) and Zimbabwe (6%). The oth-
er PGMs, namely palladium, rhodium and ruthenium are also 
supplied predominantly by three key suppliers: Russia, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe. 
With regard to the next step in the supply chain, 12 processed 
materials are identified as the most relevant processed ma-
terials for FC and hydrogen storage/production technologies, 
namely porous carbon, yttria stabilised zirconia, polymers 
(e.g. perfluorosulphonic acid - PFSA), carbon fibre composites 
(CFC), stainless steel, graphene, scrap and flake mica, boron 
nitride powder, nano materials & carbon nano tubes, carbon 
cloth/paper, polyamide ultramid and metal hydrides. For the 
electrodes, several types of carbon or carbon-based materi-
als have been developed, including mesoporous carbon and 
carbon nanomaterials. Around 40% of processed materials 
and 25% of FC components are supplied by European com-
panies. 
Carbon fibre paper and carbon fabric (cloth) are commonly 
used as gas diffusion layers (GDLs) that are key components 
in various types of FC, including PEM, DM FC and PA FC stacks. 
Bipolar plates are multi-functional components within the 
PEM FC stack. The materials used for bi-polar plates include 
graphite and stainless steel. However, stainless steel for bi-
Figure 4. Relevant raw materials used in fuel cells
Source: EU Commission (2020)93.
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rials that are needed to produce fuel cells. In particular, fuel cells 
rely heavily on platinum-based catalysts, with platinum making 
up about half of the cost of a fuel cell stack.
Geo-economic competition
The emergence of inter-continental hydrogen value chains will 
also intensify competition between countries about the siting of 
energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries. Countries with 
a lot of potential to make hydrogen from indigenous resources 
(either renewables or fossil fuels) might opt for expanding their 
value chains into energy-intensive industries such as chemicals 
and steel, instead of simply exporting hydrogen to industrialised 
countries. The model country that is often named in this regard is 
Iceland, which used to be one of the poorest countries in Europe, 
but was able to industrialise and attract energy-intensive (export) 
industries like aluminium smelting, ferro-silicon production, and 
digital data processing thanks to its abundant and cheap hydro-
power and geothermal energy. One could even argue that Iceland 
is exporting its cheap energy as high-value data94.
In a similar vein, the Grattan Institute, an Australian think-tank 
launched a report in May 2020 entitled «Start with Steel», argu-
ing that Australia should use its renewable energy abundance not 
to export hydrogen as an energy carrier but to attract new man-
ufacturing industries in steel and ammonia production95. This 
renewable-led green industrialisation, it is argued, would enable 
a «just transition» for workers currently employed in carbon-in-
tensive sectors.
In many instances, however, developing countries are still only 
regarded as the providers of raw materials and energy resources 
to power the industrial centres of the rich world, not as desti-
nations for the relocation of industries with high value-added. 
Some of the hydrogen trade schemes that are currently being 
floated smack of «green colonialism»96. One such example is a 
94 Lucas Laursen, «Iceland Exports Energy as Data», MIT Technology Review, 11 
April 2012. Available at: https://www.technologyreview.com/2012/04/11/186812/ice-
land-exports-energy-as-data/. Accessed: 14 January 2021. 
95 «Start with Steel: A practical plan to support carbon workers and cut emissions». 
Available at: https://grattan.edu.au/report/start-with-steel/. Accessed: 14 January 2021. 
96 Thijs Van de Graaf, Indra Overland, Daniel Scholten, and Kirsten Westphal. «The 
new oil? The geopolitics and international governance of hydrogen.» Energy Research 
& Social Science 70 (2020): 101667.
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plan by German turbine makers and gas companies to export 
green hydrogen from hydropower in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) to Germany97. What makes this project so conten-
tious is that only 10% of the population of the DRC has access 
to electricity98. Nonetheless, the German development agency is 
sponsoring the creation of an «atlas» with favourable locations in 
Africa for green hydrogen production99.
Industrial policy is no longer a taboo in the industrialized world. 
Supply-chain shocks and economic dislocation precipitated by the 
Covid-19 pandemic have led even the most market-oriented gov-
ernments to consider more dirigiste policies inconceivable just a 
few years ago. There are growing calls for the reshoring of impor-
tant industries, not just in pharmaceutical and medical indus-
tries, but also in energy industries. Whereas China has its «Made 
in China 2025» plan, Europe now tries to stand up and develop 
its own industrial planning in areas like batteries, hydrogen, and 
raw materials.
The future of petrostates
When it comes to the impact of hydrogen on fossil fuel pro-
ducer countries, sometimes also referred to as «petrostates», 
there are basically two schools of thought100. One school sees 
hydrogen, and green hydrogen in particular, as an opportunity 
for import-dependent countries to replace fossil fuel imports from 
often geopolitically unstable regions in the world, and to diversify 
the energy supply. Another school sees it the other way around: 
a sudden drop in export revenues due to fuel switching could 
be geopolitically destabilising for producer countries, with con-
97 Pauline Bax, «Congo Hydrogen Plant Being Considered by European Turbine Mak-
ers», Bloomberg Green, 21 August 2020. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2020-08-21/congo-hydrogen-plant-being-considered-by-european-tur-
bine-makers. Accessed: 14 January 2021. 
98 Jonathan Gaventa, «Will the dash for hydrogen benefit sub-Sahara Africa?» En-
ergy Monitor, 21 October 2021. Available at: https://energymonitor.ai/technology/
hydrogen/will-the-dash-for-hydrogen-benefit-sub-saharan-africa. Accessed: 14 Janu-
ary 2021. 
99 For more information, see: https://www.sasscal.org/atlas-of-green-hydrogen-gen-
eration-potentials-in-africa/. Accessed: 14 January 2021. 
100 Noé Van Hulst, «An International Perspective on Clean Hydrogen», Nederlandse 
Vereniging voor de Verenigde Naties, 22 April 2020. Available at: https://nvvn.nl/
an-international-perspective-on-clean-hydrogen/. Accessed: 15 January 2021. 
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comitant effects on migratory flows and international security101. 
Blue and green hydrogen and ammonia could throw a lifeline to 
producer countries and even give them a buy-in in global climate 
discussions, where they are now often at loggerheads with cli-
mate frontrunner countries who want to accelerate the energy 
transition and quickly move away from fossil fuels102.
Several countries identified as candidates to become hydrogen 
export champions already play a big role in today’s fossil fuel 
energy system. This is the case, for instance, for Australia, the 
United States and Saudi Arabia. Hydrogen would allow these coun-
tries «to retain the basic business model of the oil era which is 
based on cheap production of a universally used fuel for transport 
and heat generation»103. For some of these established energy 
players like Saudi Arabia, it seems unlikely that they will be able 
to generate as many rents from hydrogen or ammonia exports 
as they get from oil and gas exports. They face the dilemma 
that any exports of green molecules would face competition from, 
and potentially destroy demand, for their much more lucrative 
fossil fuel exports. Contrary to the oil business, in a hydrogen 
economy, petrostates will have to compete with a broader set 
of countries – roughly the countries situated in the world’s sun-
belt and some places with abundant wind such as Argentina and 
Chile. If they can become first movers, they might lock-in some 
of the emerging hydrogen demand for a long period, especially if 
they can agree on long-term supply contracts (which ensure the 
viability of investments)104.
Needless to say, in any scenario that is compatible with the Paris 
climate goals, the rise of hydrogen goes hand in hand with a 
decline of fossil fuel markets. The flipside of the investment 
opportunities that hydrogen presents is the revenues foregone 
by current oil and gas producers, possibly also in the order of 
billions or trillions of dollars. While the coal industry has felt the 
knock-on effects of ultra-competitive renewables early on, espe-
101 IRENA, A New World: The Geopolitics of the Energy Transformation, Abu Dhabi: 
IRENA. 
102 BRADSHAW, Michael, Thijs Van de Graaf, and Richard Connolly. «Preparing for the 
new oil order? Saudi Arabia and Russia.» Energy Strategy Reviews 26 (2019): 100374.
103 Axel Michaelowa and Sonja Butzengeiger, «Breakthrough of Hydrogen Technol-
ogies until 2030: Chances and Risks for Gulf Countries, International Policy Impli-
cations», in EDA Insights, September 2019. Available at: https://eda.ac.ae/docs/
default-source/Publications/eda-insight_hydrogen-economy_en_final.pdf?sfvrsn=2. 
Accessed: 15 January 2021.
104 Michaelowa and Butzengeiger, 2019. 
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cially in Europe, the oil and gas industry has long been relatively 
insulated from these cheaper electrons, which served different 
markets anyway. The electrification of several end-use sectors 
(e.g., personal vehicles, home heating) has already begun to 
change this picture. Over time, cheaper hydrogen has the poten-
tial to become a competitor for oil and gas in some of their last 
vestiges: high-heat industrial processes, heavy-road transport, 
shipping and aviation.
Several oil and gas rich countries in the Middle East are banking 
on hydrogen to maintain their position as key energy suppliers to 
the world. The desert Kingdoms of the Persian Gulf (Saudi Arabia, 
UAE, Kuwait) have ample solar potential, underground storage 
space, and experience in energy molecule trade. They could har-
ness pipeline and shipping infrastructure, including ports, to posi-
tion themselves as major hydrogen exporters. Of course, their 
ambitions might be constrained by lack of sufficient freshwater. 
A solution here could be desalination plants, but these would of 
course also consume a sizeable share of the solar electricity or 
natural gas that went in to produce the green or blue hydrogen 
respectively.
Not all petrostates have the renewable potential to become 
major clean hydrogen exporters, or simply lack interest. Rus-
sian state-controlled company Gazprom, for example, is keen on 
keeping its natural gas exports in place, and is of the opinion 
that its gas should be converted into (blue) hydrogen only at the 
point of consumption, for instance when it reaches the shores of 
Germany. While there is a technical case to be made in support 
of Gazprom’s position, it is very clear that this is by far the easi-
est way for the Russian state-led gas giant to stick to its current 
business model105.
New interdependencies
If hydrogen becomes a globally traded commodity, it could give 
rise to new trading relationships and new interdependencies. 
Just like in the early days of the LNG market, bilateral deals 
and agreements are now being forged around hydrogen trade, 
105 Kirsten Westphal, Susanne Dröge, and Oliver Geden, «The international dimen-
sions of Germany’s hydrogen policy», SWP, Berlin, June 2020. Available at: https://
www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2020C32_HydrogenPoli-
cy.pdf. Accessed: 12 January 2021.
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including Japan-Australia, Germany-Morocco, Norway-Korea, 
Belgium-Oman, Netherlands-Portugal, etc. Over time, these 
bilateral deals could give way to new energy trade relations, new 
shipping lanes and new trade routes. This is already influencing 
foreign policies around the world, and might also inform strategic 
planning by defence specialists.
The hype around hydrogen is already given a new focus to 
«energy diplomacy», traditionally defined as «government-re-
lated foreign activities that aim to ensure a country’s energy 
security while also promoting business opportunities related to 
the energy sector»106. For most countries, energy diplomacy was 
geared at securing reliable and affordable imports of fossil fuels. 
Nowadays, diplomats and officials at some foreign offices are also 
spending time at exploring secure future imports of hydrogen 
and hydrogen-derived gases and liquids. The Dutch government 
has even appointed a special «hydrogen envoy» for this purpose, 
Mr. Noé Van Hulst.
Japan’s diplomats and industrial stakeholders are engaging Aus-
tralia, Brunei, Norway, and Saudi Arabia on hydrogen fuel pro-
curement. Germany has signed a cooperation agreement with 
Morocco on methanol production from hydrogen, South Korea 
has its eyes on Norway, the Netherlands is targeting Portugal as a 
potential supplier of hydrogen, and industrial players in Belgium 
are looking towards Oman and Chile for large-scale hydrogen 
imports. If Europe will begin to import hydrogen from countries 
like Morocco and Oman, this will elevate the strategic importance 
of those countries for the EU.
If the current trend toward bilateral partnerships continues, the 
market could start from a highly fragmented base, mimicking 
the experience with the initial phases of the LNG market. The 
first LNG projects were subject to inflexible, bilateral, long-term 
contracts with oil-indexed prices – and were therefore sometimes 
referred to as «floating pipelines.» Japan spearheaded the devel-
opment of the LNG market by emerging as the first big buyer. Its 
commitment to large-scale hydrogen imports could make it, once 
again, global gas market pioneer, this time in hydrogen.
One of the key differences with trade in crude oil or natural gas is 
that hydrogen trade will be less asymmetric. It is technically possi-
106 Griffiths, Steven, «Energy diplomacy in a time of energy transition», Energy Strat-
egy Reviews 26 (2019): 100386.
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ble to produce hydrogen almost everywhere in the world. The fact 
that many countries could become «prosumers» (both produc-
ers and consumer of hydrogen) and that hydrogen can be stored 
makes it almost impossible for exporters to «weaponise» hydrogen 
trade or for importers to be trapped by a small cartel of suppliers. 
Yet, hydrogen trade will not be as reciprocal as cross-border trade 
in electricity, where electrons actually travel both ways depending 
on supply and demand conditions on both sides of the border. Still, 
international trade in hydrogen will boost the energy security of 
importers as it will provide a back-up to the electricity system. 
For energy import-dependent countries, it could also improve the 
diversity of energy sources and increase energy security. Since 
hydrogen is storable, countries could think about creating strategic 
stockpiles of hydrogen to guard themselves against any unfore-
seen disruptions in the supply – much like the multilateral oil stock 
regime that is overseen by the International Energy Agency (IEA).
At the same time, the prospect of large-scale hydrogen imports 
could also create new maritime security concerns. Hydrogen is a 
highly flammable and explosive material. Some of its derivates 
like ammonia are toxic. Risks and hazards from a marine LNG 
or oil tanker spill are well known. LNG spills pose a threat of 
asphyxiation and cryogenic burns. Studies have pointed out that 
the risk of explosion of LNG tankers is quite small, reducing the 
risk that they become terrorist targets107. Oil tankers have been 
torpedoed, and these incidents have shown that, much like LNG 
tankers, they are not «floating bombs». They can catch fire, sure, 
but they do not lead to massive blow-outs. This might be dif-
ferent for liquid hydrogen-carrying ships, where the high flame 
velocity of hydrogen creates the risk of detonation and a shock-
wave108. Scaling up such trade along fixed supply routes could 
thus create additional maritime security risks, including for nar-
row waterways and port cities. The devastation caused by the 
ammonium nitrate carrying ship that was docked at the port of 
Beirut and exploded in August 2020 is a reminder of the grave 
security risks that highly inflammable substances such as hydro-
gen and ammonia pose.
107 US GAO, «Maritime security: public safety consequences of a terrorist attack on 
a tanker carrying liquefied natural gas need clarification : report to Congressional re-
questers», February 2007. Available at: https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07316.pdf. 
Accessed: 15 January 2021.  
108 Lloyd’s Register, «World first for liquid hydrogen transportation», 23 October 
2020. Available at: https://www.lr.org/en/insights/articles/world-first-for-liquid-hydro-
gen-transportation/. Accessed 15 January 2021. 
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As energy trade flows change, so will security partnerships. Just 
look at the impact of the shale revolution on the US relation-
ship with the Persian Gulf. The US is increasingly disengaging 
from the Middle East. This foreshadows what is coming. As the 
ET progresses, key oil transit routes like the Strait of Hormuz 
become less important for global energy security. We will also 
see the weakening of alliances built on fossil fuels. OPEC as an 
organisation has basically ceased to exist – key decisions are 
now taken elsewhere. There’s already fierce conflict between oil 
producers over market share109. This will only intensify if oil and 
gas demand declines because of fuel switching to renewables and 
green hydrogen.
Carbon lock-in and stranded assets
Even if ambitious hydrogen plans are being developed out of a gen-
uine concern to meet mid-century net zero emission goals, there 
are clear risks that countries and companies pursue plans that 
lock in further use of unabated fossil fuels, a phenomenon known 
as «carbon lock-in». For instance, German plans to import large 
volumes of green hydrogen from North African countries could 
very well lead to a situation whereby solar and wind electricity 
is exported, while fossil fuels provide local electricity supplies110. 
Demand for renewable electricity in the countries of origin must 
first be met before exports of hydrogen can truly be «green».
There are also risks involved in further pouring billions of dol-
lars in expanding value chains for blue hydrogen. It is routinely 
argued that blue hydrogen is needed as a bridge to green hydro-
gen, much in a similar way as the argument about natural gas 
as a «bridge fuel». Policymakers in Germany, the European Com-
mission, and elsewhere seem to converge on the view that, in the 
end, green hydrogen should dominate supply since blue hydro-
gen is not carbon neutral.
However, blue and green hydrogen have totally distinct value 
chains. They are like parallel worlds. The blue hydrogen world 
109 VAN DE GRAAF, Thijs. «Battling for a shrinking market: oil producers, the renew-
ables revolution, and the risk of stranded assets». In The geopolitics of renewables, pp. 
97-121. Springer, Cham, 2018.
110 Kirsten Westphal, Susanne Dröge, and Oliver Geden, «The international dimen-
sions of Germany’s hydrogen policy», SWP, Berlin, June 2020. Available at: https://
www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2020C32_HydrogenPoli-
cy.pdf. Accessed: 12 January 2021. 
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is populated by oil and gas companies who are looking at CCS 
to make low-carbon hydrogen – CCS could even become a new 
form of income for depleted oil and gas fields, like those of the 
North Sea. Green hydrogen is more the terrain of utilities, grid 
operators, and electrolyser manufacturing companies. Produc-
ing hydrogen via electrolysers can improve the business case 
of renewables and help balance the grid. Those two industry 
schemes, blue and green, are set to collide head-to-head.
The «first-blue-then-green» hydrogen strategy is risky, because 
it could set off a self-reinforcing cycle of «socio-technical lock-in». 
It’s not uncommon for blue hydrogen production facilities to have 
economic life cycles of 25 years or more. Asset stranding could 
occur if the market for blue hydrogen dissipates before this period, 
for example if the costs of green hydrogen have come down faster 
than expected. and lock in. Blue hydrogen investments could also 
give rise to the development of a very costly hydrogen transpor-
tation infrastructure, which will not be suitable for a switch to 
green hydrogen, since blue and green hydrogen will be made at 
very different geographic locations. Any expansion of blue hydro-
gen production will create vested interests and new incumbents, 
which are likely to resist the shift to green hydrogen.
Shaping and governing the market
Geopolitical tensions might also erupt is with regard to the reg-
ulations and governance of international hydrogen markets. One 
area where a stand-off could occur is with regard to technical 
standards. The EU Hydrogen Strategy mentions explicitly the aim 
to «strengthen EU leadership in international fora for technical 
standards, regulations and definitions on hydrogen»111. These 
standards comprise safety and sustainability standards for both 
hydrogen molecules themselves, but also for all hydrogen-related 
transport, handling, storage, and end-use infrastructure. Defin-
ing standards can provide a competitive edge to those compa-
nies who already master and control standardized technologies. 
In recent years, China has become much more proactive in this 
field, including at major standard-setting bodies like the Interna-
tional Standard Organization112.
111 European Commission, «A hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe», Brus-
sels, 8 July 2020, p. 23.
112 John Seaman, «China and the New Geopolitics of Technical Standardization», 
IFRI, January 2020. Available at: https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/
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Another aspect of shaping the market pertains to certification of 
hydrogen. A molecule of grey hydrogen is identical to a molecule 
of green hydrogen. Therefore, a certification system is needed 
that allows end users to know the carbon content and quality of 
hydrogen. Schemes that also track the origins of hydrogen are 
usually referred to as «guarantees of origin»113. At present, there 
is not a universally accepted definition of green hydrogen, even 
though international hydrogen trade would benefit from a har-
monised system of guarantees of origin114. The carbon content of 
hydrogen will become the «new currency», in the words of Jorgo 
Chatzimarkakis from Hydrogen Europe, a European trade associ-
ation for the hydrogen industry115.
These aspects could turn into trade frictions. It is likely that, over 
time, key importers such as the EU will define restrictions that 
only allow renewable-energy derived (green) hydrogen to be 
imported without carbon penalties116. Hydrogen could become 
one of the major battlefields for future carbon trade wars. We 
are beginning to see the first manifestations of this. In October 
2020, the French government pressured Engie, a utility, to with-
draw from a $7 billion deal to procure LNG from fracked wells in 
Texas. Allegedly, Paris did so out of concern that the LNG would 
be too dirty because of upstream methane leaks117. As the EU 
and others are moving towards adopting carbon border adjust-
ment mechanisms to address the issue of «carbon leakage» 
(delocalisation of energy-intensive industries to jurisdictions with 
lax carbon regulations), exporters of blue hydrogen might be put 
at a disadvantage compared to exporters of green hydrogen.
There will also be geo-economic competition over monetary 
benchmarks in hydrogen trade. Current trade in oil is predom-
seaman_china_standardization_2020.pdf. Accessed: 15 January 2021. 
113 International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), «Green Hydrogen: A Guide To 
Policy-Making», Abu Dhabi: IRENA, November 2020, p. 9.
114 Abad, Anthony Velazquez, and Paul E. Dodds, «Green hydrogen characterisation 
initiatives: Definitions, standards, guarantees of origin, and challenges», Energy Poli-
cy 138 (2020): 111300.
115 Cited in: Sonja Van Renssen, «From blue to green: hydrogen’s own energy transi-
tion», Energy Monitor, 14 August 2020. Accessed: 15 January 2021. 
116 Axel Michaelowa and Sonja Butzengeiger, «Breakthrough of Hydrogen Technol-
ogies until 2030: Chances and Risks for Gulf Countries, International Policy Impli-
cations», in EDA Insights, September 2019. Available at: https://eda.ac.ae/docs/
default-source/Publications/eda-insight_hydrogen-economy_en_final.pdf?sfvrsn=2. 
Accessed: 15 January 2021. 
117 Ben Lefebvre, «French Government Blocks LNG Deal as too Dirty», Politico, 21 
October 2020. 
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inantly denominated in US dollars. This gives the US strategic 
levers to exert power over other countries. For example, current 
US oil sanctions against Iranian oil exports are actually based 
on the monetary and financial hegemony of the US. Washing-
ton threatens to deny potential buyers of Iranian oil access to 
US financial markets and the US banking system118. India has 
tried to circumvent the sanctions regime by engaging in barter 
trade with Iran, while Europe has tried to set up an alternative 
payment mechanism, INSTEX, however to little avail. The EU is 
now keen to avoid such entanglement in the future. Its hydrogen 
strategy mentions the explicit goal of developing a benchmark 
for euro-denominated trade in hydrogen119. It would mean that, 
in this age of «weaponised interdependence», the US would have 
less leverage over EU hydrogen imports than it has over EU oil 
imports.
Conclusions
Without a doubt, hydrogen clearly has the potential to become 
a basic building block of a carbon-free world. As green hydrogen 
projects moves from megawatt to gigawatt-scale120, it is clear 
that the political and business momentum is reaching new highs, 
and that hydrogen may finally come to live up to its promise as a 
clean energy carrier.
There are, however, big clashes of views with regard to the 
underpinning infrastructure and value chains of a future hydro-
gen economy (see Table 4). Concerning production, there is the 
clash between proponents of blue and green hydrogen. Obvi-
ously, the latter would be the most disruptive form of innovation, 
but the former still has the upper hand in terms of cost structure 
and compatibility with existing infrastructure. Concerning con-
sumption, some want to use hydrogen across the board – from 
cars and trains to home heating and industry – leading up to a 
wholesale «hydrogen society» as Japan and Korea are aspiring 
118 Van de Graaf, T. (2013). The ‘oil weapon’ reversed? Sanctions against Iran and 
US-EU structural power. Middle East Policy, 20(3), 145-163.
119 European Commission, «A hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe», Brus-
sels, 8 July 2020, p. 21.
120 Leigh Collins, «Gigawatt-scale: the world’s 13 largest green-hydrogen projects», 
Recharge, 21 December 2020. Available at: https://www.rechargenews.com/transi-
tion/gigawatt-scale-the-worlds-13-largest-green-hydrogen-projects/2-1-933755. Ac-
cessed: 13 January 2021. 
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to become. Others, by contrast, just see hydrogen as an energy 
carrier that should be used in certain niches only – restricted 
to those few areas that cannot directly be electrified. Hydrogen, 
in the latter view, is often compared to champagne, an expen-
sive luxury drink that you reserve only for special occasions, and 
which you certainly do not mix with water (i.e. hydrogen blending 
in existing natural gas pipelines).
Blue hydrogen Green hydrogen
Wide use «Hydrogen society»
Limited use «Hydrogen as champagne of 
power fuels»
Table 4. Contrasting views on the future role of hydrogen
While the outcome of that battle is still uncertain, hydrogen will 
become a fixture of the new geo-economics of energy in the com-
ing years and decades. The carbon-free fuel could be a geopo-
litical game changer for some countries. For countries like Chile 
and Morocco who lack fossil fuels and are forced to import large 
chunks of their energy supplies, the renewable energy transfor-
mation represents a complete reversal of fortune. If they succeed 
in becoming big exporters of green hydrogen, they could stand 
to gain in geostrategic importance, alongside other countries 
with abundant renewable potential such as Australia. However, 
they are unlikely to gain the same geopolitical weight as the cur-
rent set of petrostates has had over the past few decades. Since 
hydrogen is mostly a conversion business rather than an extrac-
tion business, hydrogen export rents are likely to be smaller than 
fossil fuel rents. And since hydrogen can be produced basically 
anywhere in the world, hydrogen exporters will not have the 
same foreign policy leverage as, say, Russia or Saudi Arabia has 
based on their oil and gas exports.
Overall, though, hydrogen is unlikely to become the new oil, as 
popular belief holds. It is unlikely to ever reach oil’s market share 
in the world’s energy mix (currently more than 30% of primary 
energy), let alone match the liquidity and geostrategic signifi-
cance of oil. Since hydrogen is a conversion business rather than 
an extraction business, rents will likely be smaller than those for 
oil, and they will be much more dispersed over a wider number 
of producers. If anything, hydrogen bears more resemblance to 
natural gas, and LNG in particular, and is more likely to lead to 
regional markets, especially in the mid-term.
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That said, the geopolitical stakes surrounding hydrogen are vast. 
Even as a regionally traded commodity, hydrogen is one of those 
technologies that can reshuffle the geopolitical cards in the twen-
ty-first century, alongside other technologies such as artificial 
intelligence, machine learning, electric vehicles, smart grids, and 
so on. Countries and companies are jockeying to control what 
is set to become a multi-billion dollar international commodity 
market. The size and scope of that market is still mired in uncer-
tainty, but the clean hydrogen race is clearly on, and is deeply 
tainted with geopolitical incentives and implications.
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Chapter four
Energy Geopolitics in the Maghreb. The 
Rise and Fall of Two Energy Superpowers. 
The cases of Algeria and Libya
Ignacio Fuente Cobo
Abstract
The Maghreb is a minor player on the global energy scene. The 
geopolitics of energy is conditioned by the existence of two 
hydrocarbon-rich powers, Algeria and Libya, which however do 
not have the capacity to develop a fully autonomous energy pol-
icy. Its performance in terms of oil and gas is in line with the 
behaviour of international markets and the requirements of other 
relevant actors, mainly from southern Europe, but also external 
to the region. Furthermore, in the current situation of the glo-
balized energy market and with the disappearance of the regional 
hydrocarbon markets, their ability to act with national criteria has 
been severely restricted. The highly complex internal situation in 
both countries, although with their own characteristics in each 
of them, and the mono dependence of their economies on the 
rent of hydrocarbons for their own subsistence, complicates the 
panorama. Putting an end to the curse of resources, aggravated 
in the case of Libya because they are financing the war, and in 
Algeria because of the serious structural problems that its econ-
omy is facing, constitutes its great challenge in the coming years. 
The success of the reforms will depend on the active support of 
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the international community and, in particular, of the European 
Union, whose interest in the Maghreb should increase, given 
the possibilities offered by these countries to provide low-cost 
energy to Europe, but also, and perhaps more importantly, given 
Europe’s need to stabilize a vulnerable region with great potential 
to become a continuing source of security problems.
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Introduction
It is clear that the world energy order has undergone major 
changes in recent years. The global supply is currently char-
acterised by a great abundance of hydrocarbon production, a 
considerable price reduction, and renewable energies that are 
increasingly making inroads in the global energy mix. All of this 
is modifying global energy geopolitics the world over, changing 
the balance of power and regional equilibria and affecting not 
only the producing countries but also the consumers. Few regions 
are being affected as much as northern Africa and few individual 
energy superpowers are being affected as much as Algeria and 
Libya; by changes that are having a major effect on those coun-
tries’ current situation and their future prospects.
The first of these, Algeria, has sufficient resources to make it one 
of the richest countries in Africa and a prosperous country on an 
international level. Algeria is a geopolitical force in the Maghreb 
because of its population, its prestige, its geography and its rev-
enue from hydrocarbons1 and, theoretically, it could be an eco-
nomic paradise. Algeria is fifteenth in the world ranking of proven 
oil reserves, with 12,200 million barrels2, to which a further 150 
billion cubic feet (Bcf) of natural gas must be added. The coun-
try also has extensive resources of undeveloped shale in seven 
basins that contain approximately 3,419 Tcf (trillion cubic feet) 
of potential gas, of which 707 Tcf are recoverable with current 
technology. Furthermore, six of these basins contain 121,000 
million barrels of condensed shale oil, of which 5,700 million bar-
rels are technically recoverable. All of this means that Algeria 
has the world’s fourth largest reserves after the US, China and 
Argentina3.
In 2019, hydrocarbon extraction had made Algeria the world’s 
sixteenth greatest oil producer, the third biggest in Africa (after 
Nigeria and Angola) and eleventh in the world export ranking, 
1 Mehdi Lazar, Sidi-Mohamed Nehad : »Vers une nouvelle Algérie?», Diploweb, La Re-
vue Geopolitique, 08.12.2013. http://www.diploweb.com/Vers-une-nouvelle-Algerie.
html. 
2 Benoît Delmas, «La lettre du Maghreb – La Sonatrach, la boîte noire du pouvoir al-
gérien», Le Point, 10 November 2019, https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/la-lettre-du-ma-
ghreb-la-sonatrach-la-boite-noire-du-pouvoir-algerien-10-11-2019-2346292_3826.
php.




as well as being the fifth largest producer and seventh largest 
exporter of natural gas on a global level4.
Yet in spite of these huge resources, from Algerian Independ-
ence to the present time, the country has witnessed its hydrocar-
bons sector go through good times and periods of crisis that have 
brought about changes and ruptures to the institutional system 
that governs it, although its strategic nature having never been 
questioned. Today, Algeria´s oil and gas sector is in decline and is 
facing major structural problems, which will have to be overcome 
if the country wants hydrocarbons to remain the backbone of its 
economy and the basis for its economic development.
The case of Libya is quite similar. Libya has all the elements to 
become an energy superpower, because it has great compara-
tive advantages over other regional or international competitors. 
Firstly, its proven oil reserves are considerable and could be esti-
mated at over 48,000 million barrels (2016), approximately 2.9% 
of the world’s total oil reserves; this is equivalent to 594.2 times 
its annual consumption, or a reserve-replacement ratio (RRR) of 
153 years, which means that Libya has the greatest oil deposits 
in Africa5. The country’s gas situation is similar, with reserves 
calculated at 1,549 trillion cubic metres (2014)6.
Furthermore, most of Libyan territory is still to be prospected. So 
far, only the Sirte Basin has been extensively explored, whereas 
the Murzuq, Ghadames, Kufra and Cyrenaica Basins, as well as 
the Sirte Gulf in the open sea, have hardly been explored and 
have great potential, which makes them very appealing to the 
major international oil companies.
Secondly, Libyan oil is relatively easy to extract at prices that, 
in desert zones, could be as low as $27, making these resources 
extremely competitive on the international markets. Moreover, in 
the past, installing the infrastructure required for production and 
export has been a straightforward process, which has meant the 
4 «Libya Oil Reserves, Production and Consumption Statistics – Worldometer», 
https://www.worldometers.info/oil/libya-oil/. 
5 «Libya Oil Reserves, Production and Consumption Statistics - Worldometer», https://
www.worldometers.info/oil/libya-oil/.
6 «NATURAL GAS - PROVED RESERVES(CU M)», The World Factbook, Central Intel-
ligence Agency, 2015, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
fields/2253.html. 
7 «Why Libya’s «sweet» crude oil is not enough to tempt BP or Shell | Oil | The Guardian», 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/aug/26/libya-sweet-crude-oil-bp-shell.
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oil-rich interior is connected to several different export terminals 
along the most densely populated coast, Libya’s extensive net-
work of oil pipelines, together with the absence of geographical 
obstructions to hinder exploration and development, pave the 
way for expanding production and attracting investment.
Thirdly, except for certain oil production in the open sea on the 
Pelagian Platform, Libya produces low-sulphur oil that is «sweet» 
and of excellent quality. The high quality of this oil and, thus, its 
direct listing on the top range of the complex oil market, means 
that the country’s supply is greatly appreciated on the world’s 
crude oil markets.
The fourth advantage is that Libya’s oil lies close to the main con-
sumption centres in Europe, which means the navigation times to the 
European ports, which consume most of Libya’s oil exports, range 
from two days (Sardinia) to eleven days (Rotterdam), whereas it 
takes almost a month for oil to reach Asian destinations8; all of this 
means Europe is the obvious market for these resources. What is 
more, Libya has major natural gas reserves, especially in the Ghad-
ames Basin, making the country a major exporter of gas to Europe 
through the Greenstream Pipeline that conveys it to Italy.
Therefore, it could be said that Algeria and Libya are the two 
major energy superpowers in northern Africa, and it is these two 
countries we will be focusing on in our geopolitical energy study 
of Maghreb, in view of the huge difference between hydrocar-
bon production and export levels when compared with the other 
countries in the region and given the major impact their evolution 
has on the international, European and Spanish markets.
Energy in Algeria. History of a mortgaged future
Characteristics of the Algerian Hydrocarbons Sector
Although it is not easy to obtain information that is reliable and 
verified, according to estimates made by Abdelmadjid Attar, 
Sonatrach’s Ex-CEO and former minister, Algerian hydrocarbon 
resources can be divided into three categories9:
8 «Libyan oil: Prospects for stability and growth», Apricot Energy Research, Vol. 03 
No. 1, November 2018, https://www.apicorp.org/Research/EnergyReseach/2018/API-
CORP_Energy_Research_V03_N14_2018.pdf 
9 «Les exportations d’hydrocarbures pourraient baisser dès 2023»: Toute l’ac-




 – Remaining proven conventional reserves (yet to be exploit-
ed), probable and possible: 9.8 billion barrels of liquid oil, 2.2 
billion oil-equivalent barrels of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) 
and 4.5 billion cubic metres of natural gas (4.5 BCM). Hassi 
R’Mel and Hassi Messaoud are the largest and most productive 
gas and oilfields in the country and account for 44% of the 
conventional reserves10.
 – Conventional resources yet to be discovered and technically 
recoverable: 1,400 million barrels of oil and 1,500 million cu-
bic metres of natural gas.
 – Technically recoverable unconventional resources: 6 to 8 bil-
lion barrels of oil and 22 billion cubic metres of natural gas.
Europe is Algeria’s main hydrocarbons export market, account-
ing for 70% of the total in 2017, followed by the USA (15%), 
Asia (9%), Africa (5%) and the Middle East (1%)11. 74% of the 
gas is exported via gas pipelines and 26% in the form of liq-
uid natural gas (LNG)12. It is hardly surprising that Algeria once 
10 «The Report Algeria 2018», The Report Algeria 2018, Oxford Bussiness Group, s, 
76. https://www.pwc.fr/fr/assets/files/pdf/2019/02/pwc-the-report-algeria-2018.pdf.
11 «The Report Algeria 2018», 80.
12 Mostefa Ouki, «Algerian Gas in Transition: Domestic Transformation and Changing 
Gas Export Potentia», Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2019, 15.
Figure 1. The gas and oil sector in Algeria.
(Source: The Energy Consulting Group, http://energy-cg.com/OPEC/
Algeria/Algeria_OilGas_Industry.html)
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dreamt of becoming Europe’s Maghrebi alternative to Russian 
hydrocarbons13.
Algeria has an extensive gas pipeline network for conveying the 
resources to Europe: the Transmed, which connects Algeria to 
Italy (Mazara del Vallo) via Tunisia; the Galsi, which links Kudiet 
Draoucha with Italy (Sardinia); the Maghreb-Europe, which con-
nects Algeria to Spain via Morocco and, finally, the Medgaz, which 
directly links Algeria to the Spanish coast.
The two gas pipelines that connect Algeria with Spain via the 
Mediterranean play a strategic role: not only are they a main sup-
ply source for Spain and Portugal, but they also supplement each 
other and make it possible to replace Russian gas, whose access 
via the Pyrenees is blocked owing to France’s lack of interest.
Since 1996, the Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline (GME), also called 
the Pere Duran-Farell gas pipeline (GPDF), with a capacity of 
12,000 million cubic metres per year, links the Hassi R’Mel nat-
ural gas deposits (in the Algerian Sahara) with Spain, running 
through Morocco and the Strait of Gibraltar. It is 1,430 kilometres 
13 «Moroccan-Nigerian Pipeline Puts Final Nail in Algeria’s Trans-Saharan Gas Project 
| The North Africa Post», https://northafricapost.com/17999-moroccan-nigerian-pipe-
line-puts-final-nail-algerias-trans-saharan-gas-project.html.





long (575 km through Algeria, 540 km in Morocco, 45 km under 
the Mediterranean and 270 km to Cordoba); the natural gas 
takes about five days to reach its destination14. The Algerian sec-
tion of the gas pipeline is owned and operated by the Algerian 
energy company Sonatrach. The Moroccan section is owned by 
the Moroccan State and operated by Metragaz, a Joint Venture 
formed by Sagane (a subsidiary of the Spanish firm Gas Natu-
ral), Transgas (Portugal) and SNPP (Morocco). The section that 
crosses the Straits of Gibraltar is 45 kilometres long and belongs 
to the company Gasoducto Europa-Maghreb (EMPL), in which 
Grupo Gas Natural has a shareholding, plus the Portuguese firm 
Transgas and the Moroccan company SNPP15.
The other gas pipeline is the Medgaz, from Oran to Almeria, with 
a capacity for conveying 8,000 million cubic metres per year. 
Opened in 2011, Medgaz Algeria enables gas to be transported 
to Spain directly, instead of depending exclusively on the Magh-
reb-Europe gas pipeline via Morocco. In April 2020, the Spanish 
company Naturgy purchased 34% of Medgaz from Mubadala for 
around €445 million, so the gas pipeline is now owned exclusively 
by the energy company Naturgy, having a 49% shareholding, 
and the Algerian Sonatrach holding the remaining 51%16.
The Natural Resources’ Curse
With so many energy resources, the question we have to ask our-
selves is… If Algeria is so rich, why are the Algerians still poor? 
The answer lies in the lack of a sufficiently well-structured eco-
nomic diversification, which has meant that the revenue obtained 
from oil and gas exploitation has been the main and almost only 
source of income for the Algerian Government ever since Inde-
pendence in 1963. At present, hydrocarbons account for about 
35% of the gross domestic product and two-thirds of all exports17.
14 Mónica Salomone, «Spain opens the Gibraltar Gas Highway», El Pais, 4 December 1996.
15 «Work begins on the extension to the Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline: Geoscope», 
accessed on 4 December 2020, http://www.geoscopio.com/guias/ene/noticias/Se_ini-
cia_la_ampliacion_del_gas pipeline_MaghrebEurope_7501.htm.
16 «Naturgy and Sonatrach, the owners of the Algeria-Spain gas pipelines – El Peri-
odico de la Energía | El Periodico de la Energía with daily information about electricity, 
wind energy, renewable energy, oil and gas, markets and energy legislation», https://
elperiodicodelaenergia.com.
17 «The oil and gas industry in Algeria: an overview | Trace Software Spain», 
accessed on 7th December 2020, https://www.trace-software.com/es/
industria-del-petroleo-y-gas-en-Algeria-una-vision-general/.
Energy Geopolitics in the Maghreb. The Rise and Fall of Two Energy 
Superpowers. The cases of Algeria and Libya
243
Further answering the question asked above, it would also be 
necessary to add the fact that for decades there has been a lack 
of productive reinvestment of the large amounts of revenue gen-
erated by oil; this has led to a situation where 95% of consumer 
goods have had to be imported, including petroleum by-prod-
ucts18. Despite being a major oil producer, Algeria is in the par-
adoxical position of being rich in hydrocarbons, but lacking in 
refined products, which means that it is a net importer of fuel. 
The country’s six refineries cannot meet the demand, so consid-
erable quantities of fuel have to be imported, especially diesel oil 
and petrol, which account for nearly 80% of energy by-product 
imports19.
Algeria’s good fortune in having abundant energy has its negative 
side, because it prevented the country from diversifying econom-
ically, to the extent that it has come to epitomise the «natural 
resources´ curse». Also referred to as the «Dutch disease syn-
drome», this means a rising currency value brought about by a 
sharp increase in hydrocarbon exports, encouraging imports and 
discouraging exports and, so, disincentivising diversification of 
the country’s economy.
At the same time, it drives away capital and the manufacturing 
and agricultural work force, increasing the cost of production in 
those sectors, making them less competitive20. The consequence 
of the Algerian economy’s overdependence on hydrocarbons is 
its greater exposure to the risk of significantly reducing industrial 
activities outside the mineral sector, because they are less profit-
able and thus less likely21.
All of this leads to an economy affected by the volatility of hydro-
carbon prices on the international markets, which has con-
sequences, on the country’s internal situation that are often 
dramatic. In this regard, Algeria puts across a «schizophrenic» 
image of a country totally dependent on oil revenue that fails to 
18 Lakhdar Habib, « Une future puissance régionale ? », L´Est, 19 April 2014. http://
www.lestrepublicain.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=10440:une-fu-
ture-puissance-r%C3%A9gionale-?&Itemid=585. 
19 «The Report Algeria 2018», 87.
20 Papyrakis, Elissaios / Raveh, Ohad (2014): «An Empirical Analysis of a Regional 
Dutch Disease: The Case of Canada», Environmental and Resource Economics 58, no. 
2, 179–98.
21 Palma, José Gabriel (2014): «De-Industrialisation, «premature» de-industrialisa-
tion and the Dutch Disease», Revista NECAT-Revista Do Núcleo de Estudos de Econo-
mia Catarinense 3, no. 5, 7–23. pp.8.
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offer its inhabitants the possibility of promotion, especially those 
in the youngest bracket, who turn to illegal immigration as an 
alternative.
The result is that, unlike Morocco and even Tunisia, whose econo-
mies are much more diversified, Algeria has a «rentier» economic 
model where public resources are almost entirely allocated to 
subsiding basic needs and to financing operating expenses, in a 
country where the State and its subsidiary firms provide half the 
jobs22.
Therefore, this situation gives the impression of an Algerian 
economy that operates with its hand on the brake, which means 
an economy subjected to the worst effects of its contradic-
tions: dismissals, unemployment, salary reductions and greater 
inequalities.
An economy historically dependent on hydrocarbon prices
At the same time, Algeria’s total dependence on oil and gas has 
given rise to an economic model that has always been affected by 
the volatility of hydrocarbon prices on the international markets, 
with consequences that have sometimes been dramatic, in the 
country’s own domestic situation. One such example occurred 
during the 1986 Oil Crisis, when the State’s foreign debt and the 
drop in oil sales forced Algeria to adopt a stringent structural 
adjustment plan (1994-98) under the supervision of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and the World Bank.23
The oil kickback can be regarded as a key moment in the dete-
rioration of Algeria’s economic decline24. It had a great effect 
on society as a whole and led to what came to be known as the 
Berber Spring of 1988, the subsequent emergence of terrorist 
groups, mainly the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), a forerunner of 
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the coup d’état in 1992 
and the «Black Decade», which lasted from 1991 to 2000, when 
22 Algerians enjoy energy subsidies (petrol cost 25 centimes a litre in March 2020), 
free universities, access to public health, even free books and homes for those who live 
more than 50 km away.
23 Mustapha Mekideche, »Le secteur des hydrocarbures en Algérie. Piège structurel ou 
opportunité encore ouverte pour une croissance durable?», Dans Confluences Méditer-
ranée 2009/4 (N°71), 153-166.
24 Thomas Serres, «L’Algérie face à la catastrophe suspendue: gérer la crise et blâmer 
le peuple sous Bouteflika (1999-2014)», KARTHALA Editions, 2019, 30.
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over 200,000 Algerian citizens lost their lives during the course 
of a savage civil war25.
The economic indicators only began to stabilise after 2000, 
encouraged by an increase in hydrocarbon prices, together with 
President Buteflika’s launching of the «Economic Revival Support 
Plan» in April 2001 during his first term of office, which enabled 
the country to increase its budget revenue from 950.5 million 
dinars in 1999 to 5,957.5 in 2013.
During this boom period lasting until 2014, Algeria felt the ben-
efits of certain very favourable international market conditions. 
Between 2005 and 2008, natural gas production rose from 146.2 
to 171.1 billion m3, whereas crude oil production increased from 
51.1 to 57.9 million tonnes. All of this enabled the revenue from 
oil and gas to increase by 6.2 (+526%) in a 15-year period26, so 
that by 2008 Algeria’s financial base was $51,000 million, equiv-
alent to 24 months of imports27.
At the same time, and based on the experience of the 1980s, in 
2000 the Algerian Authorities set up the «Revenue Regulation 
Fund» (FFR), a sovereign wealth fund supplied by a fraction of 
the budget surplus from hydrocarbon exports, whose aim was 
to keep the Algerian economy stable in the face of sharp falls in 
hydrocarbon prices on the international markets. In a favourable 
energy context, in 2014 the FFR reached the maximum level of 
193 billion dollars, after which it began to decrease.
By midway through the first decade of this 21st Century, Algeria 
appeared to have learnt the lesson of the 1980s and that its years 
of extreme poverty were over. A favourable international context 
together with an improvement in the country’s internal security, 
with the destruction of most of the terrorist cells operating inside 
the country and the ousting of the Armed Islamic Group to a 
zone in the Sahel where, after 2007, they were to become an 
offshoot of Al-Qaeda, allowed Buteflika’s first two governments 
(1999-2004 and 2004-2009) to legislate with a view to attracting 
new investors in this key sector of the economy. At the time, it 
25 Pierre Daum, «Mémoire interdite en Algérie, Le Monde diplomatique, August 2017», 
https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2017/08/DAUM/57773.
26 Amayas Zmirli, «Algérie - Plans de relance: la chronique d’un échec annoncé? - Le 
Point», https://www.lepoint.fr/economie/algerie-plans-de-relance-la-chronique-d-un-
echec-annonce-09-10-2017-2162999_28.php#.
27 Kassim Bouhou, «L’Algérie des réformes économiques: un goût d’inachevé», Politi-
que étrangère Eté, no. 2 (2009): 323, https://doi.org/10.3917/pe.092.0323.
Ignacio Fuente Cobo
246
seemed that Algeria was in a position to open up its hydrocarbons 
sector to the competition.
However, the structural reforms requested by the IMF to trans-
form Algeria into a market economy were not implemented. The 
increase in oil and gas prices, coupled with the investment and 
public expenditure cutbacks, enabled the regime to gain time 
and put off major reforms designed to diversify the economy so 
that it would not have to rely on hydrocarbons and change its 
growth model. Algeria lost a historic opportunity to modernise its 
economy28.
The Hydrocarbons Act was passed in 2005. It reduced the dura-
tion of contractual negotiations and offered a taxation system that 
sought to strengthen alliances with foreign firms and increase the 
number of operators in the sector, in such a way that the number 
of discoveries could be increased. However, this Act was fiercely 
opposed by the Regime’s most conservative elements, who 
claimed that energy resources were being handed over to foreign 
companies29, and it was these groups that eventually won the 
day. In 2006, an amendment was passed requiring Sonatrach to 
hold a 51% share in every contract signed with foreign operators, 
which made it less attractive for foreign capital to get involved 
in developing the country30 rendering it about as appealing as a 
forced marriage»31.
Consequences of the structural limitations of the Algerian 
economy
The structural limitations of the Algerian economy were brought 
to light as from 2014 with the drop in the prices of Brent and 
Sahara Blend hydrocarbons (this last being the one that the 
country exports), when the current account balance fell from a 
surplus of 10% in 2010, to a deficit of -3.3%, in 201432. Similarly, 
28 «Algeria: Toward an economic collapse? | Middle East Institute», https://www.mei.
edu/publications/algeria-toward-economic-collapse.
29 Maâmar Benguerba, «L’Algérie en péril: gouvernance, hydrocarbures et devenir du 
Sud», Editions L’Harmattan, 2006, 121-30.
30 Bouhou, «L’Algérie des réformes économiques». Op.cit.
31 Yves Bourdillon, «Le «modèle» économique algérien à bout de sou-
ffle», Les Echos, 5 December 2017, https://www.lesechos.fr/2017/12/
le-modele-economique-algerien-a-bout-de-souffle-188692.
32 World Bank, «Global Economic Prospect 2015», January 2015, https://www.world-
bank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/GEP/GEP2015a/pdfs/GEP15a_web_full.pdf. 
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gas and oil exports fell by 9% in quantity and 42% in value, in 
the period between the first 6-month periods in 2014 and 2015 
(i.e., they decreased from $33,210 to $19,280 million).
This fall caused a reduction in oil production, which dropped 
from two million barrels per day to 1.5 million between 2005 and 
2014, while gas production decreased by approximately 11%, 
falling from 88 billion cubic metres (Bcm) to 78 Bcm in the same 
period, stagnating at 83 Bcm for the next two years. However, in 
2017 production recovered and a notable increase of 14% was 
recorded when compared to 2015, partly due to the Tiguentourine 
gas processing facilities (In Amenas), which had been damaged 
during an Al-Qaeda terrorist attack in January 2013, returning to 
full capacity, plus the fact that there were slight increases in the 
In Salah gas supplies33.
The fact that production evolved negatively since 2008 can basi-
cally be attributed to four factors34: the aging of the main pro-
duction fields, a low renewal rate for new and proven reserves 
(discoveries), stagnation of the technical recovery rate that is 
33  Mostefa Ouki, «Algerian Gas in Transition», OIES PAPER: NG 151, The Oxforf Insti-
tute for Energy Studies, 2019, p.3, https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/
uploads/2019/10/Algerian-Gas-in-Transition-NG-151.pdf.
34 «Les exportations d’hydrocarbures pourraient baisser dès 2023»: Toute l’actualité 
sur liberte-algerie.com».
Figure 3. Algeria´s gas production, consumption and export
(Source: Sonatrach Ministère de l´énergie).
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still too low when compared to what could be achieved with new 
investments, and, finally, an inability to put recent discoveries into 
production. Thus, at the 2017 production rate, gas reserves are 
expected to run out in 47.5 years and oil reserves are expected 
to do likewise in 21.7 years35.
Furthermore, Algeria was unsuccessful with new tenders (four 
licences granted out of the 31 bid for in September 2014) which, 
combined with the reluctance of many companies to operate in 
the country, ruined Sonatrach’s ambitious exploration project 
(2014-2019), the State-owned hydrocarbons company, which 
had anticipated an investment of $102,000 million36. In the fol-
lowing years, all of this led to the abandonment of several pro-
jects that would have had considerable socioeconomic impact 
– including the construction of public hospitals and other projects 
providing employment – in a climate of constant depreciation of 
35 «The Report Algeria 2018», 79.
36 Francis Ghilés: «Algeria: the transition to the uncertain», EsGlobal 29 December 
2015.
Figure 4. Crude Oil Prices 1946 - Present. 
Fuente: https://inflationdata.com/articles/inflation-adjusted-prices/
historical-oil-prices-chart/.
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the dinar and price increases affecting both local consumer prod-
ucts and imported goods, as well as semi-finished products and 
commodities.
All of this reveals the Algerian economy’s major structural limi-
tations owing to a lack of diversification, the absence of a com-
prehensive investment plan and a lack of rigour where financial 
regulation is concerned. The consequence of the uselessness of 
the local production mechanisms was the Revenue Regulation 
Funds» (FFR) exchange reserves being utilised systematically, to 
cover the budget deficits in the ensuing years.
The positive aspect was that oil and gas exports, albeit dimin-
ished, could be supplemented by using the FFR, which enabled 
the country to keep the foreign deficit at -2.3% in 2013, increas-
ing to -4.7% in 201837 and keeping the unemployment rate down 
to 9.7% in 201438, this percentage having increased slightly to 
11.7% in 201939.
The fact that there is no foreign debt shows that the Algerian 
State still has a degree of financial margin, which means that in 
the near future it is rather unlikely that there will be a default 
scenario in the short term that would lead to a drop in the value 
of the local currency. Yet Algeria could still find itself suddenly 
required to allow its currency to depreciate and have to resort to 
external debt40.
The use of an unconventional internal financing for the budget 
debt thus indicates the failure of all the economic development 
plans devised by President Buteflika’s different Governments in 
the first decade of the new Millennium, since these plans, instead 
of liberalising the Algerian economy, silenced it. So, the Report 
for the year 2019 issued by the Fraser Institute, ranks Algeria as 
one of the five least «economically free» countries in the Arab 
World, a long way behind Morocco or Tunisia41.
37 Expansión/Datosmacro.com. https://datosmacro.expansion.com/deficit. 
38 «Taux de chômage par pays». Statistiques mondiales.com. http://www.statis-
tiques-mondiales.com/chomage.htm. 
39 https://es.theglobaleconomy.com/Algeria/unemployment_rate/.
40 See Report on the Middle East and North Africa from Crisis Group N°214, «Pulling 
Lebanon out of the Pit», 8 June 2020.
41 Salem Ben Nasser Al-Ismaily, Azzan Al-Busaidi, Miguel Cervantes, Fred McMa-




The rupture of the social contract
The fall in the price of crude oil from 2014, with its impact on 
the lives of Algerian citizens, left those in power without the vital 
factor for controlling the population. It must be remembered that 
during the Buteflika Era – when oil reached 148.93 dollars/barrel 
in June 2008 (with the average monthly price adjusted to infla-
tion) – the country benefited from a billion dollars in oil revenue 
that was entirely allocated to buying social peace42. But by 2014, 
this era of abundance, which required a minimum price of 110 
dollars on the international markets, had come to an end.
When hydrocarbon prices began to drop, the foreign trade deficit 
in a country that imports almost everything, rapidly deteriorated 
and reached $70,000 million. The social contract frittered away 
the reserve fund «just like ice in the sun», and reserves fell from 
200 billion dollars in 2014 to a mere 62 billion by the end of 
February 2020, just before the COVID-19 pandemic struck, and 
it is predicted that if it continues to dissipate at the current rate, 
42  Yves Bourdillon, »Le «modèle» économique algérien à bout de sou-
ffle», Les Echos, 5 December 2017, https://www.lesechos.fr/2017/12/
le-modele-economique-algerien-a-bout-de-souffle-188692.
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there will be nothing left of the Revenue Regulation Fund (FRR) 
before 202243.
The progressive deterioration of the economic situation led to the 
emergence of a horizontally organised citizens’ protest movement 
called Hirak (Movement) in February 2019, which in contrast to 
the Islamic or Amazigh movements, defended a perspective of 
citizenship that went well beyond the political and socio-regional 
divisions that had caused so many violent struggles in the past44.
On 2 April 2019, the Military Chief of Staff and Deputy Minister 
of Defence, Ahmed Gaïd Salah, under pressure from the mobi-
lisation of millions of citizens throughout the country45, forced 
President Abdelaziz Buteflika to resign. He had been in power 
since 1999 and had announced his intention to stand again for a 
fifth term of office, despite his age – 78 years – and his delicate 
state of health46.
On 12 December 2019, Abdelmadjid Tebboune, the former Prime 
Minister, was elected as President of the Algerian Republic, in elec-
tions characterised by low voting and street protests. Although 
the new President applied a policy of appeasement47, some Hirak 
activists stressed the need to carry on with the protests in the face 
of what they regarded as the newly elected President’s strategy 
having ignored the people´s demands. However, in March 2020, 
an overwhelming majority of the protestors decided to temporar-
ily shelve their demands in the face of the new global pandemic, 
and to stop street demonstrations. It was a question of «giving 
Hirak a break so it could return with renewed strength» 48 when 
the circumstances were more favourable.
At the same time, and in order to limit the economic and social 
effects of the pandemic, as from March 2020 the Government 
43 Hassan Haddouche, «L’Algérie pourra-t-elle échapper au FMI?», Middle East Eye, 
6th August 2020, https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/opinion-fr/algerie-petrole-fmi-
crise-economique. World Bank, «Global Economic Prospect 2015», January 2015, 
44 «Socialités et humanités. La citoyenneté en movement», Revue des sciences so-
ciales, no. 7 (2019).
45 «Algérie : vers le déconfinement du Hirak ?», Crisis Group, 27 July 
2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/
algeria/217-algerie-vers-le-deconfinement-du-Hirak.
46 »Le président algérien victime d’un AVC», AFP, 28 April 2013.
h t tp : / /www. la l i b re .be/ac tu / in te rna t i ona l / l e -p res iden t-a lge r i en-v i c -
time-d-un-avc-51b8fc43e4b0de6db9ca6630-.
47 Zeinab Filali, «Algérie : le président Tebboune met fin à une expression aussi vieille 




took a series of proactive decisions. These decisions ranged 
from postponing the payment of income tax and value added tax 
(VAT) for two months, to closing non-essential public services, 
and granting half of the executives and agents in the sector an 
exceptional paid leave for 14 days renewable.
Other back-up measures were also adopted for firms and the 
most deprived sectors of the population, such as the payment 
of a 10,000 dinar (€72) subsidy to families in need, plus the 
suspension of penalties for delays in works performed and ser-
vices provided in public contracts49. To prevent panic buying 
due to food shortages, since the end of March the Authori-
ties have been guaranteeing the country’s food supplies and 
have sought to calm down the population by increasing wheat 
orders on the international markets and increasing semolina 
production50.
The fall in prices, which also affected the gas sale contracts, 
mainly indexed to oil, threatened to deplete the decimated cur-
rency reserves while at the same time increasing the fiscal defi-
cit. The outcome was a critical situation affecting the Algerian 
economy for which the IMF forecast a 5.2% drop in 202051 
and a fiscal deficit of 20% of the GDP52. In the context of a 
decrease in oil prices and a severe economic crisis aggravated 
by the COVID-19 pandemic, in May 2020, the new President 
promised to keep the country independent, rejecting the possi-
bility of «resorting to loans from the IMF or the World Bank»53. 
It was an attempt to avoid repeating the negative experience 
the country suffered at the beginning of the 1990s, when it 
obtained IMF loans.
His proposal, with strong hints of nationalism, has been to resort 
to the savings of Algerian citizens that operate in the informal 
sector outside the traditional financial system and that amounts 
to between €42,570 and €71,000 million, because «when we ask 
49 «Une allocation de 10 000 DA aux familles impactées par la crise sanitaire», Tout 
sur l’Algérie, 13 April 2020.
50 «L’Algérie multiplie les achats de blé sur les marchés internationaux», El Iqtisadiya, 
3 April 2020.
51 «Confronting the Covid-19 Pandemic in the Middle East and Central Asia», FMI, 
Abril 2020.
52 Heba Saleh. Op.cit.
53 «I would rather borrow from Algerians than from the IMF says President», Corona Chron-
icles: 4 May – 7 May, Jeune Afrique with AFP, 20th May 2020. https://www.theafricareport.
com/27332/i-would-rather-borrow-from-algerians-than-from-the-imf-says-president/. 
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for loans from foreign banks, we cannot mention Palestine or the 
«Western Sahara»54, two causes that are very dear to Algiers.
However, if the reserves do run out, which is a plausible hypoth-
esis for 2023 and if a minimum degree of food and social security 
is not guaranteed, the Algerian Government may have no alter-
native but to resort to the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank if it wishes to prevent social upheaval55, especially if 
we take into account the fact that Algeria is a country in which 
approximately 50,000 small businesses are at risk of going bank-
rupt because of the measures aimed at containing COVID-1956 
and where more than 10 million informal workers (45% of the 
work force), have seen how their income has been significantly 
reduced during the partial lockdown period57.
The disclosure at the end of March 2020 that the Government 
was having talks with the IMF to guarantee part of a package of 
global rescue measures amounting to 50,000 million dollars is a 
good indication of the scale of the crisis, in view of the fact that 
the fund with its headquarters in Washington has a very bad rep-
utation in Algeria58.
However, the fact that the State budget is not overwhelmed by an 
unsustainable foreign debt is comforting and shows that the State 
has a degree of room to manoeuvre from a financial perspective. 
Yet this does not necessarily mean that Algeria might not sud-
denly find itself plunged into a situation where it has to allow its 
currency to depreciate and has to resort to external debt59.
All in all, «Algeria has sufficient buffers to adapt to the crisis in 
the short term. Even so, the harder the crisis hits in the rest of 
the world, the greater the risks will be to the Algerian economy 
and its ability to accept the new reality of lower oil prices, diffi-
cult external financing conditions and a constant depletion of its 
international reserves»60.
54 Ibidem.
55 Ali Benouari, « Crise économique: rompre impérativement avec les méthodes de 
gestion du passé », Le Soir d’Algérie, 16 April 2020.
56 «Plus de 50 000 restaurants et cafés au bord de la faillite», El Watan, 7 July 2020.
57 «L’emploi informel en Algérie : tendances et caractéristiques (2001-2010)», Les 
cahiers du MECAS, no. 12, June 2016.
58 «Algeria’s upstream rebirth is interrupted», https://www.petroleum-economist.com/
articles/upstream/exploration-production/2020/algeria-s-upstream-rebirth-is-interrupted.
59 «Pulling Lebanon out of the Pit | Crisis Group», https://www.crisisgroup.org/
middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/lebanon/214-pulling-lebanon-out-pit.
60 «Algeria: Toward an economic collapse? | Middle East Institute».
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The Algerian energy sector crisis
Since 2014, the Algerian energy sector has been in crisis. The 
sharp drop in oil prices that happened that year brought about a 
9% drop in gas and oil export figures, amounting to a 42% drop 
in their value, in the period between the first six months of 2014 
and 2015 (i.e., they fell from $33,210 million to $19,280 million).
Although the situation improved slightly in the following years, 
the coronavirus crisis has had a major impact on a sector fraught 
with a serious structural crisis. Algeria was one of the countries 
most affected by Saudi Arabia’s decision, at the beginning of 
March 2020, to embark on a price war, a measure that aggra-
vated the collapse in demand caused by COVID-19, causing the 
Brent and Sahara Blend oil prices to fall from 70 and 65 dollars a 
barrel, in January 2020, to respectively 19 and 15 dollars in April 
2020.
Although prices rose once again in June, both qualities reach-
ing 42 dollars, they are still highly volatile and depend on the 
extension to the reduction in supply that the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEP +)61 decided to implement. 
As the Minister of Energy, Abdelmadjid Attar, has stated, «Algeria 
is suffering economically. The international oil market has col-
lapsed. Hydrocarbon production has plummeted, Oil exports have 
plummeted. Algeria’s oil revenue is having serious problems»62.
Notwithstanding, it is not only a question of hydrocarbon prices 
falling, but also that in Algeria, as is the case in other African oil-ex-
porting countries, population growth and an increase in urban 
development, are bringing about a greater domestic demand for 
energy, which has increased by over 50% since 2007, whereas oil 
production has fallen by 25%63.
The unwillingness of the Algerian Authorities to tackle the polit-
ically thorny question of subsidies, in a country where – in gas 
and electricity alone – subsidies amount to around $8,000 mil-
61 «L’OPEP+ poursuit sa stratégie de baisse de l’offre pétrolière», Connaissance des 
énergies, 8 June 2020.
62 Khaled Remouche, «Rente, situation économique, réserves et transition énergétique: 
Attar au personnel de Sonelgaz, le compteur à l’heure de crise !», Reporters, 16 July 
2020. https://www.reporters.dz/rente-situation-economique-reserves-et-transition-
energetique-attar-au-personnel-de-sonelgaz-le-compteur-a-lheure-de-crise/ 
63 «Algeria, che cosa farà Sonatrach con ExxonMobil, Chevron, Eni e Lukoil - Startmag», 
https://www.startmag.it/energia/perche-lalgeria-non-si-gasa-piu-con-il-suo-gas/.
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lion, or what amounts to the same, 4% of the GDP, does not help 
to improve this already difficult situation. What is more, low elec-
tricity prices for Algerian consumers (approximately 30% of its 
production cost) is one of the main factors that has led to the rapid 
increase in domestic consumption and the hazardous reduction 
in the export of hydrocarbons, which are becoming increasingly 
consumed locally64. All of this has contributed towards jeopard-
ising export capacity with the consequent negative effect on the 
foreign balance of payments.
This particularly difficult state of affairs regarding Algerian hydro-
carbon exports has been further accentuated by the loss of mar-
ket share in major markets such as Spain, where in 2020, for the 
first time in 30 years, Algeria ceased to be Spain’s top supplier, 
having been ousted by the US. In February 2020, US natural gas 
accounted for 27% of Spanish imports, whereas Algerian supplies 
only amounted to 22.6% of total natural gas imports, with a very 
sharp drop of up to 38.4% when compared to the same period in 
2019 when the percentage stood at 48.5%65.
All of the above has served to hasten the country’s economic 
decline, causing revenue from oil and gas exports to amount to a 
mere 23,000 million dollars in 2020, a reduction of $10,000 mil-
64 «L’augmentation des prix de l’électricité est l’affaire de l’État»: Toute l’actualité 
sur liberte-algerie.com», accessed 10th September 2020, https://www.liberte-algerie.
com/actualite/laugmentation-des-prix-de-lelectricite-est-laffaire-de-letat-306654.
65 «L’Algérie perd sa place de fournisseur principal en gaz de l’Espagne», https://
www.dzairdaily.com/algerie-premier-fournisseur-gaz-espagne-hydrocarbures/.
Figure 6. Use of gas by sectors. (Source: Fraser Institute 2019).
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lion in comparison with the year before66 and 18,000 million when 
compared to 201867. Even with the highly competitive cost of oil 
in some of its deposits, such as those in Hassi Messaoud – where 
the price can be even lower than $3 per barrel – Algeria needs a 
minimum price of 100 dollars per barrel to balance its budget68.
The problems affecting the State-owned energy companies
Algeria has two large energy supply and distribution companies, 
Sonelgaz and Sonatrach. The former, the Socièté Nationale de 
l’Electricité et du Gaz, (Sonelgaz) is the public firm responsible 
for distributing electricity and natural gas in Algeria. Established 
in 1969, it not only has a monopoly over the distribution and sale 
of natural gas in Algeria, but also over the production, distribu-
tion, import and export of electricity69. With an inflated work-
66 Agence Ecofin, «Algérie : les recettes d’exportation d’hydrocarbures chuteront à 23 
milliards $ en 2020 (gouvernement)», Agence Ecofin, https://www.agenceecofin.com/
hydrocarbures/2207-78817-algerie-les-recettes-d-exportation-d-hydrocarbures-chu-
teront-a-23-milliards-en-2020-gouvernement.
67 «tendancesmonetaires_2semestre2018.pdf», 2, https://www.bank-of-algeria.dz/
pdf/tendancesmonetaires_2semestre2018.pdf.
68 «Breakeven Oil Prices», Data IMF, 2019. https://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=60214246 
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Figure 7. Fossil fuel subsidies.
Source: AIE, https://www.iea.org/topics/energy-subsidies.
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force of 94,335 employees at the end of 2019 (3% more than 
the 2018 figure)70, compared to the 10,000 workers employed 
by the Spanish company ENDESA, or the 70,000 workforce at 
the French EDF Group, the second largest energy producer and 
distributor in the world after China Energy Investment, Sonel-
gaz is in a difficult economic situation and has a large debt. In 
the words of its President and CEO of the Chahar Boulakhras 
Group, the debt reached 408 million Euros in 201971, which 
means that it is difficult to make the investments required to 
develop its energy networks and infrastructure that would ena-
ble it to improve the quality of its services and to meet the 
market demand.
Although only a drastic cutback in the number of workers and 
a modernisation of the company would enable it to survive, not 
only on the domestic market but also the regional and African 
markets, according to the Minister of Energy Abdelmadjid Attar 
(a former employee of Sonatrach), such a measure would be 
extremely unpopular in a country where employment offers are 
few and far between. Therefore, the solution seems to be more a 
question of lowering the salaries, which could prove to be more 
acceptable from a social perspective72. A foreign debt could also 
be a necessity, which according to its Chairman Chahar Bou-
lakhras, «has become a necessity»73, in the face of the difficul-
ties the company is experienced when it comes to developing 
its energy networks and infrastructure, improving service quality 
and meeting the market demand.
The Sonatrach Group, (Société Nationale pour la Recherche, la 
Production, le Transport, la Transformation, et la Commerciali-
sation des Hydrocarbures) is a monopoly established to exploit 
hydrocarbons. It has 180,000 employees and produces 30% of 
Algeria’s GDP. Although it is not in such a complicated financial 
situation as Sonelgaz, its operating and investment costs account 
for between 20 and 30% of its billing with an oil price standing at 
70 «Sonelgaz : une entreprise citoyenne, une fierté nationale | El Djazaircom», https://www.
eldjazaircom.dz/2020/09/29/sonelgaz-une-entreprise-citoyenne-une-fierte-nationale/.
71 «Sonelgaz : La dette du groupe atteint 62 mds DA en 2019 - Algerie Eco», https://
www.algerie-eco.com/2019/12/31/sonelgaz-dette-groupe-atteint-2019/.
72 Pedro Canales, «Algeria considering massive layoffs to modern-
ize its industry», Atalayar, 24th July 2020, https://atalayar.com/content/
Algeria-estudia-despidos-masivos-para-modernizar-su-industria. 





65 dollars a barrel74. Therefore, it is a «rent-seeking» company 
that is far from being competitive in an open oil market on a 
global scale, especially if it is compared with other oil giants, such 
as Halliburton, which employs 55,000 people and has a turno-
ver of 240,000 million dollars, compared to the Algerian firm’s 
40,000 million dollars75.
The Minister and ex-CEO at Sonatrach, Abdelmadjid Attar, is 
relying on the hydrocarbons giant continuing to be the driving 
force behind the country’s economy because it holds the monop-
oly in the sector, but if this is to be the case, major reforms are 
needed. The company «will have to reduce extraction and oper-
ating expenses», which are much higher than the world average, 
especially at a time when the fall in the price of natural gas is 
even sharper than the drop in oil prices. In the words of the 
Chairman of Naturgy Francisco Reynés, «gas prices are becom-
ing increasingly disassociated with the price of oil, the difference 
between gas and oil prices in 2019 being 38%»76. If Sonatrach is 
to be competitive, it must restructure its activities, focusing on its 
main purpose of prospecting, production, transporting, process-
ing and commercialisation of hydrocarbons, which means pulling 
out of other disassociated sectors where it operates such as air 
transport with the firm Tassili Airlines77.
A new energy model for Algeria?
The sharp reduction that is expected in the total exports of natu-
ral gas and liquid natural gas (LNG) in the next few years -which 
according to the Minister Attar, could fall to 26-30,000 million 
74 Lagha Chegrouche, «Comment Khelil et Ould-Kaddour ont transformé Sonatrach en 
coquille vide - Algérie Patriotique», https://www.algeriepatriotique.com/2020/07/09/
sonatrach-management-sclerose-infrastructures-vieillissantes-culture-rentiere/.
75 Pedro Canales. Op cit.
76 The average price of Brent and WTI oil fell by 21% and 17%, respectively, when 
compared to the first three months of 2019. At the end of the first quarterly peri-
od in 2020, the price of Brent was less than 20 dollars per barrel. The price of gas 
dropped even more sharply, with falls ranging from 36%, in the case of Henry Hub, 
and 56%, in the case of Algonquín. Juan Cruz Peña: «Spain turned off the gas tap on 
Algeria in the face of the knockdown prices of the vessels arriving from the USA», El 
Confidencial, 7th May 2020. https://www.elconfidencial.com/economia/2020-05-07/
espana-cierra-grifo-gas-Algeria-precios-buques-eeuu_2583132/ 
77 «Attar: des discussions pour résoudre le problème du flux de trésorerie de So-
natrach», http://www.aps.dz/economie/108757-discussions-avec-le-ministere-des-fi-
nances-pour-la-resolution-du-probleme-du-flux-de-tresorerie-de-sonatrach.
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cubic metres per year in 2025-2030 when compared to the 40.9 
billion cubic metres of gas and LNG that Algeria exported to Europe 
in 201978, indicates the urgency of the reform process that has to 
be carried out on the State-monopoly companies, starting with 
Sonatrach, which would enable production to be increased and 
would cut down on cost, while also encouraging diversification. It 
would be a question of introducing a new energy model in Alge-
ria that would make it possible to revitalise this strategic sector, 
the driving force of the economy and main provider of the State 
budget.
This is the message that would appear to have been understood 
by the current Algerian Government, for whom the lack of devel-
opment of new fields makes it paramount to review the legal 
system governing hydrocarbons, owing to a reduction in produc-
tion volume and the increasing growth in domestic consumption. 
It is a situation described by the Ministry of Energy’s Director 
General of Hydrocarbons, Mustapha Hanifi, as «a structural defi-
cit between domestic supply and demand as from 2025… when 
60% of the energy reserves will have been consumed for all the 
products combined»79.
Hence, the first measure adopted by the new Algerian Govern-
ment after winning the December 2019 Elections was to review 
the legal system affecting hydrocarbons, especially in contractual 
and fiscal matters, with passing on 11 December that same year, 
of a new Hydrocarbons Act whose aim is to prevent putting Alge-
ria in a structural deficit situation between domestic supply and 
demand. It is a matter of renewing the reserves and keeping up 
production capacity at least throughout the transition period until 
2030, for the purpose of which major investments and, above all, 
association with other international companies80 must be made.
The new Act thus plans to conserve «Standard 51/49», which 
regulates Sonatrach’s partnerships with foreign companies, con-
solidating the national company’s monopoly as leader in the 
hydrocarbons research & operation sector, considered to be a 
78 Sebastiano Torrini, «Algeria: Sonatrach conferma gli sforzi per incrementa-
re la produzione di gas», Energía Oltre, 17 August 2020, https://energiaoltre.it/
algeria-sonatrach-conferma-gli-sforzi-per-incrementare-la-produzione-di-gas/ 
79 Adlène Meddi, «Algérie : cette nouvelle loi sur les hydrocarbures qui ne passe pas 
- Le Point», https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/algerie-cette-nouvelle-loi-sur-les-hydrocar-
bures-qui-ne-passe-pas-14-10-2019-2341125_3826.php.




strategic and highly sensitive social sector, but also limiting the 
potential for foreign investment81.
However, the new Act also introduces three types of contracts 
in the sector, that potential international partners will find give 
them greater fiscal advantages, while at the same time ena-
bling Algeria to share the risks – and the profits – linked to the 
prospection operations that Sonatrech is currently performing 
alone. To a certain extent, this amounts to a return to the suc-
cessful system that existed in the previous Act 86/14 (1986) and 
that led to the major discoveries of hydrocarbons in the Berkine 
Basin in the 1990s. The fiscal advantages are even greater in the 
area of unconventional and offshore hydrocarbons, whose poten-
tial is promising in Algeria. Such measures could enable Algeria 
to renew its reserves and relaunch production activities, which 
would help to guarantee its energy security82.
Furthermore, in 2019 the Algerian Government would have sought 
to give a degree of stability to the gas exports with the signing of 
several agreements by Sonatrach and its partners to renew gas 
contracts in the medium- and long-term83. Sonatrach signed a 
protocol with the Italian company ENI renewing Italy’s long-term 
contract to supply Algerian natural gas. Sonatrach also signed an 
agreement with Edison (Italian as well) to renew a purchase & 
sale contract for Algerian natural gas for an 8-year period until 
2027, which guarantees an investment level of 13,000 Mcm/year 
of natural gas delivered to the Italian market via the «Trans Med-
iterranean Gas Pipeline», allowing for the possibility of an exten-
sion until 2029. These two agreements will enable Sonatrach to 
consolidate its position on the Italian market, where it will con-
tinue to be one of that country’s main providers of natural gas.
In 2019, Sonatrach signed agreements with the Portuguese com-
pany Galp Energia regarding the supply of Algerian natural gas to 
Portugal. The volumes concerned are 2,500 Mcm/year, extend-
81 Lazhar Sahbani, «Revue des principales mesures de la nouvelle loi sur les hydrocar-
bures en Algérie», PricewaterhouseCoopers Algérie, January 2020, https://pwcalgerie.
pwc.fr/fr/files/pdf/2020/01/fr-algerie-pwc-loi-hydrocarbure-2020.pdf. 
82 These are the participation contract, the shared production contract and the isk 
services contract. «- Entrée en vigueur de la nouvelle loi... - Europétrole», https://
www.euro-petrole.com/entree-en-vigueur-de-la-nouvelle-loi-regissant-les-hydrocar-
bures-en-algerie-n-i-19983.
83 Badra Hafiane, «L’adoption d’une nouvelle loi des hydrocarbures marque le secteur 
de l’énergie en 2019», http://www.aps.dz/economie/99397-l-adoption-d-une-nouve-
lle-loi-des-hydrocarbures-marque-le-secteur-de-l-energie-en-2019.
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ing for an additional 10-year period this bilateral agreement. 
Sonatrach also signed an agreement with the Spanish companies 
Cepsa and Naturgy to sell Cepsa’s shares in the Medgaz Pipeline, 
which increased Sonatrach’s shareholding in Medgaz from 43% 
to 51%. Finally, medium-to-long term agreements were signed 
with the French company ENGIE, regarding the purchase and 
sale of liquid natural gas and gas via pipeline.
Another course of action taken by the Algerian Authorities was 
to invest 78,000 million dollars in upstream activities until 2021, 
most of this being given over to prospecting and exploration. 
Recent exploration efforts proved to be fruitful, with the discov-
ery of 17 oilfields and gas fields in the first five months of 2018, 
compared to 14 for the same period in 2017, in keeping with 
the sharp increase in discoveries since 2010 yielding 32 registra-
tions in 2016 and a further 33 in 2017. At the same time, major 
amounts have been invested in modernising the mature fields 
such as Hassi R’Mel with 2,790 million until 2020; this has helped 
to ensure that the level of reserves still remaining, increased 
from 4,130 million toe84 in 2017 to 4,190 million toe in 201885.
A new energy strategy
The SH2030 strategy «Lead the Change» launched in 2018 by 
Sonatrach, is based on a substantial change in its economic 
vision: the earlier strategy based on volumes of exports has 
become obsolete and has to be replaced by new markets with 
better added value86. This basically involves diverting 50% of 
the exports to the Asian markets to the detriment of Europe. 
To achieve this, Algeria intends to utilise the remaining export 
capacity of liquid gas – which in 2018 amounted to 44% of the 
total capacity – to cater for exports to potential Asian markets.
However, having the infrastructure makes no sense if the availa-
bility of gas for export at competitive prices is not increased. In 
an international market saturated with new and more aggres-
sive competitors, such as Qatar, Nigeria, the USA, Australia, or 
Mozambique, all of which are able to sell liquid gas to Europe for 
84 Oil-equivalent tonnes.
85 «The Report Algeria 2018», 79.





less than 6 $/MMBtu87, it will be very difficult for Algeria to export 
more than small quantities on an occasional basis to the Asian 
markets and even hold to its share of the European markets88.
That is why Sonatrach has set a target to generate 20,000 million 
cubic metres of unconventional resources for 2030 and 70,000 
million for 2040, as well as to explore an offshore area cover-
ing 100,000 square kilometres along the Algerian Coast. Yet this 
cannot be done without attracting other companies to the bidding 
rounds for the energy fields, and the ability to do this will depend 
on the success of its policy of dealing with foreign companies 
bilaterally and abandoning public tenders89.





























Illizi (SE) Ain Tsila 
liquefied gas 
field.







Touat September 2019 4.5 Bcm/year Sonatrach, 
Neptune 
Energy
87 1 MMBtu is equal to 1 million BTU (British Thermal Unit). Natural gas is measured in 
MMBtu. 1 MMBtu = 28.263682 m3 of natural gas at defined temperature and pressure.
88 «GNL: Sonatrach envisage d’augmenter ses exportations vers 
l’Asie - Algerie Eco», https://www.algerie-eco.com/2018/11/23/
gnl-sonatrach-envisage-daugmenter-ses-exportations-vers-lasie/.
89 «Sonatrach Unveils 2030 Strategy, But Can It Be Implement-
ed?», Hart Energy, https://www.hartenergy.com/exclusives/
sonatrach-unveils-2030-strategy-can-it-be-implemented-30359.
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Table 1: Investment / Production Summary
Source, Website data from the companies and miscellaneous articles
Yet even if the new gas projects in the south-west and in the new 
producing region in the south-east of Illizi are able to provide 
almost 19 Bcm per year for midway through the 2020s, they 
would be insufficient to cater for a domestic natural gas demand 
that is expected to increase by 21 Bcm in 2028, from the 46 Bcm 
available in 2018.
Furthermore, it is not sufficient for Algerian gas to carry on being 
competitive in cost for export to Europe. The export terms and 
conditions have to be just as flexible as those of its competi-
tors, to adapt to the new gas market realities where prices are 
Ignacio Fuente Cobo
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set on the basis of the cost at the production centres, contracts 
are signed for shorter periods and where those contracts con-
tain renegotiation clauses that depend on how market conditions 
evolve90.
Neither do past memories of delays and non-fulfilments in the 
performance of projects already approved by Sonatrach give 
cause for optimism. By way of example, its largest contract 
awarded recently, a $3,700 million agreement signed at the 
beginning of January 2020 to construct a completely new refinery 
was first considered more than seven years ago. A second refin-
ery planned a long time ago in Tiaret, and a petrochemical facility 
agreed with the main French company Total early in 2019, after 
years of intermittent negotiations, are among the investments 
that will probably not see the light for several years91.
Algeria is making a great effort to develop its gas pipeline net-
work increasing its export capacity92. As a result, in February 
2018 a new 765 km gas pipeline was opened connecting Reggane 
North and the GR5 compression station at Hassi R’Mel operating 
since July 2017. Other enlargements to gas pipeline networks 
are also being undertaken such as the $274 million construction 
of a new 200 km long line between El Aricha and Beni Saf, com-
pleted in August 2020, whose development will allow gas from 
the Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline to reach MEDGAZ. A conse-
quence of this project will be to increase the capacity of the latter 
from 8,000 million cubic metres a year, to 10,000 million cubic 
metres a year93.
Another option is to develop unconventional resources in the 
form of shale gas, which could become a pedestal in Algeria’s 
future energy sector94. However, exploitation attempts have 
been strongly resisted by local inhabitants, whose livelihoods 
in the desert terrain depend on water supplies pumped from a 
90 «Algerian Gas in Transition», Ouki y Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 18.
91 «Algeria’s upstream rebirth is interrupted», https://www.petroleum-economist.com/
articles/upstream/exploration-production/2020/algeria-s-upstream-rebirth-is-interrupted.
92 At present, all the gas produced in Algeria is sent to the national gas distribution 
centre at Hassi R’Mel, from where the aggregate gas supplies are sent via the gas pipe-
lines that run to Spain or Italy, or to the LNG plants in the north.
93 «The Report Algeria 2018», 79.
94 In 2014, Sonatrach drilled two exploratory shale gas wells close to the city. The results were 
described by the then Minister of Energy, Youcef Yousfi, as «very promising» and proof of the fact 
that they were «resource that were worth exploiting». http://fracturahidraulicaenburgosno.
com/los-suenos-de-gas-de-esquisto-de-Algeria-son-una-pesadilla-para-los-lugarenos/ 
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deep aquifer system underneath the Sahara95. In an effort to 
placate the population, on 23 January 2020 the President of Alge-
ria, Abdelmajid Tebboune, stated that: «Shale gas is necessary» 
and gave the US as an example where «the shale gas wells are 
drilled in the middle of areas that are surrounded by residential 
houses»96. In spite of this, it will be difficult to convince the locals 
about the advantages.
At the same time, since 2011, Algeria has made the develop-
ment of renewable energies a national priority with the National 
Renewable Energies Development Plan. Algeria has a high inso-
lation level, more than 3,000 hours of sunlight per year, and an 
extremely high average insolation reaching 5 KWh/m2 per day, 
which increases to 6.2 KWh/m2 in the southern region, making 
Algeria the country with the greatest solar potential in the MENA 
Region and one of the highest in the world.
The plan involves installing by 2030, a renewable capacity of around 
22,000 MW, which will amount to 27% of the national energy mix, 
with an export option remaining open, if market conditions so per-
mit97. With a view to this, Sonatrach plans to invest 1,900 million 
dollars in renewable energies between 2019 and 2023 in order 
to achieve an installed generation capacity of 1.3 GW. Algeria’s 
immense solar potential could cater for domestic demand, reliev-
ing the pressure on gas consumption while at the same time gen-
erating growing exports as production costs continue to fall98.
Wind energy has only been developed to a limited extent, because 
it is less profitable than solar energy, given that it varies on the 
basis of the wind speed, which in Algeria is relatively moder-
ate, the annual average being 9.7 km per second. Moreover, the 
cost of wind farm maintenance in the Sahara is much higher. At 
present, Algeria has only one wind farm in the whole country, 
constructed in 2014 in Kabertene in the wilaya of Adrar, with a 
generation capacity of 10 MW.
95 Algeria is one of the most water-stressed countries in the world, with 300 litres of 
water per inhabitant compared to the world average of 7,000. This level is expected 
to be halved by 2050. Ghanimah Al-Otaibi, «In figures: facts about the water crisis in 
the Arab world», World Bank, 19 March 2015. https://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/
numbers-facts-about-water-crisis-arab-world 
96 «The ins and outs of shale gas», https://atalayar.com/blog/
los-en tre sijos-del-gas-de-esquisto.
97 «Ministry of Energy | Algérie», https://www.energy.gov.
dz/?rubrique=energies-nouvelles-renouvelables-et-maitrise-de-lrenergie.
98 «The Report Algeria 2018», 80-81.
Ignacio Fuente Cobo
266
It could be said that renewable energy development is taking 
place very slowly, and that Algeria is far from making renewable 
energies form part of the national energy mix.
Energy in Libya. War, power and oil
Without oil Libya does not exist
Without hydrocarbons, Libya might not even exist. Without oil 
and gas, there would be no work, no wages, no food and, what is 
more, there would not even be any war. Oil pays for Libya’s food 
imports, which amount to 20% of the total99 and the salaries in 
a public sector, which account for over 80 % of the work force100. 
Oil also finances however the struggle for power between rival 
groups that has been going on since 2011101. Libya is a coun-
try where the revenue from hydrocarbons accounts for 97 % 
of the GDP, 97% of the revenue from exports and 99% of the 
Government’s revenue102, a proportion much higher than in any 
other Arab oil-exporting country. As Ghassan Salame, the UN 
envoy to Libya, stated in November 2018 before the UN Secu-
rity Council, the Libyan conflict is, to a large extent, «a conflict 
over resources».103 In this sense, energy stability can only be 
achieved if the conflict is solved.
This is particularly important when considering Libya’s oil produc-
tion prospects. There are three reasons for this, the first being 
that the actual Libyan economy is more closely linked to interna-
tional oil prices than the economies of other oil exporters, which 
makes the country particularly vulnerable to economic shocks 
and to external variations in oil prices. The second reason is that 
the civil conflict situation in the country, aggravated by the pres-
ence of foreign stakeholders, causes the prospects of greater 
growth in production dependent on an agreement between the 
contenders in the conflict about the best way to manage Libya’s 
current and potential resources. The third reason implies that the 
99 «FAOSTAT», http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#country/124.
100 «MENA Quarterly Economic Brief», The World Bank, January 2014, p.18.
101  Chris Stephen, «Partition of Libya looms as fight for oil sparks vicious new divide», 
The Observer, Sunday 16th March 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
mar/16/libya-partition-looms-fight-oil-tanker. 
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reaching of a settlement between the opposing sides in Libya and 
the international partners would act as a great incentive for the 
country’s energy sector, which could prosper rapidly generating 
increased flow of oil and more revenue.
Libya has an extensive network of refineries dotted all along the 
Mediterranean Coast, consisting of104:
• Az Zawiya Refinery: lying in the north-west of Libya, with a 
crude oil processing capacity of 120.000 bbl/d105.
• Ras Lanuf Export Refinery: lying in the Gulf of Sirte, with a 
crude oil refining capacity of 220.000 bbl/d.
• Tobruk Refinery: located along the Libya’s eastern coast, with 
a crude oil capacity of 20.000 bbl /d.
• Brega Refinery: lying in the north-east of Libya, with a crude 
oil capacity of 10.000 bbl/d.
• Sarir Refinery: a back-up plant, with 10.000 bbl/d.
Gas production and export commenced in 2003, the year in which 
the Western Libya Gas Project got under way, which led to the 
commissioning of the 370-mile gas pipeline «Greenstream» in 
2004, jointly run by the Italian State-owned company ENI and 
the Libyan National Oil Company (NOC), whose operation from 
104 «Libyan Oil & Natural Gas, https://www.temehu.com/oil-gas.htm.
105 Abbreviation for barrel of oil per day, a volume of 42 US gallons [0.16 m3].




Mellitah in the west of Libya and Gela in Sicily makes it possible 
to understand why Italy immediately supported the Government 
in Tripoli after the fall of Gaddafi106. The gas flow was interrupted 
during the initial phase of the war in 2011, for eight months, and 
began to recover in 2012, but it has never returned to the levels 
it reached before hostilities broke out.
Something similar has happened with liquid natural gas (LNG); 
Libya, Algeria and the USA (Alaska) were pioneers in exporting 
to foreign markets, mainly Spain. However, during the revolu-
tion, the only LNG Plant constructed in Marsa-Al-Brega, owned 
by NOC and operated by Sirte Oil Company, was badly damaged 
at the beginning of 2011, so exports were interrupted. However, 
its production never exceeded one third of its maximum capacity, 
mainly because of technical limitations107.
Libyan oil ports, fields, refineries and operators (2020)
Loading 
ports




































Abu Attifel, NC-125 Mellitah Eni
Nakhla (C97)1 Wintershall Wintershall, 
Gazprom















106 «Che cos’è il gasdotto Greenstream - InsideOver», 29 December 2018, https://
it.insideover.com/schede/politica/cosa-e-greenstream.html.
107 The Plant does not have the technology to separate some liquid gases from the liq-
uefied LNGs, which limits the number of receiving terminals able to process the latter.
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Libyan oil ports, fields, refineries and operators (2020)
Loading 
ports
Region Main fields Refinery Operator Main 
partners
Nasser (Zelten), 
Raguba, Lehib (Dor 
Marada)6
Sirte Oil none
Mellitah West El Feel (Elephant), 
mixed with 
condensate from 






West El Sharara (NC-115 
and NC-186 fields)
Zawiya Akakus Repsol, Total, 
OMV
Bouri7 West Bouri (offshore) Mellitah Eni
Farwah 
(Al-Jurf)7
West Al-Jurf (offshore)  Mabruk Total
1  The oil from Nakhla (C97) is mixed with the product from Eni´s Abu Attifel Field.
2  Most of the production from the Agoco Fields can be sent to Ras Lanuf and Marsa al 
Hariga (Tobruk).
3  The oil from the Hamada Field, which is in the West, is sent to Zawiya. This oil is normally 
used in the country.
4 The oil produced in NC74 is sent to Ras Lanuf.
5 The crude oil from Zueitina can also be sent to the terminal at Ras Lanuf.
6  Production from Lehib is mixed with the output from one of the Harouje Fields and sent 
to Ras Lanuf.
7 Bouri and Farwah (Al-Jurf) are offshore loading terminals for Mellitah.
Table 2. Libyan oil ports, fields, refineries and operators (2020)
Sources: U.S. Energy Information Administration based on data from Energy 
Intelligence, Middle East Economic Survey (MEES), company websites, Oil & 
Gas Journal, and Lloyd’s List Intelligence (APEX tanker data).





Civil war and energy
Yet the great advantages offered by the high quality of Libya’s oil, 
the ease with which it can be extracted and the proximity of the 
consumer markets in Europe, are counteracted by the fact that 
hydrocarbon production and exports in Libya have been badly 
affected by the conflict in recent years, and the situation has 
undergone many ups and downs depending on the way the mili-
tary situation has been evolving. This can be analysed by dividing 
the history of Libyan hydrocarbons since 2011 into four major 
periods.
1st PHASE: Upheaval followed by relative stability
Before the 2011 Revolution, Libya had major plans to increase its 
production: initially up to 1.7 million bbl/d, and later to increase 
this quantity still further to 2 million bbl/d. Yet this amount was 
way below the maximum levels of over 3 million bbl/d reached 
at the end of the 1960s, the period when oil production in Libya 
was affected by the partial nationalisation of the industry and by 
the sanctions imposed by the US and the United Nations, which 
prevented the investment needed to keep oil production at its 
highest levels.
The lifting of the international sanctions, imposed after the 
Lockerbie Air Disaster in 1984, enabled in 2004 the oil compa-
nies to return, leading to a rise in production from 1.4 million 
bbl/d in 2000 to 1.74 million bbl/d in 2008, and it also made it 
possible for the country to launch an investment programme as 
from 2009, which included plans to open 23 new oilfields, adding 
775,000 barrels of oil per day108.
In spite of this, the deterioration of the security situation prompted 
by the Revolution upset these highly ambitious plans. In 2011 
hydrocarbon exports from Libya were almost completely inter-
rupted during the Civil War, while at the same time the annual 
gross domestic product decreased by 62%109. Annual production 
fell from 1.8 million barrels before the war, to just over 500,000 
108 As-Shafir, «Libyan Militias Control the Oil Industry», Al-Monitor, 14 February 2014. 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/02/libya-oil-industry-control-militias.
html.
109 «IMF Country Report No. 13/151, Libya», International Monetary Fund. May 2013. 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13151.pdf. 
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barrels in 2011, and these quantities were mainly consumed 
domestically110.
This period of great instability coinciding with the fall of Gaddafi 
did not last very long, and the oil production lost during the Civil 
War recovered rapidly in view of the limited damage caused to 
the energy infrastructure. The first phase after the fall of Gadd-
afi, which lasted from mid-2011 to mid-2013, was characterised 
by being a period of relative stability, which demonstrated how 
resilient the Libyan energy sector was, once again achieving a 
growth in production that reached more than 1.4 million bbl/d in 
just over six months. It was an amazing recovery, but it would 
not be the last time that the country was to surprise foreign 
analysts111.
Those years included elections to form a new Government and 
efforts to draw up a new Constitution. Even so, the major prob-
lem, from the very outset, was that the new Libyan Govern-
ment showed itself to be unable to deactivate the militias that 
had emerged in the struggle against Gaddafi. Each one of these 
groups had its own ideology and retained its own tribal loyalties, 
so every armed group used its power to try and impose its own 
demands. Little by little these militias were gaining control over 
security in the cities and at the frontiers, as well as controlling 
management of the detention centres and country’s energy facil-
ities112.[]
As the Libyan Government was unable to get rid itself of the mili-
tias, it used the most important ones to combat the tribal and 
ethnic struggles that were tearing apart extensive zones in the 
country, and it did so grouping together the most powerful local 
militias into one single structure that it called the «Libya Shield 
Force» placing it under the Government’s payroll and splitting it 
into three geographical areas (West, Centre and East). This was 
tantamount to creating three military divisions113:
• Libya Shield 1, in the Cyrenaica Region, which in 2014 
came to form part of the Shura «Council of the Benghazi 
Revolutionaries».
110 «International - U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)», https://www.eia.
gov/international/analysis/country/LBY.
111 «APICORP_Energy_Research_V03_N14_2018.pdf».
112 Rosa Meneses, «Libya, under the law of the armed militias«, El Mundo, 20 October 
2013. http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2013/10/17/internacional/1382027510.html.
113 Ignacio Fuente Cobo, «LIBYA, the war of everyone against everyone», s. f., 19.
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• The Western Libya Shield, linked to the Al-Qaeda leader Ibra-
him Ali Abu Bakr114 and which was to play a major role in April 
2014, in the occupation of Camp 27 to the west of Tripoli, the 
main base set up by the USA to train the Libyan Army.
• The Central Libya Shield, involved in August 2014 in the tak-
ing of Tripoli Airport, which was also known as the Misrata 
Brigades115.
The absence of a real security structure meant that bit by bit the 
situation deteriorated, without the new Authorities being able to 
assert themselves. On 11 September 2012 the US Consulate was 
attacked in Benghazi, resulting in 4 deaths including the Ambassa-
dor Christopher Stevens, and a few months later in April 2013, the 
French Embassy in Tripoli was attacked by a terrorist commando.
The attack occurred in the Tripolitania Region, but the situation 
was not evolving any better in the east of the country. The Mus-
lim Brotherhood, who had been ousted from Egypt by General Al 
Sissi’s Government, was becoming increasingly influential in that 
zone, where it had found an excellent sanctuary among its Lib-
yan coreligionists116. The same could be said for the terrorists of 
Al-Qaeda, who had become particularly strong in the most easterly 
area of the country, from Benghazi to the City of Derna, where «no 
Libyan civil servant could dare to tread and remain alive»117.
2nd PHASE: division and civil war
Midway through September 2013 a potentially explosive situation 
had been reached, with intermittent confrontations between the 
Islamic forces and their opponents who were secular, to a greater 
114 Tantoush was involved in the attacks against the US Embassies in Kenya and Tan-
zania in August 1988. See United Nations Web Services Section, Al Jazeera, 23 August 
2014, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI05702E.shtml.
115  «Tripoli airport ‘seized by Islamist militia», Al Jazeera, August 2014, http://www.al-
jazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/tripoli-airport-2014823183122249347.html . 
Also Stephen Chris and Penketh Anne, «Libyan capital under Islamist control after Tripoli Air-
port seized», The Guardian, 24th August 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
aug/24/libya-capital-under-islamist-control-tripoli-airport-seized-operation-dawn.
116 Jean Francois Galletout, «Libye: trois ans après, faul-il y retourner?», Le Figa-
ro, 19th August 2014, http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/monde/2014/08/19/31002-
20140819ARTFIG00302-libye-trois-ans-apres-faut-il-y-retourner.php?pagination=4. 
117 Samuel Laureant, «La Libye, un «nid de guêpes où il est imposible d´intervenir», 
France 24, 18th August 2014, http://www.france24.com/fr/20140817-libye-tripoli-cha-
os-violences-intervention-onu-misrata-milices-islamistes-zenten-khadafi/#./?&_suid=
1410331592374031268213796649396. 
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or lesser extent. Moreover, such clashes also occurred between 
the different regions in the country, and even between different 
towns. The country was thus embarking on a second phase of 
political division and a civil war, which was to last until 2016.
The different militias were quick on the uptake when it came 
to learning the importance of hydrocarbons as a political tool. 
Halfway through 2013, the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), 
which was responsible for safeguarding the key oil export infra-
structure, turned itself into a militia composed of 16,000 com-
batants knowns as the Barca Army, led by Ibrahim Al Jadran, an 
extremely anti-Islamic warlord, who took control not only over 
the oil facilities, but also over the ports in the Cyrenaica Region 
from which the oil was exported. The strategic Uad Rojo in the 
central district of Sirte, also fell into his hands, which threatened 
to partition the country by closing the four main oil-exporting 
terminals in the «oil crescent» in the Sirte´s Basin, Libya’s most 
important oil zone.
In August, the two main loading ports of Sidra and Ras Lanuf and 
Tobruk (Harika Port) came to an almost total standstill in the cen-
tral and eastern zones, from which 60% of the Libyan resources 
were exported. What was more, in the western region, the Zin-
tan militias cut off the two main oil pipelines connecting the El 
Sharara and El Feel (Elephant) fields to the export terminals of 
Zawillah and Mellitah respectively, which put a stop to all pro-
duction118. As a result, oil production fell from 1,000,000 bbl/d 
in July 2013, to 600,000 bbl/d in August, and then to a minimum 
of 200,000 bbl/d by the middle of September119. Closure lasted 
until September 2016120 when all the attempts by the separatist 
leader Al-Jadran to sell oil on his own account had proved to be 
just as fruitless as his attempts to have his political demands 
met121.
118 «Libya Overview», EIA, US Information Administration. 10 October 2013.
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ly. 
119 Most of Libya’s crude oil is sold to European countries. In 2012, approximately 
71% of Libyan exports were sent to Europe; the main receivers were Italy, Germany, 
China, France and Spain. The USA resumed its oil imports from Libya in 2004, after 
sanctions had been lifted, importing 56,000 bbl/d of crude oil from Libya in 2012, which 
amounted to approximately 0.6% of the USA’s total imports in that year.
120 Ibrahim al-Jadrán became popular during the revolution as a guerrilla leader in 
defence of Benghazi.





In the centre and east of the country, the rivalry between the vari-
ous factions submerged the eastern cities of Benghazi, Derna and 
Sirte into a wave of murders and terrorist attacks described as a 
«terrorist war carried out by Libyans and foreign combatants»122. 
Interruptions to production became increasingly frequent, given 
that the armed militias established a pattern of closing oilfields 
and infrastructures in an attempt to demand higher salaries and 
to improve conditions. Insecurity at the two export terminals of 
Ras Lanuf and Sidra reduced output, so oil production between 
the mid-2013 and September 2016 averaged 390,000 bbl/d, less 
than a quarter of the production figure in 2010123, while at the 
same time oil exports dropped to 830,000 bbl/d barrels per day 
in July and 445,000 bbl/d in August 2013124.
As the militias were aware of the weakness of the central Author-
ities, they went one step further and tried to sell hydrocarbons 
directly on the international markets. Although the capture of 
the oil tanker Morning Glory by the Barca Army in March 2014 in 
the Cyrenaic port of Es Sider, was thwarted by the intervention 
of special US troops125, it was indicative of the extent to which 
the struggle between the Central Government and the regional 
militias had escalated, when it came to controlling the energy 
resources126.
In general, it can be said that the purpose of the attacks against 
the oil facilities during this first post-revolutionary period was not 
to seize the revenue from the installations or damage them, but 
to deprive the Government of them, thereby forcing the latter 
to accept the attacking group’s demands. Cases of groups with 
social or economic demands applying blockades or occupying oil 
and gas facilities abounded from 2012 until 2014, and these also 
included protests at the Arab Gulf Oil Company (Agoco) in Beng-
hazi, at the Mellitah Oil & Gas, at the Zawiya Petróleum Refining 
Company, in the Sharara oilfield, and at the el-Feel (Elephant) 
oilfield.
122 Marcos Suares Sipman, «Libya, immersed in chaos, seeks international aid to 




124 Trading data from the Atlas Global Comercial and Datos de Petróleo (APICE).
125 «USA TODAY», https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/03/17/
us-navy-seal-morning-glory-seizure/6513669/.
126 Ibrahim al-Jadrán became popular during the revolution as a guerrilla leader in 
defence of Benghazi.
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On a political level, in December 2013, an increasingly Islamised 
General National Congress imposed Sharia Law127 and decided 
unilaterally to extend its mandate beyond the 18 months to 
which it had committed itself and that was due to end in January 
2014. These decisions merely served to exasperate still further 
the animosity between the different sectors of Libyan society, 
which opposed the Islamic path that the country was being taken 
down. The foundations for the «perfect storm» had been laid and 
civil war was about to break out.
June 2014´s Elections gave a further boost to the politicisation 
of the Libyan hydrocarbon sector. The outcome of the Elections 
by the end of 2014 was two different Governments, one, the 
General National Congress (GNC) in Tripoli and the other, the 
House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk, which created a totally 
unsustainable situation. As both Governments depended for their 
survival on the revenue from hydrocarbons, and this was invar-
iably channelled through the Libyan Central Bank, the struggle 
between the two worsened, as each Government tried to deprive 
the other of this exclusive source of financing.
A military confrontation to gain control over the oil revenue 
became inevitable in view of the uncompromising attitudes of 
the two Governments. However, it was possible to partly lower 
this risk by paying the State salaries to all the combatants in the 
militias, regardless of the religious affiliation or political loyalties. 
Both Governments conserved the neutrality of the National Oil 
Corporation (NOC) and the Libyan Central Bank in order not to 
politicise the energy sector.
Faced with this chaotic situation, international community pres-
sure led by the United Nations forced the reaching of a peace 
agreement on 17th December 2015 in the Moroccan City of Skh-
irat. The Agreement came to be known as the «Libyan Political 
Agreement» (LPA) and was signed by representatives of the two 
parliaments that were operating simultaneously and antagonisti-
cally in the country, i.e., the General National Congress (GNC) and 
the House of Representatives (HoR). The Agreement envisaged 
the forming of a «Government of National Accord» consisting of 
thirty-two members and directed by the secular and pro-Western 
127 Bosalum Feras, Patrick Markey, «Libyan assembly votes to follow Islam-




politician Fayez al Sarraj128, who was also Chairman of the Presi-
dential Council, as Head of State. The Accord also stipulated that 
a High Council of State of an advisory nature be established in 
Tripoli, which would be composed of representatives of the GNC. 
Meanwhile, the HoR would be recognised as the only legitimate 
Parliament in Libya.
Although since the Government of Fayez al-Sarraj was estab-
lished in Tripoli in March 2016, all the State institutions should 
have come to form part of it according to the agreement reached 
in Skhirat, this was not the case, its authority being questioned 
from the very outset in the internal sphere. Even so, al-Sarraj was 
able to take an important step towards consolidating his power 
base because he was able to rely on the loyalty of the two most 
powerful economic institutions, the Central Bank and the National 
Oil Corporation, as well as the support of several municipalities in 
the west and south of the country.
The other centre of power, namely the House of Representatives 
(HoR) or «Tobruk Parliament», as the only legislative body, should 
have replaced the previous General National Congress (GNC), 
according to the Skhirat Accords, but this did not happen. In fact, 
the HoR decided to appoint the charismatic General Jalifa Hafter 
as the Chief of the Libyan National Army (LNA). It was Hafter who 
in February of that same year had launched «Operation Dignity» 
with a view to «purging» the country of the Islamists belonging 
to the Muslim Brotherhood129.
Since then, the HoR has been giving its unconditional support 
to General Hafter, who has become the real strongman in east-
ern Libya130 in opposition to the Government in Tripoli. Although 
General Hafter promised to eradicate political Islam and take 
overpower as the new military governor of Libya, the truth of the 
matter is that he allied himself with a rival faction of Saudi-style 
ultra-conservative Salafis131.
128 «National Unity Government announced», Libya Herald, 19 January 2016, https://
www.libyaherald.com/2016/01/19/national-unity-government-announced. 
129 «Jalifa Hafter: The Libyan general with big ambitions - BBC News», https://www.
bbc.com/news/world-africa-27492354.
130 «Profile: Libya’s Military Strongman Jalifa Hafter», BBC, 15 September 2016. http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27492354.
131 «The White House Blessed a War in Libya, but Russia Won It - The New York 
Times», https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/14/world/middleeast/libya-russia-john-
bolton.html.
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As if the political situation were not already sufficiently serious as 
a result of the low-intensity conflict between the governments of 
Tobruk and Tripoli, at the beginning of 2015, a new and extremely 
violent Jihadist threat started to spread, complicating the situation 
in the energy sector. In February of that year, a group proclaim-
ing their loyalty to Daesh stormed the Mabruk Oilfield, operated 
by a Joint Venture comprising the national company NOC and 
TOTAL132. Twelve workers died in the attack and another seven 
were taken prisoner. Furthermore, the facilities were deliberately 
damaged, something that had not happened before.
Ten days after, these facilities were attacked again, at the same 
time as the storming of the Bahi oil field, operated by another Joint 
Venture consisting of NOC and Oasis133. The following day an oil 
pipeline connecting the Sarir oilfield with the Marsa Hariga termi-
nal, operated by AGOCO, was bombarded causing an explosion that 
forced it to close down. This attack was a carbon copy of the modus 
operandi utilised the month before in January 2015 by the Jihadist 
Group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, a subsidiary of Daesh, on the Sinai 
Peninsula, when it attacked an Egyptian gas pipeline in that zone.
All these incidents serve to show a strategic change in the Jihad-
ist groups, when compared to early strategies adopted by the 
various militias, for whom pressure on the hydrocarbon sector 
had hitherto constituted a way of carrying out political claims. In 
Libya, none of these Jihadist attacks sought to capture or control 
the oil or gas infrastructures, their aim was to destroy them134.
As part of this new strategy, in March 2015 Daesh attacked and 
damaged several oilfields in the Al-Ghani zone, which forced the 
Tobruk Government to stop production in eleven oilfields in the 
central basin of Sidra. Eleven guards were murdered, several of 
whom were decapitated.
However, the Jihadist threat was greatly weakened when the 
Tripoli Government ousted Daesh from the Port City of Sirte135. 
132 Geoff D Porter, «Terrorist targeting of the Libyan oil and gas sector», Combating 
Terrorism Center at West point, 27 February 2015, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/
terrorist-targeting-of-the-libyan-oil-and-gas-sector. 
133 Oasis is a consortium of North American companies, Hess, Marathon, and 
ConocoPhillips.
134 Patrick Markey, Ahmed Elumami, «Islamic State risk for Libya’s troubled oil 
sector», Reuter, 28 October 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/28/
us-libya-energy-idUSKCN0SM0HW20151028#bjDeHlAhyGhqcL8t.97.
135 Hani Amara, «Libyan Forces Clear Last Islamic State Holdout in Sirte», Reuters, 6 De-
cember 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-sirte-idUSKBN13V15R. 
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On 18 September 2016, a coalition of militias, mainly from the 
coastal city of Misrata, launched Operation Al-Bunyan Al-Marsous 
(«Solid Foundation»)136, whose objective was to force Daesh 
to leave the Gulf of Sidra Coast. The militias from Misrata, with 
considerable support from western forces, especially US air sup-
port, took Sirte, the last bastion of the Daesh organisation, on 6 
December 2016, after an offensive lasting several months. Even 
so, it proved to be a Pyrrhic Victory, because it exacted a very 
high toll in human life (700 dead among the besieging forces and 
2,500 Jihadists137). It was also ambiguous, given that it had been 
achieved thanks to the mobilisation of the militias, not by an inte-
grated national army.
The weakened state of the Tripoli Government’s military forces 
in their fight against the Jihadists of Daesh was used by Gen-
eral Hafter to his own advantage, and he attacked. By the end 
of 2016, the Libyan National Army had seized most of the Gulf 
of Sidra, defeating the militias of Al Jadram, so the former now 
136 «Libyan Troops Clash with ISIS Militants Leaving 6 Dead and 17 Injured», 
Libyan Gazette, 17 May 2016, https://www.libyangazette.net/2016/05/17/
libyan-troops-clash-with-isis-militants-leaving-6-dead-and-17-injured/. 
137 Frédéric Bobin, «Un an après l’accord de Skhirat, la dérive de la Libye paraît 
inexorable», Le Monde, 17 December 2016, http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/arti-
cle/2016/12/17/un-an-apres-l-accord-de-skhirat-la-derive-de-la-libye-parait-inexora-
ble_5050664_3232.html#3WF7pThxk19KpvE1.99. 
Figure 10. The Battle of Sirte. Source: the Creative Commons Attribution-
Share Alike 4.0 International.
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controlled nearly all the Region of the Cyrenaica in eastern Libya, 
including two-thirds of the oil production. The task of protecting 
the critical facilities of Es Sider and Ras Lanuf fell into the hands 
of the Magharba Tribe that, until then, had formed part of the 
Jadran militias, but had since switched loyalties138.
Similarly, in May 2017, with the help of the Egyptian Airforce, 
they took the bases of Hun and Wadran in the Central Region of 
Juffran, sealing off access to the south-west of the country. This 
cycle of military successes came to an end at the beginning of 
July 2017, when the forces of the LNA mopped up the last pock-
ets of resistance of the Shura Council militias from Benghazi, 
bringing to an end a battle that had lasted for three years139 and 
making General Hafter the arbiter of the situation140.
From an energy perspective, a balance was struck between the two 
centres of power during this second phase, guaranteeing that nei-
ther government had access to the processes of commercialising 
the oil or the currency reserves, which were deposited abroad in 
the Libyan Foreign Bank141. Meanwhile, the Central Bank of Libya, 
which held approximately $90,000 million in currency reserves 
and received the revenue from the National Oil Corporation (NOC), 
remained neutral, continuing to pay the wages and consumption 
subsidies in the areas controlled by the two rival governments142.
During this phase, the NOC’s ability to obtain a higher price for oil 
also improved, because as a result of the delays in the deliveries 
owing to the interruptions to production and unplanned mainte-
nance, the prices of Libyan oil had fallen when compared to other 
types of similar products. However, these problems were partially 
overcome as the clients, including the Chinese refineries, began 
to trust the NOC’s ability to fulfil the terms of their supply con-
tracts despite the war.
138 Hebsa Saleh, «Libya suffers «catastrophic damage» to key oil port facility», Financial Times, 
18 June 2018. https://www.ft.com/content/6e447aa8-72c8-11e8-aa31-31da4279a601 
139 Ayman Al-Warfalli, «Libya’s Eastern Commander Declares Victory in Bat-
tle for Benghazi». Reuters, 5 June 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-libya-security-benghazi-idUSKBN19Q2SK.
140 Emily Estelle y Min Young Park, «Fighting Forces in Libya: July 2017», AEI’s 
Critical Threats Project, 28th July 2017, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/
fighting-forces-in-libya-july-2017.
141 «Libya´s political rivals compete for oil revenues», Jane´s Intelligence Review, 
2nd December 2014.
142 David D Kirkpatrickapril, «One of Libya’s Rival Governments Moves to Control Oil 




3rd PHASE: New actors for a proxy warfare
The third phase, as from 2017, commenced with some notable 
positive effects for the Libyan oil sector. At the beginning of the 
year, some of the activity at the oil terminals in the Sirte Gulf 
resumed, after having been interrupted by the confrontations, 
while the Wintershall and Gazprom companies also resumed pro-
duction from the As-Sarah Field, in the Sirte Basin. Furthermore, 
the drilling activity in the country also increased with new plat-
forms coming into operation, while offshore the Italian company 
ENI put new wells into operation as part of its development of 
Bahr Essalam143.
In early 2018, TOTAL announced its plan to purchase Marathon’s 
shareholding in Waha, which operated in the Sirte Basin, thereby 
showing that the French firm was committing itself to the coun-
try. What is more, BP and ENI announced plans to start exploring 
in the Ghadames Basin, to the west of Libya, as part of a trans-
action that transferred to ENI, part of BP’s interests in the con-
cession. At that time, the NOC put great trust not only in political 
independence, but also in Libya’s reliability and the reliability of 
the State-owned company.
The consequence was a spectacular recovery between June and 
October 2018, in which production almost doubled, coinciding 
with a critical situation for the global market in a context where 
the market reached 85 dollars/barrel ($/b) in October of that 
same year144. So, in the first half of 2018, for the first time since 
2013, production reached one million barrels per day, while oil 
revenue nearly tripled from 4.8 billion dollars in 2017, to 14 bil-
lion dollars145.
This was due to the combined effect of larger oil production and a 
recovery of international prices, which led to the country having 
a surplus, alleviating the liquidity crisis. Certain reforms were 
also carried out, aimed at improving living conditions and limit-
ing opportunities for the militias. The reforms included introduc-
143 «APICORP_Energy_Research_V03_N14_2018.pdf».
144 David Sheppard, «Total chief executive says no shortage of sup-
plies in oil market», Financial Times, 9 October 2018, https://www.ft.com/
content/25b5d742-cbeb-11e8-b276-b9069bde0956 
145 Fingar Courtney, «Libya enters fourth year of near investment blackout», Finan-
cial Times, 13 June 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/6c179166-06ff-461d-a539-e7
4cfccdb5c7?emailId=5f691e86c597cc0004aa2cf0&segmentId=7e94968a-a618-c46d-
4d8b-6e2655e68320 
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ing taxes on transactions in foreign currency, which reduced the 
black-market rate by 25% and helped to close the gap between 
the black market and the official rate.
But although the economy was booming, things were very dif-
ferent on the military front. In June 2018, the Es Sider and Ras 
Lanuf Terminals were temporarily occupied by the Jadram militias, 
and their recovery a week later caused what the NOC described 
as «catastrophic damage»146 as a result of the fighting, which 
destroyed at least two storage tanks; this reduced the capacity 
to 400,000 barrels, approximately half.
While all this was happening, the President of France, Emmanuel 
Macron, invited Hafter to Paris in July 2018, thereby giving him 
the political legitimacy he longed for but lacked, despite being 
the strongman of the country. This decision proved to be a turn-
ing point in the conflict in Libya by paving the way to the «final» 
battle for control over Tripoli. It amounted to a serious setback 
for the policy that had been pursued both by Italy and most of 
the European Union, aligned with the Government of Al Sarraj 
proposed by the UN in 2016. France thus regained the leadership 
it had lost in Libya, to the detriment of Italy, which until then had 
been dictating policy and had stated that «it wanted nothing to 
do with Hafter»147.
With political backing from France and the new arms sent from 
Russia, Saudi Arabia and, particularly, from the United Arab Emir-
ates, which broke the embargo imposed on Libya by the UN in 
2011, Hafter managed to control the strategic Gulf of Sidra, heart 
of the Libyan oil industry, and intensified the offensives in Beng-
hazi, capital of the east and the second city in the country, and 
neighbouring Derna, a stronghold of Jihadism in northern Africa148.
Once these targets had been achieved, he began the campaign 
in the south in a strategic operation to reach the capital, his real 
target, avoiding the coastline, which was more direct, and logis-
tically more reasonable, but which would have required to him 
to confront the powerful City-State of Misrata, which supported 
146 Heba Saleh, «East Libyan forces retake key oil ports hit by militia attack», Financial Times, 
21 June 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/bbdff5e8-753a-11e8-b6ad-3823e4384287 
147 «News from France: The conflict in Libya: a silent war between Ma-
cron and Salvini», https://www.elconfidencial.com/mundo/2019-04-08/
el-conflicto-en-Libya-la-guerra-silenciosa-entre-macron-y-salvini_1930010/.




the Government in Tripoli. Apart from occupying the south of the 
country, the purpose of these manoeuvres was to control the 
Al Sharara and Al Fil Oilfields, which were essential for the eco-
nomic survival of the Government in Tripoli149. Hafter achieved 
this objective in February 2019.
Once Hafter had done this, in April 2019, he launched a cam-
paign to take Tripoli, backed by armed drones and missile systems 
supplied by the United Arab Emirates. Even so, six months later 
his forces were bogged down on the outskirts of Tripoli, which 
inspired Moscow to make a move that surprised the West, inter-
vening and tipping the balance in the General’s favour. Russia sent 
2,000 Russian combatants, mainly mercenaries from the private 
group Wagner, linked to the Kremlin, to reinitiate the advance150. 
Backed from expert snipers, guided artillery and superior air sup-
port enabled the LNA to advance on several fronts around Tripoli 
in January 2020, and capture the strategic coastal city of Sirte.
Faced with the military developments and fearing that Russia 
might establish military bases in Libya151, in September 2019 
the German Government and Ghassan Salame, the UN Secretary 
General´s Special Envoy for Libya, initiated a consultation pro-
cess that on 19th January 2020, culminated in the Berlin Interna-
tional Conference on Libya. The Conference brought together the 
Governments of Algeria, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, 
Russia, Turkey, Republic of the Congo, the United Arab Emirates, 
the United Kingdom and the US, as well as the UN High Repre-
sentatives, including the Secretary General of the UN, and the 
Special Representative for Libya, the African Union, the Euro-
pean Union and the Arab League. The Conference tried to find a 
consensus among the interested Member States regarding the 
Libyan Crisis and guarantee an international umbrella to protect 
talks in Libya about the country’s future152. However, the Confer-
ence was a failure.
149 «Hafter announces control over the Al Fil Oilfield, the second largest in Southen 
Libya», https://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/20190221/46616054463/hafter-
anuncia-control-del-campo-de-crudo-al-fil-segundo-mas-grande-del-sur.html.
150 «AFRICOM: «2,000 Wagner mercenaries are fighting for Haftar 
in Libya»«, https://www.trt.net.tr/espanol/mundo/2020/06/16/
africom-2-000-mercenarios-wagner-estan-luchando-por-haftar-en-Libya-1437197.
151 Declan Walsh, «Libyan Rivals Call for Peace Talks. It May Be Wishful Think-
ing», The New York Times, 22ndSeptember 2020, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/08/21/world/middleeast/libya-ceasefire.html.
152 UNSMIL, «Berlin International Conference on Libya», 19 January 2020. https://
unsmil.unmissions.org/berlin-international-conference-libya-19-january-2020 
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Determined «to teach General Hafter the lesson he deserved»153, 
in January 2020, Turkey deployed its own drones and between 
400 and 2,000 Syrian mercenaries, in support of Tripoli’s Gov-
ernment of National Accord (GNA)154. In June, the GNA’s troops, 
backed by Turkey forced Hafter’s combatants and their Russian 
allies to lift the siege and retreat hundreds of kilometres from 
Tripoli back to Sirte, on the Mediterranean Coast155.
In September 2020, after months of stagnation in Sirte, German 
and US diplomacy put pressure on both sides to accept a UN 
proposal to establish a demilitarised zone around the city, as a 
first step towards more extensive peace talks. The initiative was 
supported by Egypt and Turkey, even though in other aspects 
they are regional rivals that oppose each other on many issues.
153 «Erdogan accuses Hafter of ethnic cleansing and threats «to teach him a lesson»«, 
https://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/20200114/472897346708/erdogan-acu-
sa-a-hafter-de-limpieza-etnica-y-amenaza-con-darle-una-leccion.html.
154 «As Libya Descends Into Chaos, Foreign Powers Look for a Way Out - The New 
York Times», https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/world/middleeast/libya-war-hift-
er-russia.html.
155 Declan Walsh, «Waves of Russian and Emirati Flights Fuel Libyan War, U.N. 
Finds», The New York Times, 3rd September 2020, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/09/03/world/middleeast/libya-russia-emirates-mercenaries.html.
Figure 11. Conflict situation in December 2020.
Source: Own research using Ali Zifan (vectorised map) - Libyan 




Conditional support for the demilitarisation of Sirte is part of a 
broader Turkish strategy to control the resources, where troop 
deployment is subject to the Maritime Boundary Agreement 
signed in December 2019 with the Tripoli Government recognised 
by the UN. The Agreement establishes the frontier between their 
exclusive economic zones along a boundary running 100 kilo-
metres to the south of the Greek island of Crete, which is of great 
importance when it comes to finding and controlling hydrocarbons 
in the Western Mediterranean. The purpose of the agreement is 
to block any oil pipeline that crosses the Mediterranean156.
This Memorandum of Understanding was rejected not only by 
the Greek, Cypriot and Egyptian Governments, but also by the 
European Union157, because they all considered that it infringed 
upon the sovereign rights of third countries, that it did not com-
ply with the Laws of the Sea and had no legal consequences for 
Third-Party States158. Turkey also questioned Cyprus’s right to 
156 «Turkey fuels regional power game over Mediterranean gas reserves | Financial 
Times», https://www.ft.com/content/69a222d4-b37c-4e7e-86dc-4f96b226416d.
157 «EU leaders consider the Turkish-Libyan Agreement affecting Greece and Cyprus 
to be illegal», https://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20191213/472197684810/lide-
res-ue-ven-ilegal-pacto-maritimo-turco-libio-que-afecta-a-grecia-y-chipre.html.
158 Article 57 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea situates the 
maximum width of an EEZ at 200 nautical miles (370 kilometres) as from the coast that 
serves to calculate the territorial waters. It would only be possible to form the Turkish 
Figure 12. Maritime zones claimed by Turkey and Libya.
Source: own research from various sources.
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explore in the seas surrounding the island, claiming that the Nic-
osia Administration did not represent the Turkish Cypriots.
However, Turkey’s position is much more than a mere struggle for 
resources. It is a risky geopolitical game that involves trying to 
restore the influence of the Ottoman Empire, despite the serious 
consequences that this has for the regional balance159. Erdogan 
and some of his allies would be under the impression that Turkey 
was recovering its importance in the eyes of its Western allies, in 
such a way that the more assertive the role it plays in the region, 
the more worthy and impossible to ignore it will be for the West160.
The result is a confrontation between Turkey, Libya (GNC) and the 
north of Cyprus and Italy on the one hand, and Cyprus, Greece, 
Egypt and Israel, plus the United Arab Emirates and France, on 
the other. However, there is no genuine economic need to access 
the energy resources in the zones questioned to the north of Libya 
and the south of Turkey, given that the resources in question are 
too deep for any significant mining operations. Even when oil was 
at 90 $/bbl, it was not profitable to drill down to depths greater 
than 2,400 metres.
Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al Sissi, who was hitherto a firm 
supporter of General Hafter, appears to have changed his position 
since the failure of the offensive against Tripoli, by openly support-
ing Aguila Saleh Issa who heads the Parliament with its headquar-
ters in Tobruk in the east of the country161. Furthermore, Al Sissi 
has threatened a military intervention in neighbouring Libya if the 
forces backed by Turkey capture Sirte, a strategic port and gateway 
to important oil terminals, or the inland air base of Juffra, as he 
considers both of them to be a «red line» not to be overstepped162.
Meanwhile, the production and export of Libyan oil in 2020 have 
followed the vicissitudes of the war. In January, most of Libya’s oil 
production was suspended by a blockade against exports in the 
EEZ if the Turkish aim were accepted that the Greek islands and islets, many of which 
lie close to the coast of Turkey, could not be used to define an EEZ.
159 «How Turkey is trying to recover the influence of the Ottoman Empire and what 
consequences this has for the international balance - BBC World News», https://www.
bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-54418272.accedido 9 de diciembre de 2020, 
https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-54418272.
160 «Turkey fuels regional power game over Mediterranean gas reserves | Financial Times».
161 «Waves of Russian and Emirati Flights Fuel Libyan War, U.N. Finds - The New York 
Times», https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/03/world/middleeast/libya-russia-emir-
ates-mercenaries.html.




Gulf of Sirte imposed by General Hafter’s forces. Libyan production 
decreased by more than 1 million bbl/d, or approximately 1% of 
the world demand, falling to less than 200,000 bbl/d, while at the 
same time the country’s National Oil Corporation found itself hav-
ing to close down production owing to a lack of storage facilities163.
The economic consequences of stopping oil production and exports 
were dramatic. In just the first eighteen days of January, the coun-
try’s economy lost more than $5,000 million due to the interrup-
tions to the oil supply from the eastern oilfields in the oil crescent, 
which was added to the over $100,000 million lost since 2016. 
With the Central Bank reserves standing at the lowest level in their 
history, the country was fraught with serious problems when it 
came to paying the salaries of the Government employees and the 
basic amounts required to pay for food, health and education164.
163 «OPEC eyes further oil supply cuts to counter coronavirus rout | Financial Times», 
https://www.ft.com/content/cc0de784-40fb-11ea-bdb5-169ba7be433d.
164 «Libyan oil production comes to halt, affects economy», https://www.aa.com.tr/
en/middle-east/libya-oil-production-comes-to-halt-affects-economy-/1860775.
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POM has been extensively described in the literature (Blum-
berg and Mellor, 1987; Horton et al., 1997; Lascaratos and
Nittis, 1998) and is accompanied by a comprehensive User’s
guide (Mellor, 1998). It has been previously used in the
Mediterranean area by Drakopoulos and Lascaratos (1997)
and Zavatarelli and Mellor (1995) and in the eastern Levan-
tine basin by Lascaratos and Nittis (1998) and Korres and
Lascaratos (2003). The model has a bottom – following ver-
tical sigma coordinate system, a free surface and a split mode
time step. Potential temperature, salinity, velocity and sur-
face elevation, are prognostic variables. Horizontal diffusion
terms are evaluated using the Smagorinsky (1963) diffusion
formulation while the vertical mixing coefficients are com-
puted according to the Mellor-Yamada 2.5 turbulence clo-
sure scheme (Mellor and Yamada, 1982). The model has one
open boundary located at 20◦ E as shown in Fig. 1 where
open boundary conditions apply. The computational grid has
a horizontal resolution of 1/10◦×1/10◦ and 25 sigma levels
in the vertical with a logarithmic distribution near the sea
surface, which results in a better representation of the sur-
face mixed layer. As for the min/max depths of the first
sigma level these range from 0.08 to 11.88 m. Within the
first 30m of the water column there are at minimum 1 sigma
levels (at grid points with depths greater than 3250 m) and at
maximum 24 levels (at grid points with depths of 25–29 m).
Considering the size (10–14 km) of the internal Rossby ra-
dius of deformation for the Eastern Mediterranean basin,
such a model resolution (∼10 km) can marginally resolve the
mesoscale eddy activity. The U.S. Navy Digital Bathymet-
ric Data Base 5 (1/12◦×1/12◦) was used for building up the
model’s bathymetry using bilinear interpolation to map the
data onto the model’s grid. The model is very similar to the
ALERMO model used in Korres and Lascaratos (2003) with
the only exception being the horizontal resolution (coarser)
as the computational burden in this particular study was very
high due to coupling with the BFM, the incorporation of data
assimilation and the execution of several sensitivity tests.
The model includes parameterization of the Dardanelles out-
flow into the Aegean Sea, the runoff of the major rivers of the
Thermaikos Gulf (Aliakmonas, Axios and Loudias) and the
runoff of Nestos and Evros rivers to north-central and north-
eastern Greece. The Dardanelles outflow into the Aegean Sea
is a dominant factor for the freshwater budget of the basin,
providing approximately 300 km3 of brackish water on an
annual basis. The main Greek rivers (Axios, Aliakmonas,
Gallikos, Pinios, Sperchios, Evros, Strimonas and Nestos)
on the other hand, with a total runoff of ∼19 km3/yr, have a
much lower contribution. Even lower is the contribution of
the Turkish rivers with a total runoff of ∼5 km3/yr.
2.2 Biogeochemical Flux Model (BFM)
BFM is a generic highly complex model based on the Eu-
ropean Regional Seas Ecosystem Model (ERSEM) (Baretta
et al., 1995; Vichi et al., 2004). A detailed description of
Fig. 1. Bathymetric map of the Eastern Mediterranean model do-
main.
the BFM is provided by Vichi et al. (2007a, b), and its im-
plementation in the Eastern Mediterranean can be found in a
companion paper (Petihakis et al., 2007). Hereafter a brief
description is given. As in ERSEM the model uses a func-
tional group approach separating the organisms according to
their trophic level (producers, consumers and decomposers)
and further subdivided on the basis of their trophic links
and/or size. Although within each trophic level the groups
have the same process , diff rentiation is achieved throug
the different parameter values. All the important physiologi-
cal (ingestion, respiration, excretion and egestion), and pop-
ulation (growth, migration and mortality) processes are in-
cluded, and are described by fluxes of carbon and nutrients.
Carbon is the basic unit cycled in the system, followed by
macronutrients, chlorophyll and oxygen, with variable car-
bon/nutrients and carbon/chl-a ratios. Following the model’s
food web, diatoms are preyed on by microzooplankton and
omnivorous mesozooplankton, nano-phytoplankton to an ex-
tent by heterotrophic nanoflagellates but mostly by micro-
zooplankton, pico-phytoplankton mostly by heterotrophic
nanofalgellates and to a lesser extent by microzooplankton
and finally flagellates by microzooplankton and omnivorous
mesozooplankton. Bacteria consume Dissolved Organic Car-
bon (DOC) both labile and semi-labile, act as decomposers
on Particulate Organic Carbon (POC) and compete with phy-
toplankton for inorganic nutrients. Their main predators are
the heterotrophic nanoflagellates. Heterotrophic nanoflagel-
lates are preyed on by microzooplankton which in turn is
eaten by omnivorous mesozooplankton. Omnivorous meso-
zooplankton is preyed on by carnivorous mesozooplankton
which is the top predator of the food chain. For all consumers
there is feeding within the same functional group (cannibal-
ism), which acts as a stabilizing mechanism.
www.ocean-sci.net/3/397/2007/ Ocean Sci., 3, 397–410, 2007
Figure 13. Seabed topography in the Eastern Mediterranean
Source: Triantafyllou, George & Gerasimos, Korres & Hoteit, Ibrahim & 
Petihakis, G. & Banks, Andrew. (2007). Assimilation of ocean colour data 
into a Biogeochemical Flux Model of the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. Ocean 
Science. 3. 410. 10.5194/os-3-397-2007.
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Even so, any interruption to production in Libya cannot last indef-
initely, because both sides rely on oil revenue to subsist, so it 
is hardly surprising that, a few months later, on 18 September 
2020, General Hafter announced an end to the blockade. A few 
days later, on 23 October the Government and the House of Rep-
resentatives, the leaders of the confrontation, signed an imme-
diate «national and permanent» ceasefire agreement, thanks to 
UN mediation165.
The consequences of the improved situation can already be felt. 
Production tripled rapidly in December 2020166, reaching about 
1,200,000 bbl/d, coinciding with the resumption of production 
in another oilfield in the country. This has brought about a new 
oversupply problem for the OPEC countries, which were trying to 
rebalance the market, and endeavouring to do so in very adverse 
circumstances, owing to the impact of COVID-19 on the world 
economy.
The Sarir oilfield, with an output of 200,000 bbl/d has resumed 
its operations, as have the Libyan oil terminals at Hariga, Brega 
165 «Declaration of the High Representative on behalf of the EU concerning the an-
nouncement of a ceasefire agreement in Libya - Consilium», https://www.consilium.
Europe.eu/es/press/press-releases/2020/10/25/declaration-by-the-high-representa-
tive-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-the-announcement-of-a-ceasefire-agreement-in-libya/#.
166 «Libya’s oil production recovers past 1M barrel a day», AP, https://apnews.com/
article/turkey-africa-libya-middle-east-tripoli-a21bb93b6e866af684588ef5e9786a63
Figure 14. Variations in oil production in Libya in 2019-2020. Source: 
tradingeconomics.com/organization of the petroleum exporting countries.
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and Zueitina. The Sharara oilfield (300.000 bbl/d), the largest in 
Libya, was also opened in October 2020, as a result of a «Gen-
tlemen’s Agreement» between the NOC and the militia known as 
the Petroleum Facilities Guard. The nearby El Feel oilfield, with 
a capacity of 70,000 bbl/d and the oil terminal at Zawiya, which 
normally exports crude oil from Sharara167 were also opened. 
According to the Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC), these oil-
fields will require major repairs before they can resume pumping 
at full capacity, so a complete return to supply of one million bpd 
from Libya is by no means imminent and will probably take some 
time, which the OPEC views with a sigh of relief168.
It is estimated that in the future, if the truce holds, crude oil pro-
duction in Libya could reach 1,300,000 bbl/d over the coming 12 
months. In the long term, Libyan crude oil production is expected 
to reach around 1,200,000 bbl/d in 2021 and 1,150,000 bbl/d 
in 2022, according to different econometric models169. Never-
theless, that will ultimately depend on whether the terms of the 
ceasefire are respected; these include the exit of all the foreign 
combatants and mercenaries in Libya, as well as total and uncon-
ditional compliance with the Security Council’s arms embargo 
that has been in force since the conflict broke out.
Conclusions
Where Algeria is concerned, the first conclusion to be extracted is 
that the country will still be a natural gas and oil producer for the 
next 20 years, in an international environment that suggest that 
by 2040, oil and gas will still account for at least 40% of the total 
world energy. Likewise, it would seem clear that Europe, espe-
cially Southern Europe, will still be the main market for Algerian 
natural gas exports, at least until 2030, as it is being confirmed 
by the recent series of contract renewals for periods ranging from 
five to ten years, even though most of them are for lower export 
volumes than those included in the original contracts.
Yet it is highly likely that after 2030, Algeria’s role as a gas 
exporter will be significantly reduced and it will be difficult for 
167 «Libya’s Oil Crescent Gets Back to Work as Sarir Field Opens - Bloomberg», 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-30/libya-s-oil-crescent-gets-back- 
to-business-as-sarir-field-opens.
168 «Libyan Oil Production Hits 300,000 Bpd As Another Oilfield Comes», https://oglinks.
news/opec/news/libya-oil-production-hits-300-000-bpd-another-oilfield-comes.
169 https://tradingeconomics.com/libya/crude-oil-production 
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the country to regain the comfortable position it occupied before, 
when it exported gas at around 60 Bcm per year, in view of the 
major decline its exports have undergone in the last two decades. 
What is more, Algerian gas exports will have to compete with 
new or already existing exporters such as Qatar, Nigeria, the US, 
Australia and even Mozambique.
Even in a favourable international scenario, it is difficult to 
imagine that the balance of natural gas in Algeria could undergo 
significant improvements in supply and demand before 2030 and 
that the potential exports of natural gas might undergo a sub-
stantial increase. The existing oil fields are maturing, and with-
out new investments, production will soon begin to decrease at 
a considerable rate. The economic situation is also encouraging 
many skilled and qualified Algerian workers to seek alternatives 
abroad. Therefore, Algeria will probably have to make do with a 
much lower potential export volume until 2030.
What is more, Algeria is unlikely to opt for extracting unconven-
tional gas at a time of low prices, a supply surplus and strong 
opposition from many sectors of the population. It is rather unreal-
istic to think that Algeria’s potential unconventional gas resources 
could have a significant impact on the country’s natural gas sup-
ply situation before the end of the next decade, even if they are 
checked and developed. However, it would be possible to release 
more gas for export if Algeria were to invest in solar energy to 
cater for its growing electricity demand, but nonetheless gas will 
have to compete in the already overcrowded European market.
Although increasing the export capacity via gas pipeline might 
improve gas export opportunities, especially if relations between 
Russia and Europe deteriorate, Algeria will have to face up to 
growing competition from the new LNG exporting powers that 
offer more flexible contracts where price setting is concerned. In 
this sense, Algeria must regard the renewed gas export contracts 
signed in recent years in a positive light, because this will enable 
it to carry on playing a major role in exporting gas to South-
ern Europe. At the same time, the reduction in the volumes of 
gas exports contracted will make it possible to adapt the limited 
availability of gas supplies from Algeria.
Another factor that must not be forgotten is the security prob-
lems in a country that shares 1,376 Km of desert frontier with 
Mali, 956 Km with Niger and 982 Km with Libya, where war and 
the threat of terrorism are problems that are still unresolved.
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It would appear to be clear that Algeria must liberalise the econ-
omy and promote a genuine business climate, repealing laws and 
regulations that discourage initiative. To date, every attempt to 
bring about reform has become bogged down because neither 
the role of the Administration nor the banking nor taxation sys-
tem have been really questioned in a political environment in 
which the power struggle confronts those in favour of liberalism 
and the nostalgic supporters of socialism170.
However, before taking any economic measures, President Abdel-
madjid Tebboune must solve a thorny question that could cause 
social unrest in the short term, i.e. how to reorganise the produc-
tion system inherited from a parasitic rent economy at oil prices 
of over 80 dollars a barrel. Although the current political climate 
prevalent in Algeria is not conducive to reforms in the short term, 
such reforms are inevitable and must be implemented earlier 
rather than later to ensure that the country is not subjected to 
increasingly severe financial restrictions and social disturbances.
Preparing and applying suitable and extensive reforms in the 
energy sector will largely depend on how the political transi-
tion evolves in the country over the next few years, and how to 
approach the fight against rampant corruption that lies behind 
the protests staged by an extensive part of Algerian society in 
favour of greater democracy. All of this could mean accepting 
the dismissal of tens of thousands of employees from a Public 
Administration with an inflated work force, basically, people who 
are employed by the two main State-owned firms in the coun-
try: Sonatrach and Sonelgaz. As the new President, Abdelmadjid 
Tebboune, has already stated, it would be a case of «separating 
money from politics», to concentrate on improving the economic 
situation and the standard of living for the country’s inhabitants.
If the reforms fail – which means failing to detain the decline in 
oil and gas production, failing to attract new foreign investment 
and failing to develop new markets, especially for natural gas 
– or if the reforms are not implemented, Algeria could embark 
on a downhill spiral of decline, with a decrease in revenue, a 
speeding up of the «brain drain» and greater security risks, all 
of which could lead to civil unrest, with serious consequences for 
the Region and for Europe.
170 «Le libéralisme sauvage a crucifié les valeurs humaines | El Watan», https://www.
elwatan.com/edition/contributions/le-liberalisme-sauvage-a-crucifie-les-valeurs-humai-
nes-27/11/2018.
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In the case of Spain, both Sonatrach and the Algerian Govern-
ment should review the contracts and the way to negotiate them, 
in order to recover the share of the Spanish market and pre-
vent the potential catastrophe of losing the entire European mar-
ket, which would have a major effect on the country’s financial 
income. It must be pointed out that the rival countries are begin-
ning to apply more aggressive trading strategies to capture most 
of the foreign markets, starting with Spain.
Strategic logic suggests that it is in Algeria’s interest to strengthen 
the shortest and cheapest route for conveying gas to Spain, which 
is currently limited by the absence of infrastructures to enable 
gas to reach the «heart» of Europe, thereby allowing Algeria to 
make inroads into a market that has so far resisted open compe-
tition because of the power held by the State monopolies.
This strategic course of action converges with both the Span-
ish and European Union ones, which are in favour of an energy 
interconnection for the whole continent, for Eastern, Northern 
and Southern Europe, which make it possible to constitute a still 
distant Energy Union in which the supply sources are diversified.
To achieve this, it would be necessary to complete the Midcat gas 
pipeline, which would connect Catalonia with France and would 
permit the extension of the Medgaz, which would certainly be an 
incentive to increasing the production and demand for Algerian 
gas. If this gas pipeline were to be completed, across the Pyr-
enees, Spain would be less exposed to any interruptions to its 
supply from northern Africa, and would also be able to supply 
Algerian gas to the EU, with numerous benefits as a transit coun-
try171. At the same time, Algeria’s position on the world gas mar-
ket would improve. For this to happen, it would first be necessary 
to overcome the French Government’s continued reluctance to go 
ahead with this project, bearing in mind that the French Presi-
dent, Macron, stated at the Lisbon Summit in July 2018 that «we 
are not going to construct gas pipelines unless consumption is 
considerable»172.
171 «Energy Security: concept, scenarios and implications for Spain and the EU 
(DT) - Elcano», 11, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/
contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/dt33-2006.
172 «Macron halts (for the time being) the gas pipeline STEP and prefers to focus on 
electrical interconnection – El Periodico de la Energía | El Periodico de la Energía with 




An agenda of reforms for Algeria deserves the European Union’s 
active support, given Algeria’s potential not only for providing 
Europe with low-cost energy, but also, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, in view of Europe’s need to help to stabilise a country that 
could otherwise easily become the source of a large number of 
economic immigrants and major security problems. As Charles 
Michel, President of the European Council, stated, Europe must 
pay more attention to Africa and look at the continent, includ-
ing Algeria, «in a new light». But a quick glance is not enough. 
What is required is a substantial change in European energy pol-
icy that, instead of looking in other directions, should recognise 
the importance of the south, so it can make the most of better 
energy opportunities and reduce the risks that affect its security.
In the case of Libya, the agreement reached on 23 October 2020 
between the Government and the House of Representatives 
envisaged the exit of foreign troops, which has been seen by the 
Parties and most foreign powers as the beginning of a return to 
peace. Yet it is difficult to imagine that the foreign stakeholders 
are going to give up their interests in the African country with the 
largest oil reserves and that all the foreign forces in the coun-
try and the foreign mercenaries are actually going to leave, in 
circumstances where Turkey has consolidated its presence and 
Russia is exerting considerable influence with its mercenaries.
In fact, the Agreement reached on 23 October 2020 between the 
Government and the House of Representatives has not been well 
received by Turkey, whose President Erdogan «does not think it 
is trustworthy»173 because he believes that it should have been 
agreed to by the Leader of the National Government, supported 
by the international community (especially by Turkey and Qatar), 
and the authorities in the East, whose best-known figure is Gen-
eral Jalifa Hafter, who is being supported by Russia, Egypt and 
the United Arab Emirates.
However, there are signs of hope. The Libya 5+5 Committee 
(five representatives on each side) has made major progress, 
by reopening the country’s land and air routes that had been 
closed since April 2019. Another success has been the decision 
to increase and share oil production as long as the command-
ers, in the words of the Representative of the Secretary General 
173 «Erdogan says he does not think the Libyan ceasefire signed in Geneva is re-
liable», https://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20201023/484236625140/erdogan-
dice-que-no-parece-fiable-el-alto-el-fuego-libio-firmado-en-ginebra.html.
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of the United Nations, Stephanie Williams, «work together with 
the Representative of the NOC to achieve a restructuring of the 
Petroleum Facility Guard 174» in view of the fact that one of the 
main reasons for exports being stopped in recent years has been 
the fact that the Guard tends to change sides depending on how 
the war situation develops.
In any case, increases in Libyan production will depend on the 
reopening of the oil-rich Sirte Basin and the oilfields that supply 
the crucial export terminals of Ras Lanuf and Es Sider, in the Lib-
yan «oil crescent». Resuming activities in the Sirte Basin could 
lead to an increase in Libyan oil production by a further 900,000 
bbl/d175. Nevertheless, this zone is still the epicentre of the civil 
conflict in Libya and at present its energy facilities are controlled 
by the Army of Hafter and Wagner, the Russian mercenary group. 
It will be difficult for the oil situation to get back to normal, espe-
cially at the «oil crescent» facilities, until the over 20,000 foreign 
forces and mercenaries in Libya have left, given that they help 
the warring factions, not only the National Unity Government 
in Tripoli backed by the United Nations, but also the strongman 
Khalifa Hafter, in the east of the country.
A greater cause for concern is the fact that even if Libya succeeds 
in successfully managing its political differences and puts an end 
to the civil war, the damage to the infrastructures has already 
been done and it will be difficult to undo it in the short term. 
The cost of reconstruction has been estimated as ranging from 
$200,000 to $480,000 million over a period of ten years176. It is 
a huge amount that Libya would find it difficult to obtain, unless 
a major foreign financial operation were to take place. Yet even if 
an agreement to that effect were to be reached, it would first be 
necessary to put a stop to the spiral of violence, which would be 
difficult to achieve in the short term.
All in all, ten years after the Revolution that brought such great 
expectations for Libya’s population and the international com-
munity, the way hydrocarbon production and exports evolve in 
the country keeps conditioned by a policy that is still very vague 
174 «The conflicting sides in Libya signed a «permanent» ceasefire full of challenges», 
https://www.france24.com/es/%C3%A1frica/20201023-Libya-acuerdo-alto-fuego-go-
bierno-parlamento-ginebra.
175 «What Libya’s oil deal means for the global market – Investors News Blog», http://in-
vestorsnewsblog.com/2020/09/22/what-libyas-oil-deal-means-for-the-global-market/.




and by the serious and unsolved structural problems that the 
country is afflicted by. Obtaining a legitimate and honest political 
agreement that will put an end to the conflict is still the major 
challenge in the short term and the only way to get sustainable 
flows of hydrocarbons for export177. If this is not achieved, the 
country will continue to slide deeper into a low-intensity civil war, 
a situation that could last for years, even decades, and this would 
end up by confirming Libya as being the epitome of a failed State.
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«A nation in which sciences and applied arts languish will be 
overtaken by rival nations and will gradually lose its ability to 




Today’s high technology relies on rare earth elements and we 
would go back to 1960 if they did not exist. These elements are 
strategically important to the military, critical to industry and key 
to the management of energy, by way of: consumption (lighting, 
magnets, vehicles), storage (batteries, hydrogen storage) and 
production (wind turbines, photovoltaic panels, nuclear reactors). 
Doubts arise about using these elements for green technologies 
and the energy transition due to the contamination that results 
from their mining. Hence, the complete extraction-use cycle must 
be considered. Scientific publications and author’s affiliation are 
dominated by Chinese experts. Governments must work closely 
with their scientific institutions and the technology industry.
China depressed prices and achieved a virtual monopoly (97% 
of world production in 2010, while Western mining culture lan-
guished) by exploiting its Baiyun-ebo mine, the largest in pro-
duction/reserves on the planet. China wants to become the world 
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leader in the energy and digital transition and to have a share-
holding in foreign mines by 2025. The 2009-2013 crisis affected 
supply and prices. The answer was to diversify sources and sup-
port companies. The exploitation of new mines began, others 
were reopened and the search for reserves across the planet was 
promoted, including underwater mining. Recycling of these rare 
earth elements was also actively encouraged. In 2019, there were 
eleven countries in an expanding mining market where Chinese 
production accounts for 62% of the total worldwide production.
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The Age of Rare Earths
The short history regarding the discovery of rare earth elements 
began in 1787, during the great Chemistry Revolution set in 
motion mainly by Lavoisier, Mendeleiev and Mosley to classify the 
chemical elements. They were originally called earths because 
they could not be separated from their oxides using the techno-
logical expertise of the 18th Century. All that could be said is that 
those «earths» were oxides of CPSL metals, and their identifi-
cation was accepted without it being possible to separate them 
from their oxides. «Rare earths» are not actually «earths», the 
original name has become archaic in Chemistry even if it usually 
turns up1, but neither are they rare, i.e., scarce or difficult to find. 
For example, they are more abundant than mercury, gold or sil-
ver in the Earth’s crust (see Figure 1). They were originally given 
1 This leads to absurd usage, e.g., the acronym REO (Rare Earth Oxides) frequently 
used to refer to the oxides of elements in the rare earths when earth and oxide are 
synonyms. 
Figure 1. Relative abundance of the chemical elements in the Earth’s 
upper continental crust as a function of the atomic number. The rare earth 




that name because the minerals containing them were difficult 
to find and, what was more, it was necessary to look for them in 
Sweden. The discovery2 all started with two minerals: gadolinite 
(sometimes known as ytterbite), in the Ytterby Mine, and cer-
ite in the Bastnäs Mine. Both minerals are the starting point for 
the discovery of the other rare earth elements, grouped into two 
families3, The Ceric Family and the Yttric Family (Table 1).
Year Metal (symbol) Author (country)
 Gadolinite mineral (or ytterbite)
1794 yttrium (Y) J. Gadolin (Sweden) 
1843 erbium (Er) C. Mosander (Sweden)
1843 terbium (Tb) C. Mosander (Sweden)
1878 ytterbium (Yb) J.C. de Marignac (Switzerland)
1879 thulium (Tm) P.T. Cleve (Sweden)
1879 scandium (Sc) L. Nilson (Sweden)
1879 holmium (Ho) P.T. Cleve (Sweden)
1886 dysprosium (Dy) P.E. Lecoq de Boisbaudran (France)
1907 lutetium (Lu) G. Urbain (France) & C. Auer von Welsbach 
(Austria)
 Cerite mineral
1803 cerium (Ce) J.J. Bercelius & W. Hisinger (Sweden); M. Kl-
aproth (Germany) 
1839 lanthanum (La) C. Mosander (Sweden)
1879 samarium (Sm) P.E. Lecoq de Boisbaudran (France)
1885 praseodymium (Pr) C. Auer von Welsbach (Austria)
1885 neodymium (Nd) C. Auer von Welsbach (Austria)
1886 gadolinium (Ga) J.C. de Marignac (Switzerland) & P.E. Lecoq de 
Boisbaudran (France)
1898 europium (Eu) E. Demarçay (France)
 Disintegration of uranium
1945 promethium (Pm) J. Marinsky, L. Glendenin & C. Coryell (USA)
Table 1. Discovery of the rare earth elements.
Based on Krebs, R.E., 2006. The history and use of our Earth’s chemical 
elements (2nd Ed.). Greenwood Press.
2 For details refer to: PREGO, R., «Las Tierras Raras», Editorial Catarata, Madrid, 
pages 13-38, 2019. 
3 Rare earth elements are generally grouped into light (LREEs: Light Rare Earth Ele-
ments) and heavy (HREEs: Heavy Rare Earth Elements). Although, the IUPAC classifies 
seven as being light: from lanthanum to gadolinium (promethium is not considered), 
which coincides with the Cerium family, and a further seven as being heavy: from ter-
bium to lutetium, they would be the yttrics, There are other different classifications, 
and one more division is even made (MREEs: Middle Rare Earth Elements) or yttrium 
is included among the heavy ones. All of this causes confusion it being very convenient 
for this to be explained in the text about the elements. 
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Studying rare earths was originally limited, because scientists 
only had available small amounts of samples for research pur-
poses. This shortcoming ended in 1879 with the finding of samar-
skite deposits in the US; this oxide put an end to the shortage and 
high cost in chemistry laboratories. Rare earths kept their name, 
but from that point on they were no longer «rare». The discov-
ery and separation of these elements was successful between 
1794 (yttrium) and 1907 (lutetium), the only exception being 
promethium (1945), which was found with the making of the 
first atomic bomb. It was a great adventure for the experimental 
chemistry of a few scientists who had «romantic» leanings and 
sought new chemical elements in nature, spending many hours 
in their laboratories. In the words of George de Hevesy (1885-
1966), Nobel Prize for Chemistry (1943): «To have discovered 
and isolated nearly all of the rare earths without further theoreti-
cal guidance, in spite of their great similarity and the great rarity 
of some of these, is one of the most brilliant accomplishments 
that experimental chemistry has ever produced»4.
So, step by step, and on and off, the 16 elements that appear in 
Table 1 were identified. Those, together with promethium (61Pr), 
which was obtained in a different way, are rare earths’ 17 com-
ponents: scandium (21Sc), yttrium (39Y), lanthanum (57La), 
cerium (58Ce), praseodymium (59Pr), neodymium (60Nd), 
samarium (62Sm), europium (63Eu), gadolinium (64Gd), ter-
bium (65Tb), dysprosium (66Dy), holmium (67Ho), erbium 
(68Er), thulium (69Tm), iterbium (70Yb) and lutetium (71Lu). 
The number that appears before the chemical symbol for each 
element is the atomic number (acronym Z), i.e. the number of 
protons in its nucleus. As the atom is electronically neutral, these 
positive charges are made up for with an equal number of elec-
trons located in different orbitals surrounding the nucleus. From 
lanthanum to lutetium, there is a one proton and one electron 
increase from one element to the next, forming the group known 
as lanthanides. In nature, they do not exist in a native state 
but as ions, normally with three positive charges. The ionic radii 
of lanthanides are all very similar. Yttrium and scandium, which 
are also trivalent cations, are added to this set; given that they 
usually appear mixed in the same deposits with lanthanides. 
These similarities between different lanthanides, because of their 
f electronic orbitals, their trivalence and ionic radius, make them 




behave in a chemically similar way, so they appear in the same 
minerals, albeit in different proportions, which conditions their 
separation and, thus, did condition their discovery.
Carl Auer von Welsbach5 was among the one hundred scientists 
who participated in this task undertaken in Europe (Table 1). He 
was not only a good chemist -he discovered praseodymium and 
neodymium-, but also a brilliant businessman. Auer set out on a 
successful commercial path by finding the first industrial appli-
cation for rare earths. Towards the end of the 19th Century, just 
when it was thought that electricity would replace gas for street 
lighting, he patented the «Auerlicht» which increased gaslight 
thanks to the effect of incandescence provided with a fragile 
sleeve suspended from metal wires made of cerium and thorium, 
surrounding the gas flame. Bombay, Paris, Berlin, Vienna… In 
1913 300 million Auer lamps were manufactured. The Austrian 
Emperor Franz Josef honoured its creator by bestowing upon 
him the title «Baron von Welsbach». Today, his invention is still 
providing intense light in camping-gas lanterns. Another con-
sequence of his invention capacity, which has also lasted up to 
the present time, is the flint for lighters, an alloy of cerium and 
iron. The invention replaced matches which had been used to 
light fires for the previous half century. Auer’s practical approach 
shows how, although it is important to have energy readily avail-
able, and this all started off with the spark from a humble flint, 
it is equally important to know how to use it, making the most of 
it without increasing its consumption. These two points are basic 
for present-day society where handling energy is concerned.
The utilisation of rare earth elements has been transforming our 
society since the 1960s. The use of their elements is technically 
feasible because the energy, procedures and facilities are all 
available to isolate those metals. After Auer’s work a century 
ago, the successive inventions of microprocessors (1971), mag-
nets (1966-1983), the Internet (1981) mobile phones (1991) 
and smart phones (2005) increased the demand for rare earths; 
they have driven us into a high-tech society. Rare earth elements 
are in our pockets, e.g., in the form of bank notes and mobile 
phones, they are in our spectacles, if we wear them, in some zir-
conia jewellery, in our everyday lives, computers, screens, ovens 
5 BAUMGARTNER, E., «Carl Auer von Welsbach a Pioneer in the industrial application 
of rare earths», in: «Episodes from the history of the rare earth elements» (C.H. Evans, 
Ed.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, London, pages 113-130.
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and cameras, vehicles (cars, skateboards, etc.), refrigerators and 
freezers, tennis rackets and golf clubs, bicycles (whether electric 
or not), lights, etc.; they gives us quality of life in hospitals and 
dental clinics, optical fibre and Wi-Fi, transport, etc. The technol-
ogy that we enjoy today is largely based on rare earths, to the 
extent that we would be going back to the 1960s if they did not 
exist. We could quite rightly say that thanks to their applications, 
after going through the Copper Age, the Bronze Age and the Iron 
Age, we have now reached the Rare Earth Age6.
The aim of this article is to provide an overview showing why rare 
earth elements are vital to our society and how they interact with 
energy.
A great variety of uses
The history of rare earth elements is generally considered to 
consist of three stages: an initial stage beginning with their dis-
covery (up to 1947) followed by their study (up to 1969), and 
ending with the development of applications (up to the pres-
ent time) and their incorporation into everyday life. However, 
the facts that can be associated with each stage overlap. Auer’s 
patents or the ongoing research into lasers and magnetism and 
their new physical-chemical properties are such examples. Rare 
earths received their biggest boost with the invention of the 
colour TV in the 1960s. That commercial success was closely 
linked to a sharp increase in mining with new methods in a bid 
to find these elements in a pure state, which paved the way for 
research into new properties and applications. Ever since, the 
scientific quest that emerged at the end of the 18th Century to 
obtain greater insight into the world around, rewarded by aca-
demic glory or scientific honours, has become the technological 
business of their applications, which greatly condition scientific 
research, focusing it on economic results. The giant that is mod-
ern-day high-tech society, is still imbued with the altruistic sci-
ence of two centuries ago.
The role played by each one of the 17 rare earth elements in the 
world of applications is summarised in Table 2. However, several 
of them might be used in one single device.
6 ONDREICKA, B., SAMMAN, N., «Rare Earth», Sternberg Press, Berlín, 272 pages, 
2020. https://www.tba21.org/#item--rare_earth--525. Consultation date 25/01/2021.
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Scandium Tracing agent in oil refineries; additive in halide lamps; 
aluminium hardener (bicycles, rackets, golf clubs, etc.); 
metal alloys for the aerospace industry.
Yttrium Energy-efficient light bulbs; ceramics; metal alloys; 
laser cutting; improved fuel efficiency; microwave 
communication; LCD displays; temperature gauges.
Lanthanum Electrodes for rechargeable batteries; catalysts for oil 
refineries; batteries for electric vehicles; high-tech digital 
camera lenses; video cameras; portable PC batteries; 
X-ray films; lasers.
Cerium Catalysts for oil refineries; lighter flints; electrodes for 
rechargeable batteries; ceramic dyes; diesel oil additive 
for smoke breakdown catalysing; UV filters; metal alloys; 
lens polishers (glass, TV faceplates, mirrors, optical glass, 
silicon microprocessors and disc units).
Praseodymium Lasers; electric motors (for example wind turbines, 
vehicles, drones); additive in the glass for welding 
goggles; to increase resistance to corrosion in magnets; 
pigment in glass and enamels; reflectors; airport signalling 
lenses; photo filters.
Neodymium Electric motors (for example wind turbines, vehicles, 
drones); additive for glass (welding goggles, car 
headlamps, for example); ceramic condensers; electrodes 
for rechargeable batteries; magnetic resonance equipment 
for hospitals; high-power magnets for portables; lasers; 
catalysts for fluid fracking.
Promethium Phosphorescent paints; nuclear batteries; source of beta 
radiation; radioactive source for thickness measuring 
instruments.
Samarium Lasers; high-temperature magnets; nuclear reactor control 
rods.
Europium Lasers; banknote authentication devices; liquid crystal 
displays (LCD); fluorescent lighting; additive for glass.
Gadolinium Computer memories; lasers for steel cutting; X-ray tubes; 
contrast agents for magnetic resonance tests in hospitals; 
additive for glass.
Terbium Lasers; fluorescent lamps; additives for neodymium 
magnets; lighting and displays; guidance & control systems.
Dysprosium Hard disks (IT); additives for neodymium magnets; lasers.
Holmium Lasers; the most powerful magnets manufactured; 
magnetic resonance equipment for hospitals.
Erbium Lasers; solar panels; optical fibre signal maintenance; 
glass dyes.
Thulium Lasers; X-ray radiography equipment (for example in 
dental practices); high power magnets.
Ytterbium Optical fibre technology, solar panels, alloys (stainless 
steel), radiation source for portable X-ray equipment; 
lasers (for metal and hard plastic cutting); flares.
Lutetium LED light bulbs; glass with high refractive index; X-ray 
screens; catalyst in oil refineries to produce petrol and 
diesel oil.
Table 2. Main applications of rare earth elements.
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The chemical properties of rare earth elements are very similar, 
but their physical properties are not, which explains the specific 
nature of their optical and magnetic properties. In the consumer 
market, there is no single and uniform classification for rare 
earth applications and they are usually grouped into nine sec-
tors: batteries, additives for glass, catalysts (oil refining, vehi-
cles), ceramics, magnets, metallurgy (alloys, etc.), pigments and 
luminescent tubes (laser, lighting and illumination, LCD displays, 
etc.), polishing and others. The estimates made for 20207 can be 
seen in Figure 2. These estimates are no different from previous 
ones, for example, the estimate for 20158. Half the production 
goes on magnets and catalysing. From an economic value per-
spective, magnets and luminescent tubes are the most profita-
ble. The rare earths with the highest consumption ratings are9 
Neodymium (49%) and praseodymium (20%), as they form part 
7 ROSKILL, «Rare Earths». https://roskill.com/market-report/rare-earths/ Consulta-
tion date 25/01/2021.
8 ZHOU, B., LI , Z., CHEN, C., «Global potential of rare earth resources and rare earth 
demand from clean technologies», Minerals, 7: 203, 2017.
9 https://www.statista.com/topics/1744/rare-earth-elements/ Consultation date 
25/01/2021.




of magnets, followed by lanthanum (6%), cerium (4%) and ter-
bium (4%); the rest are all below 2%.
However, the cost of the different oxides of these elements is 
linked to their rarity in the minerals and how difficult it is to sep-
arate them. Ytterbium and lutetium are exceptions because of 
their high price and limited production. Other outstanding oxides 
are10 scandium oxides (US$ 955/kg 99.99% pure; November 
2020 in EXM11 China) and terbium (US$ 805/kg; idem). It must 
be remembered that prices vary on a monthly basis, depending 
on the market (Chinese, Hindu, etc.), how pure the oxide is, or 
even the volume purchased. Military uses are worth a separate 
mention, because of their importance in geopolitical games even 
if they include some of the aforementioned applications.
Military and optronic applications
The history of rare earths and uranium cross paths, as both appear 
together in some minerals and because, at times, nuclear experts 
were also involved in making use of the ores in rare earths. The 
Manhattan Project to manufacture the first two bombs, one a 
hydrogen bomb and the other a plutonium bomb, paved the way 
for an improved separation of rare earths. In this secret envi-
ronment, three North American Scientists, Jacob Marinsky, Law-
rence Glendenin and Charles Coryell, were contracted in view of 
their experience with rare earths and the similarities between 
rare earths on the one hand, and uranium and plutonium, on the 
other, so the three could research into the separation of radi-
oactive isotopes. According to Marinsky,12 the two most excit-
ing projects developed at the Clinton Laboratories in 1944-45 
were the discovery of Element 61 (promethium) and obtaining 
the radioactive source that Robert Oppenheimer needed to make 
an atomic bomb explode. Every aspect of this was shrouded in 
military secrecy, so the North American Army’s announcement of 
its discovery was delayed until 1947. Promethium is the only rare 
earth element that could be correctly described as «rare». It is so 
10 https://en.institut-seltene-erden.de/unser-service-2/metall-preise/sel-
tene-erden-preise/ Consultation date 25/01/2021.
11 The importer has to pay the logistical cost of the goods from the supplier’s storage 
facilities to the importers.
12 MARINSKY, J. A., «The search for Element 61», in: «Episodes from the history 
of the rare earth elements» (C.H. Evans, Ed.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, London, 
pages 91-108, 1996. 
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rare in the Earth’s crust that its total weight does not even reach 
one kilogram. It is radioactive and completely disintegrates in a 
few years. It is frequently excluded from the rare earths. What 
is needed for a few applications is obtained artificially in nuclear 
reactors, given that it is one of the elements yielded by uranium 
fission.
The Cold War led to the search for and development of sur-
veillance systems for monitoring other countries and to the 
Space Race, which made it even more necessary for conduct-
ing research into applications and also increased the demand for 
rare earth elements. Power based on armies is supported entirely 
by the range of military technologies that those elements pro-
vide. Without them, countries would be unable to produce most 
of the equipment they need for defence purposes. Most nations 
are reluctant to provide information, whereas the USA is more 
transparent, albeit without furnishing details13. The uses to which 
rare earths are put, are grouped together under very general 
headings, such as targets and weapon systems, guiding and con-
trol systems and electric motors, or communication devices and 
screens for displaying analogue and digital data. Nonetheless, it 
is possible to obtain some information about the essential military 
applications14. They are used in the missile guidance and con-
trol systems that direct missiles and bombs to their targets (ter-
bium, dysprosium, samarium, praseodymium and neodymium). 
The Patriot missile uses neodymium and samarium in its electric 
motors while its radiofrequency-based guidance systems require 
gadolinium, yttrium and samarium to magnetically control the 
flow of electronic signals in radar and sonar to sustain naviga-
tion. The SideWinder missile, which is guided by heat-seeking, 
has rare earth magnets in its fins to control the flight path. Smart 
bombs, precision-guided munition, of the Tomahawk cruise type, 
anti-ship (ASM) and ground-to-air (SAM) type missiles, as well as 
bunker busters need dysprosium, neodymium, praseodymium, 
samarium and terbium. Other examples are aircraft and war-
ships. An F-22 fighter contains yttrium, terbium and erbium in 
its optical, detection and optical fibre systems (there are 400 
kilograms of rare earth metals in an F-35). A nuclear submarine 
requires 4 tonnes, including europium and lutetium for its active 
and passive sonars. A Class Aegis-II destroyer carries 2.5 tonnes 
13 EPA 600/R-12/572, «Rare Earth elements: a review of production, processing, re-
cycling, and associated environmental issues», 2012.
14 https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/ Consultation date 25/01/2021.
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and lasers for the detection of mines and countermeasures. The 
electric motors in the future´s guided military destroyer Zumwalt, 
of the North American Navy, need strong permanent magnets 
(terbium, dysprosium, samarium, praseodymium and neodym-
ium). There are lasers mounted on such vehicles as tanks and 
armoured cars that enable the identification of targets up to 35 
kilometres away and increase the likelihood of achieving direct 
impacts. Such examples include the Abrams tank (europium, 
neodymium, terbium and yttrium). Yttrium is utilised to improve 
the armour on military vehicles. Radar systems need at least 
europium and lutetium. Finally, an army depends on high-tech 
products to enable soldiers to communicate with their teams, 
whereas mobile phones, computers and touch screens are in 
everyday use. Current and future components for electronic war 
and radars strictly depend on rare earth elements. The strength 
of a modern army lies mainly on its technology, which is the rea-
son why research and development are ongoing.
Civil and military researches are mixed in advanced countries 
and some successful applications are exchanged. This is the case 
with optronic systems. They are items of equipment consisting 
of radar, laser and electronic calculators applied to locating and 
automatically following targets, able to detect objects under any 
light conditions, evaluate their characteristics and carry out sur-
veillance on them by means of images. The best military example 
is the Predator-type drone, which has civil purposes for the vigi-
lance of critical and high-risk installations such as ports, airports, 
industries, thermal and nuclear power plants, etc.
Energy-related applications
The wide variety of technological possibilities that the proper-
ties of rare earth elements offer have been explained above. It is 
now worth examining in greater detail exactly how their potential 
can be applied to energy. Three categories can be distinguished, 
depending on how they are associated with energy: the first 
category directly concerns energy production; the second one 
involves improving energy consumption efficiency; and the third 
one concerns the means for making energy management easier. 
The three are combined in the emerging clean technologies, such 
as wind turbines, electric vehicles, rechargeable batteries and 
low-consumption lighting. The rare earth elements that are vital 
to clean technologies are lanthanum, cerium, neodymium, euro-
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pium, terbium dysprosium and yttrium, most of the applications 
only requiring one or two of them. The quantities and the equip-
ment in which they are used are shown in Table 3 where what 
stands out is the 120 kilograms of neodymium and 12 of dyspro-
sium, on average, that are currently required for each megawatt 
of power in a wind generator. In the most extensively utilised 
model, both metals are located in the horizontal axis wind turbine, 
where a rotor composed of three blades attached to the bushing 
causes a shaft to rotate, that shaft being connected to a multiplier 
that raises the rotation speed to 1,500 r.p.m. to produce alterna-
tive energy that is transmitted to the grid. The generator operates 
in a similar way to a dynamo whose powerful magnet is made of a 
neodymium alloy (up to 30% Nd), iron and boron. The drawback 
is that it loses its magnetic properties at a temperature lower than 
other magnets, which is why dysprosium is included, and some-
times terbium, to improve performance. Rare earth elements are 
also utilised in the IT equipment at a wind farm, intended for con-
trol, management and communication purposes.
Another application that stands out in energy production utilises 
promethium, for the element is rare and the application very 
singular in nature. Promethium is used as a supply source for 
atomic batteries. The mass number 147 (number of protons plus 
neutrons) isotope of promethium is obtained artificially and on 
transmuting to samarium; it releases beta particles, that is to 
say, low-energy electrons, which prevents the need for heavy 
armour. It forms part of a small group of radioactive isotopes 
used in beta voltaic batteries. They are able to generate currents 
with very low voltage that are utilised in space craft. In the case 
of promethium-147, the battery lasts for about five years and can 
be applied with a military function to missile guidance systems to 
prevent interference with their computing systems.
One example of the second category, improving energy efficiency, 
is lighting. Rare earth elements enable less electricity to be used 
when applied to fluorescent tubes (linear fluorescent lamps: LFL), 
fluorescent bulbs (compact fluorescent lamps: CFL), and, recently, 
LEDs (light-emitting Diodes: LED). Since the start, when Auer’s 
invention intensified gaslight, acting through thorium oxide (now-
adays yttrium), which built up thermal energy from gas combus-
tion and emitted it as infrared radiation, converted in turn into 
a brilliant visible light by the cerium oxide, a modern version of 
Auer’s lighting by incandescence can be found in mercury fluo-
rescent lamps. Mercury acts as an energy source and if the inte-
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rior glass is coated with just under a gram of rare earth elements 
(Table 3), this is sufficient to produce light similar to daylight. That 
energy source can also be a cold LED light that, containing traces 
de europium and yttrium (Table 3), provides the diverse lighting 
that is so often found nowadays in houses, cars, signs, decora-
tion, etc. LEDs are replacing fluorescent lighting because they save 
on energy and maintenance and control, while at the same time 
provide a variety of colours. It is predicted that over the next ten 
years15 there will be a sharp drop in the demand for fluorescent 
lamps (LFL and CFL), whereas there will be twice the demand for 
LEDs. However, experiments are being conducted with LED light-
ing based on quantum dot (QD) nanotechnology16, which could stir 
up the future market and distance it from rare earths.
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Table 3. Consumption of the rare earth elements in each one of their main 
clean energy applications.
Based on: Zhou, B., Li, Z., Chen, C. 2017. Global potential of rare earth 
resources and rare earth demand from clean technologies. Minerals, 7: 203.
Electric motors need neodymium and dysprosium in their magnets. 
The stator’s rotating magnetic field drag the rotor´s fixed magnetic 
field, making it rotate and causing a set of gears to move the car 
wheels. Less than half a kilogram of rare earths is required, although 
15 ZHOU & CHEN, Note 8.
16 https://electricaltrends.com/2019/06/03/impacts-on-lighting-if-china-weaponiz-
es-rare-earth-metals/ Consultation date 25/01/2021.
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a hybrid car may contain up to eleven kilograms in other items of 
equipment. Their high performance and small size make them suit-
able for hybrid and electric cars, scooters, bicycles and even drones. 
The automobile industry is seeking technological alternatives to per-
manent magnet electric motors containing rare earth elements. At 
the present time, there are two possibilities17: one, electric motors 
with an external excitation system that replaces the magnets, and 
the other, magnets composed of magnetic materials that perform 
the same function and minimise the need for rare earths. In spite 
of everything, no other magnet can achieve the same high perfor-
mance. According to Da Vukovich, Chairman of Alliance LLC, it is not 
really possible to replace rare earth magnets18.
Neodymium is a metal that is playing a major role in current 
plans to exploit wind energy on a large scale, especially marine 
wind energy. The constant increase in the manufacture of wind 
turbines and hybrid and electric vehicles has brought about an 
equally steady rise in the demand for neodymium. Toyota pre-
dicts that demand for neodymium will exceed supply as from 
2025 and is now developing engines using half the amount of 
rare earth metals. The Green Agenda, an objective for many 
national governments and international bodies to reduce car-
bon emissions, will lead to a growth in the demand for the rare 
earths needed to generate renewable energies and to provide 
zero-emission transport. It has been estimated that by 203019 
there will be a 35% increase in MW provided by wind energy, the 
use of Ni-MH will double and there will be 14 times as many elec-
tric vehicles. The Roskill Perspectives Report on the rare earths 
market20 for that year, which contains a detailed breakdown of 
the demand, assessing technological trends and industry trends 
and their impact on the consumption of each element by end-
use markets, predicts that rare earth magnet applications will 
account for 40% of the total demand for those metals.
Energy storage falls into this second category: electrochemical 





19 ZHOU & CHEN, Note 8.
20 ROSKILL, Note 7. 
21 JIANG, Z., WANG, J., CAO, D., «Research Progress of Rare Earth-Based Hydrogen 
Storage Alloys», Key Engineering Materials, 861: 354-362, 2020.
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able nickel metal hydride batteries (Ni-MH) are frequently used 
as sources of energy. They form part of consumer electronics: 
PCs, telephones, audio equipment, televisions, calculators, GPS 
systems, digital cameras, video players and recorders, etc. They 
are most extensively used in electric and hybrid vehicles. The 
battery cathode is made with an alloy (mischmetal) of rare earth 
elements that contain varying proportions of cerium (45-50%), 
lanthanum (25%), neodymium (15-20%) and praseodymium 
(5%). Ni-MH batteries are replacing nickel-cadmium batteries for 
several reasons. They provide twice as much energy, they are 
not pollutants and the metals can be recovered to manufacture 
new batteries. They are also under threat from those that use 
lithium, which offer a similar capacity at half the size, albeit at a 
higher cost. The demand for Ni-HM batteries is not expected to 
decrease, in fact, it is predicted that their number will double by 
203022.
The third category contains all the applications supporting the 
systems that control energy sources and distribution, namely 
communication systems, IT equipment, security controls, etc. 
The need to have reserves of energy means that experiments are 
being conducted for hydrogen storage with different alloys23. The 
alloys of lanthanum-nickel (LaNi5) or Mm-nickel-aluminium-co-
balt-manganese are very attractive (Mm is the symbol for mis-
chmetal). Rare earth hydride deposits form crystalline networks 
in which hydrogen gas molecules can be adsorbed. The gas is 
later released on being slightly heated under suitable catalytic 
conditions, enabling it to be used as a fuel.
Several rare earth isotopes are involved in controlling energy of 
nuclear origin, samarium, gadolinium, dysprosium, holmium and 
erbium. Samarium-149 is unusual in that it is «relatively» stable, 
because it disintegrates so slowly that fission has not yet been 
observed, that is to say… It requires more time than the age of 
the Universe! It is also a nuclear poison, i.e., it is a material that 
absorbs neutrons, useful for reducing the high initial radioactivity 
of the nuclear fuel, the uranium in the reactor core, causing the 
disintegrations to slow down. It is the second most efficient in this 
process after the xenon-135 isotope. The disadvantage of samar-
ium is that as it does not disintegrate it can only be operational 
22 ZHOU & CHEN, Note 8.
23 UCHIDA, H., HARADA, M.R., «Application of hydrogen storage alloys», in: «Science 
and Engineering of Hydrogen-Based Energy Technologies» (P.E. de Miranda, Ed.), Aca-
demic Press, London, pages. 290-302, 2018.
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for about 20 days24. Something similar happens with gadolini-
um-15725. It is a burnable poison (it disintegrates) that is loaded 
into the reactor core as an additive to control the reactivity of 
the surplus and prevent power peaks in some areas of the reac-
tor without having to apply the control rods. Gadolinium trioxide 
is generally used in boiling water reactors. Soluble poisons are 
also applied in emergency shutdown systems by injecting gado-
linium nitrate solutions directly into the reactor coolant. Likewise, 
natural dysprosium easily absorbs neutrons and is alloyed with 
steel; its oxide combined with nickel being added to a special 
cement used to cool the nuclear reactor bars. Holmium is also 
applied on occasions as a consumable poison to keep a nuclear 
chain reaction under control. In Russia, research into developing 
a uranium-erbium fuel for its RBMK-type reactors began after the 
Chernobyl accident, in order to improve performance and safety. 
Erbium isotopes 166 and 167 have been validated as nuclear 
fuel absorbers at the Leningrad, Kursk and Smolensk Nuclear 
Power Plants26, while uranium-erbium fuel was adopted27 first for 
RBMK-1500 reactors and later for RBMK-1000 reactors.
Finally, lanthanum and cerium must be included because of 
their contribution to clean technologies, as catalytic converters 
for automobiles28. In the 1990s, catalysts were developed with 
platinum, palladium, rhodium and cerium oxide deposited on 
aluminium and lanthanum oxide. Their function is to reduce the 
pollution caused by the post-combustion gases emitted through 
vehicle exhaust pipes. The unburnt hydrocarbons, the carbon 
monoxide and the nitrous oxides produced by explosion diesel 
engines are processed to carbon dioxide, nitrogen gas and steam 
before being released into the atmosphere. New catalytic con-
verters were introduced later containing cerium in the particulate 
filters; which facilitates soot combustion in the filter, reducing 
their expulsion to 1%. Cerium oxide can even be supplied as a 
liquid catalyst in the fuel. This additive, which is well-known for 
its effectiveness, accompanies the exhaust gases and reduces 
24 O’BRIEN, J., «Fundamentals handbook nuclear physics and reactor theory». U.S. 
Department of Energy, 2015.
25 Ibidem.
26 BYSTRIKOV, A.A. et al., «Experience in using uranium-erbium fuel in power-gener-
ating units with RBMK-1000 reactors», Atomic Energy, 100: 165-170, 2006.
27 FEDOSOV, A.M, «RBMK Uranium-Erbium Fuel», Atomic Energy, 124: 221-226, 
2018.
28 PREGO, Note 2, pages 88-89.
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the combustion temperature of the soot, which helps to clean the 
turbo and the particle filters.
The bibliography speaks: reporting on the research work
Rare earths first came to be known to humanity in Sweden in 
1787 and the discovery of the last one was reported in the USA 
in 1947. In between those years scientists informed their col-
leagues through personal meetings about any breakthroughs, 
and published their findings mainly in national German, English 
and French scientific journals. Any breakthroughs that were pub-
lished in other languages went unnoticed. For example, in 1897, 
when Konstantin von Chrustchoff announced in a Russian jour-
nal that he had separated two new elements, which he decided 
to call glaucodymium and russium, this remained CPSL outside 
his country. Exchanging ideas and experiences helped research 
to progress, and this was a hard work for European scientists 
(in Sweden, France, Austria, Switzerland and Germany; see 
Table 1). Urbain summarised the problems involved in separating 
and identifying rare earth elements in 19th Century in one brief 
sentence: «it was a sea of errors, and the truth was drowned in 
it»29. Publishing became much better in the next century and the 
applications, both the purely scientific ones (geology, astronomy, 
etc.) and the applied ones (materials science, engineering, etc.), 
appeared in publications that circulated internationally. Moni-
toring the works disseminated with an extensive bibliographical 
database is very revealing.
The technological platform «Scopus» was developed by Elsevier 
but has been managed independently by an international edi-
torial board since 2009; the Spanish National Research Council 
(CSIC) library network has access to it. The contents, the titles 
of 24,500 seriated publications from more than 5,000 publishers 
in 140 countries, were examined via the Scopus website30 and 
are the source of information followed. To begin with, a selection 
has been made of the publications that serve scientific journals, 
chapters of books and thematic reviews where «rare earths» 
appears in the titles or key words; the search was carried out on 
an international level and also in Spain. 86,916 documents were 
29 TRÍFONOV, D. N., TRÍFONOV, V. D., «Como fueron descubiertos los elementos quí-
micos». Editorial MIR, Moscow, P. 141, 1984.
30 https://www.scopus.com/search/form.uri?display=basic Consultation date 
25/01/2021.
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found of which 943 corresponded to Spain (1.1%), of which 59 
were written in Spanish, mainly by South American authors. In 
both cases scientific articles are predominant, 96.8% and 96.9%, 
respectively. Figure 3 shows the number of documents published 
and the year of appearance up to 2020. The first document, 
an article, appears in the year 1881, but very few publications 
appeared until after the Second World War, by which time they 
were exceeding ten per year (Figure 3). By then, new methods 
for separating rare earths had been found and purification meth-
ods were gradually improving, which enabled the researchers to 
study new properties, such as the laser effect and applications 
to magnetism and optics. In 1962, publications exceeded one 
hundred, which marked the beginning of the golden age (Figure 
3). Rare earth elements came to fully form part of everyday life 
(not forgetting Auer’s contributions) with the commercialisation 
of colour televisions using europium.
In Spain (Figure 3) the database began to keep records in 1979, 
and by 1992, over ten documents per year were being included. 
This was followed by an upward trend, albeit with certain irreg-
Figure 3. The number of scientific publications appearing annually in the 
world, dealing with rare earths, according to the Scopus bibliographical 
base, which has collected 86,916 since 1882. The data have grown 
exponentially since 1961 with an R2 adjustment of 0.983. The same can 
be seen in the top left corner for Spanish output. There have been 943 




ularities, such as the fall in the period from 2013 to 2016. In 
general, these vicissitudes are similar to the international trends, 
where there was a period of expansion marked by an exponential 
increase in scientific publications. In that respect David Abra-
ham31, strategist in the field of natural resources for the North 
American publication Technology, Rare and Electronic Materials 
Centre32 considers that research is crucial for discovering the 
secrets of materials science and «Governments should also work 
more closely with research institutions and the tech industry to 
better understand future demands for rare metals». If one bears 
this in mind, and reviews the most detailed scientific documents 
and analyses them by countries, financing sources and the affilia-
tion of the authors, the news is not good for western culture. The 
research work has mainly been carried out by Chinese authors. 
The largest number of writers regarding rare earths belong to 
the Chinese Academy of Sciences, followed a long way behind by 
the Russian Academy of Sciences, with half that number. Eight of 
the ten most frequent affiliations regarding rare earths are either 
Chinese (6) or Russian (2). Only two appear from elsewhere: 
The French CNRS (in third place) and the Japanese University 
of Tohoku (in tenth place). China also predominates pursuant to 
the main sources of financing for articles, followed by the USA 
(only one third of the Chinese quantity) and Russia (one ninth); 
other countries appear to a lesser extent, Japan and Germany, 
with industrial interests, and Brazil, because of its mining activ-
ities. If one takes into account where the research was actually 
carried out, the findings are the same. In the top ten, China is 
far ahead of the rest as the leading country (34%), with the USA 
in second place a long way behind (14%), followed by Japan 
(8%), Germany (7%), Russia, France and India (each with 6%), 
England (4%) and finally Poland and Canada (3% each). Spain’s 
contribution is poor, as can be seen from Figure 3. The research, 
according to the documents published, is mainly done by scien-
tists affiliated to the various Institutes of the Spanish National 
Research Council (CSIC), followed by universities, headed by the 
Universidad Autonoma and the Universidad Complutense both 
in Madrid. All of these receive financing from the State through 
the Ministry that is relevant to research matters and, to a lesser 
extent, from the European Union.
31 ABRAHAM, D.S., «The elements of power». Yale University Press, p. 226, 2015.
32 http://www.tremcenter.org/trem/about-us/mission/ Consultation date 25/01/2021.
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China clearly plays a predominant role, and the reasons for this 
will be discussed below. This leading role also explains why The 
Chinese Society of Rare Earths runs the only scientific journal 
in English that publishes work on aspects of the basic theory 
and the applied science in the field of rare earths: the «Jour-
nal of Rare Earths»33, dependent upon Elsevier. It is the first of 
the Top-5 journals that are responsible for most of the scien-
tific articles published about rare earths, followed closely by the 
European interdisciplinary journal «Journal of Alloys and Com-
pounds», which is not specifically focused on rare earths. The 
next two follow the same line because they concentrate mainly 
on applications, including rare earth applications. They are the 
«Journal of Magnetism and Magnetic Materials» and the «Journal 
of Luminescence», and finally, the fifth one is another Chinese 
journal, the «Journal of the Chinese Rare Earth Society». The 
most specialised aspects of rare earths are brought together in 
the series of books included in the «Handbook on the Physics 
and Chemistry of Rare Earths»34 (Elsevier). This Handbook was 
initiated in 1978 by Karl A. Gschneidner Jr. (1930-2016)35, nick-
named Mr. Rare Earth. He worked for more than 50 years in the 
Ames Laboratory and supervised 41 volumes (until he retired in 
2011), marking a period when this field was dominated by North 
America. Volume 58 appeared in 2020, so there are now 314 
monothematic chapters that cover the many and varied aspects 
of the rare earth sciences, including chemistry, life sciences, 
materials sciences, and physics. All this literary scientific activity, 
together with the exponential growth curve of publications (Fig-
ure 3), are clear examples of the large amount of attention paid 
to rare earth elements; this attention will not wane in the next 
few years. Both pure and applied scientific research into these 
elements has moved from Europe to North America, as a result 
of the negative consequences of the European «Civil» Wars in 
the 20th Century, and, although the post-war situation in China 
was no better than the situation in Europe, it is now China that is 
leading the field.
Now that global interest in rare earth elements from a scientific 
perspective has been demonstrated, it is important to find out 
33 https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/journal-of-rare-earths/about/editori-
al-board Consultation date 25/01/2021.
34 https://www.elsevier.com/books/book-series/handbook-on-the-physics-and-
chemistry-of-rare-earths Consultation date 25/01/2021.
35 PECHARSKY, V., «Karl A. Gschneidner Jr (1930–2016)», Nature Mater 15, 1059, 2016.
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what the articles focus on. The subject matter has been grouped 
into seven different kinds (Figure 4). The percentages are simi-
lar for Spain as they are for the world in general, the figures for 
Spain showing a slight increase (2%) for Materials Science and 
Chemistry, and a slight decrease (3%) for Earth and Planetary 
Sciences. It is the section covering the Materials Science that 
Figure 4. Share of research work contributions involving rare earths in the 
scientific journals. The inner circle refers only to Spain and the outer ring 
refers globally to the world. Engineering includes Chemical Engineering 
while Earth Sciences includes the Environment.
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has received the greatest scientific attention in the world in this 
percentual classification, followed by chemistry. Energy is sev-
enth in interest with 2.0% (2.2% in Spain) and its global influ-
ence is growing exponentially with an adjustment of 0.92 for R2. 
Although publications did not exceed twenty a year until 1987, 
there has been a sharp increase since 2009, the year in which 
over a hundred articles were published for the first time, the fig-
ure of 326 being reached in 2020. China also stands out when 
Energy is the subject matter, being responsible for 902 publica-
tions from a total of 3,174 documents. Spain comes twelfth in the 
world rankings.
Sources of rare earth metals: the past conditions the present
The current availability of sixteen rare earth elements, i.e. 14 lan-
thanides (promethium is not considered), scandium and yttrium, 
in the Earth’s upper crust (Figure 1) is determined by its stellar 
origins, the formation of our planet and the chemical properties 
in the process whereby the minerals were crystallised in the lith-
osphere. Only scandium could have had nuclear fusion origins 
inside the stars (stellar nucleosynthesis36), as is the case with 
the chemical elements up to iron. The rest emerged during the 
explosion as supernovae of massive stars. This event provided 
sufficient energy to overcome the electric repulsion between 
protons and to bring the strong nuclear force into action that 
keeps them united in an atomic nucleus. The chemical elements 
up to uranium were formed by addition of neutrons37, among 
them, yttrium and the lanthanides. This different process makes 
them less abundant in our solar system, around seven orders of 
magnitude, i.e., ten million times more exiguous than iron (Fig-
ure 1). That is also why scandium is about one hundred times 
more frequent than the lanthanides (Figure 1). Furthermore, the 
abundance of the elements decreases as their number of protons 
grows (Z), in such a way that the expected order of abundance 
would be on the decrease from scandium (Z= 21) to lutetium 
(71). Thus cerium (58) and neodymium (60) are among the least 
profuse lanthanides and the least profuse of all is lutetium (71). 
Lanthanum (57) should be more abundant than cerium (58) but 
this is not so. This ought to be the case with the other lantha-
36 LANGMUIR, C.H., BROECKER, W., «How to build a habitable planet». Princeton Uni-




nides, yet they appear in sawteeth, because the ones with even 
atomic numbers are more numerous than their neighbours with 
odd numbers (Figure 1). A nuclear effect provides greater stabil-
ity for atomic nuclei with even numbers of protons or neutrons 
(Oddo-Harkins Rule)38. In that sense, it is understood that the 
odd-numbered scandium (21) and yttrium (39) are less frequent 
in the Universe than their even-numbered neighbours (Figure 1): 
five orders of magnitude less than calcium (20) or one order of 
magnitude less than strontium (38). This difference makes some 
rare earths rarer in nature, especially the lanthanides such as 
thulium or lutetium, affecting the mineral extraction processes 
and their commercial cost.
One single cloud of matter configured the Sun, the Earth and all 
the other planets, which acquired different compositions while the 
solar system was being formed and as it evolved. When the Earth 
was being formed, the elements were distributed, in accordance 
with the cosmochemical classification devised by Goldschmidt39, 
into lithophiles, siderophiles chalcophiles and atmosphiles. The 
rare earth elements are all lithophiles, i.e., silicate loving. The 
chemical similarity between them comes from their electronic 
structure. That is why they are always present together in their 
minerals, in greater or smaller proportions. In nature, their atoms 
do not appear in the form of metals without electric charges but 
as positive ions that have lost three electrons. The progressive 
increase in protons causes the force of attraction to increase from 
lanthanum (57 protons) to lutetium (71 protons) and the size 
of the trivalent cation (considered to be a sphere), decreases 
to 1.02 ten billionth of a metre (Å) to 0.86 Å. This fact marks 
a small yet basic difference that determines which one of them 
will be incorporated first into the crystals that form when a liquid 
cools, whether it is water or magma. In magmas, the elements40 
from lanthanum to samarium strongly tend to remain at the 
molten phase where they accumulate. However, in hydrothermal 
solutions this happens from gadolinium to lutetium, as well as 
yttrium, because their ionic radius (0.90 Å) is similar to that of 
holmium. When one of the processes is predominant there is usu-
ally an exploitable deposit. Most of the Earth’s crust was formed 
38 ODDO, G., «Die Molekularstruktur der Radioaktiven Atome», Zeitschrift für Anor-
ganische und Allgemeine Chemie, 87: 253-268, 1914.
39 GOLDSCHMIDT, V.M., «Geochemistry», Oxford University Press, London, 742 pag-
es, 1954.
40 This is another grouping that usually appears for the light and heavy rare earths.
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from the mantle (lying at an average of 33 kilometres below the 
continents) about 2,500-2,000 million years ago. At that time, 
light rare earths amassed in the molten rocks, which took them 
along in the differentiation of the Earth’s crust, impoverishing 
the mantle in them41. If the ascending magmas transport carbon 
dioxide, the carbonates are strongly associated with light rare 
earths giving rise to deposits that are worth exploiting. These 
are their main deposits. Furthermore, the secondary deposits 
are of hydrothermal origin, forming mineralisation in the seams. 
Weathering of the Earth’s upper crust is another powerful mecha-
nism for concentrating rare earths. That is how laterite clays were 
formed, after the intense chemical weathering of granite, creat-
ing major deposits of heavy rare earths that cost little to extract 
in the subtropical zones of China, Madagascar and Laos. As a 
result of all the above-mentioned processes42, more than 270 
minerals have been discovered that contain a rare earth element 
as an essential component of their chemical formula, another 
new one often being added every year. Yet only eleven miner-
als are exploitable, to a greater or lesser extent43: fluorocarbons 
(bastnäsite, parisite, synchysite), phosphates (monazite, xeno-
time, churchite), silicates (allanite, eudialyte, laterite) and oxides 
(loparite, fergusonite). In the case of light rare earths, the most 
common deposits are monazite, bastnäsite and loparite (95% of 
the total extracted44) whereas xenotime and laterite clays are the 
most frequent deposits for heavy rare earths.
It has been considered that if demand remains at 201745 lev-
els, the reserves of rare earths on our planet will be sufficient 
for another 900 years. At present, there is an upward trend of 
about 10% per year, so those reserves could run out by midway 
through the 21st Century. The predictions made by other authors 
are more optimistic46. They do not think there is going to be a 
shortage this century, although there would be an increase in 
their prices due to extraction costs. Recent discoveries of depos-
its suggest that that prediction is not correct.
41 CHAKHMOURADIAN, A.R., WALL, F., «Rare Earth Elements: minerals, mines, mag-
nets (and more)», Elements, 8: 333-340, 2012.
42 Ibidem.
43 Ibidem.
44 GSCHNEIDNER, K.A.Jr., PECHARSKY, V.K., «Rare-earth element», Enciclopedia Bri-
tannica, 2019.
45 Ibidem.
46 HENCKENS, M.L.C.M. et al., «Mineral resources: Geological scarcity, market price 
trends, and future generations». Resources Policy, 49: 102–111, 2016.
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Space mining has commenced thanks to the cosmochemical 
knowledge obtained about chemical elements and their miner-
als, and this is the case with rare earth elements. Asteroid min-
ing is covered by international treaties concerning Space Laws47: 
the Outer Space Treaty (1967) signed by 110 countries in 2020. 
Moreover, specific legislation has also been passed in some coun-
tries: in 2015, the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness 
Act was passed in the US (abbreviated to The Space Act, and 
signed by President Barack Obama). It granted its citizens own-
ership rights over space resources. A year later, it was followed 
by the EU initiative for asteroid mining. US and Japanese space 
probes (Hayabusa Missions) have travelled or are still travelling 
(OSIRIS-Rex from the NASA) to collect samples of asteroids, now 
regarded as a source of strategic resources. The mining space 
race includes private initiative. The company Planetary Resources 
(2012) intends to develop a robot industry for asteroid mining. 
The British firm Asteroid Mining Corporation (2016) prepares 
satellites to explore asteroids. They attract millions of dollars 
in private investments despite being far from their goal, to put 
themselves in the front line where a potential space business is 
concerned.
Many groups, both public and private, see the Moon as the Earth’s 
«eighth continent»48. During its formation, the lower gravity left 
a sea of magma trapped between the mantle and the crust; as it 
slowly solidified some elements migrated towards the crust form-
ing deposits with large potassium (K) content, rare earth elements 
(REE) and phosphorus (P). They (called KREEP) are abundant in 
the largest of the lunar seas, Oceanus Procellarum. It is a dark 
and flat tract covering 1,692,000 square kilometres on the near 
(visible) side of the Moon, where several spacecraft and probes 
landed as part of the US Surveyor and Apollo Missions, the Soviet 
Luna Mission and the Chinese Rover-Robot Cháng’é Yutu Mission 
in 2013. On the occasion of this success, Ouyang Ziyuan, mem-
ber of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, stated49: «There are a 
lot of resources [in the Moon], especially rare minerals, titanium, 
uranium that are very rare on Earth, and these resources could be 
47 ROSENDAHL, M., «Galactic Preservation and Beyond: A Framework for Protecting 
Cultural, Natural, and Scientific Heritage in Space», William & Mary Environmental Law 
and Policy Review, 43 (3): Article 5, 2019.
48 KLINGER, Note 48, p. 230.
49 RINCON, P., «What is China looking for on the dark side of the Moon?», 2018. 
https://loozz.com/chile/what-is-china-looking-for-on-the-dark-side-of-the-moon-2/ 
Consultation date 18/02/2021.
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used without restrictions». Chinese exploration of the Moon has 
been taking place through the Chang’e Missions. The first two to 
collect information in orbit, the next two to carry out operations on 
the surface of the satellite, and the last two to bring back samples. 
The fifth mission came back to Earth on 16 December 2020 with 
about two kilograms of soil samples and some lunar rocks. The 
European Space Agency has signed a mutual technological collab-
oration agreement with the China National Space Administration. 
In contrast, the 112th US Congress prohibited NASA from partici-
pating in bilateral agreements and coordination agreements with 
China50. In her extensive and exhaustive review of this matter 
in the chapter of her book entitled «Extraglobal Extraction», the 
geographer Julie Klinger, Assistant Professor of International Rela-
tions at Boston University, adds a bit of common sense to the situ-
ation by concluding51 that «surely we can do better: both in finding 
the reasons to explore the cosmos, and in our everyday production 
and consumption of rare earth elements», because «the race to 
mine rare earths on the Moon has less to do with actual resources 
scarcity and much more to do with how rare earth elements min-
ing in these places [the Brazilian Amazon, Afghanistan or Green-
land] might serve frustrated bids for territory, power, and control».
Periods in the exploitation of rare earths
Coming back down to Earth, before 1890 there was no commer-
cial market for rare earth elements. The Swedish mine at Bästnas 
supplied it to scientific laboratories. Auer’s inventions that lit up 
the world began the industry and extended rare earth mining 
activities to Brazil and India. Later, during the Manhattan Project, 
major breakthroughs were made in studying the chemistry of rare 
earth elements, especially lanthanides because of their similar-
ity to actinides (uranium, neptunium, plutonium, etc.). However, 
until the end of the 1950s commercial demand for rare earth 
elements was limited, not exceeding two thousand tonnes a year, 
50 Sec. 1340. (a) None of the funds made available by this division may be used for 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or the Office of Science and Tech-
nology Policy to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral 
policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate 
bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company unless such activities 
are specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of enactment of this divi-
sion. Department of Defence and Full-year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011. United 
States Congress. https://www.congress.gov/112/plaws/publ10/PLAW-112publ10.htm
51 KLINGER, Note 48, pages 227.
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and that demand was catered for from mines in the two afore-
mentioned countries. Knowledge of the properties, especially the 
optic and magnetic properties, of the rare earth elements paved 
the way for industrial applications, which in the following decade 
triggered the search for and exploitation of new deposits in South 
Africa, the USSR and the US. Subsequently, a fresh impulse was 
given in the 80s when they were applied to rare earth magnets, 
and consumption has now reached 60,000 tonnes per year.
US domination: Mountain Pass Mine
The US Mountain Pass Mine (California) is often used to exemplify 
an important period (1965-1984) in the industrial use of rare 
earths. For twenty years that mine was the biggest source of 
REEs in the world. The resources were discovered in 1949 during 
prospection activities that detected a radioactive vein. Uranium 
extraction commenced in 1952. The deposits were rich in barium 
carbonate containing 8-15% bastnäsite, associated with miner-
als that included thorium. Thorium is a lithophile element that 
is present in nature as a tetravalent cation with an ionic radius 
similar to the radii of the lanthanides, so it is usually an unwanted 
companion in rare earth minerals. The firm Molycorp Inc. oper-
ated it as an open cast mine to cater for the demand for euro-
pium that arose with the commercialisation of colour television. 
The history of Mountain Pass is a good example of the changes 
that rare earth mining underwent and the collapse of US mining. 
Between 1984 and 1998 a series of spillages occurred affect-
ing the wastewater channels that contained radioactive waste. 
Apparently, President Richard Nixon approached the mining exec-
utives with a proposal for subcontracting some of the processes 
to China in order to reduce environmental liability in California 
and cut down on cost52. The refining plant was closed down and 
only a concentrate of bastnäsite was produced, which was then 
exported for treatment. The strict environmental regulations and 
the market prices, which rendered mining unprofitable, led to its 
closure in 2002. In 2007 an attempt was made to refloat it with 
the backing of Wall Street and the Pentagon; exports of con-
centrates returned. In 2011, Molycorp purchased the Estonian 
company Silmet53 in order to process rare metals, and signed an 
52 KLINGER, Note 48, p. 112.
53 Until 1989, Silmet supplied nuclear materials to the USSR; as from 1970, it pro-
cessed loparite from the Kola Peninsula, extracting the rare earths. At present time 
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agreement with the Japanese companies Sumitomo and Mitsub-
ishi to supply rare earths and also with the catalytic converter 
manufacturer W. R. Grace & Co. The drop in prices scuttled the 
project in 2014, once many of the most profitable shares had 
been sold on to Neo Materials, linked to China54. US dependence 
on rare earths had fallen under Chinese Control! Mountain Pass 
sent its rare earth concentrates to China for processing. In this 
context, the Chairman of Green & Co., a firm whose success was 
recognised in 2020 in Hill’s Top Lobbyist List, which helps com-
panies to wade through the complexities of the US Government, 
stated that «the Department of Defence had taken note, having 
recently solicited industry for options on rare earth separation 
capability, which could result in direct investment. These fixes, 
properly executed, represent the best chance to the U.S. has at 
revitalizing a crippled industry essential to our national securi-
ty»55. In 2019 USA produced 26,000 tonnes of rare earths (sec-
ond highest producer in the world; Table 5) coming exclusively 
from Mountain Pass, purchased by MP Mine Operation (10% Chi-
nese capital), which had resumed mining activity and refining the 
year before. A new mine rich in heavy rare earths is now being 
opened in Round Top Mountain (Texas), as well as a pilot plant at 
Wheat Ridge (Colorado) for the complete processing of rare earth 
elements; once it has proved successful, it will be relocated in 
Texas for commercial processing. In the USA, the project is con-
sidered to be strategically important for national security in key 
sectors, including defence and energy, in order to manufacture 
cutting-edge technology56. In that respect, on 30th September 
2020, the Trump Administration signed an executive order that 
declared a national emergency in the mining industry, a measure 
designed to boost the production of rare earth minerals57.
NPM Silmet AS refines rare earth elements to produce neodymium iron-boron alloys, 
neodymium ingots and mischmetal.
54 GREEN, J.A., «The collapse of American rare earth mining – and lessons learned», 




56 NS Energy, 2020. https://www.nsenergybusiness.com/projects/round-top-ra-
re-earth-critical-minerals/ Consultation date 25/01/2021.
57 International Banker, «Rare-earth elements: will China constitute its mar-






The People’s Republic of China joins the world of rare earth 
elements
After some years of interregnum (1984-1991), when diverse min-
ing sources of rare earth coexisted, the period of Chinese domina-
tion began. The Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) caused 
a stir when he broke away from the agricultural model imposed by 
President Mao (1893-1976) and stated that «The complete state-
ment should be that science and technology constitute a primary 
productive force. The future of agriculture will eventually lie in 
bioengineering and other highly advanced technologies».
1976 The Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) breaks 
away from the agricultural model imposed by President 
Mao (1893-1976) and states that «The complete 
statement should be that science and technology 
constitute a primary productive force. The future of 
agriculture will eventually lie in bioengineering and other 
highly advanced technologies».
There is a great desire for the country to be 
technologically independent from foreign countries.
1978-89 The annual production of rare earths increases by 40%.
Innovative Science & Technology programmes are initiated.
1986 Deng Xiaoping states that «the Middle East has oil, China 
has rare earths» Approval is given to the 863 Programme 
(a combination of military and civil projects) focused on 
biotechnology, space technology, information technology, 
laser technology, automation, energy technology and new 
materials.
1990s Exports of oxides and metals already extracted from rare 
earth minerals begin, causing a plunge in world prices.
President Jiang Zemin (Electrical Engineer) announced 
that it was necessary «improve the development and 
application of rare earth, and change the resource 
advantage into economic superiority».
At the end of the decade products of greater value were 
manufactured: magnets, luminescent products and 
compounds for glass polishing. 
2000s President Hu Jintao (Hydraulic Engineer) stated that 
«Science & Technology are the backbone of the Chinese 
development strategy».
China grows at the expense of Western industrial 
dynamism and uses its richness to capture companies.
Systematic restrictions (high taxation) imposed on rare 
earth exports.
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2010s The 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-15) backs the scientific and 
creativity boom.
China absorption of Western jobs.
Manufactures finished products, such as electric motors, 
computers, batteries, screens/displays, telephones and 
portable music devices.
Rare earth metals require an export licence and the export 
quantities permitted are halved, though no quotas are 
imposed on the amounts that can be sold abroad.
2013 President Xi Jinping (Chemical Engineer) assumes a 
scientific concept for developing Chinese Socialism and a 
security policy for the supply of minerals (from Africa, for 
example).
2016-20 Five-Year Plan based on innovation and technological 
progress.
It permits the absorption of patents from joint ventures 
established in China.
«Rare Earth Industry Development Plan» (2016) with the 
initiation of environmental protection, the consolidation of 
that industry and the development of new materials.
2025 In 2013 Gan Yong, President of the «China Rare Earth 
Industry Association», put China’s long-term policy into 
words: «The real value of rare earths is obtained in the 
end product». A plan is set by China to become the world 
leader, including establishing 40 industrial innovation 
centres in order to provide expertise through discovery 
of new properties inherent to rare earth elements, 
registering patents and starting to operate future 
applications.
To be a winner in the energy and digital transition, and 
the same in the military field.
Table 4. Steps taken by China involving rare earths.
This burning desire to achieve technological independence from 
other countries brought into the limelight the figure of the chem-
ist Xu Guangxian (1920-2015)58, the scientific father of Chinese 
rare earth developments. His work was vital for the progress of 
the rare earth industry in China and the training of scientists to 
become experts in the field of those metals. Once again, there is 
a US connection in the history of rare earths with nuclear fission 
(and armaments). Xu went to the US (1948) where he obtained 
a Doctorate in Physical Chemistry at the University of Columbia. 
In 1951 he returned to the new People’s Republic of China to 
58 GAO, S., «Rare earth chemistry - in memory of Professor Xu Guangxian on the cen-
tenary of his birth», Inorganic Chemistry Frontiers, DOI: 10.1039/d0qi90084b, 2020.
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take up a post at the University of Peking. Five years later he 
was running the Radiation Chemistry Department that was taking 
part in the Chinese nuclear weapons programme, where he spe-
cialised in separating and extracting uranium for nuclear fuels. 
During the Cultural Revolution he was accused of espionage and 
sent to a labour camp (1969-1972). After Mao’s death and the 
coming of Xiaoping, Xu was given back his university post, where 
he focused on rare earths. He then proceeded to carry out theo-
retical, experimental and industrial research into the separation 
of these metals, completing a counter current extraction process 
which considerably reduced the time required to extract the met-
als and the cost of doing so. In 1986, Xu founded the Research 
Centre of Rare Earth Chemistry, and three years later, he was the 
key person in setting up the State Key Laboratory of Rare Earth 
Materials Chemistry and Applications. Until his death, Xu was a 
scientist famous the world over for his expertise in the field of 
rare earths.
Chinese domination: Baiyun-ebo mine
As was the case with the Mountain Pass Mine earlier, the history 
of the Baiyun-ebo Mining District exemplifies the developments 
made in rare earth mining since then. This open cast mine cov-
ers 48 square kilometres in the Chinese Autonomous Region 
of Inner Mongolia, about 150 kilometres to the north of the 
City of Baotou, whose economy revolves around iron and steel. 
The rare earth mineral is transported to Baotou for processing. 
Iron deposits were discovered there in 1927 and rare earths 
in 1935. Minerals have been extracted since 1957, including 
the resources used at the Nuclear Fuel Material Plant 202 in 
Baotou, which played a key role in manufacturing the first Chi-
nese atomic bomb detonated in 1964. Baiyun-ebo has reserves 
amounting to approximately 1,500 million tonnes of iron (car-
bonates and oxides) and 1 million tonnes of niobium (oxides). 
The zone also contains 48 million tonnes of rare earths (mona-
zite and bastnäsite), which is to say that they are predominantly 
light rare earths. They are to be found in a series of veins and 
dykes as a result of hydrothermal replacement of dolomite. It 
is the largest, rare earths mine on the planet, in terms of both 
production and reserves, which has enabled the China Northern 
Rare Earth Group High-Tech Co Ltd, owner and operator of the 
Baotou processing facilities to be the world’s largest supplier of 
rare earths. Apart from Baiyun-ebo, which has 83% of all Chi-
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nese deposits, there are the Daluxiang and Maoniuping Mines 
(which are second in light rare earths output in China) in the 
Province of Sichuan59; in many ways, their deposits are similar 
to those at Mountain Pass as is the case with their content in 
bastnäsite and barium. There are other mines in the south-east 
of the country60, in the provinces of Jiangxi (discovered in 1969), 
Hunan, Fujian and Guangdong and in the Autonomous Region of 
Guangxi Zhuang. The deposits appeared after the weathering of 
granite and concentration through adsorption of ions on clays, 
making them easy to mine. It is estimated that there are one 
million tonnes of rare earth elements that are very important 
because they are rich in content of the heavy rare earth type, 
accounting for 80% of the world’s deposits.
The prodigal finding of rare earths in China did not go unnoticed 
to the country’s governors. It was in 1992 that the former Pres-
ident Deng Xiaoping uttered his famous sentence: «the Middle 
East has oil, China has rare earths»61. Nine years after, President 
Jiang Zemin continued along the same lines, «Improve the devel-
opment and application of rare earth, and change the resource 
advantage into economic superiority»62. The development started 
by Xiaoping in 1976 has been followed by subsequent Presidents 
as can be seen in Table 4. The rare earths mined in China are 
one of the ways in which China can exert its geopolitical influence 
on an international level. One of the country’s targets for 2025 
is to become the world’s top technological research & develop-
ment power for the rare earth industry. The Chinese are pro-
ceeding towards this goal with a long-term strategy. Moreover, 
although the deregulations that took place during the era of the 
US President Ronald Reagan and the English Prime Minister Mar-
garet Thatcher are normally treated separately from the Xiaoping 
reforms, the former played a fundamental role in reorganising the 
59 WANG, D. et al., «A Special Orogenic-type Rare Earth Element Deposit in Maoni-
uping, Sichuan, China: Geology and Geochemistry», Resource Geology, 51: 177-188, 
2001.
60 VONCKEN, J.H.L., «The rare Earth elements, An introduction». SpringerNature, Ba-
silea, pages 43-45, 2016.




earths.%E2%80%9D Consultation date 18/02/2021.
62 HURST, C. «China’s Rare Earth Elements industry: what can the West learn?» Insti-
tute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS), 2010.
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global economy and the birth of the Chinese monopoly over rare 
earths63. In the 1990s, thanks to the Baiyun-ebo Mine, Chinese 
supplies of rare earths were the cheapest because they were a 
by-product of iron ore extraction, the labour costs were lower 
and the environmental legislation was permissive. China plunged 
the prices and managed to exclude its competitors from the rare 
earth market, attaining such a predominant position that it nearly 
managed to monopolise the market.
Crisis and current situation
China had achieved such a predominant situation on the rare 
earth market because of its mineral deposits and price policy. At 
the turn of the century, it not only produced rare earths already 
separated at the plants it had constructed in China to process 
the minerals, but it had also opted for preparing end products on 
its own territory such as magnets, electric motors, computers, 
batteries, telephones, etc., that is, products of high economic 
value64. To develop its industry, it offered firms and foreign capital 
very favourable terms and conditions. Attracted by low domestic 
prices and an abundant supply, they were installed in a duty-free 
zone of Baotou with 120 square kilometres of land for foreign 
industry. That city went from being the Chinese capital of the 
rare earths industry, to being the international capital. Although 
the Baiyun-ebo Mine is in the middle of the desert, the city lies 
on the banks of the Yellow River, which provides all the water 
needed for processing the ores and for the industrial process-
ing of manufactured products. Baogang Steel and Rare Earth, an 
industrial complex the size of a city is in Baotou. In 2014, five 
firms65 were processing annually 73,500 tonnes of rare earth. 
This growth at the expense of Western industrial dynamism, has 
left a major gap in rare earth mining, industry and research in 
other countries. Globalisation and cost reduction had made it 
profitable for companies to relocate. In this respect in the US, 
Abraham admits with regret that «the Unite States is losing the 
expertise to develop its own resources and allowing future tech-
63 KLINGER, Note 48, p. 104.
64 GESCHNEIDER, K.A. «The rare earth crisis – the supply/demand situation for 2011-
2015». Mater Matters, 6: 32-41, 2011.
65 Baotou Feida Rare Earth Co., Baotou Jinmeng Rare Earth Co., Baotou Hongtianyu 
Rare Earth Magnets Co., Wuyuan Runze Rare Earth Co. and Xinyuan Rare Earth Hi-
Tech & New Material Co.
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nological advances to go to other countries»66. The French law-
yer and journalist Pitron is even more pessimistic, admitting that 
«French mining culture is dying»67.
In 2007, China began to impose restrictions on rare earth 
exports. It is the biggest exporter of them and also their big-
gest consumer. It wanted to (and wants to) save them for its 
own domestic market. In 1998, it introduced a licencing system 
and imposed an export quota for rare earth products by set-
ting an export quota that amounted 65,600 tonnes per year in 
2005. The following year it imposed a 10% export duty on rare 
earth metals and oxides. In 2009, the export quota fell to 50,145 
tonnes and a year later the control was even more stringent: 
the sale tariff for other countries was raised to 15% (neodym-
ium 25%) and it only recognised 32 exporters as being entitled 
to export rare earths68. The trading situation was tense, but an 
incident in the China´s Sea aggravated it still further. The price 
of rare earth elements rocketed on the world market. It was the 
2009-2013 Crisis69.
There is a group of eight small islands in the East China´s Sea, 
known as Senkaku in Japan, Diaoyu in China and Diaoyutai 
in Taiwan, which Japan incorporated into its territory in 1895. 
After a UN Report was published in 1968 revealing the pres-
ence of major energy resources in the archipelago’s territorial 
waters, the Chinese and Taiwanese Governments claimed own-
ership of them. In this way, nationalist activists from the three 
countries have been involved in incidents. On 7 September 
2010 there was another incident70, this time a Chinese trawler 
was boarded by a Japanese coastguard patrol boat, what led 
to a serious diplomatic incident when the trawler was detained 
and taken to Japan. There, all the crew members were released 
except the Captain as he was to be prosecuted. Although China 
had not officially declared an embargo, as from 22 September a 
wave of anti-Japanese protests and demonstrations prevented 
rare earth shipments being sent to Japan. Rare earths were 
66 ABRAHAM, Note 31, p.211. 
67 PITRON, G., «La guerra de los metales raros». Ediciones Península, Barcelona, 
p. 209.
68 CHEN, Y., ZHENG, B., «What Happens after the Rare Earth Crisis: A Systematic 
Literature Review». Sustainability, 11, 1288, 2019.
69 VONCKEN, Note 60, pages 112-113. 
70 REINHARD, D., «The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands territorial dispute between Japan and 
China», UNISCI Discussion Papers, 32: 1696-2206, 2013.
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now playing a direct role in geopolitics! This was to be the 
first embargo during the energy and digital transition. Japan 
imports from China, 90% of the metals it requires for its high-
tech products. The diplomatic incident was over by the rapid 
release without charges of the captain of the trawler Minjinyu 
5179. Despite all of this, the «embargo» was enforced for Japan 
until mid-November and was also extended to the USA and 
the EU. The situation was overcome but it caused considerable 
alarm among the consumers of those metals and their respec-
tive nations. That same year, the EU Government published a 
report on commodities that were vital for the European high-
tech industry and the lack of security over their supply. Out of 
the fourteen commodities mentioned71 rare earths were consid-
ered to be most at risk. A similar report was issued by the US 
Energy Department72, analysing the role of rare earth metals 
in the clean energy economy. The USA admitted that it was 
vulnerable where the following seven elements for its military 
equipment were concerned: dysprosium, erbium, europium, 
gadolinium, yttrium, neodymium and praseodymium.
In 2011, the rare earth crisis reached its peak when prices, 
which had been stagnating since 2009, increased disproportion-
ately. Indeed, prices, which had been rising by an average of 
3.7% per year73 between 1990 and 2009, suddenly rocketed74. 
Cerium rose from 4.5 US$/kg in 2009 to US$ 158/kg in 2011, 
neodymium rose from US$ 14/kg to US$ 318/kg, dysprosium 
from US$ 100/kg to US$ 2,510/kg, europium from US$ 450/kg 
to US$ 5,870/kg and terbium from US$ 350/kg to US$ 4,410/kg. 
The following year, in 2012, prices fell by 23-76% and continued 
to drop to values that doubled or tripled the pre-crisis prices, 
although in 2016 europium and terbium remained above US$ 
1,600/kg. Unlike the prices for other metals, rare earth prices 
are not accessible because there is no extensively used public 
exchange. They are particularly susceptible to the movements on 
the Chinese market and many transactions are carried out directly 
between the purchaser and the seller, who reach an agreement 
71 European Commission, «Presentation of a list of 14 essential mineral commodi-
ties», MEMO/10/263, 2010.
72 U.S. Department of Energy, «Critical materials strategy», December 2010.
73 ECORYS, «Mapping resource prices: the past and the future», Final Report, Europe-
an Commission - DG Environment (ENV.G.1/FRA/20410/0044), 2012.
74 CHARALAMPIDES, G. et al., «Rare Earth Elements: Industrial Applications and Eco-
nomic Dependency of Europe». Procedia Economics and Finance, 24: 126-135, 2015.
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about the amounts. Moreover, heavy rare earth elements such as 
dysprosium and terbium have cash prices that vary depending on 
whether the Chinese frontier with Burma (Myanmar) is open or 
closed, given that the supply of these low-production elements 
decreases rapidly. In June 2020, the price of europium was US$ 
285/kg and terbium was US$ 831/kg. There are specialist com-
panies that, on payment, offer their periodical evaluations of this 
market.
In 2009, the US, the EU and Japan lodged complaints against 
China before the World Trade Organisation (WTO) for restricting 
rare earth exports. Since 2001, China has formed part of this 
supranational organisation that imposes a set of trading rules 
on its member countries. In mid-crisis they once again asked 
for a solution to the complaints submitted three years before. 
In 2014, the WTO ruled75 against Chinese export quotas for rare 
earths. In 2015, after this failure, China cancelled the export 
quotas and the export tariff, and began to enforce the rare earth 
export licence. It is determined to utilise its own resources and 
to employ its citizens to obtain rare earths and to manufacture 
high tech devices. At present, the trade war between the USA 
and China is adding yet another complication to the rare earths 
sector.
The main consequence of the crisis was that the countries that 
are the biggest, rare earth consumers admitted that they were 
totally dependent on China. Therefore, in response to a poten-
tial scarcity situation they began the quest to find alternative 
sources, following three different paths and giving their backing to 
the firms involved: new mines were exploited, abandoned mines 
were reopened and the hunt for new reserves began all over the 
planet. Production is now more balanced. China, by extracting 
130,000 tonnes per year (without including illegal mining, which 
in 2011 was estimated at 20% of the official figure) and pursuing 
its price policy, managed to control 97% of world production in 
2010 (Table 5). In 2019, the percentage figure fell to 62%, as 
eleven countries appeared on the scene as the mining market 
expanded (Table 5).
75 WTO, «China-Measures related to the exportation of rare earths, tungsten, and 
molybdenum», WT/DS431/AB/R • WT/DS432/AB/R • WT/DS433/AB/R, 2014.
WTO Appellate Body rules against Chinese restrictions on access to rare earths and oth-




Reserves Nation 2019 (%) 2015 2010 2005 2000 1995
44000000 China 132,000 
(61.97)
105,000 130,000 98,000 70,000 30,000
14000000 USA 26,000 
(12.20)
4,100 5,000 28,700
? Myanmar 22,000 
(10.32)
3300000 Australia 21,000 
(9.85)
10,000 3,000
6900000 India 3,000 
(1.41)
1,700 2,700 2,700 2.700 2,500
12000000 Russia 2,700 
(1.27)
2,500 2,000 6,000
? Madagascar 2,000 
(0.94)
1100 Thailand 1,800 
(0.84)
760 2,200 150
22000000 Brazil 1,000 
(0.47)
880 550 1.400 400
22000000 Vietnam 900 
(0.42)
200
50000 Burundi 600 
(0.28)
     
124251100 TOTAL 213,000 
(99.97)
125,140 133,250 102,900 81,100 70,750
Table 5. List of the eleven biggest producing countries of rare earths, with 
their mines in 2019 and their evolution since 1995. The world reserves are 
estimates, no data were available for Myanmar and Madagascar. Units are 
given in metric tonnes.
Based on data from the Mineral Commodity Summaries, U.S. Geological 
Survey. 
China produces 132,000 tonnes per year from a world total of 
213,000 tonnes per year of rare earths extracted (Table 5). It 
produces 20,000 tonnes more than in 2018!76 In China produc-
tion increased by 10%, whereas in the US it rose by 44%. Aus-
tralia and Burma have exceeded 20,000 tonnes per year. The 
huge Mount Weld Mine has been operating in Australia since 2013 
(the mineral concentrate goes to a plant in Kuantan, Malaysia, 
for processing), and it could come to be the biggest source of 
rare earths outside China. The situation is complex. The US still 
imports from China 80% of the rare earths it consumes, and 
China is the main client of Burma. However, Burma has closed its 
frontier between the two countries because of territorial disputes, 
76 U.S. Geological Survey, «Mineral Commodity Summaries», 2020.
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suspending rare earth exports77. The «Autonomous State» of Wa 
in Burma, lying on the border with China, is not recognised either 
by the Burmese Government or by any other international bod-
ies, except China. The minerals extracted there come from two 
mines where rare earths have accumulated by adsorption of ions 
on clays and they contain high concentrations of dysprosium and 
terbium (32% of the world production). They are an appealing 
source for the Chinese refineries given that they are commercial-
ised at relatively low prices by cheap labour and with deficient 
environmental protection. Other countries, such as Russia, have 
been extracting rare earths for years, but their production figures 
do not exceed 3,000 tonnes a year. There are also other countries 
that extracted in the past, such as India or Brazil, that have now 
reopened their old mine workings, and there are also the new-
comers, who are mining for the very first time, namely Madagas-
car, Thailand, Vietnam or Burundi. The eleven nations mentioned 
above were the main producers of rare earths in 2019 (Table 5).
Critical and strategic elements
The demand for rare earth elements has been growing steadily, 
at approximately the same pace as production (Table 5) which 
doubled between 1995 and 2010, and will do likewise in 2020. 
These metals have become «critical» for industry and strategic 
for nations. Any chemical elements or minerals are considered to 
be «critical» if their scarcity would damage a country’s economy 
because they are essential for that country’s technological appli-
cations. Limitation is caused when there is no replacement and 
risks arise because the supply78:
a) depends on the price, as was the case during the aforemen-
tioned 2009-2013 rare earth crisis;
b) depends on the time, the fifteen elements consumed by the 
computing industry in the 1990s, not all critical, have in-
creased to some sixty at present, including most of the rare 
earth elements;
c) depends on the technological context. What is essential for 
one kind of industry may not be for another and it may vary 
from one country to another on the basis of their needs;
77 ROSKILL, «Rare earths: Myanmar’s border to China recloses». https://roskill.com/
news/rare-earths-myanmars-border-to-china-recloses/ Consultation date 25/01/2021.
78 PREGO, Note 2, pages 109-111.
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d) depends on imponderable occurrences such as the COV-
ID-19 pandemic; according to the Global Times79 (the Chi-
nese Communist Party’s emblematic newspaper) rare earth 
exports plunged by 26.7% year-on-year in the first eleven 
months of 2020, because in Ganzhou, where approximately 
70% of the world’s rare metals are processed, they were 
working in February at 20% of their capacity due to the out-
break, which affects exports to the USA, Japan and Europe80;
e) in the particular case of rare earth elements, there is a 
«problem of balance»81 as they are mixed in different pro-
portions depending on the mineral, when an element is ad-
justed to its market demand, others are obtained in excess, 
which can put up their price owing to storage cost. On the 
contrary however, if production is adapted to the demand 
for the excess, a scarcity of the former is generated. Neo-
dymium and dysprosium are the elements that are generally 
most in demand, whereas cerium, gadolinium, holmium, yt-
terbium, lutetium praseodymium and thulium are produced 
in excess and are stored82.
The globalisation of the economy has involved industry, and with 
it trading in chemical elements and their minerals. They include 
those that are essential from a military perspective. They are the 
ones referred to as «strategic», whose domestic production can-
not meet the demand made on them by the military industry. In 
2012 the US military industry accounted for 5% of the rare earths 
consumed in the country. The US Department of Defence83 admit-
ted that it was vulnerable where certain rare earth elements were 
concerned, because they were strategic for their military equip-
ment and recommended stockpiling yttrium and dysprosium in 
2013 and europium in 2015. Strategic elements/minerals will 
always be critical but not critical elements will not always be stra-
79 GT Staff, «Rare-earth exports plunge in first 11 months: Chinese customs», Global 
times (2020/12/7). https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1209248.shtml Consultation 
date 25/01/2021.
80 XUANMIN, L, «China’s rare earth exports drop 20-30%, crippled by COVID-19 
outbreaks abroad», Global Times (2020/5/14). https://www.globaltimes.cn/con-
tent/1188392.shtml Consultation date 25/01/2021.
81 VONCKEN, Note 60, p. 109.
82 BINNEMANS, K. et al., «Recycling of rare earths: a critical review», Journal of 
Cleaner Production, 51: 1-22, 2013.
83 GAO, «Rare Earth materials: developing a comprehensive approach could help DOD 
better manage National Security risks in the supply chain». Report to Congressional 
Committees, 2016.
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tegic. Publications sometimes confuse the two terms in usage. 
The world reserves of those elements/minerals whose supply in 
times of war would not cater for a State’s minimum requirements 
are highly sought-after, and every industrialised country has its 
own list. The critical and strategic elements club has come to 
form part of geostrategy and world geopolitics.
The EU considers to be critical, those materials that are not only 
of major economic importance but are also affected by a sup-
ply security risk. There are 20 such materials from a list of 54 
potential materials: antimony, beryllium, borate, chrome, cobalt, 
coke coal, elements in the platinum group, rare earth elements, 
fluoride, gallium, germanium, natural graphite, indium, magne-
site, magnesium, mineral phosphate, niobium, silicon metal and 
wolfram. The EU does not include scandium84 in the list of rare 
earths, but it does include yttrium. The criticality can be val-
ued in detail; it is the heavy rare earths (from europium to lute-
tium, plus yttrium), followed by the light ones (from lanthanum 
to samarium) that the EU85 considers to be at greatest risk where 
supply is concerned, supply being considered in the context of 
their potential for replacement, the rate at which they can be 
recycled, mining production and governance (according to the 
World Governance Index). Each member of the EU has its own 
list, which may or may not be the same as the common list. 
However, they all agree when it comes to the rare earths, as 
do the following technologically developed nations: Japan, South 
Korea and Australia, apart from China and the USA. Moreover, 
the importance of rare earth is increased by the fact there is a 
sharp growth in their demand, 8% per year. The following five 
rare earth elements are indicated as being both important and 
at risk where supply (2015-2030) is concerned86: dysprosium, 
europium, yttrium, neodymium and terbium.
The EU imports 99% of its heavy rare earths and 87% of its light 
rare earths from China. The risk involved in this dependence has 
led to different paths being forged in the quest for supplies. Accord-
84 Scandium production is limited, about 15-20 tonnes per year, albeit continual on 
the increase, keeping pace with demand; its main applications are alloys with alumin-
ium (aerospace industry, sports equipment), lasers in odontology and high-intensity 
discharge lamps (price in 2019: in lingots US$ 134/gram; as oxide US$ 5/gram). 
85 EU Ad-Hoc Working Group on raw materials, «Report on critical raw materials for 
the EU», European Commission, 2014. 
86 MCLEOD, C.L., KREKELER, M.P.S., «Sources of Extraterrestrial Rare Earth Elements: 
To the Moon and Beyond», Resources, 6, 40, 2017.
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ing to recent estimates, there are rare earth reserves (Table 5) in 
China (about 44 million tonnes), followed by Brazil and Vietnam 
with around half that amount, then the USA and Russia, with one 
third of the Chinese estimate and, after that, a series of countries 
that are augmenting their exploitation activity. An approximate 
estimate of total world supplies puts the figure at around 124 mil-
lion tonnes of rare earths (i.e., oxides of their elements: Rare Earth 
Oxides, REOs). It has also been estimated that, if these supplies 
were to be added to those resources not yet discovered, reserves 
would be large in relation to the expected demand, and may be 
sufficient for 900 years. Bastnäsite and monazite minerals make 
up the highest percentage of rare earth resources, there being 
considerable quantities of monazite in Australia, Brazil, China, 
India, Malaysia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand and the USA. 
Mining operations are expected to get under way in Greenland 
(the Llimaussaq complex: uranium, rare earth elements and zinc), 
Zambia (Nkwombwa Hill), Canada (Hoidas, Thor, Stange and Mis-
ery Lakes deposits), South Africa (Pilanesberg open cast complex 
and the reopening of Steenkampskraal). It must not be forgotten 
that it may take up to fifteen years from the moment deposits 
are discovered until they can actually be exploited commercially, 
which means that there can be no swift response to shortages.
Africa is a combat zone in this geostrategic «war» to obtain sup-
plies in the future or to control them now. Javier Molina Acebo87, 
member of the Board of the EdV-ESIC Business & Marketing 
School, considers that «arms from the Second World War are 
the modern day bits». In his opinion, wars are no longer fought 
«from an aeroplane, but with technology» and it is the rare 
earths that provide the support for the technology industry. In 
this sense, looking to Africa and remembering that «the Chinese 
are the owners of Angola, that it is exchanging raw materials for 
civil development». China has already approached the nations 
of Africa to exploit their rare earths potential. It uses their inter-
national debt to offer financial rescues in exchange for access to 
their rare earth deposits88.
87 De QUIROGA, C., «Las tierras raras, posible baza de China en la guerra comer-
cial», ABC Economía (22/05/2019). https://www.abc.es/economia/abci-tierras-raras-
posible-baza-china-guerra-comercial-201905220138_noticia.html Consultation date 
25/01/2021.
88 FERREIRA, G., CRITELLI, J., JOHNSON, W., «The Future of Rare Earth Elements in 
Africa in the Midst of a Debt Crisis», Eunomia Journal (Aug. 15, 2020). https://www.
civilaffairsassoc.org/post/the-future-of-rare-earth-elements-in-africa-in-the-midst-of-
a-debt-crisis Consultation date 25/01/2021.
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European Union’s response to the crisis
In 2011, during the rare earths supply crisis, the EU drew up a 
list of 14 raw materials. In 2014, it rewrote the list and increased 
the number to 20. By the time it had completed its latest update 
the number had grown to 27. On all these lists, both light and 
heavy rare earths posed the greatest supply risk to the EU. Once 
the critical elements had been identified, the EU promoted and 
partially financed the Project EURARE (European Rare Earth Ele-
ment; 2013-2017) with nine million Euros (65% of the total). The 
project was set the basis for «the development of a European 
Rare Earth Element (REE) industry. Establishment of an REE value 
chain in Europe would safeguard the uninterrupted supply of REE 
raw materials and products crucial for sectors of the EU econ-
omy (including automotive, electronics, machinery and chemi-
cals) in a sustainable, economically viable and environmentally 
friendly»89. The map prepared by EURARE90 shows 76 rare earth 
beds and deposits in Europe (excluding Russia and including Tur-
key). Seven of them are resources, i.e., deposits that have been 
explored in sufficient detail to obtain good estimates. They lie in 
Scandinavia (Fen in Norway and in Sweden Norra Kärr and Olse-
rum), Greenland (Sarfartoq, Kvanefjeld, Kringleme and Motzfeldt) 
and Germany (Storkwitz). Europe is attaching special importance 
to Greenland91 as a main supply in the future. This autonomous 
region belonging to Denmark is an appealing source of rare earths. 
The Kvanefjeld Project, led by the Australian company Greenland 
Minerals, in which China’s Shenghe Resources has a shareholding, 
aims to supply 25% of the world demand. There is another option, 
in Sweden, smaller but nevertheless of interest because it exploits 
heavy rare earths. The Norra Kärr complex (mineral eudialyte), 
discovered in 1906, is currently Europe’s most promising pro-
ject and is being run by Tasman Metals Ltd92. Taken as a whole, 
89 «The main goal of the EURARE project was to set the basis for the development 
of a European REE industry that will safeguard the uninterrupted supply of REE raw 
materials and products crucial for the EU economy industrial sectors, such as automo-
tive, electronics, machinery and chemicals, in a sustainable, economically viable and 
environmentally friendly way». http://www.eurare.org/ Consultation date 18/02/2021.
90 «REE resources, deposits and occurrences in Europe recognised by the EURA-
RE Project (2013-2017)». http://oryktos.blogspot.com/2018/03/europes-ree-eura-
re-project-is-completed.html Consultation date 25/01/2021.
91 PAULICK, H., ROSA, D. AND KALVIG, P., «Rare Earth Element projects and explora-
tion potential in Greenland», MiMa rapport 2015/2, 2015.
92 VONCKEN, Note 60, p. 40.
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EURARE considers that these seven deposits can guarantee EU 
supplies for decades. These types of mining activities require a 
lot of investment, so it is advisable to concentrate exclusively on 
Greenland and Sweden, as suggested by Christopher Ecclestone, 
a mining specialist working with the New York investment bank 
Hallgarten & Company: «Europe ought to concentrate on one or 
two mines and on recycling a lot»93.
In Spain, the map refers to a deposit in Mulas and two occur-
rences, one of which is associated with alkaline igneous rocks in 
Galiñeiro mountain range, and another in sandbanks located in 
the «Rambla de las Granatillas». A recent review detected five,94 
lying in «Sierra del Galiñeiro» (Galicia), «Campo de Montiel» 
(Ciudad Real), «Rambla de las Granatillas» (Almeria), «Río Cua» 
(Asturias) and Fuerteventura Island (Canary Isles). The «Sierra 
del Galiñeiro»95 is a 10-square kilometres geological complex, 
described by a Dutch geologist in 1966. It is composed of alka-
line and peralkaline gneisses with minerals rich in rare earths 
(bastnäsite, fergusonite, monazite, thorite, xenotime, allanite, 
thorianite and zircon), whose erosion transports rare earths and 
thorium into the sediments of the Vigo Ria96 and the River Miño97. 
In 2013, a mining project was thwarted by technical difficulties 
and local social pressure. There is a monazite alluvial sandbank in 
«Campo de Montiel» covering an area of 2.34 square kilometres 
with 30 thousand tonnes of material with a high content in neo-
dymium, praseodymium and europium. It was found by the com-
pany Quantum Mineria, whose Matamulas Project was rejected in 
2019 after receiving a negative environmental impact statement 
because it affected the habitat of the imperial eagle, the lynx and 
the little bustard98. The other three were a) the alluvial deposits 
at Granatilla, to the south of the volcanic complex of «Hoyazo de 
93 https://elpais.com/politica/2015/05/10/actualidad/1431274081_028653.html 
Consultation date 25/01/2021.
94 MORANTE GUTIÉRREZ, M., «Estudio de prefactibilidad de un aprovechamiento de 
tierras raras en España». Universidad de Cantabria, Santander, pages 43-46, 2019.
95 FLOOR, P., «Petrology of an aegirine-riebeckite gneiss-bearing part of the Hes-
perian Massif: The Galiñeiro and surrounding areas, Vigo Spain». Leidse Geologishe 
Mededelingen, 36: 1-204, 1966.
96 PREGO, R. et al., «Rare earth elements in sediments of the Vigo Ria, NW Iberian 
Peninsula», Continental Shelf Research, 29: 896-902, 2009.
97 PREGO, R., et al., «Lanthanides and yttrium in the sediments of the lower Miño 
River (NW Iberian Peninsula). Imprint of tributaries», Journal of Soils and Sediments, 
19: 2558-2569, 2019.
98 BURKHALTER, E., Personal Communication, 2019.
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Níjar», which were mined for the garnet and contain light rare 
earths and thorium99; b) The carbonatites in the Fuerteventura 
Basalt Complex have a greater content in light rare earths in 
exploitable amounts100; and c) The River Cua, for which there is 
no accurate information. Apart from these three places already 
identified, new deposits have also been found on Gran Canaria 
Island101 containing a volume of light rare earth elements and 
yttrium covering about one thousand cubic kilometres. There are 
further deposits on the border between Salamanca and Zamora, 
in the zone known as «Domo del Tormes», where considerable 
proportions of lanthanum and cerium have been detected in bio-
tite porphyry granite102.
Another option is to recycle rare earth elements. It is a second-
ary alternative whose purpose is to prevent contamination or to 
fulfil strategic resource requirements, more than to obtain genu-
ine economic benefits in the industrialised countries. Recycling is 
very low, 1%, due to an absence of technological challenge, inef-
ficient collection and a lack of incentives103. Importance is being 
increasingly attached to this question and extensive reviews are 
available on the subject104 that can be referred to. The problem 
faced by the industry is that recovering rare metals is a very 
expensive process, the cost currently being greater than their 
value105. They are generally waste materials from permanent 
magnets, lamps, screens, computing material and rechargeable 
batteries. In EU only fluorescent tubes, Ni-MH batteries and mag-
nets are recycled on a commercial scale. For the last two, the 
European Project REE4EU106 developed on an industrial scale, a 
99 LÓPEZ-RUIZ, J., «El campo neógeno del SE de España», Enseñanza de las Ciencias 
de la Tierra, 7.3: 244-253, 1999.
100 MANGAS, J. et al., «Minerales de tierras raras en las carbonatitas del Complejo 
Basal de Fuerteventura (Canary Isles)», Geogaceta, 20: 1511-1513, 1996.
101 MENÉNDEZ, I. et al., «Distribution of REE-bearing minerals in felsic magmatic 
rocks and paleosols from Gran Canaria, Spain: Intraplate oceanic islands as a new 
example of potential, non-conventional sources of rare-earth elements», Journal of 
Geochemical Exploration, 204: 270-288, 2019.
102 LÓPEZ PLAZA, M., GONZALO CORRAL, J.C., «Caracterización geoquímica de las 
anatexitas del Domo del Tormes (provincias de Salamanca y Zamora)», Revista de la 
Sociedad Geológica de España, 6: 113-128, 1993.
103 BINNEMANS et al., Note 82.
104 BUSTILLO REVUELTA, M., RUÍZ SÁNCHEZ-PORRO, J., «Tierras raras: geología, 
producción, aplicaciones y reciclado», Fuello Editores, Madrid, pages 353-403, 2019.
105 PITRON, Note 67, p. 76.
106 REE4EU «Project: Rare Earth Recycling for Europe». https://www.ree4eu.eu/
the-project/ Consultation date 25/01/2021.
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rare earth alloy extraction method for magnet production. Price 
rises have made recycling more profitable; material is sent to 
countries where labour is cheap and environmental legislation 
is lax. The US exports 80% of its electronic waste to Asia and 
the EU sends 1.3 million tonnes per year to Africa (Ghana) and 
Asia (China, Philippines, India and Vietnam). As the chemist 
Keith Veronese points out107: «[in] the Third World [dirty recy-
cling] is disturbing post-apocalyptic. Venturing into mountains of 
discarded monitors, desktop towers, and refrigerators, children 
and teenagers fight over sun-and-rain-exposed electronic parts 
in search of any metals – even ones the First Word discards with 
every can of soda – for possible resale».
At present, greater importance is being attached to «urban min-
ing», i.e. recycling of domestic materials, and more attention is 
being paid to industrial wastes such as phosphogypsum and alu-
minium red mud. Although some devices are relatively poor in 
rare earths, thus making their recovery difficult, if huge volumes 
of material are added together a large quantity can be obtained 
and such devices are becoming a potential source of neodymium, 
praseodymium, samarium, dysprosium, cerium, europium and 
yttrium. They can be separated using hydrometallurgical pro-
cesses108, which are less costly and hardly cause any pollution.
US response to the crisis
At the end of the rare earths crisis, in 2013, US had reacted 
like the EU, by setting up a Critical Materials Institute (CMI)109, 
an energy innovation centre run by the Ames Laboratory with a 
holistic approach to the critical materials cycle. Self-designated 
as the Manhattan-type Project because of its dimensions (four 
national laboratories, seven universities and 10 industrial part-
ners); project includes scientific research, innovation in engi-
neering, manufacture and process improvements. It is the US’s 
attempt to reduce its vulnerability in the field of rare earths. In 
107 VERONESE, K., «Rare», Prometheus Books, New York, p. 143, 2015.
108 JYOTHI, R.K. et al., «Review of rare earth elements recovery from secondary 
resources for clean energy technologies: Grand opportunities to create wealth from 
waste», Journal of Cleaner Production, 267: 122048, 2020.
109 The Critical Materials Institute is a U.S. DOE Energy Innovation Hub led by Ames 
Laboratory, and supports early-stage research to advance innovation in U.S. manufac-
turing. CMI seeks ways to eliminate and reduce reliance on rare-earth metals and other 
materials critical to the success of clean energy technologies. https://www.ameslab.
gov/cmi Consultation date 25/01/2021.
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her book which appeared in 2017, Victoria Bruce, a journalist 
with training in geology, states that «American technological 
prowess used to be unrivalled. But because of globalization, and 
with the blessing of the US government, once proprietary mate-
rials, components and technologies are increasingly commercial-
ized outside the US.»110. Afghanistan could provide good mining 
support. In 2011 the United States Geological Service (USGS) 
had informed111 about the largest, rare earth mineral deposits 
discovered under an extinct volcano in South-West Afghanistan. 
It estimated that the reserves could supply the whole world for 
10 years. In this respect, James Kennedy, a rare earths expert 
and President of ThREE Consulting, wrote112: «Although this area 
is one of the most promising mineralised areas in the world, it is 
a shit sandwich… Yesterday, looks like a vehicle-borne IED wiped 
out many if not most of the Afghan mining and oil and gas per-
sonnel near Afghan Geological Survey and Ministry of Mines in 
Kabul…probably lost most of their senior geologists… Conclusion: 
forget about it….mining in this country will not happen in our 
lifetime…too corrupt and no infrastructure», so he declared that 
«American greatness comes from economic and technological 
leadership, not endless conflicts. This is an issue for American 
leadership».
The US response involves reopening the aforementioned Moun-
tain Pass Mine, where light rare earths are extracted. As was the 
case with the EU in Europe, the USGS conducted an extensive 
survey113 to find out what potential deposits could be extracted 
from USA territory. Bokan Mountain (Alaska) was found to have 
5.3 million tonnes of rare earths, of which 40% were of the heavy 
kind, Bear Lodge (Wyoming) contained 550 thousand tonnes, 
Round Top (Texas) had 300 thousand tonnes and Elk Creek 
(Nebraska) proved to be rich in scandium (3,400 tonnes of its 
oxide). Amongst them, as the matter of heavy rare earths is 
a sensitive subject, the underground Bokan Mountain mine on 
110 BRUCE, V., «Sellout: How Washington Gave Away America’s Technological Soul, 
and One Man’s Fight to Bring It Home», Bloomsbury, New York, 304 pages, 2017. 
111 PETERS, S.G., «Summaries and Data Packages of Important Areas for Mineral In-
vestment and Production Opportunities in Afghanistan», The USGS-TFBSO Afghanistan 
Minerals Project. U.S. Department of Defense, and the U.S. Geological Survey, 2011.
112 KENNEDY, J., «Blackwater mercenaries go Off-World», 2017. https://www.linke-
din.com/pulse/blackwater-mercenaries-go-off-world-james-kennedy Consultation date 
18/02/2021.
113 TRACY, B.S., «An Overview of Rare Earth Elements and Related Issues for Con-
gress», Congressional Research Service, USA, 2020.
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Prince of Wales Island (Alaska) seems to be the most suitable. 
There is a currently closed uranium mine in this mountain, which 
lies in and around the rare earth deposits. The Canadian firm 
Ucore114 took over the concession in 2012 and expects to pro-
duce 375 tonnes of rare earth concentrates per day throughout 
the eleven years it plans to commercialise near the mine, apply-
ing its patented solvent extraction technology.
Another global option for supplying the scarce heavy rare earths is 
the Browns Range Mine (xenotime-Y), which covers 3,600 square 
kilometres in Western Australia. It is in a position to become the 
biggest producer of dysprosium (price in December 2020: US$ 
244/kg) and terbium (US$ 958/kg) outside China. In 2018, with 
a view to checking its technical and economic feasibility, Northern 
Minerals Limited began producing rare earth carbonate at a pilot 
plant located inside the mine itself.
Japanese response to the crisis
Japan is a highly sensitive nation when it comes to restrictions 
imposed on rare earth elements, especially when this affects its 
automobile industry. For example, Toyota needs 10,000 tonnes 
of rare earths per year for its hybrid vehicles. One option Japan 
has turned to in order to overcome the scarcity problem is recy-
cling. Firstly, it is recycling the catalytic converters that contain 
platinum, palladium, rhodium and cerium oxide deposited on alu-
minium and lanthanum oxide, so new catalytic converters can be 
manufactured. Secondly, in 2018, Toyota manufactured a new 
magnet115 for electric motors that requires only half the amount of 
rare earths. It uses neither terbium nor dysprosium and replaces 
part of the neodymium with lanthanum and cerium, which are 
more abundant and cheaper. Other firms had already taken this 
path. In 2012, Nissan had developed a new electric motor with 
40% less dysprosium and TDK had discovered a method for man-
ufacturing magnets also with 50% less of that same metal116. 
114 UCORE, «Bokan Mountain Alaska: The highest grade heavy rare earth element 
Project in the United States of America», 2021. https://www.ucore.com/bokan Refer-
ence date 25/01/2021.
115 Toyota, «Toyota will reduce its use of critical rare earths by 50%, thanks to a new 
magnet for electric motors», 2018. https://prensa.toyota.es/toyota-reducira-el-uso-
de-tierras-raras-criticas-un-50-gracias-a-un-nuevo-iman-para-motores-electricos/ 
Reference date 25/01/2021.
116 ZHOU, B. et al., 2016. Rare Earth Elements supply vs. clean energy technologies: 
new problems to be solved. Mineral Resources Management, 32: 29-44. 
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Apart from this specific area of industry, and as Abraham noted 
in 2015117, «Japan is a little bit in flux at the moment. They do 
look at rare metals as the lifeblood of their economy and their 
manufacturing economy» and he continues, «they’re less afraid 
to put money to ensure supply lines are strong, although that’s 
faded a little bit. But they also invest a lot more in education and 
giving money to universities to focus on a lot of these materials».
The other path that emerged as a result of the 2009-2013 cri-
sis was the search for the country’s own rare earths. The Japa-
nese Government aims to obtain more than 60% of its rare earth 
requirements without resorting to China. To achieve this, the 
main Japanese corporations carry out mining projects in coop-
eration with local companies in Australia, India and Kazakhstan. 
Japanese companies can rely on backing from their Government, 
which is establishing international associations in those same 
regions. Japanese dependence on imports is about to become 
a thing of the past, after the discovery, in 2011, of deep-sea 
mud with a high content of rare earth elements (hydrothermal 
iron oxyhydroxides and phillipsite) in the North Pacific. Geologists 
estimated that these were huge and very promising resources 
where an area of one square kilometre could yield one fifth of the 
world’s annual consumption of these elements118. Later, in 2013, 
a Japanese campaign carried out on the deep-sea research vessel 
Kairei found a layer of mud 2-to 4-metres thick at depths rang-
ing from 5,600 to 5,800 metres around the island of Minami-To-
rishima, within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). These 
muds are very rich in both light and heavy rare earths, containing 
0.66% heavy rare earths, i.e., 25 times more than the deposits 
in the south of China119. The island of Minami-Torishima, which 
is small (1.5 square kilometres) and isolated (there is no other 
land mass for a thousand kilometres in any direction) is 1,950 
kilometres south-east of Tokyo in the North Pacific Ocean, and 
has belonged to Japan since 1898. The prospect of Japan becom-
ing a nation rich in metal resources, in general, and rare earths, 
in particular, has become a reality with the discovery of these 
resources. A system is now being devised that will make it possi-
117 Abraham, D., Kintisch, E., «The Rare Metal Age», Science & Diplomacy, vol. 4, no, 
4, 2015.
118 KATO, Y., et al., «Deep-sea mud in the Pacific Ocean as a potential resource for 
rare-earth elements», Nature Geoscience, 4: 535-539, 2011.
119 IIJIMA, K. et al., «Discovery of extremely REY-rich mud in the western North Pa-
cific Ocean», Geochemical Journal, 50: 557-573, 2016.
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ble to recover them, together with a procedure for processing the 
minerals so they can be exploited in a short term. It is estimated 
that there are approximately 16 million tonnes of mineralised 
rare-earth sediments. An area of 105 square kilometres means 
1.2 million tonnes of rare earths, amounting to 62, 47, 32 and 
56 years of the overall annual demand for yttrium, europium, 
terbium and dysprosium, respectively120. The country’s scientists 
believe that it will be possible to cater for the world’s require-
ments for over 500 years!
The Japanese initiative has speeded up the search for similar 
marine deposits in all the oceans. Such deposits have been 
known to exist for over a century. Approximately 40 years ago, 
scientists began to find out about the origins, distribution and 
potential of these resources. Then the low prices of metals on 
the world markets dampened enthusiasm for mining the ocean 
depths until 2000, although research was never actually given 
up. Mining consortia from China, France, Germany, India, Japan, 
South Korea and Russia are continuing their attempts to exploit 
the seabeds that are richest in polymetallic nodules with eco-
nomic potential121. They are mainly concentrated in three ocean 
regions: the Central Indian Ocean Basin, the Peru Basin and the 
Clarion-Clipperton Fracture Zone in the North-East Pacific. The 
deposits are composed of manganese nodules, ferromanganese 
crusts and polymetallic sulphides precipitated in the hydrother-
mal vents of the oceanic ridges. They lie beyond the 200-mile 
Exclusive Economic Zone, in international waters, so exploration 
and exploitation in those areas can be carried out by anyone. 
Known as «The Zone», it falls within the administrative scope of 
the International Seabed Authority (ISA)122, established in 1994. 
Each consortium, through ISA´s organisation and abiding by the 
120 TAKAYA, Y. et al., «The tremendous potential of deep-sea mud as a source of ra-
re-earth elements», Scientific Records, 8, 5763, 2018.
121 HEIN, J.R. et al., «Deep-ocean mineral deposits as a source of critical metals for 
high- and green-technology applications: Comparison with land-based resources». Ore 
Geology Reviews, 51: 1-14, 2013.
122 The International Seabed Authority (ISA) is an autonomous international organi-
zation established under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) and the 1994 Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1994 Agreement). ISA is the orga-
nization through which States Parties to UNCLOS organize and control all mineral-re-
sources-related activities in the Area for the benefit of mankind as a whole. In so doing, 
ISA has the mandate to ensure the effective protection of the marine environment from 
harmful effects that may arise from deep-seabed related activities. https://www.isa.
org.jm/about-isa Consultation date 25/01/2021.
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ISA’s rules, contract a research plot covering less than 150 thou-
sand square kilometres, and holds exclusive rights over that area 
for eight years. These new legal arrangements reveal the fact that 
a century ago, the oceans (71% of the planet) had no owners, 
but now 40% of that marine surface (28% of the planet) belongs 
to one country or another, 10% (7% of the planet) remaining in 
dispute. To express it another way, the «free» ocean has been 
reduced from 71% to 36%, i.e., it has been halved in favour 
of national and commercial interests. Some States now wish to 
extend their exclusion rights from 200 to 350 miles.
The emergence of underwater mining resources and the deposits 
lying in the Spanish Exclusive Economic Zone have been summa-
rised and analysed clearly and in depth in an article published by 
the Spanish Geological Survey (IGME)123. That article points out 
that there are three geographical zones of great interest: the Gulf 
of Cadiz, the «Banco de Galicia», a seamount at 180 kilometres 
west Galician coast, and the underwater mountains close to the 
Canary Isles. The last of those three is the most outstanding. 
Defined as the Volcanic Province of the Canary Isles, it features a 
large number of underground hills and mountains, some of which 
are beyond the 200-mile limit. One such example is the under-
water mountain Tropic (3.5 kilograms of rare earths per tonne of 
ferromanganese crust). Spain has been studying this zone and the 
surrounding seabed for many years124, in order to provide docu-
mentation for the demand it submitted to the UNO in 2014 apply-
ing to extend the Canary Isles continental shelf to 350 miles. The 
ferromanganese crusts studied in the underwater mountains of 
the Canary Isles contain, amongst other metals, 0.4% rare earths.
A «rare» key piece in the energy puzzle?
Rare earth elements came to fully form part of our society in 
the 1960s, turning it into a high-tech society. At the begin-
ning of that decade the Russian science historian Trifonov125 
123  MARINO, E. et al., «Llega la era de la minería submarina», Tierra y Tecnología, 49, 
2017. https://www.icog.es/TyT/index.php/2017/05/llega-la-era-de-la-mineria-subma-
rina/ Consultation date 25/01/2021.
124 MARINO, E. et al., «Strategic and rare elements in Cretaceous-Cenozoic co-
balt-rich ferromanganese crusts from seamounts in the Canary Island Seamount Prov-
ince (northeastern tropical Atlantic)», Ore Geological Reviews, 87: 41-61, 2017.




stated, in an excellent review of the subject of rare earths, 
that «Rare-earth elements are a forgotten branch of inorganic 
chemistry» and predicted: «It would not be surprising if in 
the near future the rare-earth metals become just as com-
mon in science and industry as, for example, magnesium or 
aluminium are now». And that is what happened. In the past 
fifty years, rare earths have been dealt with in great detail 
from both viewpoints boosted by their applications, leading 
us to the Rare Earth Age. Although each one of the planet’s 
inhabitants barely consumes 17 grams of rare earths a year, 
the world would be moving at a much slower pace without 
these scarce crumb-like bits of the Earth’s crust126. Progress is 
constantly being made in this area. One only needs to glance 
through what is being published in scientific journals and then 
remember when these new devices first became available and 
how they are now making their contribution to alternative and 
renewable energy supplies. Once rare earths have been fully 
incorporated into our culture, and the above pages have been 
read, attention can be paid to answering the three questions 
that were asked about their relationship with energy. Are rare 
earths directly involved in energy production? Do they improve 
energy consumption efficiency? Do they provide means for 
making energy management easier?
The last question leads to the periodic table of chemical ele-
ments. Lanthanides are the only elements for which filling their 
seven «f» orbitals provide special magnetic and optical proper-
ties. After these, i.e., from hafnium to radium, the «f» orbitals 
are complete, and the radioactive actinides only repeat that filling 
for their «cousins». However, only four of them exist in nature, 
the rest being elements obtained artificially. The four are: actin-
ium and protactinium (extremely scarces), thorium and uranium, 
which are not suitable for the lanthanide applications. They are 
unique among the chemical elements in our Universe. Together 
with scandium and yttrium, which are contained in the same min-
erals, they are irreplaceable in most technological applications. In 
the US, the USGS accepts this in its reports127: «Substitutes are 
available for many applications but generally are less effective». 
As in the case of Europe, the final report on the EURARE Project 
126 PITRON, Note 67, page 106.
127 USGS, «Mineral Commodity Summaries 2020», U.S. Department of Interior & U.S. 
Geological Survey, 2020.
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points out the following128: «For applications where substitutes 
have been identified the substitutes are generally critical raw 
materials themselves, or more expensive». Several elements, 
more onerous and less abundant, such as europium, terbium and 
dysprosium cannot be replaced, whereas with thulium, ytterbium 
and lanthanum, finding alternatives is difficult (only in 25% of 
the devices); with praseodymium, neodymium and samarium, in 
60%, and for the rest of elements is possible in 37-40% of the 
cases129. It goes without saying that the conclusion «the out-
standing efforts of materials scientists over the last few decades 
appear to have effectively decoupled substitution from price in 
many cases, because often no suitable substitute can be found 
no matter what price is offered without performance and func-
tion being seriously compromised». In potential replacements, 
means that rare earth elements can be regarded as irreplaceable 
in their military role, which makes them «strategic». In reply to 
the initial question, it can be stated that rare earths are essential 
for energy management in all control, communications and IT 
devices, because they make it possible to build-up pseudo-in-
telligent electrical grids, and they are also vital for other similar 
purposes in our current technological society.
Pursuant to the second question, rare earth elements are to 
be found in many items of equipment that reduce energy con-
sumption. They are particularly important in two, lighting and 
magnets. The modern and increasingly utilised LED lights use 
less rare earth elements and also consume less energy, they 
last longer and their performance is 20% better than that of the 
phosphorescent tubes they are replacing. Magnet manufacture 
consumes a mix of neodymium (the primary application of its 
global production), praseodymium and dysprosium, as well as 
other elements utilised in fillers, such as cerium and gadolin-
ium. These magnets have replaced the traditional ones in elec-
tronic devices in order to amplify radiofrequency signals, fans, 
hard disk reading heads, nuclear magnetic resonance imaging, 
speakers and headsets, electric motors, wireless tools, servomo-
tors, synchronous motors, stepper motors or motors for electric 
and hybrid automobiles. Roskill’s Rare Earths Outlook report130 
128 EURARE brochure, 2017. http://www.eurare.org/docs/EURAREbrochure_vfinal.
pdf Consultation date 25/01/2021.
129 GRAEDEL, T.E. et al., «On the material basis of modern society», PNAS, 2013. 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1312752110 Consultation date 25/01/2021.
130 ROSKILL, «Rare Earths. Outlook to 2030», 20th Edition, 2020.
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contains a detailed breakdown of the demand, assessing techno-
logical and industrial trends and their impact on the consumption 
of each element by end-use market. It predicts that by 2030 
rare earth magnets will account for 40% of the total demand, 
i.e., almost twice the present percentage. As has already been 
pointed out (Figure 3), research into applications is taking place 
at an astonishing rate. The magnetic properties of rare earths 
in the manufacture of sustainable and efficient cooling systems 
and heat pumps, by making use of the magnetocaloric effect, 
are being examined. It is one of the best energy-saving solutions 
given that it allows for environmentally friendly cooling (it does 
not use gases that are harmful to the atmosphere), silent cooling 
(it has no moving parts) and consumes less energy (they are 
three times as efficient as the traditional solutions). As its feasi-
bility with gadolinium has already been demonstrated, tests are 
now being conducted with prototypes using cheaper rare earth 
elements, on industrial cooling equipment, vehicle and building 
air-conditioning systems and cooling systems in supermarkets. 
This is just one of the many examples showing the great potential 
that rare earth elements have, perhaps their biggest contribu-
tion: «green» applications to reduce energy consumption.
Finally, rare earths play a role in different cases of energy stor-
age and production. If one considers the three basic sources of 
energy on Earth: solar nuclear fusion (hydrogen and helium), 
nuclear fission (uranium thorium and potassium) in our planet, 
and gravity (tides), rare earths play an insignificant role: Prome-
thium as a nuclear battery, or a secondary role: as a poison to 
reduce high reactivity in nuclear reactors. In both cases, there 
are other chemical elements that can be utilised as substitutes. 
As a result, they are replaceable. If one takes into account the 
energy sources coming from the gradients originated by the three 
primary ones on the Earth: mainly the intermittent sources (wind 
and solar), and the hydraulic and geothermal sources, the role 
played by rare earth elements is considerable, especially in the 
case of electric generators for wind turbines. Even so, depend-
ence on rare earths can be reduced by manufacturing asynchro-
nous or synchronous generators without permanent magnets, If 
no alternative solutions are forthcoming in the next few years, 
the wind sector could end up consuming 6% of the annual pro-
duction of neodymium and over 30% of the annual production of 
dysprosium, because off-shore wind farms -one of the renewable 
technologies with the greatest expansion potential- are expected 
to reach a capacity of 120 GW. The European Commission esti-
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mates that by 2030 the EU will have an installed capacity of at 
least 60 GW of marine wind energy plus 1 GW of ocean energy, 
from the current 12 GW, and it is planned to reach 300 GW and 
40 GW, respectively, of installed capacity by 2050131.
At another aspect of energy: storage, rare earths play an interest-
ing role in the fabrication of batteries, even if only small amounts 
of rare earths are used in the cathodes of Ni-MH batteries. Com-
pared with the still expensive lithium-ion batteries, they will con-
tinue to be used. Experiments are being carried out in which 
hydrogen gas for vehicles is stored, and research is also being 
conducted pm an extended performance of solar cells132 using 
ytterbium, as it absorbs the infrared light and sends it to erbium, 
which returns it as visible green light. Rare earths are valuable 
Energy Transition assets in the energy storage and production 
areas. It is to be hoped that they will play a greater part in energy 
generation and research must be conducted into increasing and 
improving their applications, if possible by putting to good use 
the surplus caused by the above-mentioned critical problem of 
balance in the production of rare earth elements.
Challenges to overcome
At present, two of the still unresolved challenges stand out from 
the rest. One of these is an environmental challenge and the 
other is geostrategic. They must always be approached with a 
comprehensive overview and we must invariably be concerned 
about our planet. On the one hand, rare earth elements must 
be used efficiently when developing a renewable energy and 
low-carbon economy. It is vital to have a suitable scientific pol-
icy when seeking solutions that enable each nation to achieve 
its own energy independence, adapting to its natural wealth. In 
this sense, Spain is no different, and great care must be taken to 
ensure that there is no loss of scientific and technical expertise 
due to a generation gap in passing on knowledge. Moreover, as 
131 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, «An EU strategy for making the most of renewable ma-
rine energy potential for a climatically neutral future», 2020. https://eur-lex.europa.
eu/legal-content/ES/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0741 Consultation date 25/01/2021.
132 FAKHIM LAMRANI, A., «Rare-earth-doped TiO2 rutile as a promising ferromagnetic 
alloy for visible light absorption in solar cells: first principal insights», RSC Advances, 
10, 35505, 2020.
ROBERS Jr., G., «Nanoparticle Breakthrough Could Capture Unseen Light for Solar En-
ergy Conversion», 2018. https://newscenter.lbl.gov/2018/04/23/nanoparticle-break-
through-solar-energy-conversion/ Consultation date 25/01/2021.
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the prices of everyday pieces of equipment are constantly falling 
and their life cycle shortening, it is necessary not only to utilise 
resources efficiently, but also to change certain consumer hab-
its and business models and to create a profitable supply chain 
where products are designed to be easily recycled or reused. 
Governments have to work more closely with research institu-
tions and the technological industry in order to understand what 
the future demands for critical elements will be and to enhance 
their work. In an interview, Pitron133 offers a way: «The only 
realistic solution I can see is the circular economy in which the 
economic growth is not proportional to the increase in the use of 
raw materials and energy. This will let us carry on growing while 
caring for the planet at the same time». All in all, this means try-
ing to live simply and in moderation.
Environmental friendliness: preventing pollution
US domination of the rare earths market through its Mountain Pass 
Mine ended at the turn of the last century. In 1980, a mistaken 
classification of rare earths had disastrous consequences for its 
mining activities134. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the 
International Regulatory Agency subjected rare earth mining to the 
same regulations as the mining of thorium, a radioactive element 
that is wasted when certain rare earth minerals are processed. 
This, together with several incidents in which radioactive waste 
was spilt in the Mojave Desert, caused the US’s rare earths min-
ing industry to collapse and be moved to China. Pitron describes a 
similar sequence of events in France135, where the French chemical 
industry Rhône-Poulenc, the owner of a plant in La Rochelle, was 
one of the top two rare metal firms. During the 1980s, it purified 
annually half the world’s rare earths. After constant rumours in the 
press about radioactive pollution in the sea, the company moved 
the business to China, where in addition it was supplied with rare 
earths at a quarter the price of Europe. The contamination problem 
occurred again in China, this time on a much worse scale. The toxic 
waste generated when processing the mineral is disposed of a few 
133 ALDAMA, Z., «Las energías renovables y las tecnologías digitales no son tan ver-
des», El País Economía, 2020. https://retina.elpais.com/retina/2020/02/14/innova-
cion/1581675324_297883.html Consultation date 25/01/2021.
134 MILLS, R., «How the US lost the plot on rare earths», 2019. https://www.mining.
com/web/us-lost-plot-rare-earths/ Consultation date 25/01/2021.
135 PITRON, Note 67, pages 90-95.
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kilometres from Baotou. About seven million tonnes a year are dis-
charged136 into the Weikuang tailings dam, which the locals used 
to refer to as «the rare earths lake». The dam was constructed in 
1966, at the same time as the processing plants, which use several 
acid baths to extract the rare earths137. In 2005, Xu Guangxian 
expressed his concern in an official survey138 into thorium as the 
cause of radioactive contamination in the Baotou zone and the Yel-
low River. The pond is twelve kilometres to the west of that city and 
ten to the north of the Yellow River. Approximately 150 million peo-
ple depend on the river for their water supply, so radioactive con-
tamination is a very serious problem. Ten thousand cubic metres of 
residual gas are generated to produce one tonne of rare earths, the 
residual gas containing sulphur dioxide, hydrofluoric and sulphuric 
acid and concentrated powder. Moreover, seventy-five cubic metres 
of acid wastewater and around a tonne of radioactive waste are 
also generated. All of this waste flows into the Weikuang tailings 
pond, which covers a surface area of twelve square kilometres and 
contains 150 million tonnes of tailings139.
The contamination problem causes scepticism about green 
technologies and arouses doubts about the advantages of the 
energy and digital transition where health and the environment 
are concerned. It is absolutely essential to consider the com-
plete extraction-application cycle for rare earth elements. Glo-
balisation to obtain economic profit is amounting to a dichotomy 
with fake blindness. In the words of Pitron140: «Isn’t there a 
tragic irony in the fact that the pollution no longer emitted in 
the urban agglomerations thanks to electric vehicles, merely 
appears in other areas, especially where the resources are 
extracted that are indispensable for the manufacture of such 
vehicles?». The challenge lies in finding ways to mine rare earth 
resources that are both economically and environmentally via-
ble. It would appear that this challenge has been developed 
successfully in the USA projects involving the opening of mines 
on their territory, and the same seems to be the case in Aus-
136 AsiaNews.it, «China’s dilemma: how to mine rare earths whilst protecting reserves 
and the environment», 2011. http://www.asianews.it/news-en/China%E2%80%99s-
dilemma:-how-to-mine-rare-earths-whilst-protecting-reserves-and-the-environ-
ment-21039.html Consultation date 25/01/2021.
137 EJatlas, 2020. https://www.ejatlas.org/print/bayan-obo-world-biggest-rare-earths-
mine-baogang-group-baotou-inner-mongolia-china Consultation date 25/01/2021.
138 HURST, Note 62.
139 EJatlas, Note 137.
140 PITRON, Note 67, p. 80-81.
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tralia and the EU141. The EURARE Project has embarked on pilot 
schemes using technologies adapted to the type of mineral 
that is exploited in the EU and has done so in compliance with 
European legislation to protect the mining and industrial pro-
cess environment where emissions and waste are concerned142. 
The environment is not a hindrance to guaranteeing the supply 
of rare earths in Europe or other continents. According to the 
British expert Goodenough143 «the greatest drawback to guar-
anteeing the supply of rare earths in Europe is that companies 
find it difficult to make their activities profitable. There is great 
dependence on prices, which are determined by the investors’ 
fluctuations on the Stock Exchange and the market equilibrium 
regarding supply and demand. It is advisable to receive State 
backing, at least initially».
The irony of all this is that thorium could be a profitable by-product 
from mining the rare earth minerals that contain it. Yet this metal 
is considered to be the nightmare in many mining operations, and 
it is not worth very much because at the present time it only has a 
few applications. Developing nuclear reactors to generate electricity 
has been based on uranium, a choice that made it possible to pro-
duce plutonium for nuclear weapons. When the uranium-plutonium 
option was selected, the other alternative, the thorium option, was 
abandoned. This fuel does not generate waste with weapon poten-
tial as a by-product144. The US Government constructed an experi-
mental molten salt reactor (MSR) at the Oak Ridge Laboratory using 
uranium-233 as the fuel, created by bombarding thorium-232 (the 
only natural isotope) with neutrons. It was in operation for 15,000 
hours from 1965 until 1969145. Thorium is much less dangerous 
than uranium, and a new generation of chemists, physicists and 
nuclear engineers estimate that the thorium path is the key to a 
new, clean and safe source of nuclear energy146. The drawback is 
the greater cost and the fact that it needs a standard fuel, uranium 
141 EURARE, Note 128.
142 KEITH-ROACH, M. et al., «Environmental Legislation and Best Practice in the 
Emerging European Rare Earth Element Industry», in: «Rare Earths Industry, Techno-
logical, Economic and Environmental Implications» (Lima, B. & Filho, L., Eds.), Elsevier, 
pages 279-291, 2016. 
143 See Note 93.
144 VERONESE, Note 107, pages 180-181.
145 A detailed review of the subject, with the current situation, strengths and weak-
nesses at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thorium-based_nuclear_power Consultation 
date 25/01/2021.
146 VERONESE, Note 107, page 178.
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or plutonium, to start its chain reaction. Apart from that, nuclear 
reactors based on thorium-232 are more efficient and the tech-
nology is known. It stands out because of its simplicity. It does 
not need large containment domes or many security mechanisms. 
It could be used as the destination for the thorium surplus found 
in rare earth mining147. There are three times as many thorium 
land reserves as there are uranium reserves and they contain more 
energy than all other fossil fuels together. Monazite is the main 
commercial source of thorium. It is found in large deposits in India, 
South Africa, Brazil, Australia and Malaysia. It contains an average 
of 2.5% of thorium, although in some deposits the percentage is 
as high as 20%. With technological development in progress, tho-
rium would pave the way for easy-shutdown reactors and would 
not generate long-life waste, i.e., the radioactivity will have dissi-
pated in half a millennium. Despite all of the above, there are those 
who consider it to be a costly diversion. According to Nils Bohmer, 
nuclear physicist and member of the Norwegian ecologist group 
Bellona: «The advantages of thorium are purely theoretical. The 
technology development is decades in the future. Instead, I think 
we should focus on developing renewable technology - for example 
offshore wind technology - which I think has a huge potential to 
develop»148. At present, of the modern molten salt reactor options, 
it is liquid fluoride thorium reactor (LFTR) projects that are being 
researched and developed in fifteen countries, including the EU. 
In 2020, China was the only country that was actually construct-
ing reactors of this type, two of them currently being built in the 
Gobi Desert, scheduled to come into service in 2030. The country 
has chosen this type of reactor as an essential part of its medium- 
and long-term energy strategy149, to which aim China originally 
employed 750 scientists and engineers, a further 400 being later 
assigned150.
Return to mining and industry
In 1976, the Government of the People´s Republic of China first 
blazed the trail (Table 4) towards technological independence, 
147 VERONESE, Note 107, page 179.
148 HARRABIN, R., «Thorium backed as ‘future fuel’» BBC (31st October 2013). https://
www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-24638816 Consultation date 18/02/2021.
149 TENNENBAUM, J., «Molten Salt Reactors (MSR) and Travelling Wave Reactors», 
2020. https://msiainforma.org/es/espanol-reactores-de-sal-fundida-msr-y-de-on-
da-progresiva/ Consultation date 25/01/2021.
150 VERONESE, Note 107, page 182.
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an aspiration it hopes to achieve by 2025, as the world leader in 
energy and digital transition. Rare earth elements are its main 
tool, which it is using to research into new properties, to register 
patents, to exploit applications and to take part in other coun-
tries’ mining operations. This is not the first time that human 
ambitions on our planet have moved in that direction. On 13 June 
1944 Theodore Roosevelt and Winston Churchill signed a collab-
oration pact between the two countries «to obtain the mecha-
nisms needed to control many of the world’s mineral deposits 
of uranium and thorium during and after the War»151. The aim 
was that «in the event of an arms race commencing when the 
conflict ended, the US would be able to rely on sufficient raw 
materials to guarantee its supremacy»152. A few centuries ear-
lier, Daniel Defoe had written153 how English State intervention 
should take place to make the textile industry the driving force 
in economic development. In summary, national manufacturers 
ought to be protected by imposing taxes on imports, while at 
the same time charging high taxes on raw wool exports, and 
applying a Government sponsored industrial espionage policy 
over Dutch industry, while he also advised that artisans skilled in 
wool textile production should be brought into the country from 
the Netherlands. Depending entirely on others and defend this is 
what seemed to be a suicidal policy until recently, but now it has 
become the most natural thing in the world154. The 2009-2013 
crisis in the supply of rare earths and China’s domination of the 
market through prices and exports, instilled panic in users and 
their governments. In 2020, Chinese domination still provided 
about half of the world supply155, controlled by quotas allocated 
to its six State companies. The impact of the COVID-19 pan-
demic has highlighted still further consumer dependence not only 
on renewable energy, but also on other commodities and pre-
151 WATSON, P., «Secret history of the atomic bomb», Editorial Crítica, Barcelona, 
page 359, 2020.
152 Ibidem. 
153 DEFOE, D., «A Plan of the English Commerce», Vernon Art and Science (New Edi-
tion 2013), 1728.
154 PITRON, Note 67, page 106.
155 In Spain, rare earth imports stand at 550 tonnes a year for the manufacture of 
glass and ceramics. Smaller quantities are also imported from Austria, France and Italy. 
The implications for National Security are very limited and would be associated with 
a broader context of potential instability affecting the global markets and temporary 
price rises associated with the so-called «Trade War».
https://www.dsn.gob.es/es/actualidad/sala-prensa/tierras-raras Consultation date 
25/01/2021.
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pared products supplied by China. The situation though seems 
to be changing, implementing strategies to reduce dependence 
on Chinese supplies has increased since midway through 2019, 
with the governments in the USA, Russia, the EU, Australia and 
Japan intervening directly (Table 5), by giving tax and economic 
incentives. Supply sources are becoming increasingly diversified. 
Pitron in his clarifying, unsettling and provocative book examines 
this in detail: Japan has reached agreements with India to import 
rare earths and has adopted an aggressive diplomatic attitude 
with Australia, Kazakhstan and Vietnam; Germany is seeking 
mining alliances with Mongolia; and South Korean geologists are 
holding talks with their North Korean neighbours, etc.156 Roskill’s 
prediction states that «Whilst China retains its dominant position 
in both rare earth supply and demand, the increase in non-Chi-
nese affiliated mine and refined rare earth production is a key 
trend, required not only to meet increasing global demand, but to 
fulfil the changing requirements of downstream consumers with 
regards to security of supply and ESG regulation»157.
The main problems faced by countries nowadays are twofold. On 
the one hand, there has been an abandonment of mining and a 
loss of experts that have migrated to China, where there has been 
a constant increase in the number of rare earth specialists. One 
only has to review the scientific publications. A conference on rare 
earths attracts five hundred Chinese scientists, whereas in North 
America only one hundred attend. On the other hand, as Abra-
ham points out in his interesting book158 «The average age of the 
mining workforce in the United States is close to fifty; most will 
retire in the next ten or fifteen years. Likewise in Canada industry 
sources estimate that nearly 60,000 workers may retire by 2020, 
but the sector may need 100,000 new workers to meet demand».
Europe and America require specialists, scientists, technologists 
and entrepreneurs to exploit their own resources of critical ele-
ments and materials, while at the same time patenting appli-
cations and manufacturing high tech devices. The bottleneck 
is neither economic nor geological, but human, and it will take 
years to train good engineers and metallurgists. Abraham regret-
fully admits that very few people study rare earths. Only one 
North American university offered that speciality in 2015, and 
156 PITRON, Note 67, page 199.
157 ROSKILL, Note 130.
158 ABRAHAM, Note 31, p. 85.
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the 25,000 employees working in that industry in 1970 fell to 
1,500 in 2010159. It is to be hoped that this serious decline will 
slow down with the recent upsurge in mining on Western soil, but 
experience indicates that it takes about fifteen years for a rare 
earth mine to become fully operational.
Finally, there is the vital role of industry and trading, where the 
multinationals also play their part. They may act in their own 
interests, which do not necessarily have to be the same as the 
national interests. During the crisis with China, Japanese compa-
nies acted in their own best interests, which did not coincide with 
Japan’s interest160. On a world scale, there was a steady depar-
ture of foreign companies to China, which offered them low-cost 
access and unlimited resources. There, its secret technology was 
at risk and their specialists formed part of an exodus from their 
home countries. Globalisation arrived to affect this complex circle 
of interests. As far as the major international companies with 
interests in China are concerned, a dualism, a conflict of interests 
emerges that manifests itself in the political decisions, either in 
defence of the nation or in defence of the firms that are based 
in the country. That could largely explain the current situation in 
North American society. What happens with rare earths is merely 
just another symptom of this dualism and now the global supply 
chain is feeling the effects. In his book, Pitron gives an account 
of the scandal, known as «Chinagate»161, in which several dozen 
people were convicted. The scandal revolved around Chinese 
economic support for Clinton’s re-election in the 1996 Elections. 
Before that, the US Administration had shared with China, the 
industrial secrets of its missile technology, having been forced 
to do so by Clinton himself. It would appear that the response to 
the 2009-2013 crisis, not only regarding those metals but also 
the energy transition, aims more to a self-defence, far away from 
the strict concept of globalisation. In another sense, during the 
opening session (25/1/2021) of the Davos Forum, the President 
of China said: «Now [in China] we will play a more active role 
to encourage a world economic globalisation that is more open, 
inclusive, balanced and to the benefit of all»162. For the time 
159 Ibidem, p. 195.
160 Ibidem, p. 205.
161 PITRON, Note 67, page 175-176.
162 DE LA CAL, L., Xi Jinping inaugura Davos pidiendo multilateralismo: «el mun-
do no volverá a ser lo que fue en el pasado», 2021. Suggestive article in the 
Macroeconomy section of El Mundo. https://www.elmundo.es/economia/macroecono-
mia/2021/01/25/600edf7d21efa091338b45a0.html Consultation date 27.01.2021
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being, the short-term prediction for rare earths, as quoted by 
Roskill163, after the interruptions to industrial production caused 
by COVID19, there expects to be a sharp recovery in demand in 
2021, increasing by 10% year-on-year and backed by a Green 
Agenda; this is also the target set by many national govern-
ments and international bodies that are seeking to reduce carbon 
emissions.
In the medium term, it must not be forgotten that although Chi-
na’s growth rate is faster than that of its competitors, the country 
consumes huge amounts of energy. China is boosting the produc-
tion of its own energy, while at the same time searching for min-
ing resources abroad, including rare earths, estimating that its 
own production will not be sufficient for domestic consumption. 
The problem is explained by Kalantzakos164: «Although, demo-
cratic governments in responding to China’s handling of the rare 
earths crisis achieved a certain level of cooperation (mainly sci-
entific and diplomatic), they did not formulate or enact a central 
strategic plan that would over time provide a viable alternative to 
China’s dominant position in the industry».
If one reads through the history of protectionist policy of the Eng-
lish Prime Minister Robert Walpole, concurrent with Disraeli, and 
followed by Roosevelt’s new world order, one gets the impression 
that just like the US Empire and the British Empire before it, a 
new Empire is beginning to take shape on the horizon, the Chi-
nese Empire, and rare earths bear witness to this.
163 ROSKILL, nota 130.
164 KALANTZAKOS, S., «China and the Geopolitics of Rare Earths». Oxford University 
Press, New York, page 167, 2018.
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